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This report was prepared by Martin Marietta Denver Astronautics Group for
the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, George C. Marshall Space Flight
Center (NASA/MSFC), in response to Contract, NAS8-36433, and is submitted as the
Interim Final Report, as specified in the contract data requirements list. In particular, the
work was performed for the Electrical Power Branch at NASA/MSFC.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This document reports on the Contract, NAS8-36433, and is in response to
the work which was performed in developing and delivering the automation software of the
Space Station Module Power Management And Distribution (SSM/PMAD) system. The
work was done by Martin Marietta Corporation, Denver Astronautics Group for the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration, George C. Marshall Space Flight Center,
in support of the Electrical Power Branch's development of an advanced automation
SSM/PMAD system test bed. The NASA Contracting Officer's Technical Representation
for the Contract is Mr. David J. Weeks. Martin Marietta is reporting on all Tasks included
within NAS8-36433. These consist of Task I, Task II, Task III, and Task IV.
Task I - "Common Module Power Management and Distribution
(CM/PMAD) System Automation Plan Definition". This task forged an overall plan for
attacking the problem of automating the power system breadboard. Various power
hardware configurations were also analyzed as to performance and applicability to the
problem. This task was completed in July of 1986 and the Task I Report is included in this
document.
Task II - "Definition of Hardware and Software Elements of Automation".
This task defined the various knowledge based and deterministic algorithms to be used
within the SSM/PMAD. An overall implementation plan utilizing iterative refinement was
established for the SSM/PMAD software. This task was completed in August of 1987 and
the Task II Report is included in this document.
Task III- "Implementation/Verification of CM/PMAD Automation
Approach in MSFC Breadboard". This task consists of obtaining the SSM/PMAD
hardware, building the SSM/PMAD software, establishing and documenting operational
plans and procedures, and integrating system components. Delivery and support of
development components to NASA/MSFC were also performed within this task. Delivery
of the initial Task III system was completed in December of 1988 and support is presently
continuing. Task III is reported on in significant detail within Section 5.0 of this
document.
INTRODUCTION
1-1
INTRODUCTION
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February1989
Task IV - "Definition and Development of the MSFC CM/PMAD
BreadboardHostComputerEnvironment". This taskexaminedtheneedfor acentralhost
capability within theCM/PMAD. Requirementsfor suchamachinewereestablishedand
recommendationsweremade. This taskwascompletedin Octoberof 1985andtheTask
IV Reportis includedin AppendixIII of thisdocument.
Theoveralldocumentis ahistoryanddescriptionof thework performedin
defining,designing,anddevelopingtheSSM/PMADbreadboard,completewith software.
The hardwarearchitectureis describedalongwith its associateddeterministic software
architecture,theAI systemsarchitecture,andthemethodologyandprocessof theoverall
systemintegration.
System development was performed on a Symbolics 3640 utilizing
ZetaLISP, a Xerox 1186utilizing InterLISP D and the Common Lisp Object System
(CLOS),a Motorola VME/10 utilizing PASCAL andAssemblyLanguage,andMotorola
107 board level processorsUtilizing PASCAL and AssemblyLanguage. The system
deliveryenvironmentwasthe sameasthethatusedin developmentwith theexceptionof
theSymbolicssystemwhich wasa 3620D.
=
i
i
i
L2
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1.1 Executiv_ Overview
The purpose of this project is to automate a breadboard level Power
Management and Distribution (PMAD) system which possesses many functional
characteristics of a specified Space Station power system. The automation system was
built upon a 20 kHz ac 1 source with redundancy of the power buses. There are two
power distribution control units which furnish power to six load centers which in turn
enable load circuits based upon a system generated schedule. This report documents the
progress in building this specified autonomous system.
The resulting system possesses the capability to perform diagnosis
whenever a distribution fault is encountered. The system autonomously reconfigures its
operation during run-time to reschedule activities around the fault, rather than performing a
system halt. The system functionality is previewed in the subsections of this overview.
Automation of Space Station Common Module Power Management and
Distribution (SSM/PMAD) was accomplished by segmenting the complete task into the
following four independent tasks.
Task I
Task II
Task III
Task IV
- Develop a detailed approach for PMAD automation.
- Define the software and hardware elements of automation.
- Develop the automation system for the PMAD breadboard.
- Select an appropriate host processing environment.
Early planning activity (prior to 1985), by Mr. David J. Weeks of
NASA/MSFC, provided the capability to perform Task IV initially. This was done in
order to establish an appropriate platform upon which to build the system.
1.1.1 System Architecture
The result of the initial defining work was to separate items as needed into
hardware and software elements. Figure 1.1.1-1 shows the highest level breakout for the
two areas.
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HARDWARE
Switchgear
Switch Control
Analog to Digital
A utomation
SSM/PMA D
SOFTWARE
Complex Functions (AI)
Conventional
- Control
- Lowest Level
FIGURE 1.1.1-1 Automation Architecture Breakout
The SSM/PMAD breadboard hardware consists of two distinct elements:
the power control hardware through which current flows to power the target loads, and the
automation hardware which is made up of computers and process oriented circuit cards.
This is shown in Figure 1.1.1-2.
AUTOMATION HARDWARE
[ SYMBOLICS 3620 D ]_ETHERNET
AI XERO"""""_118----6-
FUNCTIONS__ _ __ __
[_ MOTOROLA VME/10 [
RS232 _ AL aI HMI N
RS422
\ I..4 705 COMMUNICATIONS [4.. / Q vLLP_-----t i_a • • _ UP TO 8 LLPS
RS422
],_ SWITCH INTERFACE CONTROLLER _ [DATA [GENERIC CONTROLLER • I_ |
ANALOG TO DIGITAL _EMOTE POWER CONTROLLER 6
I POWER BUS ]
/
POWER CONTROL FROM SOURCE
HARDWARE _''_ TO LOADS
FIGURE 1.1.1-2 The SSM/PMAD Hardware Architecture Overview
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The power control hardware consists of analog and digital level hardware
units and is considered as part of the power system topology hardware. The automation
hardware is part of the automation system and provides the interface between the user, the
autonomous functions (FRAMES, FELES, LPLMS, and MAESTRO), the
Communications and Algorithmic Controller (CAC), the Lower Level Functions (LLFs)
that exist at the Lower Level Processors (LLPs), and the actual hardware control. This is
depicted in Figure 1.1.1-3.
USER
AUTOMATION
HARDWARE
AUTOMATION
SOFTWARE
•-- FELES
LPLMS
MAESTRO
FRAMES
w
CAC
LLFs "_-.,
POWER
CONTROL
HARDWARE
FIGURE 1.1.1-3 User Access of System Functionality
As can be seen in Figure 1.1.1-3, the SSM/PMAD is a multi-agent
distributed system. The distribution of software functions will be described in the next
section.
1.1.2 Content and Distribution of Software Functionality
The Front End Load Enable Scheduler (FELES) provides the user access to
the scheduling environment, MAESTRO, and handles returning information from
FRAMES. Whenever run-time rescheduling activities are required, FELES initiates
MAESTRO and LPLMS activity with the appropriate update information.
The Load Priority List Management System (LPLMS) handles initializing
and changing priorities of loads. Based upon heuristics, initial priorities for powered loads
will change with occurrence of various system events such as changing availability of
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system power, passage of time, emergencies, and others. These priorities must be
managed and allocated in proper ways to assure dependable system performance,
preventing shedding of critical or higher priority loads, and LPLMS accomplishes this
needed function.
MAESTRO is a load scheduling function. It contains basic model
knowledge of the overall power system and the required heuristics to ensure correct
allocation of resources. The result of MAESTRO's work is the production of a Load
Enable Schedule (LES) to be carded out by the Lowest Level Processors (LLPs).
The Fault Recovery and Management Expert System (FRAMES) is the
backbone of the run-time environment for the LES. FRAMES diagnoses faults and
commands the overall system whenever faults or anomalies occur. FRAMES maintains the
system status and provides the autonomous run-time user-interface. FRAMES understands
the function and roles of all the operating agents within the SSM/PMAD. In total,
FRAMES functions as a watch-dog over the entire power distribution environment and
assumes management for the environment whenever faults or anomalies are detected.
The CAC is the central communication facility for tying the higher level
automation hardware and the LLPs together. The various functions which exist on the
CAC are bundled to form the Communications and Algorithmic Software (CAS). The
primary responsibilities of the CAS are to sort and deliver the LES into its appropriate
subcomponent representati0nSfor execution by the LLPs, and to stage and deliver data
between the Xerox and the LLPs. It also contains the manual mode operations interface.
The Lower Level Functions (LLFs) perform algorithmic management of the
LES. They also contain a lower level Segment of the FRAMES diagnosis activity which
provides rapid limit checking and initial levels of fault condition pattern matching.
The allocation of these Software _entities to the appropriate hardware is
shown in Figure 1.1.2-1.
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SYMBOLICS 3620 D
FELES
LPLMS
MAESTRO
FIGURE 1.1.2-1
XEROX MOTOROLA
1186 VME/10
FRAMES CAS
Software to Hardware Allocation
LLPs (8)
LLFs
LLFs
LLFs
LLFs
I
1.1.3 SSM/PMAD Functionality
SSM/PMAD system capability, resulting from the architecture, allocation,
and design of the previously described entities, achieves the goals which were originally set
out. The system activities therefore, rest on three basic operations.
First, the system must be initialized by the breadboard user. This operation
is depicted in Figure 1.1.3-1.
.
3.
FIGURE
USER )
Step A: The user initiates system initialization
Step B- The schedule and priority list is downloaded
1. The initial schedule events and priority lists
are sent to FRAMES from MAESTRO & LPLMS
The schedules and priorities are transmitted complete
to the CAC.
The CAC distributes schedules appropriately to the LLPs.
1.1.3-1 SSM/PMAD System Initialization
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Initializationprovidestheneededsystemsynchronizationto achievestart-up
conditions. For instance, somenotion of aninitial setof loadswith specifiedpriorities
mustexist for thesystemto start. However,thescheduleis producedautomatically,giving
thebreadboardoperatorelief from extensiveplanningactivities.
After systeminitialization,theSSM/PMAD systemcanattaintwo levelsor
modesof operation.Theseareautonomousmodeandmanualmode.
The autonomousmode operation engagesall hardware and software
entities. If a fault occurs in this mode,a seriesof autonomousactivities take place,
performing diagnosis,rescheduling,and reconfiguration operationswithout operator
intervention. Theactionsof theautonomousmodeoperationareshownin Figure1.1.3-2.
Autonomous process and information flow.
MAESTRO & FRAMES CAC Communications Switch Management
LPLMS Updates Monitoring Control & Control
1. The LLPs send up available switch state information.
2. The CAC buffers information to FRAMES.
3. FRAMES sends fault and utilizati0n information to FELES.
4. FRAMES requests further information or switch commanding in the
event of a known or suspected fault (performing diagnosis).
5. The CAC distributes commands, schedules, priority lists, and upper level
: requests to the appropriate LLPs.
6. New schedules add priority lists are made avallabie to FRAMES.
Note: Actions 4 & 5 take place only when the Xerox needs information.
Action 6 occurs only if a new contingency schedule or update
priority list is available.
FIGURE 1.1.3-2 SSM/PMAD Autonomous Mode Operation
INTRODUCTION
1-8
INTRODUCTION
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February1989
Manual mode operation allows the user to seize total control of the
breadboard.When this happens,all higher level AI functionsceaseoperationwithin the
system.This activity is shownin Figure 1.1.3-3.
C
1.
2.
3.
4.
FIGURE
USER
User requests switch commanding or data.
The CAC distributes the commands and requests to the LLPs.
The LLPs send up available switch state information.
The user requested information is presented.
1.1.3-3 SSM/PMAD Manual Mode Operation
1.1.4 Reca.12
In achieving system success, the SSM/PMAD was developed by defining
achievable tasks (I through IV) and by performing the crucial initial planning activities
which provided allocation of goals.
Martin Marietta has now delivered an initial working SSM/PMAD to
NASA/MSFC and is continuing work to provide follow-on capabilities in a natural growth
path for the overall system. Changes have been identified which make this growth
possible. Please refer to "What's Next" in the Summary Section of this document for a
listing of suggested changes.
Operation of the current system provides t_or both manual and autonomous
level activities. Under autonomous conditions, the operator may simply observe the
system following initialization. The user-interfaces are always available to query. Under
manual conditions, the operator possesses sole responsibility for system activities as the AI
systems have been removed from operational execution.
1 On December 14, 1988 a NASA Change Request specifying 120 V dc source power was
put into effect.
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2.0 BREADBOARD
The breadboard used in the SSM/PMAD system consists of two parts.
1) The power hardware and switchgear,
2) The automation and control.
The power hardware and switchgear part was supplied under another
contract, NAS8-36583, and will be reported on in a separate final report, report number
MCR-89-524. This report will focus almost exclusively upon the automation and control
portion of the breadboard, which is known as the Automation of the Space Station
Common Module Power Management and Distribution system, or simply the SSM/PMAD.
Descriptive detail of the hardware will be provided here for the sake of clarity. All
components discussed in this chapter are described from an introductory viewpoint. More
detailed descriptions are provided in later sections of this document.
Breadboard design for the SSM/PMAD automation and control contained
both hardware and software. The architecture for the system focuses on hardware
modularization within a functional decomposition view. That is to say, hardware
processors within the SSM/PMAD do not share tasks. Each stands independently. The
software and algorithms however, are not so clearly segregated. For instance, a schedule
request from the user interface is routed through at least four hardware processing
environments before it is completed. As well, diagnosis activities within the system utilize
the services of more than one computational and control engine before completion.
Therefore, the system (breadboard) will be described from three different views.
2.1 The Hardware View
In Figure 2.1-1 the hardware for the SSM/PMAD is shown along with the
component interconnections. Functionally, the hardware components from the top down
are as follows:
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FIGURE 2.1-1 SSM/PMAD Breadboard Diagram.
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1)
2)
3)
4)
A Symbolics 3620D computer utilizing Symbolics'
ZetaLISP computer language;
A Xerox 1186 computer utilizing InterLISP D and
Common Lisp Object System (CLOS) languages;
A Motorola VME/10 computer utilizing Pascal and
Assembler languages;
Motorola 107 (68010) board level processors at the LLPs
utilizing Pascal and Assembler languages.
Communication occurs as a rank ordered hierarchy with each level
communicating up only one level and down only one level. This means communications
from the Symbolics 3620 D only takes place to the Xerox 1186. In turn, the Xerox 1186
communicates to the Symbolics 3620 D going up and down only to the Motorola VME/10.
The Motorola VME/10 communicates up to the Xerox 1186 and down to the Lower Level
Processors (LLPs). The LLPs communicate up to the Motorola VME/10 and down to the
Switch Interface Controllers (SICs). The SICs belong to the hardware contract for the
SSM/PMAD, so the final report for that contract should be referenced for further detail.
The rank ordering for the communications hierarchy may appear to be violated if the user
interfaces at the Symbolics 3620 D, Xerox 1186, and Motorola VME/10 are considered as
a level of communications activity. However, the system was defined as an automated
system. And, using that definition, only one user interface is needed at run-time, that being
the one at the Symbolics 3620 D.
Commands and data are passed back and forth among the various hardware
components as needed. Whenever a schedule is passed down (the passage transcends the
four levels of the Symbolics 3620 D, the Xerox 1186, the Motorola VME/10, and finally,
the LLP) it is made available to the appropriate LLPs for execution. In turn, whenever
relevant data are available from the LLPs, the necessary hardware entity (the Motorola
VME/10) is selected for receipt of the data, so that it in turn can make the data available to
the Xerox 1186, and if needed, appropriate data are then sent on to the Symbolics 3620 D.
This up and down transfer of data provides the components at each level with the
information necessary for their operation.
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In addition, the LLPs command and receive information from the
switchgear. The LLP may request data from the SIC card regarding the status of switches
and sensors. Furthermore, the LLP may command the SIC to open or close any switch.
Upon receiving a command from the LLP, the SIC determines where it must send or
acquire data to fulfill the request. If the SIC must command a switch on or off, the
appropriate Generic Controller (GC) card is so informed and the command is executed. If
the SIC requires data from a switch, the appropriate GC card's enable line is asserted so it
may send data. If the SIC requires data from the sensors, it accesses the Analog to Digital
card directly and acquires the digitized sensor words. When the SIC finishes processing
the LLP command, it issues a response. This hardware architecture is summarized in
Figure 2.1-2.
4
{ ,
:? .............
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Figure 2.1o2 LLP/Switchgear Hardware Diagram
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2.2 The SOftware View
The software view is functionally composed of:
1) A scheduling mechanism, MAESTRO;
2) A front end to the scheduling mechanism, FELES;
3) A load priority management function, LPLMS;
4) A fault management and recovery system, FRAMES;
5) Centralized communications and data management algorithms, CAC;
6) Lower level processing, control, and management functions, LLPs.
The functionality of the software spreads out over various elements of the
hardware as needed. For example, the FRAMES may request information about voltage or
current being used by a particular load at a particular load center, see Figure 2.1-1.
Functionally, this request would utilize algorithms located on each computer (e.g., Xerox
1186, CAC, and LLP) necessary to complete the request.
...... The FELES (FELES will be considered to contain MAESTRO as a foreign
operating element necessary to complete the scheduling task for the system user) receives
information about loads and initial priorities as supplied from a system user. This task
performs the necessary front end operations to the scheduler for the user and constructs the
necessai'y schedules for use by the lower level functions. The FELES (with MAESTRO)
exists solely on the Symbolics 3620 D computer.
The LPLMS constructs, maintains, and manages the load priority list. The
LPLMS exists solely on the Symbolics 3620 D computer.
The FRAMES performs fault monitoring, fault recovery, and fault
management and is an automated process leading to an overall autonomous power
management system. The functions of the FRAMES are situated mainly within the Xerox
1186 computer, but some of its elements do exist in each LLP.
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The CAC performs communications control and data handling and
packaging. Its functionsexist primarily at theMotorola VME/10 with somefunctional
elementsoccurringin theLLPs.
TheLLPscontainelementsof FRAMESandMotorolaVME/10 algorithmic
functionality, aswell asperforming lower level datamanagementandschedulecontrol.
LLP definedalgorithmsexisttotallywithin eachLLP.
Eachsoftwareentity utilizesa specificdatabase(s).The databasesexist at
the samehardwarelocationwith thesoftwareentity. In caseswheredataareto beshared,
thesoftwarepassesthatdatathroughalist orotherappropriatedatastructure.
2.3 The User's View
Figure 2.3-1 reflects locations where users interface to the SSM/PMAD.
Various activities occur at each of the locations and are representative of the software
entities which exist there. During periods of typical system execution, the user's view of
the system is:
1)
2)
The user-interface at the Symbolics 3620 D provides a facility for data
input and scheduling activities, as well as an interrogation mechanism
into the Symbolics 3620 D. The user-interface mechanisms on the
Symbolics 3620 D consist of an alpha-numeric keyboard, a mouse, and
screen displays of icons, multi-level menus, text, and graphics.
The user-interface at the Xerox 1186 provides the facility to interrogate
FRAMES and to request specific hardware component information.
The user-interface mechanisms on the Xerox 1186 are similar to those
of the Symbolics 3620 D and consist of an alpha-numeric keyboard, a
mouse, and screen displays of icons, multi-level menus, text, and
graphics.
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3) The user-interface at the Motorola VME/10 provides manual intervention
into the system. The user-interface mechanisms provided at the
Motorola VME/10 are an alpha-numeric keyboard and screen displays of
single-level text menus and text.
z_
7*
All user interfaces are required to start the system and to load all appropriate
software at system initialization time. Multi-level menus are item selection structures
(usually choices are selected via use of a mouse) which can be linked. For example,
selection of an icon or menu item by a user causes another menu to appear on the screen
from which a selection must be made to complete the user action. This differs from a
single-level menu action where the system displays a menu to obtain data via user
interrogation on a menu by menu basis. Single-level menus generally require a single
alpha-numeric character input which is read from either the keyboard or screen.
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] INTERFA CE
I 3620 D
I I InteRFACE I I tNre_FAC_i I1186 VME/10SYMBOLICS
Mouse & Keyboard
Icons
Menus (multi-level)
Text
Mouse & Keyboard
Icons
Menus (multi-level)
Text
Keyboard only
Menus (single-level
and symbol choice)
Text
NOTE: All three interfaces can be active at one time, and actions
at a higher level interface can cause a change in information
display at a lower level.
D => User inputs are echoed.
FIGURE 2.3-1 SSM/PMAD Breadboard User Interfaces
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3.0 TASKI
Task I for the SSM/PMAD was completed in July of 1986. The
fundamental activity of Task I was to review the overall process needed to implement an
autonomous power system, given the Government provided candidate network topologies,
and to define the primary functions needed to provide autonomy of the power system. As
well, function partitioning was performed leading to the candidate architecture which was
chosen for implementation.
The SSM/PMAD implementation came about as a result of the groundwork
performed in Task I. The function partitioning of Task I led to the separation of activities
into those of a knowledge based variety and those of a deterministic variety. This provided
the basis which was later used in defining and allocating the individual functions
FRAMES, FELES, LPLMS, the CAC, and the LLPs.
Review of the Government provided candidate network topologies
established the appropriate type of hardware system architecture for control and
automation. This, coupled with the appropriate functional decomposition, provided
automation hardware selection criteria given that the study for the host computer had been
completed in Task IV.
Detailed results of Task I are provided in the Task I Study Report, included
as Appendix I within this document.
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4.0 TASK II
Task II for the SSM/PMAD was completed in August of 1987. The
fundamental activity of Task II was to define software and hardware for the automation
system of the SSM/PMAD, given the results of Task I.
The approach to SSM/PMAD automation was defined in Task II.
Knowledge base studies were performed and functional decomposition for the deterministic
software defined in Task I was initialized. Also, the LISP computer language was chosen
for use in developing the SSM/PMAD automation software within the knowledge based
activities, while PASCAL was chosen for the host computer.
The hierarchically arranged distributed SSM/PMAD data handling and
control system was realized by allocating knowledge based activities to the top layers and
deterministic processing to the lower levels.
Some nomenclature has changed since the Task II report. In particular, the
primary power distribution assembly (PPDA) is now called the power distribution control
unit (PDCU).
The Task II Study Report suggested the use of Causal Reasoning as a
primary AI technique used to develop the AI components of the SSM/PMAD. In-line
coding of rules was chosen at implementation time during Task III. The reasons were
subtle and hidden at the time of the Task II study. In summary, the reasons that causal
reasoning has not yet been implemented are 1) a causal model for a developing hardware
system usually does not exist at a reasonably high hierarchical component level; 2)
performance for a theoretical causal reasoning system is not as yet measurable or
predictable; and 3) expert rules at an initial level work well enough to provide system
diagnosis within FRAMES. Causal reasoning should, however, be further investigated
and used whenever data about the basic system behavior and performance have been
accumulated.
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Detailed results of Task II are provided in the Task II Study Report,
includedasAppendixII within thisdocument.
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5.0 TASK III
The Task HI initial automation system for the SSM/PMAD was delivered to
NASA/MSFC by Martin Marietta in December of 1988. The following sections and
subsections describe the hardware and software that make up that system.
5.1 Task III Introduction
The purpose of Task III is to define, design, develop, integrate, test,
document, and deliver the automation components necessary for initial automation of the
SSM/PMAD system. Also, Martin Marietta is performing on-site support of the
SSM/PMAD to NASA/MSFC, in particular, to personnel of the Electrical Division's Power
Branch in the Information and Electronics Systems Laboratory at NASAfMSFC.
NASA/MSFC personnel participated heavily in providing requirements and system level
definition, especially in relation to the SSM/PMAD system level activities and definition
related to the Space Station Freedom.
Task ffl reporting includes the areas of:
- Power automation breadboard configuration
- Theory of the breadboard operation
- Resource scheduling
- The Front End Load Enable Scheduler (FELES)
The Load Priority List Management System CLPLMS)
The Fault Recovery and Management Expert System (FRAMES)
Power distribution management
Breadboard timing considerations
- Manual override capabilities
A test plan
A breadboard usage plan (included in Appendix VIII within this
document).
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It is important to note a caveat concerning the use of the word
"contingency"within thecontextof thisdocument.In thedevelopmentof theSSM/PMAD
the ability to handlefault conditionsastheyoccurredwasparamount. If contingencies
werehandledby apreplannedactivity, thenall possiblecontingencieswould beexplicitly
understoodprior to systemrun-time,andtheexecutedactivitieswouldsimply behandled
through a massive table look-up. In order to achieve a viable successwithin the
SSM/PMAD,contingenciesareinsteadhandledby knowledgeprocessingactivitieswhich
occur at systemrun-time. Therefore the handling of fortuitous events in the form of
symptomsoccurswhenevera fault occurs,andthestateof thesystemis maintainedasit
changesratherthanasapredeterminedplan.
5.2 Overall Breadboard Configuration
The overall breadboard configuration is described in the following sections.
A development chronology will be described, showing a schedule of activities which led to
the present system; the present configuration will be shown, the functional interfaces and
dataflows for the software will be discussed, and the grounding scheme used for the
hardware will also be described.
5.2. I Development Chronology
A synopsis of the development Of the SSM/PMAD breadboard with respect
to time requires an understanding of when the defined tasks were performed. These were:
L
1) TASK IV - October 1985 - Host computer selection
2) TASK I - July 1986 - CM/PMAD function definition
.... = ,
3) TASK II - August 1987 - Automa_tion H/W & S/W definition
4) TASK 1II - December 1988 - Initial automation system.
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The overall approach to task development and completion was that of a
cascading effort with each preceding task supplying impetus to a following task. This
provided a natural flow for the overall planning and development activity and proved to be
manageable.
An overall schedule of activities is shown in Figure 5.2.1-1. The schedule
provides breakdowns by task and also gives individual element relations to the Contract's
Work Breakdown Structure. Also shown is Martin Marietta's continuing work and
development for the SSM/PMAD in the 1989 calendar year.
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Figure 5.2.1-1 SSM/PMAD Development Schedule
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5.2.2 Present Configuration
The SSM/PMAD automation system consists of two distinct segments.
First, the computer hardware forms the computational engine segment. This is necessary
for the second but distinct segment, the automation software. These two segments
combine to form the facility for the system autonomy.
5.2.2.1 The Hardware Configur'dfion
In describing the system hardware, it is important to note two points of
interest. First, there are many individual computational engines making up the
SSM/PMAD; and second, more than one type of communications interface is used.
Various computer hardware components can be seen in Figure 5.2.2.1-1. Overall, the
automation system hardware architecture is comprised of three levels. The top level is
shared by the Symbolics 3620 D and the Xerox 1186. The middle level is occupied by the
Motorola VME/10. And processing at the lower level is performed on Motorola 107 board
level processors. There is an Ethernet connection between the Symbolics 3620 D and the
Xerox 1186. The Xerox 1186 also is connected to the Motorola VME/10 via an RS 232
link. The Motorola VME/10 communicates to the lowest level processors (LLPs), and they
in turn communicate to the switch interface controllers (SICs), both via an RS 422
interconnection. The LLPs provide control for either a power distribution control unit
(PDCU) or a load center (LC). All requests for data originating at an LLP are routed to a
SIC for completion.
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Figure 5.2.2.1-1 SSM/PMAD Automation Hardware Configuration
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5.2.2.2 The Software Configuration
The software architecture, as can be seen in Figure 5.2.2.2-1, exists in a
similar manner and represents the software part of the breadboard configuration. A
scheduling example is used to describe the flow which is utilized within this configuration.
Scheduling is accomplished using the FELES on the Symbolics 3620 D. The resultant
schedule is passed along to the FRAMES at the Xerox 1186, which copies needed
information from the schedule into its database. The schedule is passed intact to the CAC
at the Motorola VME/10. The CAC then processes the schedule for inclusion by the lower
level functions on the LLPs. The appropriate schedule segments are then sent to the
respective LLPs and the system is ready to begin schedule execution. Data are then passed
among the various software components on an as-needed basis. This provides strong
partitioning to isolate needed knowledge base functions from deterministic functions.
As can be seen, some of the fault recovery and management functionality
was isolated within a deterministic partition. This partition was attached to the lower level
functions implemented in the LLPs and is known as the FRAMES lower level. This is an
innovative approach within Artificial Intelligence (AI) development. The configuration
strives for solution of the high level problem of power system automation rather than the
more mundane approach of trying to define a simple problem domain which can be solved
by a single expert system.
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Figure 5.2.2.2-1 SSM/PMAD Automation Software Configuration
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5.2.3 Functional Interfaces and Dataflow
This section of the report describes the functional interfaces between the
logical modules of the automation software of SSM/PMAD. The first part gives a
schematic overview of the logical modules and their overall responsibilities. The next two
sections describe the specific data that flows between the logical modules, the transactions,
and the LLP/SIC Interface Control Document, respectively. The last section describes the
system-wide dataflows of SSM/PMAD.
5.2.3.1 Overview
Figure 5.2.3.1-1 gives a broad overview of the relationships between the
logical modules of the automation software. The software residing on the Symbolics 3620
D, specifically, FELES, LPLMS, and MAESTRO are somewhat woven together via the
Controller. FELES, LPLMS, and MAESTRO all use data from the same database of
activities and equipment in order to perform their functions. For this reason it is not
possible to completely breakdown the interfaces between these three modules. Rather, it is
the Controller's responsibility to see that the processes on the Symbolics 3620 D operate
cooperatively with one another.
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Figure 5.2.3.1-1 SSM/PMAD System Overview
5.2.3.1.1 The Controller
The Controller is responsible for maintaining the correct system state with
respect to the processes residing on the Symbolics 3620 D. The Controller has a specific
state transition network (described in the appendix) that it traverses. It controls execution
of FELES, LPLMS, and MAESTRO, passing along any transactions directed toward them.
In some sense, it also manages interaction of the user at the user interface, enabling and
disabling some functionality. For example, during normal operation of the system the user
!
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is not allowed to create a new schedule. The Controller also manages contingencies so that
MAESTRO, FELES, and LPLMS can respond correctly to contingency situations.
5.2.3.1.2 MAESTRO
MAESTRO, the scheduler, is responsible for taking a set of activities and a
model of the power system network, and producing an efficient schedule for the activities.
MAESTRO makes use of the loads and activities databases residing on the Symbolics 3620
D, as well as a model of the power system network to generate a schedule. MAESTRO is a
complex scheduling system and has many capabilities which are discussed in detail in the
section on resource scheduling (5.4).
5.2.3.1.3 Front End Load Enable Scheduler
The responsibility of FELES is to process and send the schedule generated
by MAESTRO to FRAMES and the CAC. FELES partitions the schedule into 30 minute
blocks and translates the scheduled information into RPC commands for FRAMES and the
CAC. In addition to a simple translation, FELES makes use of the activities database to
determine load parameters including power consumption, whether the load may be
switched to redundant, whether the load is testable and may be interrupted or not, and the
maximum and minimum current the load can draw. FELES is discussed in more detail in
section 5.5.
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5.2.3.1.4 Load Priority List Management System
The LPLMS is responsible for maintaining and transmitting a load priority
list to FRAMES and the CAC. The load priority list is used to keep track of the priorities
of loads (RPCs in the case of FRAMES and the CAC). This list is used by the LLPs in the
event contingency situations require load shedding. The loads with the least priority are
always shed first. This prevents the shedding of critical loads within the overall system.
Priorities for loads are computed dynamically and take into account criticality of loads.
LPLMS is discussed in more detail in section 5.6.
5.2.3.1.5 Eault Recovery and Management Expert System
The responsibility of FRAMES is the management and diagnosis of faults.
The initial management of faults, keeping the power system safe, etc., is done by the lower
level FRAMES functions within the LLP software, and by circuit breaker hardware units.
The diagnosis function of FRAMES is performed on the Xerox 1186 and is implemented in
an knowledge base system fashion. FRAMES maintains a model of the power system
network, indicating what RPCs should be turned on and what RPCs are actually on. When
FRAMES receives contingency information from the LLPs, it proceeds to isolate the fault
and make a diagnosis as to what has occurred. This information is then communicated
back to the Symbolics 3620 D for recovery of the schedule.
5.2.3.1.6 Communications and Algorithmic Controller
The CAC is responsible for processing communications between the LLPs
and FRAMES. Schedules sent down from the Symbolics 3620 D are partitioned here and
sent to the respective LC and PDCU LLPs. Data from LLPs are col!ected and passed on up
to FRAMES.
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5.2.3.1.7 Lowest Lgv¢l Processors
The LLPs are responsible for executing scheduled RPC commands and
responding to exception conditions intelligently. The LLPs maintain individual command
lists and load priority lists. They support data compression and reporting software,
command execution, load shed execution, and condition execution software. They also
execute automatic switch control and verify configuration and limit allocations.
5.2.3.1.8 The Switchgear
The switchgear includes the hardware for both RPCs and data collection and
commands from and to RPCs. For purposes of describing the functional interfaces of the
automation software the various hardware is viewed as one component: switchgear. The
interface between the switchgear and the LLPs is described in an interface control document
and in the last part of this section on the functional interfaces.
5.2.3.2 Transactions
A transaction consists of the parts as shown in Figure 5.2.3.2-1. The
message block is the actual data of each transaction. All the transactions are defined in the
following subsections.
Figure
Message Start
Destination
Source
Message Type
Message Block
Message End
5.2.3.2-1
x Start of message indicator
Control-A (ascii 1)
x Address of unit where message is being sent
x Address of unit sending the message
p Type of message
? Contains message data bytes
The format of this varies with each
message type
x End of message indicator
CR (ascii 13)
Transaction Format
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5.2.3.2.1 Time Trdnsaction
5.2.3.2.2
Type
Source
Destination
Description
FIELD
Now Month
Now Day
Now Year
Now Hour
Now Minute
Now Second
SOM Month
SOM Day
SOM Year
SOM Hour
SOM Minute
SOM Second
01
FELES
CAC, FRAMES
TIME provides the timing parameters for time synchronization of the
breadboard software components. FELES will distribute this to the CAC and
FRAMES. Now represents the current time. Start of Mission provides an
actual calendar/clock time from which to base all scheduling offsets.
It corresponds to mission time 00:00:00 (dd:hh:mm). All time based schedule
data will be represented as minutes offset from the Start of Mission.
LENGTH FORMAT
2 nLll'l'l _1C
2 numenc
2 numeric
2 numeric
2 numeric
2 nL_rrlenc
2 numeric
2 numerlc
2 ntnnenc
2 numeric
2 nmnenc
2 numeric
DESCRIFrlqON
Calendar/clock month
Calendar/clock day
Calendar/clock year
Calendar/clock hour
Calendar/clock minute
Calendar/clock second
Start of Mission month
Start of Mission day
Start of Mission year
Start of Mission hour
Start of Mission minute
Start of mission second
Event List Transaction
Type
Source
Destination
Description
02
FELES
CAC, FRAMES
will distribute the evonts for the load enable schedule to
the CAC and FRAMES for operation of the breadboard.
FIELD
Effective Time
Number of Events
EVENT
"Fune of Event
Comp6n_t
Event
Max Power
Permission to Test
Redundancy
Switch to Redundant
Max Current
Min Current
Min Power
LENGTH FORMAT
6 ntmaeric
2 packed79
29 GROUP
6 numeric
3 =fi_plian6rneric
I alphanumeric
5 numeric
1 alphanumeric
I alphanumeric
1 alph_eric
3 numeric
3 numeric
5 numaie
DESCRItWION
Effective time of the event list
Number of events
AN EVENT DF__S_IPTOR
Time event is to be initiated
Id of the e°mp°nent
F-off, N-on, C-change
watts (0-99999)
Y-yes, N-no
Y-yes. N-no
Y-yes, N-no
damps (0-999)
damps (0-999)
watts (0-99999)
i
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5.2.3.2.3 Load Priority List Transaction
Type 03
Source FELES
Destination CAC, FRAMES
Description Whenever a new load priority list is created, FELES will distribut_
the list to FRAMES and the CAC.
FIELD LENGTH FORMAT
Effective Time 6 numeric
Number of Components 2 packed79
Component 3 alphanumeric
DESCRIFFION
Effective time of the priority list
Number of components
Id of the component
5.2.3.2.4 Component_ Switch to Redundant Transaction
Type 06
Source FRAMES
Destination FELES
Description A transaction indicating those RPCs whose loads switched to redundant
power supply.
FIELD LENGTH tK)RMAT
Number of Redundants 2 packed79
SWITCH TO REDUNDANT 9 GROUP
Component 3 ntnneric
Time of switch 6 nunaerie
DESCRIPTION
Number of Redundant specs
COMPONENT SWITCH TO REDUNDANTS
Id of the component
Time switch is to be initiated
5.2.3.2.5 Loads Shed Transaction
Type 07
Source FRAMES
Destination
De.,seription FRAMES will notify the FELES anytime loads are shed, so that
appropriate scheduling decisions may be made.
FInD LENGTH FORMAT DESCRIPTION
Number of Sheds _ packed79 Number of load shed specs
LOAD STIED 9 GROUP LOAD SHED DESCRIFFOR
Component 3 numeric Id of the component
Time of switch 6 numeric Time the shed was initiated
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5.2.3.2.6 Contingency Ev0nt List Transaction
Type
Source
Destination
Desmpfion
08
FELES
CAC, FRAMES
When FETES has completed its reaction to a contingency situation, CAC and
FRAMES will be notified of the new load enable schedule as well as what state
the power system components should be in in order to successfully execute the
new set of events. All state entries will be listed before all event entries,
beth state and event entries have the same format, the key difference being all
"time of state"s are filled with zeros.
FIELD LENGTH FORMAT DESCRItrHON
Hfexaive Time '_ ntmaeric Eflecitve time of the contingency event list
Number of States/Events 2 packed79 Number of states and events
STATE 29 GROUP A CONTINGENCY STATE DESCRIFFOR
Time of State 6 numeric Always 0000013
Component 3 alphanumeric ld of the component
Event 1 alphanumeric F-off, N-on, C-change
Max Power 5 nurnerie watts (0-99999)
Permission to Test 1 alphanumeric Y-yes, N-no
Redundancy 1 alphanumeric Y-yes, N-no
Switch to Redundant 1 alphanumeric Y-yes, N-no
Max Current 3 numeric damps (0-999)
Min Current 3 numeric damps (0-999)
Min Power 5 numeric watts (0-99999)
EVENT 29 GROUP AN EVENT DESCRIPTOR
Time of Event 6 numeric Time event is to be initiated
Component 3 alphanumeric ld of the component
Evem 1 alphanumeric F-off, N-on, C-change
Max Power 5 nemerie watts (0-99999)
Permission to Test 1 alphanumeric Y-yes, N-no
Redundancy 1 alphanumeric Y-yes, N-no
Switch to Redundant 1 alphanumeric Y-yes. N-no
Max Cmxent 3 numeric damps (0-999)
Min Current 3 nemerie damps (0-999)
Min Power 5 numeric watts (0-99999)
5.2.3.2.7 Component Out of Service Transaction
Type 09
Source FRAMES :==- -
De_t_0_ vw_S
Description Whenever a component is known to be out of service FRAMES will
notify FELES so that appropriate scheduling decisions may be made.
LENGTH FORMAT
Number of Services 2 packed79
OUT OF SERV ICE 15 GROUP
Component 3 alphanumeric
Begin Time 6 ntmaeric
End Time 6 numeric
DESCRIPTION
Number of out of service entries
COMPONENT OUT OF SERVICE DESCRIPTOR
Id of the componen!
Beginning time [he component is out of service
Ending time the component is out of service
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5.2.3.2.8 Actual Power Utilization Transaction
Type
Source
Destination
Description
I0
FRAMES
FELES
In order to report/graph actual power utilization of components vs. available
and/or scheduled power FRAMES must notify FEI_ES of those measurements.
_D
BusA start time
BusA end time
Number of Utilizations
LENGTH FORMAT
6 ntmaene
6 ntnnedc
2 packed79
8 GROUP
3 alphanumeric
5 ntmaeric
6 nurnedc
6 ntmacric
2 packed79
8 GROUP
3 alphanumeric
5 ntnneric
UTILIZATION
Component
Power Utilization
BusB start time
BusB end time
Number of Utilizations
UTILIZATION
Component
Power Utilization
DESCRIPTION
Beginning time for BusA utilization
Ending time for BusA utilization
Numbe_ of component utilization entries
COMt_NENT UTILIZATION
Id of the component
watts (0-99999)
Beginning time for BusB utilization
Ending time for BusB utilization
Number of component utilization entries
COMPONENT LrrILIZATION
Id of the component
watts (0.99999)
5.2.3.2.9 Ready? Transaction
Type
Source
Destination
Description
11
FELES
CAC, FRAMES
READY? is send by _S to tell FRAMES and the CAC to initialize and be
prepared for the initial EVENTS and PRIORITIES, when the initialization has
oceured CAC and FRAMES will notify FELES with the delarative I'm READY1 message.
FIELD LENGTH FORMAT DESCRIPTION
Ready? 1 alphanumeric 7 - are your ready?, initialize
5.2.3.2.10 Ready! Transaction
Type 12
Source CAC, FRAMES
Destination FELES
Description The declarativ message READY1 is sent by FRAMES and the CAC to the FI_ES
as a notification that they are ready to receive the inital EVENTS and PRIORITIES.
FIELD LENGTH FORMAT DESCRIPTION
Ready 1 alphanumeric Y - yes
TASK III
5-17
TASK III
Interim MCR- 89-516
Final
Report February 1989
5.2.3.2.11 Initialized Transaction
Type 13
Source CAC, FRAMES
Destination FELES
Description After receiving the initial EVENTS and PRIORITIES, FRAMES and the CAC send this message
to the FELES, this notifies FELES that the other breadboard computer system components
are ready for operation.
Fnq.D LENGTH FORMAT DESCRIVI'ION
Initialized 1 ;qphanumeric Y - yes, rye received initial EVENTS
and PRIORITIES
5.2.3.2.12 Source Power Change Transaction
Type
Source
Destination
Description
14
FELES
CAC, FRAMES
The SOURCE POWER CHANGE is a simulated space station message, i.e. someone/thing of
authority has notified the module that there will be change in the availability of
power to the module.
FIELD LENGTH FORMAT
Start time 6 ntmaeric
End time 6 n_lrneric
Power 5 ntmaeric
DESCRIPTION
Starting time of the specified available power
Ending time of the specified available power
watts (0-gO999, 25000 max)
5.2.3.2.13 Contingency Start Transaction
Type 15
Source FRAMES
Destination FELES
Description An anomolous condition has been recognized in the power system, FRAMES is
working the situation and tells FELES so. Any transactions received by FELES
between the CONTINGENCY-START and CONTINGENCY-END messages are considered
pertinent information to the contingency situation.
FIt_D LENGTH FK)RMAT DESCRIIWION
Contingency time 6 numenc Start time of the contingency situation
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5.2.3.2.14 Contingency End Transaction
Type 16
Source FRAMES
Destination FELF_
Description The contingency situation has been handled by FRAMES and all pertinent information
has been sent to FELES, FI_ES should now handle implications to the schedule.
FIELD LENGTH FORMAT DESCRIPTION
Contingency time 6 nurneric End time of the contingency situation
5.2.3.2.15 LLP Availability Transaction
Type 40
Source CAC
Destination FRAMES
Description Inform Frames of the availability of LLPs.
FIELD LENGTH FORMAT
Unavailable LLPs 1 byte
DESCRIPTION
ld of unavailable LLP (A-H)
5.2.3.2.16 Fault Event List Transaction
Type 17
Source FRAMES
Destination CAC
Description FRAMES must be able to command tripped switches at the CAC level to complete
its analysis of a contingency situation. Since this direct command capability
is executed immediately, time of event is not necessary, the order of the
FIELD
events is important though.
LENGTH FORMAT
Number of Opens
Number of Flips
Number of Closes
Number of States/Events
EVENT
Time of Event
Component
Event
Max Power
Permission to Test
Redundancy
Switch to Redundant
Max Current
Min Current
Min Power
2 nulnellc
2 numeric
2 numeric
2 packed79
29 GROUP
6 numeric
3 alphanumeric
I alphanumeric
5 numeric
I alphanumeric
1 alphanumeric
1 alphanumeric
3 numeric
3 numade
5 numeric
DESCRIPTION
Number of opens
Number of flips
Number of closes
Number of states and events
AN EVENT DESCRIlYI'OR
Always 00000 (not used)
Id of the component
F-off, N-on, C-change
watts (0-99999)
Y-yes, N-no
Y-yes, N-no
Y-yes, N-no
damps (0-999)
clamps (0-999)
watts (0-99999)
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5.2.3.2.17 Switch Positions Transaction
Type 42
Source LLP
Destination FRAMES
Description Inform FRAMES of actual state of switches after a switching operation.
FIELD LENGTH IR3RMAT
DESCRIPTION
p anll//lerlC -o , -on
5.2.3.2.18 Switch Performance Transaction
Type 43
Source LIP
Destination FRAMES
Description Inform FRAMES of time based switch performance information.
FIELD LENGTH tK)RMAT DESCRIPTION = =
Start Time 4 integer
EndTime 4 integer
NumBer Switches 4 integer
CURRENT DATA 20 GROUP
Current Avg. 4 integer
Current max. 4 integer
Current min. 4 integer
Max. Tune 4 iraeger
Min, time 4 integer
Start of performance interval m seconds
End OtperVorn_ance in=rval h secon&
Number of switches (always 28)
A SWITCHPERFORMANCE DESCRIPTOR
Average current in dAmps
Maximum current in damps
Minimum current in dAmps
Time of maximum current
Time of minimum current
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5.2.3.2.19 Source Reduction Status Transaction
Type 44
Source LLP
Destination
Description Send FRAMES source reduction status data.
FIb7 .D LENGTH FORMAT
Where 1 byte
Null Byte 1 byte
Switch Number 4 integer
Anomalous 1 byte
Null Byte 1 byte
Number of Switches 4 integer
STATUS 12 GROUP
Word 0 4 integer
Bit 0 bit
Bit 1 bit
Bit 2 bit
Bit 3 bit
Bit 4 bit
Bit 5 bit
Bit 6 bit
Bit 7 bit
Bit 8 bit
Bit 9 bit
Bit 10 bit
Bit 11 bit
Bit 12 bit
Bit 13 bit
Bit 14 bit
Bit 15 bit
Word 1 4 integer
Bit 0 bit
Bit 1 bit
Bit 2 bit
Bit 3 bit
Bit 4 bit
Bit 5 bit
Bit 6 bit
Bit 7 bit
Bit 8 bit
Bit 9 bit
Bit 10 bit
Bit 11 bit
Bit 12 bit
Bit 13 bit
Bit 14 bit
Bit 15 bit
Current 4 iN.eger
Switch Timestamps 8 integer
Tenap Timestamp 4 integer
DESCRIPTION
Not used
Not used
Not used
Flag denoting anomalous condition
Not used
Number of switches (always 28)
SWITCH STATUS DESCRIPTOR
Bit defined
Surge current trip
Over current trip
Under voltage trip
Ground fault trip
Over temparamre flag
Fast trip trip
Already tripped flag
Already on flag
Already off flag
Scheduled off, drawing current
Schedule on, not drawing cmrent
SIC not present
Generic Card not present
Not enough power available
Could not schedule flag
Tripped flag (anomalous flag)
Bit def'med
Mechanical on, should be off
Mechanical off, should be on
Solid state on, should be off
Solid state off, should be on
RPC command lines on, should be off
RPC command lines off, should be on
RPC command lines in illegal state
Out of current limits
Out of power limits
Switch has been shed
Over temparature warning
No change in RPC command lines
Not used
Unable to command
Switched to redundant
Current over range warning
Current through switch
Two switch status time stamps (busA and B)
Ternparature status time stamp
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5.2.3.2.20 Sensor Performance Transaction
7_
2
z
Type 45
Source LLP
Destination FRAMES
Description Scaad FRAMES sensor performance data.
FIELD LENGTH FORMAT
Start Time 4 integer
End Time 4 integer
Nmnber Sensors 4 integer
SENSOR 68 GROUP
Vmasavg 4 integer
Vrmsmax 4 integer
Vnnsmin 4 integer
Irmsavg 4 integer
Irmsmax 4 integer
Irmsmin 4 integer
Prcavg 4 integer
Premax 4 integer
Premin 4 integer
Freqavg 4 integer
Preqrnax 4 integer
Freqmin 4 integer
Pfavg 4 integer
Pfmax 4 inleg_
Pfmirm 4 integer
Pfminb 4 integer
Enrgy 4 integer
DESCRIPTION
Start of performance interval (seconds)
End of performance interval (seconds)
Number of sensors (2-LC, 13-PDCU)
SENSOR PERFORMANCE DESCRIFFOR
Average RMS voltage(Volts)
Maximum RMS voltage (Volts)
Minimmn RMS voltage (Volts)
Average RMS c_rr_nt (dAmps)
Maximtma RMS current (dAmps)
Minimum RMS cawrent (dAmps)
Average real power (Watts)
Maximmn real power (Watts)
Minimum real Power (Watts)
Average frequency (Hertz)
Maximum frequency (Hertz)
Minimum frequency (Hemz)
Average power factor
Maximum Power factorabsolute
Minimum leadingpower factor
Minimum lagging power factor
Energy consumed (Waus)
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5.2.3.2.21 Switch and Sensor Status Transaction
Type 46
Source LLP
Destination FRAMES
Description Send FRAMES switch and sensor status data.
FIELD LENG'I'H FORMAT
Anomalous 1 byte
Null Byte 1 byte
Number Switches 4 integer
STATUS 12 GROUP
Word 0 4 integer
Bit 0 bit
Bit 1 bit
Bit 2 bit
Bit 3 bit
Bit 4 bit
Bit 5 bit
Bit 6 bit
Bit 7 bit
Bit 8 bit
Bit 9 bit
Bit 10 bit
Bit 11 bit
Bit 12 bit
Bit 13 bit
Bit 14 bit
Bit 15 bit
Word 1 4 integer
Bit 0 bit
Bit 1 bit
Bit 2 bit
Bit 3 bit
Bit 4 bit
Bit 5 bit
Bit 6 bit
Bit 7 bit
Bit 8 bit
Bit 9 bit
Bit 10 bit
Bit 11 bit
Bit 12 bit
Bit 13 bit
Bit 14 bit
Bit 15 bit
Current 4 integer
Switch Timestamps 8 integer
Temp Timestmnp 4 integer
Number Sensors 4 integer
VALUES 36 GROUP
Vrms 4 integer
lrms 4 integer
Vde 4 integer
Idc 4 integer
Pavg 4 integer
Freq 4 integer
T_np 4 integer
Pfs 4 ir_ger
State 4 integer
Bit 0 bit
Bit 1 bit
Bit 2 bit
Bit 3 bit
Bit 4 bit
DESCRIPTION
Flag denoting anomalous condition
Not used
Number of switches (always 28)
SWITCH STATUS DESCRIPTOR
Bit defined
Surge current trip
Over current trip
Under voltage trip
Ground fault trip
Over temparamre flag
Fast trip trip
Already tripped flag
Already on flag
Already off flag
Scheduled off. drawing current
Schedule on, not drawing current
SIC not present
Generic Card not present
Not enough power available
Could not schedule flag
Tripped flag (anomalous flag)
Bit defined
Mechanical on, should be off
Mechanical off, should be on
Solid state on, should be off
Solid state off, should be on
RI_ command lines on, should be off
RPC command lines off, should be on
RPC command lines in illegal state
Out of current limits
Out of power limits
Switch has been shed
Over temparature warning
No change in RPC command lines
Not used
Unable to command
Switched to redundant
Current over range warning
Current through switch
Two switch status time stamps (busA and B)
Temparature status time stamp
Number of Sensors (2-LC, 13-PDCU)
SENSOR DATA DESCRIPTOR
RMS voltage (Volts)
RMS current (dAmps)
Voltage IX: component (Volts)
Current DC component (dAmps)
Real power (Watts)
Frequency (Hertz)
Tezaperamre
Signed power factor (* 100000)
Bit defined sensor state
No error bit
Power out of limits
Current out of limits
Voltage out of limits
Temperature out of limits
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5.2.3.2.22 F_¢lt Event Status Transaction
1
Type 47
Source LLP
Destination FRAMES
Description Send FRAMES fault event status data.
FIELD
Where 1 byte
Null Byte 1 byte
Switch Number 4 integer
Anomalous 1 byte
Null Byte 1 byte
Number of Switches 4 integer
ST ATUS 12 GROUP
Word 0 4 integer
Bit 0 bit
Bit I bit
Bit 2 bit
Bit 3 bit
Bit 4 bit
Bit 5 bit
Bit 6 bit
Bit 7 bit
Bit 8 bit
Bit 9 bit
Bit 10 bit
Bit 11 bit
Bit 12 bit
Bit 13 bit
Bit 14 bit
Bit 15 bit
Word 1 4 integer
Bit 0 bit
Bit 1 bit
Bit 2 bit
Bit 3 bit
Bit 4 bit
Bit 5 bit
Bit 6 bit
Bit 7 bit
Bit 8 bit
Bit 9 bit
Bit 10 bit
Bit 11 bit
Bit 12 bit
Bit 13 bit
Bqt 14 bit
Bit 1_ bit
Current 4 integer
Switch Timestamps 8 integer
Temp Timestamp 4 integer
LENGTH FORMAT DESCRI/rlqON
1,2, 3, or 4 for location of fault checking error
Not used
Switch where problem occured
Flag denoting anomalous condition
Not used
Number of switches (always 28)
SWITCH STATUS DESCRIIrFOR
Bit defined
Surge current trip
Over current trip
Under voltage trip
Ground fault trip
Over temparature flag
Fast trip trip
Already tripped flag
Already on flag
Already off flag
Scheduled off, drawing current
Schedule on, not drawing current
SIC not present
Genetic Card not present
Not enough power avaihble
Could not schedule flag
Tripped flag (anomalous flag)
Bit defined
Mechanical on, should be off
Mechanical off, shoul d be on
Solid state on, should be off
Solid state off, should be on
R.PC command lines on, should be off
RPC command lines 0ff, should be on
Rt_ command lines in illegal state
Out of current limits
Out of power limits
Switch has been shed
Over temparamre warning
No change in RPC command lines
Not Used
U_letu co_
Switched tO redundant
Current over range warning
Current through switch
Two switch status time stamps (busA and B)
Temparature status time stamp
TASK III
5-24
TASK III
Interim
Final
Report
MCR-89-516
February 1989
5.2.3.2.23 Switch and Sensor Data Transaction
Type 48
Source LLP
Destination FRAMES
Description Inform FRAMES of actual switch and sensor data.
FIELD LENGTH FORMAT
Dtime 4 integer
Number Switches 4 integer
Current 112 integer
Number Sensors 4 integer
SENSOR 12 GROUP
Idat 4 integer
Vdat 4 integer
Pdat 4 integer
DESCRIPTION
Time of update
Number of switches (always 28)
Array [0..127] of switch currents (dAmps)
Number of sensors (2-LC, 13-PDCU)
SENSOR DATA DESCRIVI'OR
Sensor current (dAmps)
Sensor voltage (Volts)
Sensor power (Watts)
TASK III
5-25
TASK HI
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February 1989
5.2.3.3 LLP/SIC Transactions
The LLP to SIC transactions are defined in this part of the report. The first
subsection describes the definitions of data used by the transactions, while the second
subsection lists the various commands and responses between the LLP and SIC. The
command definitions given here are directly adapted from the LLP/SIC Interface Control
Document.
5.2.3.3.1 D_finitions
This section defines the format of the various words used by the commands
in the following section.
=
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5.2.3.3.1.1 Status Format DefinifiQn
Byte 1
Byte 2
CC -->
Byte 3
$80 -->
$FF -->
$81 -->
$82 -->
$83 -->
$84 -->
$85 -->
$86 -->
$87 -->
$88 -->
$89 -->
$8A -->
$8B -->
$8C -->
$A1 -->
$A2 -->
$A4 -->
$A6 -->
$A8 -->
$AA -->
SAC -->
$AE -->
$F7 -->
Byte 4
SOD -->
status OK
status NOT OK
copy of command received with MSB bit always set to 1
status OK
unknown command
first byte not a command byte
did not receive fh'st data byte
first data byte msb not high
did not receive second data byte
second data byte msb not high
switch already on
switch already tripped when tried to turn it on
switch already off
switch already tripped when tried to turn it off
GC Data Valid error when getting switch data
continuous buffer overflow (reset continuous buffer)
once buffer overflow (redo once buffer)
SIC character buffer overrun
character overwritten (OE)
parity error from UART (PE)
OE and PE
framing error (FE)
FE and OE
FE and PE
FE and OE and PE
SIC internal memory parity error
end of status
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5.2.3.3.1.2 Command Wgr_t Format Definition
Byte 1
CC -->
.Byte 2
ddl -->
Byte 3
dd2 -->
Byte 4
SOD -->
command
first byte of data word
second byte of data word
end of command
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5.2.3.3.1.3 Switchword Format Definition
bit 0
bit 1
bit 2
bit 3
bit 4
bit 5
bit 6
bit 7
bit 8
bit 9
bit 10
bit 11
bit 12
bit 13
bit 15
(1)
(2)
bit 14 = 0 (switch not tripped)
current (1)
current (1)
current (1)
current (1)
current (1)
current (1)
current MSB (1)
always 1
current overrange H (1)
$2 solid state switch on H
S 1 mechanical switch on H
over temperature H
off control input H (2)
on control input H (2)
always 1
RMS current
bit 13 bit 12
0 0
0 1
1 0
1 1
RPC command
on (error in hardware)
on
off
no change
bit 14 = 1 (tripped)
tripped surge current H
tripped fast trip H
spare
spare
tripped over current (12t) H
tripped under voltage H
tripped ground fault H
always 1
tripped overtemp latched H
$2 solid state switch on H
S 1 mechanical switch on H
over temperature H
off control input H (2)
on control input H (2)
always 1
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5.2.3.3.1.4 GC Data Valid Word Format Definition
bit 0 GC Data Valid switch 7 H
bit 1 GC Data Valid switch 8 H
bit 2 GC Data Valid switch 9 H
bit 3 GC Data Valid switch 10 H
bit 4 GC Data Valid switch 11 H
bit 5 GC Data Valid switch 12 H
bit 6 GC Data Valid switch 13 H
bit 7 always 1
bit 8 GC Data Valid switch 0 H
bit 9 GC Data Valid switch 1 H
bit 10 GC Data Valid switch 2 H
bit 11 GC Data Valid switch 3 H
bit 12 GC Data Valid switch 4 H
bit 13 GC Data Valid switch 5 H
bit 14 GC Data Valid switch 6 H
bit 15 always 1
NOTE: L - data valid
H - data not valid
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5.2.3.3.1.5 Sensorword Format Definition
bit 0 sensor data bit 0
bit 1 sensor data bit 1
bit 2 sensor data bit 2
bit 3 sensor data bit 3
bit 4 don't care
bit 5 don't care
bit 6 don't care
bit 7 always 1
bit 8 sensor data bit 4
bit 9 sensor data bit 5
bit 10 sensor data bit 6
bit 11 sensor data bit 7
bit 12 don't care
bit 13 don't care
bit 14 don't care
bit 15 always 1
A Sensorword-Set consists of 9 sensorwords:
V rms
I rms
V offset
I offset
V instantaneous
I instantaneous
P instantaneous
P real
frequency
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5.2.3.3.2 Commands
The commands and responses between the LLP and SIC are defined here.
This section only defines the syntax of the commands. The semantics of what the
commands mean are derived from the command names and descriptions.
5.2.3.3.2.1 _Unconditionally Command Switch Off
i
z
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
Command switch off immediately even if already off or tripped.
cc--> $20
ddl --> $80+j
j:
bit 0 --> switch 0
bit 1 --> switch 1
bit 2 --> switch 2
bit 3 --> switch 3
bit 4 --> switch 4
bit 5 --> switch 5
bit 6 --> switch 6
dd2 --> $80 + k
k:
bit 0 --> switch 7
bit 1 --> switch 8
bit 2 '-> swqtch-9
bit 3 --> switchi0
bit 4 --> switch 11
bit5--> switch 12
bit6--> switch 13
RESPONSE: Status
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5.2.3.3.2.2 Unconditionally Command SwitCh Qn
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
Command switch
cc--> $21
ddl --> $80 + j
j:
bit 0 --> switch 0
bit 1 --> sw_tch 1
bit 2 --> switch 2
bit 3 --> switch 3
bit 4 --> switch 4
bit 5 --> switch 5
bit 6 --> switch 6
dd2 --> $80 + k
k:
bit 0 --> switch 7
bit 1 --> switch 8
bit 2 --> switch 9
bit 3 --> switch 10
bit 4 --> switch 11
bit 5 --> switch 12
bit6--> switch 13
RESPONSE: Status
on immediately even if already on or tripped.
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5.2.3.3.2.3 Reset Switch
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
Reset switch.
cc--> $22
ddl--> $80
j:
+j
bit 0 -->
bit 1 -->
bit 2 -->
bit 3 -->
bit 4 -->
bit 5 -->
bit 6 -->
dd2 --> $80 + k
k:
bit 0 -->
bit 1 -->
bit 2 -->
bit 3 -->
bit 4 -->
bit 5 -->
bit 6 -->
Status
switch 0
sw:tch 1
switch 2
switch 3
switch 4
switch 5
switch 6
switch 7
switch 8
sw:tch 9
switch 10
switch 11 •
swl :ch 12
switch 13
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5.2.3.3.2.4 Select GC
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
Select GC (all GC select codes will be set to zero).
cc--> $23
ddl--> $86
dd2--> $85
Status
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5.2.3.3.2.5 Execute SIC Firmware Rese_
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
Execute SIC firmware reset (does not reset actual set configuration).
cc--> $24
ddl--> $80
dd2--> $80
Four bytes plus Status:
Byte 1:
bit 0 -->
bit 1 -->
bit 2 -->
bit 3 -->
bit 4 -->
bit 5 -->
bit 6 -->
bit 7 -->
Byte 2:
bit 0 -->
bit 1 -->
bit 2 -->
bit 3 -->
bit 4 -->
bit 5 -->
bit 6 -->
bit 7 -->
Byte 3:
bit 0 -->
bit 1 -->
bit 2 -->
bit 3 -->
bit 4 -->
bit 5 -->
bit 6 -->
bit 7 -->
Byte 4:
bit 0 -->
bit 1 -->
bit 2 -->
bit 3 -->
bit 4 -->
bit 5 -->
bit 6 -->
bit 7 -->
Status
0 if GC7 connected, 1 if not
0 if GC8 connected, 1 if not
0 if GC9 connected, 1 if not
0 if GC10 connected, 1 if not
0 if GC11 connected, 1 if not
0 ifGC12 connected, 1 if not
0 if GC 13 connected, 1 if not
always 1
0 if GC0 connected, 1 if not
0 if GC1 connected, 1 if not
0 if GC2 connected, 1 if not
0 if GC3 connected, 1 if not
0 if GC4 connected, 1 if not
0 if GC5 connected, 1 if not
0 if GC6 connected, 1 if not
always 1
current SIC switch 0 setting
current SIC switch 1 setting
current SIC switch 2 setting
current SIC switch 3 setting
0 if A/D connected, I if not
don't care
don't care
always 1
don't care
don't care
don't care
don't care
don't care
don't care
don't care
always 1
TASK III
5-36
TASK III
Interim
Final
Report
MCR-89-516
February 1989
5.2.3.3.2.6 Res¢t Continooo_ Buffer
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
Reset continuous buffer
cc--> $25
ddl--> $80
dd2--> $80
Status
5.2.3.3.2.7 Fill Continuous Buffer
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
ee3 -->
RESPONSE: Status
Fill continuous buffer. First use reset continuous buffer, then use this
command to download code that is to be continuously executed. Code
will start executing as soon as the download is started. Up to 80 of
these commands may be concatenated before the buffer space is overrun.
cc--> $26
eel --> $80 + q
q:
higher 4 bits of downloaded 8 bit code
ee2 --> $80 + r
r:
lower 4 bits of downloaded 8 bit code
$26 until last command, then SOD
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5.2.3.3.2.8 Fill On¢_ B_ffer
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
ee3 -->
RESPONSE: Status
Fill once buffer. This command is used to download code that
is to be executed only once. Code execution is started by the trigger
once buffer command. Up to 80 of these commands may be concatenated
before the buffer space is overrun.
cc--> $27
eel--> $80+q
q:
higher 4 bits of downloaded 8 bit code
ee2 --> $80 + r
r"
lower 4 bits of downloaded 8 bit code
$26 until last command, then $0D
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5.2.3.3.2.9 Get Buffered Data
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
Get buffered data.
cc--> $29
ddl --> $80 + v
v:
bit 0 -->
bit 1 -->
bit 2 -->
bit 3 -->
bit 4 -->
bit 5 -->
bit 6 -->
dd2--> $80
$20
buffer 0 (sensors 0-3)
buffer I (sensors 4-7)
buffer 2 (sensors 8-11)
buffer 3 (sensors 12-15)
don't care
don't care
don't care
$ssssss - three bytes of status
$8F - dip switch setting for SIC card (if not $8F, SIC not installed).
$nnnn - position in loop counter
$kk - times through the loop counter
$mm- breakpoint
$22 - start of data
For each bit 0-3 of v (above) set the following:
14 Switchwords
1 GC Data Valid word
Temperature Sensorword of [bit[ 1]]TM
Sensorword of [bit[ 1]]TC
Sensorword of [bit[2]]TM
Sensorword of [bit[2]]TC
Sensorword of [bit[3]]TM
Sensorword of [bit[3]]TC
Sensorword of [bit[4]]TM
Temperatu_
Temperature
Temperature
Temperature
Temperature
Temperature
Temperature Sen sorword of [bit [4]] TC
Frequency Sensorword of [bit[ 1]]
Sensorword-Set of [bit[1 ]]
Frequency sensorword of [bit[2]]
Sensorword-Set of [bit[2]]
Frequency Sensorword of [bit[3]]
Sensorword-Set of [bit[3]]
Frequency Sensorword of [bit[4]]
Sensorword-Set of [bit[4]]
$22 - end of data
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5.2.3.3.2.10 Trigger Once Buffer
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
Trigger once buffer.
cc--> $2A
ddl--> $80
dd2 --> $-8-0 :
Status
5.2.3.3.2.11
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
Get Power Factor Sign
Get power factor Sign, _Calculate the_Power factor use
pfI=[PSfgl/[Vf'msi_Ii:msi]] . Use the same calculation to determine
pf2 using Pavg2, Vrms2, and Irms2; if pf2 < pfl denotes capacitive
loading; if pf2 >= pfl denotes inductive loading; i.e. voltage
leading current.
cc--> $2B : :_
ddl --> $80 + 0-$F depending on sensor pair used
dd2--> $80
6 sensor wordsi
Vrms 1
Irms 1 , '
P real 1 .... !
Vrms2 :: :
Irms2 .......
P real 2
Status
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5.2.3.3.2.12 Get Data For Switch
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
Get data for one specified switch a specified number of times.
cc--> $2C
ddl --> $80+j
j: 1-$7F depending on the number of times data is to be taken --
input buffer must be taken into account.
dd2 --> $80 + k
k: 0-$D depending on the switch specified.
j Switchwords
Status
5.2.3.3.2.13
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
G_t Data For Sensor
Get data for one specified sensor a specified number of times.
cc--> $2D
ddl--> $80+j
j: 1-$EF depending on the number of times data is to be taken.
dd2 --> $80 + k
k: 0-$F depending on the sensor specified.
j Sensorword-Sets for sensor k
Status
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5.2.3.3.2.14 Conditionally Command Switch On
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
Command switch on checking switch on or tripped status first;
if any of the above conditions exist, the switch command for
that particular switch or switches is not executed.
cc--> $2E
ddl --> $80 + j
j:
bit 0 --> switch 0
bit 1 --> switch 1
bit 2 --> switch 2
bit 3 --> switch 3
bit 4 --> switch 4
bit 5 --> switch 5
bit 6 --> switch 6
dd2 --> $80 + k
k:
bit 0 --> switch 7
bit 1 --> switch 8
bit 2 --> switch 9
bit 3 --> switch 10
bit 4 --> switch 11
bit 5 --> switch 12
bit6--> switch 13
RESPONSE: Status
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5.2.3.3.2.15 Conflitionally Command Switch Off
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
Command switch off checking switch off or tripped status first;
if any of the above conditions exist, the switch command for
that particular switch or switches is not executed.
cc--> $2F
ddl --> $80 + j
j:
bit 0 --> switch 0
bit 1 --> switch 1
bit 2 --> switch 2
bit 3 --> switch 3
bit 4 --> switch 4
bit 5 --> switch 5
bit 6 --> switch 6
dd2 --> $80 + k
k:
bit 0 --> switch 7
bit 1 --> switch 8
bit 2 --> switch 9
bit 3 --> switch 10
bit 4 --> switch 11
bit5--> switch 12
bit6--> sw_tch 13
RESPONSE: Status
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5.2.3.3.2.16 Get Data For All Switches
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
Get data for all fourteen switches a specified number of times.
cc--> $30
ddl --> $80+j
j: 1-$7F depending on the number of times data is to be taken --
input buffer size must be taken into account.
dd2--> $80
j times:
14 Switchwords
GC Data Valid word
Status
5.2.3.3.2.17
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
=-= -U: : =
Get Da_ For All Sensors
Get data for all sixteen sensors one time.
cc--> $31
ddl--> $80
dd2--> $80
16 Sensorword-Sets
Status
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5.2.3.3.2.18 Get Data For All Temperature Sensors
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
Get all 16 temperature sensor readings one time.
cc--> $32
ddl--> $80
dd2--> $80
16 * 2 Sensor words for the temperature sensors
Status
5.2.3.3.2.19 G_t All 16 Power Fact0r_ and Sign_
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
Get all 16 power factors and signs.
cc--> $33
ddl--> $80
dd2--> $80
16 times (six Sensor words):
Vrms 1
Irms 1
P real 1
Vrms 2
Irms 2
P real 2
Status
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5.2.3.4 System-wide Dataflows
This part describes the overall datafl0w of SSM/PMAD under operating
conditions. Six figures are presented. The first three represent initialization of
SSM/PMAD. The fourth represents normal operation. The fifth represents data flow in a
source reduction contingency situation while the sixth represents data flow in a contingency
arising from a problem in the hardware.
The figures are depicted with boxes representing the locations of computing
elements. The items between the boxes represent transactions that are sent between the
computing elements. Where important, numbers on the left hand side of the transactions
indicate ordering information among the transactions. The numbers in parantheses on the
right of the transactions are the id numbers of the transactions. For example, in the first
figure below, fin'st a ready? message is sent from the Symbolics to FRAMES and the CAC.
Second, the CAC both responds to the Symbolics with a ready! and an LLP availability to
FRAMES. FRAMES also responds with a ready! transaction to the Symbolics. The other
figures are interpreted analogously.
t
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5.2.3.4.1 Initialization Dataflow
Figure 5.2.3.4.1-1 shows the Symbolics 3620 D asking if FRAMES and
the CAC are ready. FRAMES and the CAC both respond appropriately. In addition, at
this time, the CAC notifies FRAMES which LLPs are available.
Symbolics Interface
2. Ready! (12) .,._l
_ Ready? (11) - I
__ady? (11)
2. Ready! (12) _._
FRAMES 1
2. LLP Availability (40)
CAC
Figure 5.2.3.4.1-1 Initialization Dataflow Part 1
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Once FRAMES and the CAC have indicated that they are ready the
Symbolics3620D sendsdown theinitial eventlist andload priority list asreflected in
Figure 5.2.3.4.1-2. Upon receiving andprocessingtheselists, FRAMES andthe CAC
respondwith the initializedmessage.
Symbolics Interface I
Figure 5.2.3.4.1-2
Event List & LPL (2 & 3)
iL_2. Initialized (13) ,,._l
E_nt List & LPL (2 & 3_ [ FRAMES
"__'__ List & LPL (2 & 3)
2. Initialized (13) __
CAC
Initialization Dataflow Part 2
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When theSymbolics3620D hasreceivedtheinitialization messagesfrom
FRAMES and the CAC, it sendsdown the sync time message. At this point normal
operationis entered.(Figure5.2.3.4.1-3)
Symbolics Interface yncTime (1) - [ FRAMES
CAC I
1. Sync-rime (1)
Figure 5.2.3.4.1-3 Initialization
I
Data flow Part 3
LLPs
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5.2.3.4.2 Normal Operation D_taflOw
Figure 5.2.3.4.2-1 shows normal operation of SS_MAD. In normal
operation a variety of switch and sensor data transactions are sent to FRAMES. FRAMES
collects and processes this data and periodically reports utilization data to the Symbolics
3620 D.
Figure 5.2.3.4.2-1
Symbolics Interface °'i"zat'°n"°'I I
A
Switch 8, Sensor Status (46) |1Switch States (42)Switch & Sensor Performance (43 & 45)Switch & Sensor Data (48)
CAC
l
Switch & Sensor Status (46) -[/Switch States (42)Switch & Sensor Performance (43 & 45)Switch & Sensor Data (48)
LLPs
Normal Operation Dataflow
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5.2.3.4.3 Contingency Situation Dataflows
Figure 5.2.3.4.3-1 represents the data flow in a source power reduction
contingency. First the source power change is propagated down to the LLPs. This
indicates a contingency situation which FRAMES recognizes and tells the Symbolics 3620
D. When the LLPs implement the source power change they report back the results via the
source reduction status transaction. Any load sheds or switch to redundants are reported
back to the Symbolics 3620 D followed by a contingency end transaction. This triggers the
Symbolics 3620 D to process the contingency and send a contingency events list and load
priority list to FRAMES and the CAC.
Symbolics Interface
.
3.
3.
1_,2. Contingency Start (15) ,_1
1 -I1. Source Power Change (14)
5. Contingency Events (8)
5. Load Priority List (3)
1. Source Power Change (14)
5. Contingency Events (8)
5. Load Priority List (3)
Contingency End (16)
Load Shed (7)
Component Switch to Redundant (6)
FRAMES [
i
3. Source Reduction
Status (44)
CAC [
,[Source Power Change (14) 3. Source ReductionContingency Events (8) Status (44)
Load Priority List (3) I r
LLPs
.
5.
5.
Figure 5.2.3.4.3-1 Source Power Contingency Dataflow
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In the contingencysituationwherea fault occursin the hardware,Figure
5.2.3.4.3-2representstheresultingdataflow. First,symptomsaredetectedvia the switch
and sensorstatustransactionfrom theLLPs. This indicatesto FRAMES that there is a
contingency and FRAMES sendsa contingency start to the Symbolics 3620 D and
necessaryfault event lists to the LLPs to isolatethe fault. The LLPs respondwith fault
eventstatustransactions.When the fault is diagnosedby FRAMES, it sendsload shed,
componentswitch to redundant,and out of servicemessagesto the Symbolies3620 D
followed by the contingencyend message.The Symbolics3620D then processesthe
contingencyand sendsa contingencyeventsand load priority list to FRAMES and the
CAC.
I Symbolics Interface
Figure 5.2.3.4.3-2
4. Contingency End (16)
3. Out of Service (9)
3. Component Switch to Redundant (6)
3. Load Shed (7)
L 2. Contingency Start (15) JI-5. Contingency Events (8) - I
5. Load Priority List (3)
2. Fault Event List (17)
5. Contingency Events (8)
5. Load Priority List (3)
FRAMES
r
'1. Switch &
Sensor Status (46)
3. Fault Event
Status (47)
I CAC
2. Fault Event List (17))j/
5. Contingency Events (8
5. Load Priority List (3)
LLPs
Power System Contingency Dataflow
L13 Switch &
Sensor Status (46)
• Fault Event
stabs(47)
1
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5.2.4 Breadboard Grounding Scheme
The SSM/PMAD breadboard was grounded with the objective of isolating
high frequency noise generated from the 20kHz power source from the automation
hardware. The output of the 20kHz source 1, the switchgear, and the loads were floated
relative to ground to prevent high frequency noise from propagating through ground to the
automation hardware. The automation hardware and switchgear control cards (SICs, GCs
and A/Ds) all draw power directly from single-point grounded facility power (120 V ac, 60
Hz). All data communication cables have external shields which are grounded at the end
away from the Motorola VME/10 (the VME/10 is particularly susceptible to noise in the
system). Additionally, common mode filters and RC snubbers were added in strategic
locations throughout the power system to minimize switching transient noise.
Note: In December of 1988 a Change Request to implement the Space
Station Freedom power system as a 120 Volt dc system was signed into effect.
5.3 Breadboard Theory. of Operation
The SSM/PMAD automation breadboard system incorporates both hardware
and software activities. When considering the breadboard for its automation purpose,
understanding software functional philosophy and how allocation within the hardware is
accomplished becomes necessary for understanding its theory of operation.
The hardware activities center on computational and control engines and,
especially on those types of activities which are concerned with Artificial Intelligence (AI)
and the hardware needed to execute concurrent activities (these are activities which require a
single goal from more than one cooperating knowledge based or expert system agent,
which may also use the services of deterministic functions within their processing
activities). Theory of operation for the hardware components of the SSM/PMAD is
explained in Appendixes VII and VIII and in the vendor-supplied hardware manuals.
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The softwareactivitiesfocus on supplyingautonomousmanagementand
control to thesystem.Thesoftwareappearsin bothdeterministicandAI forms.
Note: Forthosewho areinterestedin instructionfor actualphysical
operationof thebreadboard,referenceismadeto theSSM/PMAD
TestPlanin section5.12andtheBreadboardUsagePlanin
AppendixVIII.
5.3.1 The SSM/PMAD Goal
In order to operate spacecraft, power systems must exist to supply the
energy needed for the various components and subsystems to carry out their work. Up to
now, these power systems were either managed by ground systems personnel performing
planning and scheduling for the activities to be carded out by the spacecraft, or were
managed by flight crew personnel carrying out the same activities on-board the space
vehicle. In either case, a priori knowledge of the initial plan did not guarantee the
production of a sound manageable power usage schedule, and the efforts of many people
were necessary to complete the required iterations to produce a manageable power usage
plan for a given mission profile.
In addition to this, power usage contingencies arise within practically all
missions. Planning under the conditions of a contingency often does not allow for the key
personnel or the time needed to complete the task in a safe manner, regarding the
appropriate priorities and how they may change with respect to time and conditions. It is
generally agreed that an expert who handles the management of a contingency replanning
activity does so by knowing what !h e important System factors are, and by tracing through
those factors until arriving at a safe and acceptable plan.
= ......
The primary goal of the SSM/PMAD is tO autonomously provide, manage;
and update as needed an appropriate, autonomously supplied power usage schedule
(reflecting the needs of loads and their respective priorities), whether under nominal
conditions or a contingency. This means that the loads are provided power in the best way
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that the automationsystemcanprovide. The line of reasoningwithin eachknowledge
processing environment of the SSM/PMAD instills this goal, and the deterministic
processingsupportsit. Hence,thesystemhasonedirectionandonephilosophy;to simply
implementandsupportthegoal.
5.3.2 Theory of Functional Division
Software within the SSM/PMAD is partitioned into separate divisions based
upon functional needs and differences (see the Task I Study Report in Appendix I). All
deterministic functionality was assigned to algorithmic (closed-form) software functions.
These functions exist primarily on the Communications and Algorithmic Controller (CAC)
at the Motorola VME/10 or the Lowest Level Processors (LLPs). Software functions
which would not necessarily have assured outcomes based upon given inputs (not closed-
form) were assigned to knowledge based activities.
Some of the knowledge based activities were deemed expert systems due to
their superior knowledge of the breadboard. For instance, the Load Priority List
Management System (LPLMS) is a knowledge based activity along with the Front End
Load Enable Scheduler (FELES). This is because they exercise general level knowledge in
arriving at their conclusions. The Fault Recovery And Management Expert System
(FRAMES) and MAESTRO however, are expert systems because they possess specific
knowledge and expertise about the power automation breadboard, and they exercise this
knowledge in arriving at their conclusions.
One of the general results of the functional partitioning was that software
activities were generally allocated wholly within a single computational and control
environment. There were two instances where this was not feasible. First, in controlling
the communications upward from the LLPs to the Xerox 1186 there,was need for a
mediating activity. This activity took the form of a buffering extension in the
Communications and Algorithmic Software (CAS). Second, in the lowest level diagnostic
activities of FRAMES there was a need to interface to the Switch Interface Controllers
(SICs) directly to provide range testing on data and to perform immediate testing for soft
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faults. This could not be accomplished at the Xerox 1186 and was therefore allocated as
deterministic functions to the Lowest Level Functions (LLFs).
Table5.3.2-1 displays the functional content for the allocations which were
made for the above described reasons.
TABLE 5.3.2-1 Breadboard Functional Content
NAME LOCATION FUNCTION DESCRIPTION
FELES
MAESTRO
LPLMS
FRAMES
CAS
LLFs
Symbolics 3620 D
Symbolics 3620 D
Symbolics 3620 D
Xerox 1186 & LLP
VMFJlO (CAC)
LLPs
User front end and scheduling interface
Load scheduling
Initialing and managing load priorities
Fault diagnosis and contingency management
Communications & execution list management
Lower level load management and reporting
The following subsections describe the theory of how the software entities
function within the breadboard environment and what their individual goals are. The sum
of the software component functional philosophies is representative of the breadboard
theory of operation.
5.3.2.1 The FELES Functional Philosophy
The FELES serves as the user's front end to the MAESTRO scheduler in
particular and to the Symbolics 3620 D in general. The FELES is viewed as possessing a
generalized knowledge content necessary to complete its assigned task. It is therefore a
knowledge based system. In theory i t owes direction to the user without _specific user
request. And to take advantage of the I/O devices possessed by the Symbolics 3620 D, the
user interface is mouse'sensitlve icon and menu orlented not requiring the user to commit to
keyboard input. This provides a user setup of MAESTRO without having to be cognizant
of its complex fufictionality. The FELES sets that up for the user.
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5.3.2.2 The LPLMS Functional Philosophy
Management of priorities for a multiple output power distribution system is
quite a dynamic problem. Sometimes there is no clear-cut approach to a solution so
employing a heuristic is desirable. This is the approach taken by the LPLMS. Also, the
updating of priority lists should be maintained on a time-line that is reasonably close to
some measure of how often loads may change their energy usage or switch off or on within
the system. A figure of 15 minutes was arrived at based upon experts' experiences with
previous operational spacecraft power systems. Therefore, the LPLMS reviews the load
priority list at least on a regular 15 minute time basis. Also, when contingencies arise the
entire priority list may change. So the LPLMS must also review and update the priority list
based upon urgent system need. This capability is achieved as a result of a request from
FRAMES when an unplanned system condition such as a fault is detected. The request is
handled by the LPLMS, and a new load priority list is generated.
5.3.2.3 The FRAMES Functional Philosophy
FRAMES is the heart of the SSMPMAD system. It provides the complex
management of the entire system, including setting up the activities of the other knowledge
based functions. FRAMES maintains the power system status, tracking each opening and
closing of the various power distribution switches. All information flowing up from the
LLPs is reviewed for content and meaning from an integrated system point of view within
FRAMES. Whenever hard-fault information is transmitted to FRAMES from the LLPs,
the affected portions of the system are analyzed in order to diagnose the fault and its cause.
FRAMES plans switchgear execution in order to carry out the diagnosis. A basic model of
the breadboard must be contained and understood within FRAMES in order to accomplish
these activities. FRAMES must update the elements on the Symbolics 3620 D with
pertinent information and must inform MAESTRO and LPLMS of the system status with
respect to the need of their activity. FRAMES also provides a user interface which is icon
and menu driven with user inputs coming from a mouse. The basic screen image is that of
the power system topology with enhancements added for displaying switch status.
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5.3.2.4 The CAS Functional Philosophy
The CAS functions in three basic ways. First, all lists bound for the LLPs
are separated and sent_ t° the appropriate processors. The types of l!sts sent to the LLPs
represent events, priorities, and maximum power values during periods of source
reduction. Second, it buffers all data flowing from the LLPs to the Xerox 1186. Third it
provides the user-interface during manual system control.
5.3.2.5 The LLF Functional Philosophy
The LLFs exist within two environments; the power distribution control unit
(PDCU) and the load center (LC). For both environments they carry out numerous
activities. However, functionality is not completely uniform between the two distribution
controllers. For both, the Scheduled operations of switching activities are carried out.
They both acquire and process switch and sensor data in the form of current and voltage
(temperature data from the sensors is not currently used), and pass that data to the CAC
which is eventually destined for the parent FRAMES. They also perform range testing and
fault testing on the data, providing notification to the parent FRAMES in the event anything
out of limits or faulted is found. Presently the testing atthe PDCU is expanded to handle
soft fault detection. Also, both environments calculate and pass the system performance
statistics.
5_3.3 : _erafion_ _eo_ intention
Figure 5.3.3-1 shows the software flow for the SSM/PMADI The high
level daiaifiterCfiange between_entitles demo_nstr-ates-the _Ctivities Which take place in the
operatio n of the breadboard. A single user can operate the entire system. The only critical
user functions are to initiate the system's start state. From then on, the system is
autonomous in its operation, including contingencY management. The user is able to
requestvi-ewing-0f tlae latesi available data from the Xerox 1186 user-iniefface. Detailed
information_a_ui the Scheduleof events is available from the Symbolics 3626 D screen.
s? ms7
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The user-interfaceat the Motorola VME/10 shouldonly beexercisedfrom the manual
mode.
In the manual mode, all knowledge basedcomponentsof the system
becomeinactive,andthehighestlevel softwarefunctionsexistin theMotorolaVME/10 for
userinterfaceactivity. Thehighestlevel softwareswitchcontrol functionsin themanual
modeexist in the LLPs wherethe actualswitch control is commandedbasedupon the
user'srequest. The CAC still maintainsLLP communicationmanagementfunctions.
Ultimately, asin moreconventionalsystems,theuseris thehighestlevel control function
whentheSSM/PMADsystemis in manualcontrolmode.
A descriptionof whathappenswith the SSM/PMAD when the systemis
startedandrun is asfollows (referto theflow in Figure5.3.3-1):
1) TheuserinitializestheSymbolics3620D; MAESTROcreatesa
scheduleof
eventsfist;LPLMS createsanassociatedpriority list. Communications
areenabled.
2) TheuserinitializestheXerox1186enablingFRAMES and
communications.
3) TheuserinitializestheMotorolaVME/10,enablingcommunicationsand
downloadingsoftwareto theLLPs.
4) Theuserinitiatessystem-wide xecutionandmanagementof theevents
list.
5) FRAMESmonitorsall eventswithin thesystem.Faultswhichoccurare
diagnosed.Contingenciesaremanaged.New neededschedulesare
autonomouslyinitiated,generated,implemented,andmanaged.
6) Systemstatusandstatisticsareautonomouslymaintainedandreported.
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USER ) SSMIPMAD System Initialization
Step A: The user initiates system Initialization
Step B: The schedule and priority list Is downloaded
as needed (initialization or update).
1. The Initial schedule events and priority lists
are sent to FRAMES from MAESTRO & LI_MS
2. The schedules sad priorities are transmitted complete
to the CAC.
3. The CAC dinar|bates schedules appropriately to the LLPs.
SSMIPMAD Autonomous Omrratlon
Autonomous process and Information flow.
MAESTRO & FRAMIES CAC Communications Switch Menlgement
LPLMS Updates Monitoring Control & Control
I. The LLPs send up available switch state Information.
2. The CAC buffers information to FRAMES.
3. FRAMES sends fault and utilization Information to FIgLES.
4. FRAMES requests further Information or switch commanding In the
event of a known or suspected fault (performing diagnosis).
5. The CAC distributes commands, schedules, priority lists, and upper level
requests to the appropriate LLPs.
6, New schedules and priority lists are made avellable to FRAMES.
Note: Actions 4 & 5 take place only when the Xerox needs Information.
Action 6 occurs only if s new contingency sehedule or update
priority list Is available.
(
SSMIPMAD Manual Oneration
USER
l. User requests swine" commanding or data.
2. The CAC distributes the commands and requests to the LLPt,
3. The LLPs send up available switch state [nformaUon.
4. The user requesled Information is presented.
Note: LLP processing units are Motorola 68010 on 107 cards.
FIGURE 5.3.3-1 The SSM/PMAD Operational Flow
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5.4 Resource Scheduling
Resource scheduling in SSM/PMAD is used to schedule activities requiting
electrical power as will be needed on Space Station Freedom, making efficient use of
available power while recognizing constraints and priorities. This section of the report
describes the theory and implementation of the resource scheduler as implemented in
MAESTRO. The last part of this section describes the user interface to MAESTRO.
5.4.1 Theory of Operation
The goal of scheduling is to map out when a set of tasks may be completed
making efficient use of available resources. Resources in SSM/PMAD are switches, crew,
tools, power, etc.
The scheduler, as implemented in MAESTRO, can be defined in four parts.
The first part is the representation of activities. Activities are used to represent those types
of tasks that are to be performed on Space Station Freedom like operations. The language
and representation of constraints defines the second part. There can be constraints on the
resources to be used by activities, as well as constraints between activities or the parts of
activities. The actual schedule generation process defines the third part. Scheduling in
light of contingencies defines the fourth part.
5.4.1.1 _ti_s
Activities within MAESTRO are represented hierarchically. An activity
group is a set of activities representing different ways to accomplish a particular goal. An
activity, in turn, is a linear sequence of subtasks which, when performed in the order
specified, satisfy that goal. A subtask is a portion of an activity whose resources and
conditions requirements do not vary over its duration. Duration can vary, as can delays
between subtasks.
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5.4.1.2 Constraints
Constraints represent conditions on or between activities. They arise for a
variety of reasons. Resource types and availability give rise to rate-controlled and
consumable resources. Certain requirements that need to be met for proper operation of a
task define conditions on activities. Opportunity window constraints, representationally
equivalent to conditions, are constraints not associated with a resource but necessary for the
performance of an activity. These constraints, rate-controlled and consumable resources,
conditions, and opportunity windows are all performance-controlling constraints.
Rate-controlled resources are those whose availability continues when the
subtask using them ends. Examples of this are crew time, thermal rejection, electrical
power and equipment. Consumable resources, on the other hand, once depleted, stay
depleted until some activity specifically replenishes them. Water, liquid nitrogen and
lubricating fluids are examples of this type of constraining resource.
Conditions are states the spacecraft must maintain in order to perform a
subtask, and include spacecraft attitude and position' temperature ranges, acceleration,
vibration, etc. In general, conditions cannot be consumed by an activity requiring them,
which differentiates them from rate-controlled resources. An opportunity window is a
performance-controlling constraint not associated with the availability of any resource, but
constraining the performance of a subtask just like a condition constraint would. Activities
with opportunity window constraints must have appropriate subtaskS scheduled to happen
within them.
Many of the performance-controlling constraints can be satisfied by more
than one resource or condition. An example of this is the case where a subtask could be
performed by either of two crew members trained to use a particular piece of equipment,
but not by any of the other crew members. This is referred to as a resource disjunction, a
case where one resource or another can satisfy a requirement. The existence of a resource
disjunction in a subtask description greatly increases the difficulty of finding times during
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which a subtask can run, as opportunities to perform the subtask depend on which resource
is chosen. This can be further complicated by the fact that a resource choice in one subtask
can control that in another, e.g. the crew member who performs the calibration of an
instrument should be the same one who read the manual at the start of the activity.
Another basic type of constraint on activities is the relational constraint.
Constraints of this type relate the start or end of one subtask to that of another, either in the
same activity or in another. The current version of MAESTRO only allows uni-directional
constraints, in which a constraining subtask can run whether the constrained one can be
scheduled while scheduling the constrained one depends on the scheduling of the other. A
relational constraint may also constrain activities by relating the start or end of a subtask to
some event or absolute time on the timeline.
5.4.1.3 Schedule Generation
MAESTRO creates a schedule by repeatedly executing three steps, referred
to as the select-place-update cycle. The first step involves evaluating every activity
requested for scheduling with respect to a set of selection criteria, and choosing one activity
to put on the schedule next. These criteria include the base priority associated with each
activity, the percentage of performances requested that have been scheduled for each
(success level), and the relative constraint of each (opportunity). Relative constraint is a
rough measure of how many different opportunities each activity has to be placed on the
schedule. These criteria are combined using user-selectable weights which reflect the
importance of each criterion to the user. An activity chosen will have higher priority, a
lower percentage of requested performances scheduled, and/or fewer opportunities to be
scheduled than other activities.
Once an activity has been chosen to be scheduled, one instance of it is
placed on the schedule. The calculation resulting in the measure of constraint actually
determines all allowable start and end times for all subtasks in each activity. This
information can be used during placement to position the performance according to soft
TASK III
5-63
TASK HI
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February 1989
constraints (preferences) imposed by a user. The user, for example, maximize the data
collection subtask, or can schedule the activity as early or as late in the scheduling period as
possible. If there is a resource disjunction in a subtask's requirements, a preference can be
specified and adhered to, and in fact, a set of possibly contradictory soft constraints can be
specified along with an ordering in their importance.
The final step in the scheduling cycle involves updating resource availability
profiles to reflect the activity's consumption of resources. The cycle then repeats for as
long as the user wishes or until there are no opportunities to schedule any activity. The
combination of weights on selection criteria and attention to soft constraints during
placement allows the scheduler to be tuned for a variety of scenarios.
5.4.1.4 Contingency Operations
There are a number of situations in which a schedule must be altered in
other ways to accommodate various changes. It may become known that resource or
condition availabilities will change or have changed, or that an activity not previously
known about needs to be added to the schedule. These situations are handled within
MAESTRO by a heuristically-guided unscheduling mechanism in concert with a method of
altering descriptions of activities already in progress, and aided by the maintenance during
scheduling of multiple partial schedules. A change in resource availabilities may result in a
projected over-use of a resource. When a resource is found to be overbooked, all activities
using that resource during the time it is overbooked are evaluated. The evaluations are
done according to a set of criteria designed to determine what activity to alter or unschedule
to solve the problem. This should be done with the least impact on the schedule. The
criteria include how well the activity's use of the resource fits the amount of overbooking,
whether the activity is in progress or not, the activity's priority, amount of crew
involvement, use of other resources, further opportunities to be scheduled, success level,
and others. These criteria are also weighted to allow flexibility to a user. An activity is
selected and unscheduled or selected and altered, then all are again evaluated and another
unscheduled or altered, until no resource overbookings remain.
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Activities whose condition constraintsare violated must be altered or
unscheduled;thereis nochoiceasto which to affect. Theseareall handledthe sameas
thosechosento beperturbedby a resourceoverbooking. When it is determinedthat an
activity not scheduledmustbeaddedto thetimeline,theschedulerfirst tries to find away
to scheduleit which will notdisturbanythingalreadyscheduled.If noopportunityexists,
MAESTROwill try to find opportunitieswhich will resultin only lower-priority activities
beingperturbed,andif found,will unscheduleor alteroneor moreof thoseusingthesame
techniquesit usesto handleoverbookings.If no lower-priority activitiescanbe foundto
bump,theschedulerejectstherequest(perhapstheactivity is not schedulablevenin the
absenceof otheractivities,or all interferingactivitiesareof ahigherpriority).
The last thing MAESTRO tries to do after altering the schedulein a
contingencyis to scheduleanyactivitieswhoserequestshavenotbeenfully met, possibly
usingresourcesreleasedwhensomeotheractivity wasalteredor unscheduled.
5.4.2 Implementation
To schedule activities for the power system the scheduler needs to know
about the various resources involved, and needs to have a model of the utility power
system. This section describes how the resources are allocated and the utility power
system is represented. Following that, scheduling for Space Station Freedom module like
power management and distribution is discussed. Finally, operation of the system from the
point of view of the scheduler is described.
5.4.2.1 Rcso0rc_ Allocation
Although MAESTRO can handle an unlimited number of resources, several
have been allocated for the demonstration of the SSM/PMAD breadboard. This set is
representative, and in the case of the power system resources, necessary for the operational
scenario presented by MAESTRO. Each of the components of the power system are
represented as two types of resources: One, a piece of equipment, and two, a rate-
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controlled power resource. A rate-controlled resource CREW is allocated and other non-
powered equipment General Purpose Handling Tools and Fluid Handling Tools are
available. Several pieces of RPC specific test equipment have been defined for ease in
setting up a schedule that exercises specific power system components. Each of the
allocations listed is for the entire duration of the scheduling period chosen by the user in
creating a schedule. The capability to modify and shape these resource availability profiles
has not been implemented as part of the Symbolics 3620 D interface for the SSM/PMAD.
The resources available are:
All Load Center and Subsystem Testers 18
All RPC testers 6
General Purpose Handling Tools 4
Fluid Handling Tools 4
Crew 2
All other equipment _ 1
Power system components (equipment) 1
Power system components (rate-controlled) actual power capability
5.4.2.2 Utility Power
Typical spacecraft built and flown to date have a dedicated power system
sized to handle any load the instruments and subsystems on board might normally require.
The only limit useful for scheduling with regard to power consumption has been the source
output capability (battery management is a complex issue for scheduling, but will not
normally be a factor in SSM power distribution or consumption). The SSM's on Space
Station Freedom will be unique with respect to PMAD design in that the power system will
limit consumption at numerous points along any power path, and these limits are relevant to
scheduling. In order to clarify this point it will be useful to describe the SSM/PMAD
breadboard under development for Marshai] Space FlightCent-er.
A representative schematic of a portion of this breadboard is shown on the
following page: (Figure 5.4.2.2-1)
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Figure 5.4.2.2-1 SSM/PMAD Breadboard Diagram.
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Power distribution hardware includes three different types of remotely
controllable switches: 1) Remote Bus Isolator (RBI), 2) Remote Controlled Circuit
Breaker (RCCB), and 3) Remote Power Controller (RPC).
RPC's provide solid state switching, fast circuit breaking in the case of hard
faults, current limiting, I2t fault tripping, under-voltage tripping and over-temperature
tripping. All of the switches provide status reporting and measurement of current through
the switch. Other sources of data include sensors located throughout the breadboard,
providing current, voltage, frequency, power and power factor. Of note is the fact that
more than three, 1-kilowatt RPC's are connected to a single 3-kilowatt RPC.
The functional elements of the PMAD system are depicted in Figure
5.4.2.2-2, the Symbolics 3620 D Interface Processing Architecture. A schedule is made
available to the Front End Load Enable Scheduler (FELES), which determines RPC
schedules detailing when power will be required of each, and how much. The Load
Priority List Management System (LPLMS) uses the input schedule to create an ordered list
of RPCs to shed (open) in the event power consumption must be reduced quickly. The
RPC schedule and Load Priority List (LPL) are passed to the Fault Recovery and
Management Expert System (FRAMES), the Communications and Algorithmic Controller
(CAC), and onto the Lowest Level Processors (LLPs). Each LLP executes its portion of
the schedule, allowing current through the switches to the amount specified in the schedule.
When a fault is detected, FRAMES collects information about it, attempting to isolate it and
determine the cause of the problem, then sends information to the FELES.
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Data
Figure 5.4.2.2-2 Symbolics Interface Processing Architecture
Symbolics 3620 D Interface Processing Architecture
In order to exercise the full potential for automation of this breadboard, the
control and fault handling systems on the breadboard had to be interfaced with a scheduling
and resource management system, and so MAESTRO has been modified to perform this
function. Fault information is passed to MAESTRO, which reschedules such that the
revised schedule takes into account the new state of the power system, and makes this
schedule available to the FELES.
It is important to note that the power automation software has a very
different view of a module and its activities from that of the scheduler. MAESTRO
schedules activities which use various resources over durations in time. These resources
include equipment which must be powered to operate, and that power is supplied through a
set of RPCs within the power system. When a fault occurs, some piece(s) of equipment
will be turned off, at least temporarily, so that some activity is interrupted. The power
system does not "know" about activities or equipment, so the scheduler must ascertain the
effects of some RPC becoming unavailable. To do so it must have a representation of the
internals of the power system and the equipment connections to that system.
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5.4.2.3 Scheduling for SSM/PMAD
The above power system design presents several challenges for scheduling
of activities using power. These are for the most part derived from the fact that a large
number of power system components are limiting resources. A number of 1-kilowatt
RPCs (or in some cases 3-kilowatt RPCs) will be connected to a single, 3-kilowatt RPC,
making that RPC a limiting resource. Thus, instead of scheduling against the availability of
electrical power (a single resource), the system must schedule against the availability of as
many as 100 power resources. Not only are these RPCs power resources, but they are
also pieces of equipment which can become unavailable, raising the number of power
related resources to around 200.
When specifying an activity to be scheduled, the user or scheduler must in
some way determine which of these power resource s will be used to accomplish each
subtask, and what power level each resource will supply. Since power must be consumed
by some piece of equipment, which itself is a resource represented to the scheduler,
location and mode(s) of that equipment can determine paths and levels of power for each
subtask, but the associations between equipment and power then must be represented.
This increases the complexity of the already complex process of modelling each activity for
the scheduler. Furthermore, there may be choices as to where a portable piece of
equipment can be powered. Since it is the responsibility of the scheduler to determine
resource use, the choice of this location must be made by the scheduler. This leads to a
potentially large number of resource disjunctions, the choices between resources utilized as
described previously. As was mentioned, these resource disjunctions complicate
scheduling immensely. Perhaps the most significant impact on scheduling of this power
system design is in the area of contingency operations. These involve a change in the
assumptions upon which a schedule is based, causing the scheduler to try to adjust the
schedule such that ongoing activities may continue and resources may be used efficiently.
In order for the scheduler to perform this adjustment, it must be informed of the specific
nature of the Changes in assumptions.
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Many high priority activitieswill haveredundantpowerpathsassignedto
them. The power systemis capableof automaticallychangingthe resourcesusedby a
subtask,i.e. switching to a redundantpath in theeventthatpowercannotbe suppliedvia
the primary path,and thesechangesmustbe reflectedin thedescriptionof the subtask.
Thus,theschedulermustbeableto automaticallyalterits activitymodelsto accountfor this
typeof change.
Powerconsumptionalongredundantpowerpathscannotbe scheduled,as
this would result in extremelyinefficient useof power. Therefore,whena fault occurs
whichcausesthepowersystemto makeuseof analternatepathto powersomething,apart
of thatpathmayalreadybefully allocatedto oneor moreothersubtasks.Thisrequiresthat
somethingbe immediatelyturnedoff, interruptingsubtasksnot usingpoweron thefaulted
power path. These interruptions are known as load shedding, and must also be
communicatedto thescheduler.
The schedulermust react not only to redundancyswitching and load
shedding,but alsoto immediatepower reductionsfrom outsidethe moduleandto user
requeststo scheduleactivities not previously requested. Thesesituations all require
revisingthescheduleasquickly aspossibleto accommodatechanges.While thescheduler
is making changes,the power systemand other subsystemswill be trying to continue
executionof anold andpossiblyinvalid schedule,which canresultin a cascadeof faults
registeredby thesesubsystems.Timing concernsthereforebecomeacritical aspectof the
contingencyreschedulingproblem. Also, there is a large volume of information to be
passed between the scheduler and the various subsystems, necessitating a fairly direct
communications path between these systems.
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5.4.2.4 System Operation
Before going into a typical system operation scenario, it is necessary to
analyze the effects of contingencies from the scheduling point of view. In this section,
contingencies are discussed followed by an operational scenario.
5.4.2.4.1 Contingencies
Contingencies may occur after schedule generation in any of the following
ways: Changes in resource availabilities; equipment breakdowns; changes in mission
objectives; changes in target availabilities; and experiments' requirements alterations.
Contingencies may result in invalid schedules with resource overbooking, inefficient
schedules with opportunity to do more work, and partially completed activities which
require some repair to fulfill mission objectives. Furthermore, there are three places where
a contingency may occur with respect to a schedule: 1) Prior to schedule execution; 2)
during schedule execution, with ample lag time between notification, and 3) occurrence;
and immediate or nearly immediate contingencies.
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In the first case, a contingency may occur prior to schedule execution as
depicted in Figure 5.4.2.4.1-1 below:
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Figure 5.4.2.4.1-1
NOW I Contingency [
Contingency 1
Schedule Span
TIME
There are three things to note about this case: 1) none of the candidate
activities have been initiated; 2) notification occurs early enough so no real-time decisions
need to be made; and 3) the schedule may be repaired by simply unscheduling and
rescheduling selected activities.
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In the second case, a contingency may occur during schedule execution as
depicted in Figure 5.4.2.4.1-2 below:
co
w I II I I I! II
I,-
II II II II-
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< _ 11 ! I
4k 4, 4k
[Now Contingency [
Schedule Span
TIME
Figure 5.4.2.4.1-2 Contingency 2
When there is ample lag time between notification and occurrence, no
immediate reactions are required, there may be a mix of activities, some not yet initiated and
some in progress, and activities which are in progress may be restructured in some cases.
In activitY restructuring there may be a choice of activities to alter. In this case, intelligent
decisions need to be made about which activities should be affected. Completed portions
of selected activities remain on the schedule with the uncompleted portions removed.
Resource profiles are updated to reflect removals. Finally, to restructure an activity any of
the following mechanisms may be used: Resource switching, altering subtask or delay
durations within the parameters of the normal activity model, and alter activity in the ways
specified for contingencies in the activity model, e.g., interrupt, skip, and restart.
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Finally, contingenciesmayoccurin real-timeor nearreal-timeasdepicted
below in Figure 5.4.2.4.1-3:
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Figure 5.4.2.4.1-3
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TIME
Contingency 3
Schedule Span
In this case, quick reaction is required, there are few choices about which
activities to affect and usually the affected activities will be in progress. In addition,
changes will be effected on the schedule which are not under the control of the scheduler.
The key point in this form of contingency is that coordination with subsystems, the crew,
and ground personnel is essential.
5.4.2.4.2 Operation Scenario
5.4.2.4.2.1 Start Up
The user must define a schedule from which the load enablement commands
may be generated. This may be accomplished through creating a new schedule or
retrieving one from the Schedule Library.
When the schedule is available, the Symbolics 3620 D Interface is ready for
starting the operation of the breadboard.
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TheController sendsa READY? to FRAMES and CAC andwaits for the
responsethat both areREADY!. TheREADY? messageto eachindicatesthat the fault
diagnosisandalgorithmic softwareshouldberesetandreadyfor autonomousbreadboard
operation.
Upon receiving confirmation that FRAMES and CAC areREADY!, the
initial eventlist andpriority list arecreatedandtransmittedto each. TheController now
waits for the responseof INITIALIZED! from each. The INITIALIZED! message
indicatesthattheothersoftwarecomponentshavereceivedtheinitial eventandpriority lists
andarenow readyto beginoperation.
The useris now promptedfor when to placethe breadboardinto action,
from 1 to 55 minutes from now. This choice will sendeach softwarecomponentthe
TIME-SYNChronizationinformation,identifying thecurrenttimeandthetimethemission
(breadboardoperation) shouldstart; the start of mission correspondsto mission time
00:00:00.The automationsoftwareis nowactiveandpowersystemcommandswill begin
to beexecuted.Note thatthesystemhasagranularityof oneminute.
5.4.2.4.2.2 Norm_l Operations
The system is now running autonomously. Any user interactions within
this mode are only at the user's convenience, as the system management has been fully
,,automated.
Every 15 minutes the LPLMS will generate a new priority list and distribute
that to FRAMES and the CAC. The list is generated and transmitted approximately 5
minutes before it becomes effective.
Every 30 minutes the FELES will generate a new event list and distribute
that to FRAMES and the CAC. The list is generated and transmitted approximately 5
minutes before its effective time.
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5.4.2.4.2.3 Breadboard Fault
An RPC or RCCB trips, registering a fault. Automatically, FRAMES is
notified, isolates the fault and determines the corrective action.
FRAMES notifies the Symbolics 3620 D Interface of the contingency
situation by sending a CONTINGENCY-START message, indicating that the next set of
information sent will be relevant to the current fault. All information sent to the Symbolics
3620 D Interface until a CONTINGENCY-END is received is considered applicable to the
contingency, so that MAESTRO will not begin to act until all relevant data are accessible.
FRAMES contingency information may consist of LOAD-SHEDs, OUT-OF-SERVICEs,
SWlTCH-TO-REDUNDANTs, or AVAILABILITY specifications.
During the contingency situation the LLPs should continue executing the
load enable schedules for any non-faulted components. This is fully allowed by the
segregation of partial FRAMES functionality into the lower level functions.
At this time, the Controller will stop the FELES and LPLMS from
generating new lists until the contingency is handled by MAESTRO. The FELES and
LPLMS wait to be restarted.
The Controller notifies MAESTRO of the contingency and passes the
appropriate fault information. MAESTRO makes changes to the schedule such that a!l
power interruptions are reflected in subtask descriptions as subtask interruptions, some of
which can be continued, others restarted, and others halted, and such that subtask
descriptions reflect loads switched to redundant sources.
Once MAESTRO has repaired the schedule, the Controller restarts the
FELES and LPLMS. New event and priority lists are created and the state of all the
components are specified. These are transmitted to FRAMES and the CAC.
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The Controller and the breadboardare now in a stable state and the
Controllerreturnsto normaloperations.Any newfault situationwill promptthesystemto
beginthesametypeof activitiesonceagain.
5.4.3 MAESTRO User Interface
This section describes the user interface to MAESTRO. It includes the user
interfaces to the activity and equipment editors as activities and equipment are important to
scheduling. The user interface of the Symbolics 3620 D Interface is described further in
Appendix VI. Only the portions referred to will be described here.
5.4.3.1 The Equipment Editor
i
The Equipment Editor provides the mechanisms for adding modes of
operation and locations to equipment. There are two main windows to the Equipment
Editor. The Description Window is used for adding modes and locations to equipment, as
well as for displaying information about equipment. The Powered Equipment display is a
scrollable window of the available equipment. Each line on this display is mouseable.
FiguresS.4.3.i-1 and 5.4.3.1-2 which follow reflect a sample display of the Equipment
Editor and the Equipment Editor Help screen, respectively.
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DESCRIPTION
Modes ro_r Equrpmen!
Load Center 3 Test Device
HAk_F MA_ POWFJ_ MAX _Ih_RFNT
Off 0 0.000
tl000w Test 1000 4.80_
RFPII I_IN ANT TIr_Ir
YES NO
YES YES
Locations foe Equipment
Load Center 3 Test Device
RPc I _ATInN
DO0 LOad Center 3
D01 Load Center 3
002 Lced Center 3
003 Load Center 3
004 Load Center 3
005 Load Center 3
006 Load Center 3
007 Load Center 3
008 Load Center 31
POtI_REO EQUIPMENT
Load Center 3 Test Device
Load Center 4 Test Device
5'ubsystem I Test Device
Su_syctem 2 Till Device
00 Test Device
PPC 01 Test Cevlce
RPC 02 Test Device
RPC 0"3 Test Device
RPC 04 Test Device
FL°C 05 Test Device
RPC 06 Test Device
RPC: 07 Test Device
RF_ 011, Test Device
RPC 14 Test Device
/_ 15 Test Devicei 16 Test Device
RPC 17 Test Device
RPC 18 Test Device
FLoc 19 Test Device
RPC 20 Test Device
RPC 21 Test Device
RPC 22 Test Device
Figure 5.4.3.1-1 Equipment Editor Screen
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Figure 5.4.3.1-2 Equipment Editor Help Screen
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5.4.3.2 The Activity Editor
The Activity Editor is used to create activities describing tasks to be
scheduled. Each activity has a priority and a number of subtasks to be executed
sequentially. The main window is used to enter information about the activities and the
subtasks associated with that activity. The inverted window is for display purposes only.
Figures 5.4.3.2-1 and 5.4.3.2-2 show the Activity Editor and Activity Editor Help screens,
respectively.
Oe fine ACTIVITY
Activity Name: Spacelab2
Priority [O-highest Ihru 3-lowest]: 3
f'4_Jnlbe¢ of Performances Requested [1-100]: t
Nu_'nbaf of Subtask= [1-50]: 1
ebOfI$, d_) uses these values
Define flctt SUBTASK (SA431601A)
of ACTIVITY
Spacelab2
Subtask Name: First Subtask
Minimum Ovratlon [dd:hh:mm]: OO:OO:Ot
MaxIPrl_.Cn Duration [dd:hh:mi*n]: 00:00:01
Mlnlm_cn Clelay [dd:hh:mm]: 00:(30:00
MaMmt._*n Oelay (dd:hh:mm]; 00:00:00
Rest of SUbtask Can Be Skl0ped In ContlngerK:y?: Yet No
Minln'_m Ouratlon Completed tO Skip {dd:hh:n'_]: 00:00:01
SubtaSk Can Be Interrupted and Continued In Contingency?: Yes NO
•Rcfrcsh eScrttns Cr¢st_
Figure 5.4.3.2-1 Activity Editor Screen
I
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Figure 5.7L3.2-2 Activity Editor Help Screen
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5.4.3.3 The Scheduler
The Scheduler is used for displaying the current schedule, as well as for
resetting the scheduler, retrieving a schedule from the schedule library and getting
information about the scheduled activities. The help screen for the scheduler provides more
detail on the available operations on the Scheduler Screen. Figures 5.4.3.3-1 and 5.4.3.3-
2 show the Scheduler and Scheduler Help screens, respectively.
MAES]RO the SS Module _cheduler
MISSION-TIME $C_D_E _I _"-C-ONIROL
[00:00:00] No N.,,me r t ._
...........................................................................................................................................i"iii_!!i_!!i_ _i :_-_i-';-iii:_i_! '.;__:_'i _=!_.i_!;!_>_!7<_!:.;;i_i!i:::._i?;:;3_;::!:i:i!_;i::i:-i_i_iii:-i;IL
I i
i i l 1 i i i
:7 :::;zi:_".:!;_71_] ................. IM'TMfl IIl;:_i;_;i .......................
Figure 5.4.3.3-1 Scheduler Screen
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Figure 5.4.3.3-2 Scheduler Help Screen
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5.5 Front En_J Load Enable Scheduler ('FELES)
5.5.1
The Front End Load Enable Scheduler (FELES) is responsible for
translating activity schedules created by MAESTRO into component event lists for the
power system and FRAMES. Basically, each item on the schedule must be translated into
the appropriate RPC with additional information about the load connected to that RPC.
This additional information includes the amount of power allowed through the RPC,
whether the load has permission to test, whether the load may switch to a redundant source
of power, and the amount of current the load may use.
5.5.2 Implementation
FELES runs as an individual process on the Symbolics 3620 D. The
component event list is created periodically at time (- EFFECTIVE-TIME LEAD-TIME)
allowing sufficient time to create and transmit the event list to the power system and
FRAMES. Each event list created covers a period of time from EFFECTIVE-TIME for a
length of (+ SCHEDULING-PERIOD DELTA). As a new event list is created the
EFFECTIVE-TIME is incremented by SCHEDULING-PERIOD in preparation for the next
event list. The DELTA is used for an overlap period between schedules in the event a
contingency arises. Both LEAD-TIME and SCHEDULING-PERIOD may be modified by
a LISP programmer for tuning of FELES to the actual performance characteristics of the
breadboard and support software. As each event list is created, it is added to the event list
keyed by the time it was created for historical record keeping.
Each event list consists of a time stamped list of events that specify actions
the breadboard should perform in order to accomplish the objectives of the schedule of
experiments/activities. Each event has the following format:
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Timeof Event
Component
Event
Max Power
Permissionto Test
Redundancy
Switchto Redundant
Max Current
Min Current
Min Power
Timetheeventis to beinitiated
expressedin minutesfrom thestartof mission
Alphanumericidentifierof thepowersystemcomponent
F-off, disabled
O-on,enabled
C-change,enabledbutexpectadifferentpowerlevel
Maximumwattsprojectedutilization
Y-grantpermissionto opentheswitchfor testing
N-nopermissionto openfor testing
Y-thereis aredundantpowerpath
N-noredundantpowerpath
Y-permissionto switchtoredundantpath
N-nopermissionto switch
Maximumcurrent(p=iv)basedonmodulevoltageof 208
Minimumcurrentprojected
Minimumwattsof projectedutilization
5.5.3 User Imerface
=
The Front End Load Enable Scheduler enables the user to browse and
monitor the generation of load enablement commands. See Figures 5.5.3-1 and 5.5.3-2
that follow. Please refer to the Console description in the Symbolics 3620 D Environment
section for status line monitor defnitions.
The Event Monitor is a textual and graphical display indicating what
commands are being recognized by the power system. This monitor is continually updated
as events are initiated as mission time advances. This monitor effectively shows what
should be happening in the power system. The graphical display shows the RPCs within
each load center. If the RPC is black, it is enabled. A circle cross below an RPC indicates
the RPC is out of service.
The Event Data Base is a textual listing Of an event list. When the list Was
created and when it becomes effective are indicated. The user may choose any list that has
been created by the FELES. By mousing on an event line, the user will see what
experiments are utilizing the specific component at the time indicated.
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EVENT MONITOR
rJ0:G0:00 Hi? ON tOO
O0:OO_OO _lS ON 100
O0:OO;OO $_C ON 100
G0_OO:OO F_S ON tOO
t _ I/ ..... I
I
EVENT DATA BASE
Event List O]Created : O0:O0:00 Effective : 00:00:0
Tlme C o ml:2Do.e._ T y_..____rMa__P._ WCr.
O0:O0:O0 ¢RPC Nf7 31w_ ON tOO
DO:CO:CO ('_CC8 _lf; tO*w_ ON fO0
O0:00:O0 (U$1.AB Pewer $,yltem ?llw) ON _OO
CO:O0:CO ('RPC LCS- f_ 3kw) ON tOO
O0:o0:oB ¢_C _ _l 3kw} ON 200
O0:OO:O$ (ROOm A f_ _O*w) ON ;tOO
O0:OO:O¢ (_PC AO_ 3_w) ON _0
00:00:00 ('_PC A03 3kw) ON _0
O0:OO:O_ ¢_CC_ A02 _O*w) ON BO
00:00:0¢ ¢USLAe Pewer 3y|tea ,_lFiw) CtCANO_' ,980
00:00:0# ¢_PC lCt-O_ _w) ON 40
00;00:0# ¢_PC {C3"0_ I_w) ON 20
OO:OO:O8 (RPC ¢C3-04 law) ON ;_0
00:00:08 ¢_PC _C#'OO 3lw) ON ;tOO
00:00:0_1 _',RP_ Nf7 3t_w) CMANO_ It&O
O0:OO:OB (RCC8 htl$ IO*w) CNANG_ _40
OO:O0:O_ <_PC AO# 3_w) ON _0
00:00:0_ ¢_cce AO_ _O*w) CI_,_NO_ I00
O0;O0:OP (USLAB Pewee 3.v_fe_ 25&_) CHANO_ t;_80
00:00:011 (RPC t.C2"04 fiw) - - ON 20
_R¢fr¢=h tScr¢¢ns P_Liv¢ [vents [vent. Oet_bosc Recent. [ven_
Figure 5.5.3-1 Front End Load Enable Scheduler Screen
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Figure 5.5.3-2 Front End Load Enable Scheduler Help Screen
i
TASK III
5-88 ORIGINAL PAGE I_
OF POOR QUALITY
TASK In
Interim MCR- 89-516
Final
Report February 1989
5.6 Load Priority List Management System CLPLMS)
5.6.1 Theor_
The Load Priority List Management System (LPLMS) is responsible for
determining and providing a list of lowest level RPCs in reverse order of priority so that the
lowest level processors in the power system may quickly shed loads in the event of a
power system contingency. For example, in the event of an immediate power change
where the scheduler does not have time to compute a new schedule, the LLPs must shed
the lowest priority loads to stay within the new amount of power. As another example, an
RPC may trip for some reason causing a high priority load below it to be switched to
redundant. The effect of switching a load to a redundant supply may force some other
loads on the redundant bus to be shed due to limiting power availability on the bus and
priority of loads. These actions must be done quickly at the LLP level, yet the power
system does not have knowledge of loads and activities, so the Load Priority List (LPL) is
computed at a functionally higher level (near the scheduler).
The accuracy of the LPL is dependent upon how fast the LPL can be
generated and sent to the LLPs. The schedule has a one minute granularity, yet it is not
possible to send a new LPL to the LLPs every minute. A LPL may be generated once
every x number of minutes (where x is a programmable variable equal to 15 minutes in this
implementation), creating a reasonable approximation of what loads are running over the x
minute interval and their respective priorities. At the same time, it is possible that, during
operation, a particular load on the LPL is not actually using power sometime during the x
minute interval. For this reason it is up to the LLP to continue shedding loads until power
constraints are met. An optimal method would be to have an accurate LPL for each minute
of operation of the breadboard.
5.6.2 Implementation
The Load Priority List Management System runs as an independent process
on the Symbolics 3620 D. The LPL is created periodically at time (- EFFECTIVE-TIME
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LEAD-TIME) allowing sufficient time to create and transmit the LPL to the LLPs. Each
LPL created spans an interval of time starting at EF_CTIVE-TIME and ending at (+
EFFECTIVE-TIME HOW-OFTEN), where HOW-OFTEN is currently set at 15 minutes.
As a new LPL is created EFFECTIVE-TIME is incremented by HOW-OFTEN in
preparation of the next LPL. As each LPL is created it is added to the LPL database keyed
by the time of creation for historical record keeping.
The criteria used to order the LPL must take into account what each RPC is
being used for, how much power it is drawing, and how crucial it is to continue providing
power to the task using the RPC. Unfortunately, over a 15 minute time period, an
individual RPC may be used sequentially by different tasks. It is impossible to know
which task during the 15 minute period might be interrupted if that RPC is turned off, so
the influence of all of these tasks must be taken into account. A damage assessment is
made of what damage might be done by shedding a particular RPC, and is combined with
the benefit of how much power would be dropped if that RPC were switched off to
determine where the RPC falls in the list.
The LPLMS examines the currently active schedule generated by
MAESTRO collecting all of the subtasks to be performed during the time interval the LPL
will be active. These are used to determine which RPCs will be used. From these
subtasks and RPCs, the LPLMS uses the same weighting criteria as the scheduler uses to
determine the next subtask to schedule. This generates a priority for the subtask in
increasing order. Once this is completed, it only has to be reversed and sent to the LLPs.
5.6.3 User Interface
The Load Priority Maintenance screen provides the user the ability to inspect
load priority lists that have been generated by the LPLMS and transmitted to the power
system. No updating or modification operations are permitted. See Figures 5.6.3-1 and
5.6.3-2.
TASK III
5-90
TASK III
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February 1989
ThePriority DataBasedisplayswhena priority list wascreated,whenthat
list is effective, the orderedpriority list, and for eachcomponentin the priority list the
subtasksof theactivitiesthatareutilizing thatcomponentduring theeffectivetimeperiod.
Theusermaydisplayanypriority list thathasbeencreatedbytheLPLMS.
The Weightings is an informational display that shows what weighting
criteria wasusedin thedevelopmentof thepriority list andrangefrom 10-highestto 0-
lowest.
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Figure 5.6.3-1 Load Priority List Management Screen
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Figure 5.6.3-2 Load Priority List Management Help Screen
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5.7 Fault Management and Recovery
Automation of power management and distribution for SSM/PMAD
requires the ability to manage and recover from faults in an autonomous mode. Obviously,
without this ability, automation would be severely limited. Therefore, the power system
must accomplish comprehensive fault management including detection, recovery, cause
identification, system recovery and network protection.
The fault management and recovery aspects of SSM/PMAD are not an
isolated part of the automation software, but practically make up most of the automation
software. Fault management and recovery requires integration of all components of the
automation testbed. Detection of anomalous situations occurs at the switchgear in
microseconds. Responses needed in seconds occur at the LLPs. FRAMES diagnoses
faults in minutes and MAESTRO recovers from fault situations in tens of minutes. Thus
the fault management and recovery aspect of the automation software is functionally
apportioned in light of required response times for effective response and management.
As an example, a hard fault will be detected by an RPC when it trips as the
first line of defense against network problems. This status change data, along with other
sensor data, is transmitted to FRAMES. FRAMES recognizes symptoms in the data,
trying to match against known symptom sets (patterns). Depending on the symptom set,
the fault diagnosis software will either identify the cause, a set of possible causes, or
initiate some diagnostic switch manipulations which will lead to such identification. Switch
manipulations are constrained by a supervisory module containing MAESTRO and
information about load constraints.
There are three types of faults that may occur in the power network. A hard
fault is a situation physically causing a switch to trip, as well as broken components. A
soft fault is an illegal use of current not necessarily causing a switch to trip, for example, a
resistive short to ground. Finally, an incipient fault is a situation that will become a hard or
soft fault in a reasonably short period of time if nothing is done to avert it.
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The fault management and recovery software is conceptually divided into
three parts. First is the protection of the network by the smart switchgear and subsequent
detection of symptoms by the LLPs. Second is the recognition of a fault situation and
analysis of the fault by FRAMES. Third is the recovery of the fault situation by
MAESTRO. The first two are discussed in detail below. The third, MAESTRO, is
discussed in the section on resource scheduling.
Knowledge engineering for SSM/PMAD and particularly FRAMES was
done throughout the project. The knowledge engineering resulted in a fault and symptom
matrix that was used to develop the FRAMES software. This fault and symptom matrix
can be found in Appendix XI.
5.7.1 Low_st Level Processors
From a FRAMES perspective, lowest level processors are identical. LLPs
gather switch and sensor data from the power system hardware under their control. The
switch information is scanned to determine if switches have tripped. If a switch has
tripped, th e LLP m_ks the switch as out of service. Any switching operations on an out of
service switch are ignored. The LLP software then informs FRAMES of the hard fault. In
diagnosis, FRAMES may require more information from the power system network. If
so, FRAMES sends the appropriate LLPs a fault event list which manipulates the
switch(es) for faultisolafion. An LLP always responds with a fault event list response
containing the requested information. Inquiries to the LLPs are made until FRAMES
diagnoses the fault. When the fault has been diagnosed, FELES issues a contingency event
list and LPLMS issues a new priority list. Upon receipt and implementation of the
contingency event list, - the LLPs clear all temporarily out-of-service flags and resume
normal operations. Although LLP software looks identical from an external point of view,
there are some differences between load center (LC) and power distribution control unit
(PDCU) LLPs.
|
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LCs and PDCUs handle soft faults in somewhat different ways. A soft
fault, as mentioned earlier, is an illegal use of current. When a switch is scheduled it is
allotted a maximum current and power. If the allotted current is exceeded, a LC sheds the
load because it does not conform to the schedule. In this situation, the LC software
informs FRAMES of the illegal use of current and the remedial action taken. Conversely, a
PDCU will only inform FRAMES of the illegal use of current. To take remedial action
could affect as many as fourteen switches in the load center below the PDCU switch. The
PDCU software also looks for illegal uses of current within the PDCU using Kirchoff's
Current Law to find discrepancies. LLPs would not be able to handle hard or soft faults
without the intelligent power system hardware.
LLPs interface to the power system through a Switchgear Interface Control
(SIC) card. The SIC card communicates with fourteen Generic Controller (GC) cards.
Each GC card controls the switching operations of a connected switch. The four different
types of switches are: One kilowatt Remote Power Controller (RPC), three kilowatt RPC,
ten kilowatt Remote Controlled Circuit Breaker (RCCB), and a twenty-five kilowatt
Remote Bus Isolator (RBI). The RPCs and RCCBs will current trip if their hardware
limits are exceeded. This is done to protect the power system and give the automation
system time to correct the problem. The RPCs and RCCBs also return current sensor data
to the GC which is digitized and transmitted to the SIC. The SIC communicates with an
Analog to Digital (A/D) card which accepts up to sixteen voltage, current, and temperature
sensor inputs. The A/D card processes the analog sensor inputs and returns digitized RMS
voltage, RMS current, DC voltage, DC current, frequency, average power, instantaneous
power, power factor, and temperature data to the SIC card. All digitized data has eight bits
of accuracy. Use of this intelligent hardware through the SIC interface facilitates the
automation system.
5.7.2. Fault Recovery and Management Expert System
Xerox 1186.
overstresses
Conceptually, FRAMES is not simply an expert system residing on the
It is an extended assembly using smart switchgear to identify and classify
and to quickly disconnect them from the network. Local algorithmic
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controllers, the LLPs, gather the data and sensor values and transmit them to the Xerox
1186 for classification and diagnosis. FRAMES begins at the switches and ends at an
interface screen where it reportsstatus outputs. _uSthe_fault recovery andmanagement
software is a large conceptual piece of software. The expert system component for
classifying and diagnosing faults resides on the Xerox 1186 and is the component to be
discussed here as fault diagnosis.
5.7.2.1 Theory. of Operation
There are a number of issues involved in fault diagnosis in general. These
include: The computation of symptom sets, model based reasoning, single vs. multiple
faults, and how fault isolation is done. Each of these issues will be discussed here.
5.7.2.1.1 Symptom Sets
A symptom set is a set of symptoms that indicate a fault. To put it another
way, a fault gives rise to a set of symptoms. In fault diagnosis, these symptom sets may
be computed in a number of ways. One may have a model of the power system and
dynamically compute the possible symptom sets for any possible fault in the power system.
Alternatively, one may analyze all the possible faults in the power system beforehand and
save the dynamic computation for memory space instead. The benefit of dynamic
computation is to be able to compute symptom sets for unforeseen power system
topologies. In the static computation mode, if the power system topology changes
significantly, potentially large amounts of work are wasted and need to be redone.
Symptom sets are used for pattern matching in an attempt to determine what
fault may have occurred in the power system. Obviously, a symptom or set of symptoms
resulting fro m _ actual fault may indicate more than one possible fault. It is then :imp°rtant
to isolate the fault from among the various possibilities. Alternatively, it may be possible to
analyze a symptom set without pattern matching to all possible symptom sets, letting the
symptom set drive out the possible fault scenarios:
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In FRAMES, all the reasonable fault scenarios are analyzed and their
symptom sets computed. These are used within FRAMES to pattern match against to
determine possible fault situations.
5.7.2.1.2 Model Based Reasonin_
Similar trade-offs apply here as in the computation of symptom sets. In
general, the motivation for using model based reasoning is when all the fault scenarios are
not necessarily knowable beforehand. This usually happens when requirements are
changing or when the domain of reasoning is a dynamic domain. Model based reasoning is
usually used when reasoning from some sort of first principles is required.
For FRAMES this was not considered necessary. An analysis of the power
system was done and was also considered static. This analysis gave rise to the possible
symptom sets described above. As all the symptom sets were known beforehand, it did
not seem necessary to use model based reasoning.
5.7.2.1.3 Single vs. Multiple Faults
The issue of single vs. multiple faults is whether FRAMES will diagnose
those faults that occur singly, spaced out from one another, or if FRAMES will diagnose
independent and dependent faults occurring at or near the same time. Diagnosing multiple
faults is not a well understood problem. The dependent nature among faults greatly
increases the complexity of the situation. Furthermore, multiple simultaneous faults were
not considered very credible scenarios for the domain under consideration. For FRAMES,
single fault diagnosis is utilized. FRAMES also diagnoses certain classes of multiple
faults, masked faults. For example, if a switch's current sensor is broken and a short
appears below the switch, the switch above will trip on over current. FRAMES will
diagnose these kinds of faults.
There is another type of fault situation, cascaded faults, that applies to both
multiple faults and single faults. A cascaded fault situation is where a short circuit may
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arisebelow a 3k RPCcausingit to trip on a fast trip. Consequently all the load center
RPCs that were closed will also trip on under voltage. This is a cascade effect. To be
accurate, what is really being reported to the expert system on the Xerox is a set of
cascaded symptoms arising from a single fault in this example. Most faults will have
cascaded symptoms giving some indication of the fault. Thus, when FRAMES diagnoses
faults, it also includes those faults with cascaded symptoms.
5.7.2.1.4 F_01t I_lation
The issue of fault isolation is how to isolate where a fault occurred.
Symptoms may describe a large class of possible faults that could account for them.
Obviously, one does not want to hypothesize all the possible faults. Rather, one would
like to discriminate further between the possible faults. There are two basic mechanisms to
do this. One is to probe for values at various points in the power network. Obviously, in a
fully automated _syStem this is not easy to accomplish. The second basic method is to
manipulate the switches.
Switch manipulation is performed in FRAMES. Switch manipulation
provides for control of the state of faulted areas of the network, allowing testing by
opening:_ndCiosing: switches to produce_usefui_resu]ts. As sWitches are opened and
closed, data are collected from the results of these operations to further discriminate
between possible faults. Switch manipulation proves to be a very useful diagnostic tool in
power networks due to the hierarchical topology of the switches, for example, as in Space
Station Freedom.
5.7.2.2 Implementation
The SSM/PMAD power breadboard is essentially a/'adial or linear feed
from the RCCBs to the loads (the ring bus lies outside its jurisdiction). The radial feed
means that each RPC has exactly one parent, which greatly simplifies fault diagnosis. Note
that this would not be true under a more elaborate cross-strapping regime. Note also that
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RCCBshaveexactly two parentsbut sincetheydo not trip onundervoltage,that fact is
lessimportant.
Considerdividing thesystemwith thefollowing levels:
Level 1- loadcenterswitches(RPCs)
Level2 - PDCURPCs
Level3 - PDCURCCBs
Level4- RBIs
Level5- Source
Sinceall theRPCs(but not theRCCBs)will trip onundervoltagewhenits
line voltagedropsbelowa specifiedthreshold,akeyconsiderationfor diagnosisis what is
thehighestlevel (1-5) to report a symptom. In mostcasesthehighestlevel will report a
fast trip, I2t (overcurrent)or groundfault interrupt(gfi) andanyswitchbelow(i.e.closer
to the loads)will reporttripping onundervoltage. (Of course,only thoselower switches
thatwereclosedbeforethefault shouldreportanundervoltagetrip.)
5.7.2.2.1 (_0mponents That Can Cause Failures
The diagnostic software considers the following components and
subcomponents as capable of causing or having a failure.
5.7.2.2.1.1 Cables
Cables can have a high impedance short to structure or return (I2t), a low
impedance short to structure or return (fast trip), or a high impedance short to ground (gfi).
5.7.2.2.1.2 Switch Input Sl_ab
The cable-like portion of the switch at its input can have the same problems
as regular cables.
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5.7.2.2.1.3 Switch Ou _tput Stub
The cable-like portion of the switch at its output can have the same problems
as regular cables.
5.7.2.2.1.4 C0rr_nt Sen_or8 _and Current Comparators in Switches
The current sensors and current comparators in switches control the I2t, fast
trip, and gfi trip mechanisms. Failure in either the sensor or comparator could cause a
switch to trip when current was nominal and report I2t, fast trip, or gfi. Likewise, a failure
could cause the switch not to trip on a current anomaly when it should be reading an
abnormal current as nominal or by miscalculating the comparisons.
5.7.2.2.1.5 Voltage Sensors and Voltage Comparator_ in Switches
The voltage sensors and voltage comparators in switches control the under
voltage trip mechanism. Failure in either the sensor or compamtor could cause a switch to
trip on under voltage when voltage was actually nominal or vice versa, not tripping when
current was too low. While the latter is assumed to be rare, it would account for a switch
reporting an under voltage trip when the sibling and parent switches continue to draw
current (a shared cable would also account for this).
5.7.2.2.1.6 Eraseabl¢ Programmable Logic Device
The EPLD subsumed numerous functions including some mentioned above.
Since actual control of these functions is likely to be separated into individual components,
the diagnostic software assumes that either a single EPLD function will fail or the entire
chip will. If the entire chip fails, it could cause a switch to trip and report any of the
standard trip conditions except fast trip: I2t, gfi, and under voltage. Since its effects can
be so diverse, it would be useful to be able to discriminate a failed EPLD from other
possible causes. Fortunately, a failed EPLD will not communicate with the SIC at all.
This lack of communication will be found in the first step of manipulating switches. As it
turns out, this is the only failure that can be definitively pinpointed to a specific component.
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5.7.2.2.1.7 _s
The loadsareassumedto beableto causeanyof thecurrentirregularities
(andthus,trip conditions)thatcablescan. Loadsareconsideredto betheresponsibilityof
theloadproviderratherthanthepowersystemproper.
5.7.2.2.2 Numbers of Failures
It has been decided that multiple failures occurring simultaneously are not
credible. This leaves two categories of failttres: single point failures and two point failures
where one is a masked fault. A masked fault is an irregularity in a switch that causes it not
to trip in response to an excessive current but instead to propagate the excessive current up
to the switch's parent. The parent will then trip (if it did not, three failures would be
involved which is assumed to be unrealistic) and the original switch will subsequently trip
on under voltage. The resultant set of symptoms will look identical to those produced by,
for example, a cable fault above the original switch that creates the same magnitude and
type of current excess. The term "masked" is used since this type of failure could happen at
any point but will not manifest until the specific, faulted functionality is called for.
5.7.2.2.3 Sources of Additional Informiation
Beyond the original symptom set, there are two source of additional
information, only one of which is presently used.
It is possible that certain switches will not trip at all. Such a switch could
propagate an excessive current to its parent and, when its parent trips, also fail to trip on
under voltage. The failure to trip on under voltage is an "unreported" symptom. Once the
topmost component reporting a symptom has been identified, a quick calculation can
determine what all the reported symptoms should have been. (Essentially, any switch
below the topmost that was closed/enabled below the fault should report tripping on under
voltage.) Comparing these calculated symptoms to those actually reported will reveal any
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unreportedsymptoms. There shouldbe no more than one unreported symptom: an
unreportedsymptom reflects a maskedfault (probably a completeEPLD failure) and
credibility considerationslimit thenumberof maskedfaults to one,sincea maskedfault is
only revealedby asecondfault (typically excessivecurrentpropagatedto andthroughthe
switchwith themaskedfault). It is not clearthat thescenariowith unreportedsymptoms
canactuallyhappen(i.e.,thattheEPLDwill malfunctionin thatway) andthesoftwarefor
handlingthiscontingencyis notused.
The second source of additional information is the manipulation of
switches. This is the a powerful diagnostictool usedby FRAMES but unfortunately it
provides limited information. When the topmostsymptomis in a load center,switch
manipulation will either reducethe numberof possible causesfrom five to three, for
example, or it will not reduce the numberat all, depending on the responseto the
manipulation.Whenthe topmostsymptomis in thePDcu, manipulatingswitchescan
distinguishbetweensinglepo_ntfailuresandatwo faultscenariowith amaskedfault, and,
in thecaseof the latter,potentiallydeterminewhich lower circuit thefaultsarein. In only
two cases,however, can manipulating switches isolate the Causeto an individual
component.Theentiremanipulationprocessis discussedin detail in subsequentsections.
5.7.2.2.4 Kinds 9f Failures
The simplest fault scenario occurs when a load center RPC reports tripping
on excessive current (I2t, t_ast trip, or gfi) and no other component reports any anomaly.
The cause is one of the following: high impedance short to structure/return, low impedance
short to structure/return or high impedance short to ground in the RPC switch output, the
cable connecting the RPC to the load, or in the load itself; or in the current sensor in the
RPC or current comparator in theRPC. -(Note: the type of short is a function of the type of
trip reported, as indicated earlier.)
There are five possible causes and switch manipulation is the only means
available to the system to obtain more information. The switch manipulation in all cases
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follows a set pattern. Since there is only one switch involved here, only the first step of
that pattern is used.
An "open" command is sent to the load center RPC. If it does not respond
at all, its EPLD is malfunctioning. This is assumed to be the cause of the current trip as
well and the diagnostic process ends. If the switch opens, then a "close" command is sent.
If the RPC is closed and it trips with the same symptom no further discrimination can be
made.
Several scenarios are possible and all five of the possible causes are
plausibly implicated. First, even if the load did not resume current consumption, a short in
the connecting cable or the switch output cable would retrip the RPC. Likewise, depending
on how the EPLD was malfunctioning, it might renip the RPC even in the absence of
current. Similarly, malfunctioning in either the current sensor or comparator could retrip
the RPC with or without current flowing. Finally, if the problem was in the load and the
load restarted, it would retrip the RPC.
Suppose, on the other hand, the RPC does not retrip when it is reclosed, it
can be concluded that the cause is not a short in the switch output cable or in the connecting
cable. The other three remain plausible. If the load did not restart (and the SSM/PMAD
has no way to monitor the load other than the presence of current across its RPC), then
there could still be a problem in either the load itself of the current sensor or comparator.
(Note that if the load restarts, as indicated by current across the RPC, and
the RPC does not nip, then there is an ambiguity: all the conditions of the first trip have
been replicated but the RPC reacts differently. This may reflect an intermittent failure that
FRAMES is not designed to address. Also note that although FRAMES is not designed
specifically to diagnose multiple faults and certain other cases, FRAMES does still report
the situation at which it could not determine a diagnosis. Switches may still be taken out of
service in these situations. In all situations, information is displayed on the FRAMES
interface indicating the diagnosis status.)
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A morecomplexscenarioentailsthetopmostsymptombeinga 3k RPCin
thePDCU trippingonexcessivecurrent(fasttrip, I2t, or gfi). The singlepoint causesthat
could causethis are: high impedanceshort to structure/return,low impedanceshort to
structure/returnor high impedanceshort to groundin the PDCURPC switchoutput, the
cableconnectingthePDCU RPCanda loadcenterRPC,or in a loadcenterRPCswitch
output, as well asthe current sensoror comparatorin the PDCU RPC. The two point
causes(with maskedfault) are: acompleteEPLDfailure in a loadcenterRPCor acurrent
sensoror comparatorfailure in a loadcenterRPCcoupledwith oneof thepossibleshorts
of the singlepoint failure. Note thatthesetwo point causesareactuallyclassesof causes,
eachclasscontainingup to 14members(onefor eachof the loadcenterRPCson thebus
below the3k RPC in thePDCU - in the worstcasethey wereall closedbeforethefault
occurred. Thus there are 3x3, or 9 classesof two point failures and 9x14, or 126
individual two point failures. Note further that for singlepoint causes,thereare 14 load
centerRPCswhoseswitch input cablescould havefailures, sotherearenot five, but 18
singlepoint failures. Thusthereis atotalof 126+18,or 144possiblecauses.
Diagnosis proceedsby manipulating switches in accordancewith set
protocol (the fixed andradial natureof thebreadboardobviatesthe needfor anadaptive
procedure). First the PDCU RPCand all the load centerRPCsarecommandedopen,
partly io assurethebread_ard is in a knownstatefor testingandpartly to testtheEPLD.
If any of thesefails to respond,all testingstopsand that switch is assumedto have a
completelyfailed EPLD which is thesinglecause.Note: this might not be true if a load
center....RPCfails to respond i t may be thecasethat thereis a secondfault, a hard short,
below that RPC. The EPLD:probiemis actingasamaskedfailure soevenif thatRPC is
replaCedi'itwil! trip againwhenenabled.
=
If all switches respond to the open commands, the PDCU RPC is
commanded closed. This is an important step since it discriminates between single point
failures and twO point failures wlth masked faults. If the PDCU RPC retrips with the same
symptom when it is closed, the problem is a single point failure. All load center RPCs
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have been opened so the circuits below them are isolated and cannot propagate an excessive
current flow upward (there should, in fact, be no current flow whatsoever in those
circuits). Thus, the problem must be in or between the PDCU RPC and the switch input
cables of the load center RPCs as listed above (note that this includes the PDCU RPC's
current sensor and comparator).
If, on the other hand, the PDCU RPC does not retrip when it is closed, then
either the problem is in the PDCU RPC's current sensor or current comparator (which in
this case will not show up until a load center switch is closed and a connected load begins
to draw current) or it is a two point failure involving a masked fault in one of the 14 load
center RPCs and a hard short in the circuit beneath it. (Note: not all 14 load center RPCs
may be candidates - only those that were closed before the fault occurred.)
In this circumstance, manipulation proceeds with the load center RPCs.
Each one is closed and, if it does not cause retripping, opened in turn. They are tested in
isolation to assure that only one RPC and the circuit beneath it are tested at a time. If one of
these RPCs causes retripping, one of two things is the case. The problem could be a
masked fault in that switch together with a hard short in that RPC's switch output cable, in
the cable connecting it to the load, or in the load itself. No further narrowing of
possibilities can be made without either manually changing out the switch, cable and/or
load or manually testing these components with instruments (the latter might not be
possible with the load).
In addition, if this load center RPC is the first to be closed, that results in a
current draw of sufficient magnitude (e.g. whose load restarts), an additional hypothesis
must be added to the above set. It may be that the current sensor or comparator in the
PDCU RPC may be faulted in such a way that it reacts to any non-zero current (which is
also presumably above some level, particularly to the fault in question) as an overcurrent.
The only way to know whetheror not this is a]_ossibility is to monitor for current flow
each time a load center RPC is closed. Current software at the LLP level does not collect
this data, so FRAMES at the higher level does not track whether or not a load center RPC
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thatcausedretripping is the first to causecurrentdraw. Even if it is not thefirst to draw
currenthowever,it maybe thefirst to draw anin-rangecurrentthatis sufficiently largeto
causethetripping.
If noneof the loadcenterRPCscausesretripping,threepossibilitiesremain.
Thefirst is an "overload":while no individual loadcenterRPC(or, actually,its connected
load) wasdrawing enoughcurrentto makeit trip, someof them aredrawing more than
they werescheduledto in sucha way thatcollectively the loadcenterRPCsaredrawing
enoughto trip thePDCU RPC(3.3K worth). FRAMES exploresthis possibility at this
point. All the load centerswitchesareopen(eachwasopenedafter it wasclosedin the
previousportionof theswitchmanipulationprocedure).All therelevantswitches(theones
that wereclosedbeforethe fault) areclosedin sequence.If, at somepoint during these
closingseverythingtrips againin theoriginal pattern,it is assumedthattheproblemis, in
fact,anoverloadandthatsomeif notall of thecontributingswitchesarein thesetthathas
alreadybeenclosed.
Finally, if all therelevantloadcenterRPCshavebeenclosedandnothing
has retripped, there are two possibilities. One is that someof the loads beneaththe
switchesthatwerere-enabledwherelatched,thatis, theyshutthemselvesoff whencurrent
wascut off dueto undervoltagetripping andthey did not restartwhenthe RPCwas re-
enabled.Theotherpossibility existsonly if anyof therelevantloadswerenot restartable
(i.e. if theoperatordid notgive permissionto testwhendescribingtheload/activity to the
scheduler).In thiscasetheseloadcircuitswerenot tested. It is thuspossiblethat anyof
theseRPCs,connectingcablesor loadshadfaults thatwouldcausetheoriginalproblem. It
is alsopossiblethatanyor all of theseloadscouldhavebeencontributingto anoverload.
Software Configuration
FRAMES is implemented on the Xerox 1186 computer using the LISP
programming language and utilizing Portable Common Loops (PCL is an implementation
of CLOS and is not related in any way to Xerox LOOPS) for object oriented programming
primitives. The structural configuration of FRAMES is given in Figure 5.7.2.2.5-1:
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Figure 5.7.2.2.5-1 FRAMES Software Configuration
In the figure there are five main components making up FRAMES.
FRAMES interfaces to the rest of the world by using two streams: The FELES Symbolics
3620 D stream and the Motorola VME/10 breadboard stream. All autonomy
communication occurs through these streams. Status information, diagnoses, etc. occur
through the screen and keyboard as described in the user interface section.
The I/O module is responsible for handling the communications to the other
computers. It sets up transactions for transmission and queues them up on an output
queue. It also receives transactions and parses them into internal representations. These
transactions then get queued up on a receive queue.
The Process Data module receives transactions from the other computers
and processes them. This module is entirely data driven. Each transaction invokes a
different piece of code for its handling. Transactions from the LLPs mostly consist of
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switch and sensor data. These data are then stored in the model of the power network and
the local database for use by the Fault Diagnosis module. Other transactions, for example,
the Ready? and Event List transactions from the Symbolics 3620 D also get processed here.
The Domain Model module is an object oriented representation of the power
system network. This is analogous to the visual representation given on the screen.
Cables, switches, and loads are all objects and have a variety of slots associated with them
for storing fault data, switch status, etc.
The Database module is a simple database used for organizing the data
FRAMES uses for operation. There are basic store and retrieve functions associated with
this database. When data are stored they are also time stamped. Data are never overwritten
and previous elements of data may be accessed by specifying the appropriate time stamp.
Finally, the Fault Diagnosis module is the main portio n of the automation
software of FRAMES for handling fault situations. This is where the expert/heuristic
knowledge is stored. As symptoms from the LLPs are detected FRAMES is triggered to
analyze the symptoms and respond appropriately. FRAMES sends down fault event lists
to the LLPs when it decides to further isolate the possible location of a fault. When a fault
is diagnosed, FRAMES communicates the appropriate information back to the Symbolics
3620 D.
5.7.2.3 User Interface
The user interface to FRAMES is depicted in Figure 5.7.2.3-1. The user
interface consists of six distinct windows.
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Figure 5.7.2.3-1 FRAMES User Interface
title.
The title window is located at the top of the screen and simply displays the
The main window depicts a schematic of the power system being modeled
and operated autonomously. A large number of the objects on the schematic are mouse
sensitive. Each of the load centers and subsystem distributors may be selected by pressing
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down and holding the left mouse button to get a menu of operations. The load centers and
subsystem distributors may be closed and opened simply for viewing purposes. Each of
the sensors may be selected and examined for current and voltage. The switches may also
be examined providing current, voltage, switch state, and tripped information. Any recent
data transmitted from an LLP about a switch may also be examined from the switch. The
cables may also be examined letting the user know if they are powered. There is a second
mode to operation of the schematic window. In super-user mode, the various objects may
also be inspected and modified. This operation alters the state of the model and thus no
longer guarantees correct system operation. To enter super-user mode one types: (super-
user t) at the interaction window.
The Menu window, below the schematic window, provides for exiting and
reinitializing FRAMES. These options are selected simply by left clicking on them.
The Legend window describes the meaning of the symbols that appear on
the Schematic window.
The Data Monitor window is used to display switch data coming from the
LLPs. it is simply a monitor window for watching what data the system is receiving.
These data are also stored in the database and are also accessible through examination of the
switches.
Finally, the Interaction window is where system operations and diagnoses
are displayed. As FRAMES recognizes a fault in the system, it displays messages
describing what it is currently doing, e.g. opening and closing switches. When FRAMES
has made a diagnosis, the diagnosis is also displayed here.
5.8 Power Distribution Management
Power distribution within the SSM/PMAD breadboard is functionally
broken down into five separate categories. First, the power distribution control unit which
distributes power to the load centers. Second, load centers which distribute power to the
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loads. Third, switchgearwhichphysicallycontrolstheflow of power. Fourth,automation
which is comprisedof thehardware,interfacesandsoftwarerequiredto runa loadcenter
or aPDCU. And last,redundancymanagementwhich iscontrolledat theloadcenterlevel.
Theseareaswithin powerdistributionmanagementshallnow bediscussed.
5.8.1 Power Distribution Control Unit
A power distribution control unit (PDCU) controls power flow to six load
centers. At the top level of the power system, a PDCU has three, 25kW remote bus
isolators (RBIs) to control power flow from the source. Below the RBIs are two, 10kW
remote control circuit breakers (RCCBs). And below each RCCB there are three, 3kW
remote power controllers (RPCs). The PDCU also contains thirteen sensors of various
power ratings throughout the architecture. These sensors facilitate monitoring the power
flow into, within, and out of the PDCU. The function of the PDCU is to provide power to
load centers and keep each load center's power independent. Furthermore, each load center
may be isolated from the source at the PDCU RPC which feeds it. In this manner, the
PDCU monitors, controls, and distributes power to the load centers.
5.8.2 Load Center
A load center monitors and controls attached loads. Load centers come in
two varieties, those which contain lkW RPCs and those which contain 3kW RPCs. A
3kW load center is called a subsystem distributor and a lkW load center is referenced as
just a load center. Both load centers and subsystem distributors perform the same
functions. A load center contains twenty-eight, IkW RPCs and draws power from two
PDCUs. Fourteen RPCs draw their power from each PDCU. This means there are two
power busses within any load center. At the input of each power bus, a sensor monitors
power flow into the load center. This sensor is controlled by the load center. With this
sensor and the RPCs, the load center may control whether or not a load receives power and
monitor how much current it draws.
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5.8.3 Switchgear
Switchgear is a general term for all the power system hardware which takes
the commands and gathers data for PDCUs and load centers. This hardware shall now be
described in greater detail.
5.8.3.1 Switchgear Interface Control
A switchgear interface control (SIC) card communicates with an LLP,
fourteen generic controller (GC) cards, and an analog to digital (A/D) card. The SIC has
nineteen different commands which it is designed to handle. The SIC receives these
commands from its controlling LLP. The commands are described in the SIC/LLP
interface control document in Appendix VII. The SIC communicates with the fourteen
GCs for switching and trip information. Each GC may control an RBI, an RCCB, or an
RPC. The SIC also communicates with the A/D card and receives sixteen voltage, current,
and temperature sensor data inputs.
5.8.3.2 Generic Controller
A generic controller (GC) card controls the switching operation of an RBi,
RCCB, or:RPc and returns the switch status information to the SIC card. The GC
receives command data information from the SIC and commands the switch on or off or
does noihing based on the C0rrimand. Additionally, the GC card processes analog signal
information passed to it from the switch and decides whether or not to trip the switch.
Conditions which warrant the GC tripping off a switch are Under Voltage, Over Current
(I2t), Surge Current, Ground Fault, or Over Temperature. Moreover, the GC contains an
Over Temperature warning, a current limit switch turn on processor, and zero voltage and
current crossing detectors.
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5.8.3.3 Analog to Digital Card
The analog to digital (A/D) card accepts sixteen voltage, current, and
temperature sensor inputs and returns proportional digitized information to the SIC card.
The A/D card processes the analog sensor inputs and returns digitized root mean square
(RMS) voltage, RMS current, DC voltage, DC current, frequency, average power,
instantaneous power, power factor, and temperature data to the SIC card.
5.8.3.4 Romote PQwCr Controller
A remote power controller (RPC) provides 5 amperes (lkW) or 15 amperes
(3kW) at 208 Vrms, 20 kHz to any resistive, capacitive, or inductive load. The switch is
single pole single throw (SPST) with a main solid state switch, a parallel current limiting
switch, and a relay isolator. The RPC provides the GC with analog current, voltage,
ground fault, temperature sensor inputs. In addition, the RPC provides the GC with
positional information for the solid state switch and the relay isolator. The RPC also
contains a self-protection circuit to protect itself from a quick current surge greater than
400% of its normal peak current. The GC commands the RPC on and off.
5.8.3.5 Remote Controlled Circui_ Breaker
A remote controlled circuit breaker (RCCB) provides 50 amperes (10kW) at
208 Vrms, 20 kHz to up to 3 fully loaded 3kW RPCs. The switch is SPST and consists of
a large relay which switches both the positive and return sides of the 20 kHz power. The
RCCB may be switched "hot" and provides the GC with analog current sensor data and
relay status information. The GC commands the RCCB on and off.
5.8.3.6 Remote Bus Isolator
A remote bus isolator (RBI) provides 25kW, 208 Vrms at 20kHz to the
RCCB switches. The switch is SPST and consists of a large relay which switches both the
positive and return sides of the 20kHz power. The RBI may not be switched "hot" and
provides the GC with relay status information only. The GC commands the RBI on and
off.
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5.8.3.7 Switchsear Calibration Aigorithms in LLP Software
=Within flae LLP s0fiWare, c0nx/ersion constant Vaiues fordigitized switch
current and sensor=infomaafion are hard coded. Witlain the PDCU there are thirteen
sensors; theSegensors are rated for i5, 50. and 125 amps. The 15 amp sensors are below
the 3kW RPCs within the PDCU. The 50 amp sensors are below the RCCBs. The rest of
the sensors are of the 125 amp variety. The load centers contain two sensors of the 15 amp
type. The RCCBs and RPCs all provide switch current data based on a 10kW, 3kW or
lkW power rating. The LLP software takes the digitized data and produces the appropriate
value based on system topology.
At present, the LLPs receive digitized data which at full scale is 200% of the
rated current or power. So for the Switches, the conversion factors are as follows:
lkW RPC 0.377 dA (deciAmps)
div (division)
3kW RPC 1.13 dA
=div
10kW RBI 3.77 dA
div
The sensor data are converted as follows:
Vrms 1.63 V
div
Irms .118 A
div
(15Asensor)
.392 A
div
.980 A
div
(50 A sensor)
(125 A sensor)
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Note: A division is defined asone least significant bit of the returned
digitized byte from the SIC card. The unit of deciAmps is used becauseof the
communicationprotocolwith theSymbolics3620D. OnedeciAmpequalsonetenthof an
Amp.
5.8.4 Ao_omation
Automation as it relates to power distribution covers three topics. First, the
hardware platforms under which the algorithmic software executes. Second, the interfaces
that connect the hardware platforms with each other, the switchgear, and the high level
expert systems. And last, the actual algorithmic software. Although scheduling and fault
management and recovery come from the expert systems, this is where the power system is
monitored and controlled.
5.8.4.1 A0tomation Hardware
One of the two platforms for automation hardware is the Motorola VME/10.
The Motorola VME/10 is a Motorola 68000 based, 32 bit machine, with multi-tasking
capability and running the VersaDos operating system. The Motorola VME/10 algorithmic
software is written in Pascal. This computing platform contains a VME bus backplane into
which extra VME cards may be added. In the back of the automation Motorola VME/10
there are 2 MVME-331 intelligent communications controllers, 2 MVME-705 6 port serial
communications cards, an extended memory card, and an MVME-400 dual port RS-232
serial communications card. The communications algorithmic controller (CAC) software is
based on the Motorola VME/10.
The other platform is the lowest level processor (LLP). The LLP is
comprised of three VME bus cards and a VME bus rack mount chassis. The first card is an
MVME-107 68010 based single board computer with 512k Bytes of on board random
access memory. The processor on this card gives the LLP the computing horsepower of a
32 bit processor. The second card is an MVME-331 intelligent communications controller.
This card communicates with the MVME-107 over the VME bus and directly to the
MVME-705 card. Last, the MVME-705 6 port serial communications card is controlled by
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the MVME-331 card. The load center and PDCU software running on the LLP platforms
was also developed in Pascal under PDOS.
5.8.4.2 interfaces
Several interfaces exist within the automation system which permit data
transactions. The CAC software on the Motorola VME/10 communicates with FRAMES
on the Xerox 1186 over an RS-232 communication link through the MVME-400 card. The
CAC software also transacts with the LLPs running load center on PDCU software. This
communications link is RS-422 and passes through MVME-331 and MVME-705 cards at
both ends. In addition, the LLPs have two more RS-422 links using four wire operation to
the switchgear. To conclude, there are three data system interfaces between the switchgear
and FRAMES.
5.8.4.3
Algorithmi c software may be broken down into three distinct subSystems.
First, there is the communications algorithmic=controller software on the Motorola
VME/10. Second, the LLPs running loadcenter algorithmic software. Last, the LLPs
running power distribution control unit software. The functionality of these different
alg0rith_c software systems shall now be discussed.
5.8.4.3.1 Communications Algorithmic Controller Software
The communications algorithmic controller (CAC) software runs on the
Motorola VME/10 and operates primarily as a parser and server for the LLPs. All
messages from FRAMES, LPLMS, and FELES directed to the LLPs must pass through
the CAC software before distribution to the LLPs. These messages have a global frame of
reference and the CAC must parse ou t each message for every LLP. In this manner, each
LLP only receive-s messages with info_ai_0npertinent to its local frame of reference.
Conversely, when an LLP sends a message to FRAMES, the CAC software inserts the
global address of the LLP at the beginning of the message. The message FRAMES
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receives has local information but is globally located. To conclude, the CAC software
provides an interface between local LLP software and global expert systems.
5.8.4.3.2 Load Center Algorithmic Software
The load center (LC) software commands and monitors the switches within
its domain. The LC algorithmic software is initially downloaded to the LLPs from the
CAC and sent an event list, priority list, and time list. At this point the LC software enters
its control loop. First, the software updates the event list and priority list, if necessary,
and performs any scheduled operations in the event list. Next, the software strobes the
topology hardware for all switch and sensor data. Then, the software inspects the switch
and sensor data for hard faults and anomalous conditions. The software also computes
short term statistics from the data. If switches have been commanded on or off, or if an
anomalous condition or hard fault has occurred, the LC software informs FRAMES and
receives any new instructions. If a new message has come down from the CAC, it is
processed. At this point, the cycle repeats. The LC software performs as an intelligent
slave commanding and monitoring the topology hardware for the upper level expert
systems.
5.8.4.3.3 Power Distribution Control Unit Algorithmic Software
The power distribution control unit (PDCU) software commands and
monitors the switches within its domain. The PDCU algorithmic software is initially
downloaded to the LLPs from the CAC and sent an event list and time list. At this point the
PDCU software enters its control loop. First, the software updates the event list, if
necessary, and performs any scheduled operation s in the event list. Next, the software
strobes the topology hardware for all switch and sensor data for hard faults and anomalous
conditions. The software also computes short term statistics from the data and searches for
soft faults based on Kirchoff's Current Law. If an anomalous condition or hard fault has
occurred, the PDCU software informs FRAMES and receives any new instructions. If a
new message has come down from the CAC, it is processed. At this point, the cycle
repeats. The PDCU software performs an intelligent slave commanding and monitoring the
topology hardware for the upper level expert systems.
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The load centerand power distribution control unit softwarediscussed
abovecontains many proceduresand functions. Someof thesefunctions have been
flowchartedwith visualcontrol logic representations(VCLRs). Many of the VCLRs are
thesamefor loadcenterandPDCU software.Thosewhichdo differ, aresolabeled. The
following VCLRs areincludedin AppendixIX:
1. LCMAIN - Loadcentermainprogram.
2. PDCUMAIN - Powerdistributioncontrolunitmainprogram.
3. ALGORITHMS - Checkswitchesandsensorsfor trips and
anomalousconditions.
4. CURRTIME - Returnspresentmissiontimein seconds.
5. CVTDAYANDSEC- ReturnsJuliandayandsecondsfrom dateand
time.
6. CV'ITIME - Returnnumericalvaluesfrom systemdateandtime.
7. GETYIME - Getsystemdateandtime.
8. SETCLOCK- Setsystemtime anddateandstorestartof missiontime
anddate.
9. CALCENERGY- Computepowersystemperformancestatistics.
10. DOSCHEDULE- Implementneweventandpriority listsandexecute
events.
11. GETALLDATA - Getswitchandsensordatafrom switchgear.
12. MANUAL MODE- TranslateMotorolaVME/10commandsto SIC
card.
13. UPDATECONTINGENCYLIST - Updatesschedulewith a
contingencylist.
14. UPDATEPRIORITIES- Updatespriority list.
15. UPDATESCHEDULE- Buffersneweventlist andsets
implementationtime.
16. CHANGESCHEDULE- Implementsneweventlist.
17. INIT_BUF_QUEUE- Initializeseventlist bufferqueue.
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18. INSERT_SCHED- Insertsaneventlist in bufferqueue.
19. REMOVE_BUFFER- Removesabuffer from thequeue.
20. CONFIGURE_SICPORTS- ConfiguresSIC ports.
21. SEND/RECEIVESICDATA - SendsandreceivesSICdata.
22. CMNDSWlTCH - Turnson/off switchesandsetstrip flags
accordingly.
23. LOADSHED- Loadsheddingbasedonpriority.
24. REDSW- Redundantswitching.
25. CHANGESWITCH STATE- Changepowerlimits on aswitch.
26. SWITCH-ON - Turnon switch.
27. UNCONDITIONAL OFF- Turnoff switch.
28. DECODE- DecryptsMotorolaVME/10communicationincoming.
29. ENCODE- EncryptsMotorolaVME/10 communicationoutgoing.
30. GETMotorolaVME/10DATA - AssignsVME/10 inputnextdata
spacein buffer.
5.8.5 Rcxlundancy Management
Certain loads require redundant sources of power to make sure they keep
operating. The load centers power redundant loads with one switch off each power bus
within the load center. If a switch trips with a load which is redundant and the LLP has
permission to switch to redundant, it attempts to power the redundant switch. If sufficient
power is available on the redundant bus, the redundant switch is powered. If lower
priority loads may be shed to provide enough power for the redundant switch, the loads are
shed and the redundant switch is powered. If there is not enough power available, the
redundant switch is not powered. This method of redundant switching allows for failure of
a power bus, since the redundant switch is on the redundant power bus. Load centers are
in control of redundant switching and providing redundant power to loads.
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5.9 Operation Consideraliions
The operation of the ACM/PMAD involves a complex _set of user and
system interactions, both with the hardware and the software. The current implementation
provides quite an open system architecture. Careful consideration should be exercised in
operating the system in order to assure personnel safety and system integrity. The system
is built around a 20 kHz, 208 volt source which can be dangerous if not operated properly.
=
The present system has the capability for extension to handle multiple faults.
It currently handles only single faults with predictable outcomes. When setting up system
operation regimes, single fault scenarios should be used. The lowest level hardware
activated switching should work under multiple faults, but FRAMES may try to perform
exotic switch testing activities for which there needs to be knowledge base enhancement for
reasonable and assured performance.
Communication of switch activity arrives at the Xerox 1186 in what may
appear to be an extended amount of time. However, the systemis reacting to the presence
of data in a reasonable amount of time when the integration of the information at the CAC
and the FRAMES is considered.;
5.10 Breadboard _ming Considerations
When automating the breadboard, certain timing considerations must be
addressed. First, switching operations within any event list are treated separately. This
leads to events being processed sequentially and therefore events scheduled for the same
timearenot executed simultaneously. B ecaus e the automation system is distributed, the
LLPs do not switch at the same time or necessarily in the same order. Hence, a load center
switch could switch before its corresponding switch in the PDCU giving erroneous under
voltage faults. For this reason, the PDCU switches are initially powered on and PDCU
event lists only change the value of scheduled power through a given switch. Last, each
access to the SIC card can take as much as 2 1/4 seconds (the timeout). As a result, each
additional access to the switchgear increases the control loop cycle time. Timing within a
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distributedautomatedprocessingsystemcanhaveseriousconsequencesif not considered
andaddressedaheadof time.
There are also automation system timing constraints which must be
considered. On the averageit takessevento tensecondsfor a changein switchposition
within anLLP to filter backup to theFRAMESinterface. However,FRAMES mayonly
processonetransactionat atimeandthiscouldlengthenthetimeit takesfor LLP datato be
processed.It takesapproximatelytensecondsfor FRAMESto processatransactionfrom
theLLPs andbe readyfor thenext transaction.WhenFRAMESprobestheLLPs for fault
isolation datait could takeup to aminute andone-halfbeforethe SIC dataarereturned.
This timetoo,couldbeextendedif FRAMESis busyprocessingatransactionfrom another
LLP. Naturally, with moreLLPs, the probability of FRAMES receiving intermediary
transactionsincreases.All datapresentedin this sectionis empiricalin naturefrom testing
performedon thebreadboard.
5.11 Manual Override
It is desirable in an automated system for human beings to be able to take
over control of the system. In the event that the automated system fails, it is necessary for
a user to be able to take control. This control on SSM/PMAD comes through a manual
override interface. When in manual mode of operation, the user may access the entire
breadboard. This means the user may turn on or off and have control over all switches
manually. Moreover, the user must have working knowledge of the power system because
switching PDCU switches can have major consequences on load centers. The user also
has access to all breadboard sensors. This form of manual intervention removes
automation from the breadboard, but permits a user to direcdy control the breadboard.
5.11.1 Operation
The manual mode of operation interface is accessed at the Motorola
VME/10. When a command is entered at the interface, the Motorola VME/10 converts the
command to the appropriate four byte command string and sends it to the appropriate LLP.
The four byte commands are defined in the SIC/LLP interface control document in
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Appendix VII. Upon receipt of the commandstring at the LLP, the LLP forwards the
commandto the SIC cardandwaits for aresponse.When theresponsecomes,theLLP
returns the data to the Motorola VME/10. The Motorola VME/10 takesthis dataand
displaysit to theuserinterfacescreen.Manualmodeof operationdirectly accessestheSIC
cardandinterpretstheresponses.
5.11.2 Implementation
The manual mode interface was implemented with ease of use in mind. The
entire user interface is menu-driven. Each menu gives the user the ability to change the
LLP and SIC being accessed. Each sub menu defaults to returning to the main menu.
Each menu gives the user the option of shutting off all switches on the currently designated
LLP and SIC. The manual mode user interface implementation was created to facilitate
user access to the breadboard.
5.11.3 User Interface
The manual mode user interface may be accessed after tile initial event list,
priority list, and time list have been received at the LLPs. The interface is initiated by
pressing a carriage return at the Communications Algorithmic Controller (CAC) when in
normal operation. The following menu will appear on the CAC monitor upon entry into
manual mode-
l
!
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MANUAL OVERRIDE MENU
1. Switchgear Interface Card (SIC) RESET
2. Generic Card (GC) SELECT
3. Switch, Power Sensor, & Temp Sensor DATA
4. Temperature Sensor MENU
5. Switch MENU
6. Power Sensor MENU
7. Select LLP
8. Select SIC
9. KILL all Switches
10. QUIT
SELECT A FUNCTION (1 TO 10)
The user must then select an LLP before performing any operations on that
LLP. This selection process notifies the LLP software to enter its manual mode procedure
and notifies the CAC of which LLP to query. The CAC will also inform the selected LLPs
of exit from manual mode so they may recycle their software.
The user interface also contains three sub-menus which will now be
discussed. First, the temperature sensor menu gives the user access to all temperature data
from the selected LLP and SIC. The menu that appears on the CAC monitor is as follows:
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TEMPERATURE SENSOR MENU
1. All temperature sensors DATA
2. MONITOR all temperature sensors
3. KILL all Switches
4. Select LLP
5. Select SIC
6. Manual Override Menu RETURN (default)
SELECT A FUNCTION (1 TO 6)
Second, the user might select the switch
following menu:
SWITCH MENU
menu which furnishes the
1. Switch(es) RESET
2. Conditional Switch(es) ON
3. Conditionai Switch(es) OFF
4. UNconditional Switch(es) ON
5. UNconditional Switch(es) (OFF)
6. SELECTED Switch DATA N Times
7. All Switches DATA N Times
8. CONTINUOUSLY switch switch
9. MONITOR selected switch
10. Select LLP
11. Select SIC
12. KILL all Switches
13. Manual Override Menu RETURN (default)
TASK III
5-124
TASK HI
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February 1989
SELECTA FUNCTION (1TO 13)
This menuallows theuserto turn onor off anyswitchor groupof switches
on theselectedLLP andSIC. Likewise, theusermaymonitor thestateof anyswitchon
theselectedLLP andSIC. Last,theusercouldselectthepowersensormenu. Thismenu
allows theuserto monitorthepowersensorsandget thepowerfactordatafor anysensor.
Thismenulooksasfollows:
POWER SENSOR MENU
1. SELECTED Sensor DATA N Times
2. ALL Sensors DATA
3. Power Factor DATA
4. MONITOR selected power sensor
5. KILL all Switches
6. Select LLP
7. Select SIC
8. Manual Override Menu RETURN (default)
SELECT A FUNCTION (1 TO 8)
All of the menus have the option of selecting a new LLP and a new SIC,
providing easy manipulation of the breadboard.
5.12 ACMPMAD Test Plan
This is the Task III Test Plan.
5.12.1 GENERAL
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5.12.1.1 P...urpose of the Test Plan
tO:
The Test Plan for ACMPMAD, contract NAS 8-36433, program is written
1. Provide guidance for the management and technical effort necessary
throughout the test period.
5.12.2
o Establish a comprehensive test plan and communicate to the user the
nature and extent of the tests to provide a basis for evaluation of the
system.
Project References
The documents utilized by this contract are:
1. Contract Agreement, NAS 8-36433, dated June 25, 1985.
2. Software Development Plan for ACM/PMAD, Revision A, dated
February 1987.
. SSM/PMAD Breadboard Usage Plan, MCR-88-624, dated September
1988.
4. LLP/SIC Interface Document, dated August 1988.
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5.12.3 Acron_a_
AI Artificial Intelligence
ACMPMAD Automation of Common Module Power Management and
Distribution
CM/PMAD Common Module/Power Management and Distribution
FRAMES Fault Recovery and Management Expert System
LLP Lowest Level Processor
LPL Load Priority List
LPLMS Load Priority List Maintenance System
MB Megabyte
MSFC Marshall Space Flight Center
RPC Remote Power Controller
SIC Switchgear Interface Card
SSM/PMAD Space Station Module Power Management and
Distribution
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5.12.4
section.
Equipment Requirements
The hardware and software required to run the tests are identified in this
5.12.4.1 Hardware
The SSM/PMAD communications architecture (Figure 5.12.4.1-1) is
ixERox!°s232t v.E,,0_
'Ill
identified below:
._. __ _,
SYMBOLICS ] Ethernet
RS422
,u_ F
Figure 5.12.4.1-1 SSM/PMAD Communications Architecture
1. Symbolics 3620 D 3640.
2. Xerox 1186 AI workstation with CLOS development environment with
3.5 MB RAM, 80 MB Hard Disk and IBM PC Floppy Output
Capability.
1. Motorola VME-10 development system.
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below:
The SSM/PMAD breadboard block diagram is shown in Figure 5.12.4.1-2
I DWER II IIN6BUS
A
PDCU
LOAD J
CENTERI
LI :P|
I R)Cl
ISCI
• I
FAULT RECOVERY &
MANAGEMENT
EXPERT SYSTEM (FRAMES)
& DATABASE
COMMUNICATION ff
ALGORTHIMIC
CONTROLLER
WME IO
HI 422
POWER DATA DOS
LOAD
CENTER
11.TTTI
LORD CENTER DATA BUS
RS 422
POWER
RINO IBUS
B
POllER CONTROLLED
T CONTROLLER CIDCUIT BREAKER ISOLATOR
I OR 3 Kill IO Kill 15 KIP
LLP - LOUIESTLEUEL PROCESSOR
SIC - SWITCHREAR l/f CONTROLLER
ABC - DNALOA TO OlOITAL CRAB
PBCU o POWER DISTRIBUTION CONTROL UNIT
_r- LOAD CENTER CONNECTION
Figure 5.12.4.1-2 Breadboard Block Diagram
TASK Ill
5-129
TASK HI
Interim
Final
Report
MCR-89-516
February 1989
5.12.4.2 Software
The configuration of the software is identified below:
1. Versados 4.51 Object, 849CMP60004
2. Versados VMELAN 2. l, 849CMP60005
° Motorola VME/10 Graphics Server and Demo 1.01,849CMP60002
4. Pascal 2.3, 849CMP60001
5. Xerox Lisp: Lyric Release for the 1186 - Lisp.Sysout, 849CMP71001
6. Xerox Lisp: Lyric Release for the 1186 - Lyric-Patch-1,
849CMP71002
7. Xerox Lisp: Lyric Release for the 1186 - Lyric-Library,
849CMP71003
o Xerox Lisp: Lyric Release for the 1186 - Installation Utility,
849CMP71004
o Xerox Lisp: Lyric Release for the 1186 - System Files,
849CMP71005
10. Xerox Offiine Diagnostics Master Disk 1.3e #1, Rev. Lyric,
:_49CMP71006
11. Xerox Offline Diagnostics Boot Diagnostics Master Disk 1.3e #2,
Rev. Lyric, 849CMP71007
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12. PCL-CLOS,849CMP50002versiondated8/27/87,
13. SymbolicsOperatingSystemGenera7.1
14. TCP/IPProtocol
15. VME-10AlgorithmicSoftware,849CMP10000
16. SSMPMADSymbolicsInterfaceV1.0 Software,849CMP20000
5.12.5
17. XeroxFRAMESSoftware,849CMP15000
Test Description
This test is designed to demonstrate the capabilities of the ACMPMAD
system. It is intended to satisfy the requirements of Activity (2) of Task II, Activity (2) of
Task III, Activity (5) of Task III and Activity (1) of Task IV. All test requirements are
satisfied by demonstration.
5.12.5.1 Test Data
5.12.5.1.1 Input Data
Input data are controlled by this test in order to demonstrate system
capabilities. When the word "type" is used, a Return is implied unless specified otherwise.
5.12.5.1.2 Output Data
Output data will consist of schedule data.
Test Pr0ce0ures
Test Setup
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5.12.5.2.1.2 SSMPMAD Interface Software,. - Symbolics 3620 D
ACTION RESPONSE
1. Turn on power Screen appears.
. Place the SSMPMAD Symbolics
Interface tape in the Symbolics
3620 disk drive.
No observable reaction."
.
,
.
Load the SSMPMAD Symbolics
Interface tape by typing
"(tape:can'y-load)"
Type "Q" or "S" for selective load
Type "y" to 'pmad:si;ssmpmad.
translations' only
A list of directories appear
and the user is prompted
whether to load all of the
files or just selected ones.
Prompt appears.
pmad:si; ssmpmad.
translations is loaded.
. Edit the translation f'de to change
the physical host to *SSMPMAD-
PHYSICAL-HOST*
Physical host is changed
,
.
Evaluate the buffer. Type
"META SHIFT-E"
Save the f'de
Prompt appears.
File is saved.
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9. Type "(tape:carry-load)"
10. Type "Q" or "S" for selective
load
A list of files appear and the
user is prompted to load all
of the files or just selected
ones.
Prompt appears.
11. Type "y" to the following files:
12.
pmad:si;*.lisp
pmad:ui;*.lisp
pmad:pmad;*.lisp
pmad:lplms;*.lisp
pmad:developer;*.lisp
pmad:schedule-library;*.*
pmad:library;*.*
pmad:si;*.bin
pmad:ui;*.bin
pmad:pmad;*.bin
pmad:lplms;*.bin
pmad:scheduler;*.*
To load the system into the
Symbolics 3620 D Environment,
type "(load "host:>
ssmpmad>load")
The specified files are
loaded.
The system is loaded into
the Symbolics
Environment.
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5.12.5.3
13. Type<SELECT>"A"
Q..._--
FRAMES Software - XCrQx 1186
Screens are displayed and
everything is initialized.
1. Turn on power
. Press "FI" key (boot from
local hard disk)
Screen appears with row of
buttons displayed on
bottom of screen.
After short interval of time,
Xerox is booted; normal
display is seen on screen.
i
!
.
4.
Display the background menu
by holding down the Right
Mouse Button while over the
"Background".
Select the File Browser by
highlighting "File Browser" in the
Background Menu with the cursor
and releasing the previously
held down button.
. Select the window position
and shape by moving mouse to
the preferred position, holding
down the Left Mouse Button,
dragging the right-bottom comer
Background Menu is
displayed.
A default empty window
shape is displayed for the
user to shape to the
preferred size.
A File Browser window is
displayed. It is waiting for
input as to what location to
display files from.
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of thewindow to sizeit, and
releasethemousebutton
. Insert the FRAMES Disk 1 into
the floppy disk drive and close
the floppy door.
No observable reaction.
7. Type"{floppy}".
. Select all the files on the disk
by positioning the cursor over
the topmost file entry and clicking
the Left Mouse Button followed
by positioning the cursor over
the bottom-most fide entry and
clicking the Right Mouse Button.
NOTE: To get to the bottom-most
file entry may require scrolling the
window. To scroll the window,
slowly move the cursor to the left
of the window and stop when the
scroll bar appears. Clicking the
Left Mouse Button will display the
current line (next to the cursor)
at the top of the window. When
the bottom-most file is displayed,
discontinue this action.
The contents of the disk in
the floppy drive is
displayed.
Each file has a ">" pointing
to it.
On the top-right portion of
the File Browser Window,
a menu of actions is
displayed.
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. Click the Left Mouse Button on
the "Copy" selection.
pathname to copy the files
tO.
The top of the File Browser
Window queries for a
10. The destination pathname is
variable. It always starts with
"{dsk}".
To figure out the rest of it,
look at the locations of the flies
on the floppy as the hard disk
displayed in the File Browser. The
rest of the data name should
correspond to the greatest level of
common pathname of the files on
floppy
For example, if all the files on
the floppy are under
"<lispfiles>comm>" that should
be the completion to arrive at:
"{ dsk }<lispfiles>comm>". If
there were files under both
"<lispfiles>comm>"
and "<lispfiles>data>", the
greatest completion will be ........
"<lispfiles>" to arrive at
"{dsk}<lispfiles>". Once the
pathname is entered, type a
Return.
The selected files are
copied from the floppy to
The idea files behind this is
to copy the files on the
floppy to the same relative
pathnames on the hard
disk
When copying is
completed, the copy
selection on the
File Browser is not
highlighted.
The user is prompted
whether to retain the
subdirectories.
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11. Type <Retum>
12.
13.
Removethefloppyfrom the
floppy driveandinsert the
nextfloppy in its place.
Displaythecontentsof the
floppy byclicking theLeft Mouse
Buttonon the"Recompute"option
of theFile Browser.
No observablereaction.
Thefilesof thecurrent
floppy aredisplayedin the
FileBrowserWindow
14.
15.
RepeatSteps8 through13until
all thefiles from all the
floppiesarecopiedto theharddisk.
Move thecursorto thetopportion
of theFile BrowserWindow.
Hold downtheRightMouse
Buttonandhighlightthe"Close"
optionof thewindow menu.
Releasethemousebutton.
All thefilesarecopiedto
theharddisk
TheFile Browserwindow
is no longervisible.
16. Type "(load '{dsk}<lispfiles>
frames>init>load-all.lisp)"
17. Type"(load-all)"
Thecorrespondingfile is
loaded.
Thefiles for FRAMESare
loadedinto theLisp World.
A displaywindow appears
showingthefiles being
loaded.
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18. WhentheDisplayWindowinverts,
movethecursorinto thewindowand
click theLeft MouseButton.andclosing.
ThenpresstheSpace-Bartwicein quick
succession.InteractionWindowreturns
furtherto scrollold dataoff thetopof the
window.
Numerousthingsoccur,
includingwindowsopening
Whenthe
This indicatesthattheuser
doesnot wantto bequeried
withanormalinteraction
prompt ("XXX>"
whereXXX is some
integer),FRAMESis
finishedloading.
NOTE:It takes
approximately30minutes
to loadthesystem.
19. To logout,type"(il:logout)" Thescreenrevertsto the
statusof Step1.
20. Turn off power. Systemis turnedoff.
Q__
5.12.5.4 Test Initialization
There are four component types to initialize: Symbolics 3620 D, Xerox
t 186, Motorola VME/10 and LLPs.
_)S . _ ,,? T
The simplest procedure (until familiarity with how the system works is
acquired) is to initialize the four component types in the following strictly linear order:
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5.12.5.5 Pow¢r Up the Symbolic_ 3620 D, Xerox 1186 and Motorola VME/10
. Turn on the monitor (switch in back)
on the Symbolics 3620 D.
Monitor is powered up.
o Turn on the main power on the
Symbolics 3620 D.
The user is prompted with a
"FEP Command:" prompt.
3. Type "hello" on the Symbolics 3620 D. The user is prompted with a
"FEP Command:" prompt.
o Type "FEP0:>PMAD.BOOT. 1"
on the Symbolics 3620 D.
The system boots up with
the operating system
HERALD.
NOTE: The user may be
prompted to enter date and
time. Time and date will be
entered as necessary. A
<Return> will be pressed if
the date and time is correct.
The user is prompted to log
in.
° Turn on the power to the Xerox 1186. The screen appears with a
row of buttons displayed
near the bottom of the
screen.
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.
.
8.
Press the "FI" key on the Xerox 1186. The system boots up. The
screen looks like it was the
last time a user logged out.
Power up Motorola VME/10. VME/10 is powered up.
Power Up Motorola VME]10 Monitor _d ..... VME/IO monitor and Wyse
Wyse terminal, terminal are powered up.
-_ - .
"Waiting for disk to spin
up" message appears on
VME/10 monitor.
"Power Up Test Complete"
message appears on
VME/10 monitor.
Qm
System automatically boots
up and configures all the
ports on the VME/10.
"=" prompt appears on the
VME/10 monitor.
Wyse terminal completes
power up self test.
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5.12.5.6 Initialize the Symbolics 3620 D
1. Type ":login PMAD"
2. Type "Y"
3. Type "P"
The PMAD user's
initialization f'lle is loaded
enabling the Symbolics to
communicate with other
computers.
"Do you wish to load
SSMPMAD patches?"
prompt appears.
Symbolics loads patches.
User is prompted with "(Y,
P or N)".
Symbolics proceeds. User
is prompted with
"(Y, P or N)".
4. Type "P"
.
Press <SELECT> "A".
Symbolics proceeds.
The SSMPMAD interface
is started.
When it is finished, the
user sees the console screen
of the SSMPMAD
interface.
6. Press <CONTROL> S. Maestro the SS Module
Scheduler screen appears.
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, Select "Reset" to reset the scheduler Select Length of
Scheduling Period menu
appears.
.
.
Select "8 Hour"
Schedule the demo activities by selecting:
Select Activities for
Scheduling menu appears.
The Schedule is ready and
the FELES is ready to be
started.
Demol Partl
Demol Part2
Demol Part3
Demol Part4
Demol Part5
10. cliCk Left Mouse Button on
"Highlighted"
11. Select "Schedule"
12. Press <SELECT> L.
The activities are displayed.
The activities are
scheduled.
Lisp Listener appears.
13. Type "(set-feles-lead-time 2) Feles lead time is set to 2.
This is an optimization for
responding to contingency
situations faster.
TASK III
5-142
TASK III
Interim
Final
Report
MCR-89-516
February 1989
14. Press <SELECT> A. Maestro the SS Module
Scheduler screen appears.
5.12.5.7
.
*
Q_
Initializ_ the Xerox 1186
Position the cursor over the
Background Menu and hold down
the Right Mouse Button.
Position the cursor over the
"FRAMES" selection of the Background
Menu and hold Right Mouse Button
(over the small triangle) to highlight the
"Initialize FRAMES" option.
Release the mouse button.
The Background Menu
appears.
The FRAMES interface is
displayed and initialized.
NOTE: This will take 2
minutes at the most.
FRAMES is now ready
for normal operations.
Q--
5.12.5.8 Starting the Schedule
1. Press <META> S on the Symbolics
3620D.
Starts and updates control
box. (No visible action).
Q--
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5.12.5.9 Initialize the Motorola VME/10 and the LLPs
NOTE: If the Motorola VME/10 has timed out,
press "Reset" on the Motorola VME/10 chassis
and wait for the system to reboot.
vv v!
= prompt appears on
the VME/10.
Type "CLRBK" on the Motorola VME/10.
o Turn on LLP's 10, 12 and 13
and press their Reset Buttons
(The Red Button).
Load Center LL_...P.P
A 10
C 12
D 13
3. Press <Return> on the Motorola VME/10
"Turn on all LLPs and
Press Their Reset Buttons"
prompt appears.
LLPs are turned on.
Errors may occur from the
ports being cleared which
can be ignored.
4. Type "Off" on the Motorola VME/10.
5. Press <BREAK> on the Motorola VME/10.
vv 1!
= prompt appears on the
VME/10.
User is logged out.
"Enter user no. =" prompt
appears.
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6, Type "200.MSFC" on the Motorola
VME/10.
"=" prompt appears.
7. Type "ALGO" on the Motorola VME/10.
8. Type "Y" on the Motorola VME/10.
. Type "Y" to LLPs 10, 12 and
13 and type "N"
LLPs 11, 14, 15, 20 and
21 on the Motorola VME/10.
"Do you wish to use real
Xerox communications?"
prompt appears.
"Is CN 10 present?"
prompt appears.
The LLPs selected are to
displayed on the VME/10.
10. Type "N" on the Motorola VME/10.
11. Type "Y" to all download questions
on the Motorola VME/10 pressing "Reset"
on the LLPs unless the download starts
immediately on the screen.
"Do you wish to go back
and try again?" prompt
appears.
"Do you wish to download
to CN10?" prompt appears.
Each LLP will be
downloaded.
NOTE: LLP downloads
each take approximately 8
minutes.
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12. Poweruppowersectionof the
breadboardincluding20kHz,
208,nominalandhousekeeping
power.
"Do youwishto goback
andtry again?"
promptappearson the
VME/IO.
Powersectionof the
breadboardis
poweredup.
13. Type"N" on theMotorolaVME/10.
14. Type"Y" on theMotorolaVME/10.
15. Press<Return>on theMotorolaVME/10.
"Do youwish to usethe
debugstatements?"prompt
appearson theVME/10.
"Ensurethereis a
terminal..."
Wyseterminalwill scroll
with information.
Menufor startof mission
timeappearson the
Symbolics.
5.12.5.10
Qm
Test Steps
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5.12.5.10.1
.
Schedule 1
C1 C5 D1 D5 TIME
ON OFF ON OFF 0
OFF OFF ON ON 2
OFF ON OFF ON 4
ON ON ON ON 6
OFF OFF OFF OFF 38
Select a "one minute" delay to start
the schedule on the Symbolics 3620 D.
The schedule will begin
execution at that time.
At mission time 0, the light
bulb at switches C01 and
D01 lights. Shortly
thereafter, the FRAMES
interfaces reflects the
power to the load at
switches CO 1 and DO 1.
At mission time 2, the light
bulb at switch C01 is tumed
off and the light bulb at
switch D05 is turned on.
Again the Frames interface
reflects the power to the
load at switches CO 1 and
D05.
At mission time 4, the
light bulb at switch C05
lights and the light bulb at
switch D01 is turned off.
Again the FRAMES
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2. Injectashortatpoint A atmission
time 9 (Figure 5.12.5.10.1-1).
interfacereflectsthepower
to the loadatswitchesC05
andD01.
At missiontime6, the
light bulbat switchesC01
andD01areturnedbackon.
AgaintheFRAMES
interfacereflectsthepower
to the loadat switchesCO1
andD01.
A04 will trip.
C01andC05will
subsequentlytrip onunder
voltage.
BothLLPswill senddatato
FRAMESindicatingthese
trips.
WhenFRAMESreceives
thisdata,it will senda
messageto bothLLPs to
turnoff all theswitches
from A04 andbelow.
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Load Center C
I
l
I
I
I
.oJ
Load Center D
Figure 5.12.5.10.1-1 Test Plan Switch Configuration
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WhentheLLPs respond
(alsoindicatingthatthe
operationwasperformed
without anyerrors)
FRAMESwill command
A04 to flip.
WhenPDCUA closesA04,
it will trip again.
This datawill besentback
to FRAMES.
. Wait approximately 5 minutes for
Contingency to go into effect.
FRAMES will then
diagnose the fault and
send a message to FELES
that A04 and all the
switches below it are out
of service.
Contingency goes into
effect.
o Inject a short at point B (Figure
5.12.5.10.1-1).
D01 will trip.
Load Center D will send
data to FRAMES indicating
the situation.
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FRAMEScanbeobserved
to receivetheinformation
andwill sendamessageto
LoadCenterD to openDO1.
LoadCenterD will open
D01 andreportbackthat
nothingunusualoccurred
in doingso.
FRAMESwill thensenda
messageto flip D01 (close
andthenopenD01).
WhenLoadCenterD closes
DO1,DO1will trip again.
Thiswill be reportedbackto
FRAMESandFRAMES
will diagnosethefault.
FRAMESwill indicatethe
switch isout of serviceon
theinterface.
FRAMESwill senda
messageto FELES
indicatingthatD01 isno
longerin service.
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FELESwill have
MAESTROreschedule
thetasksandFELESwill
sendacontingencylist
downto FRAMES and
theVME/10.
i
_z
5. Wait for the schedule to finish.
6. Remove shorts from switches.
Q_
5.12.5.11 Schedule 2
. Press <META> K on the Symbolics
3620D.
2. Select "Re-initialize" on the Xerox 1186.
3. Press <Return> on the Motorola VME/10.
Once the contingency list
goes into effect, all
unnecessary switches will
be turned off. This change
can be observed on the
FRAMES interface.
All lights are turned off.
Shorts are removed.
The current schedule is
killed.
"Done initializing" message
appears.
"Do you wish to enter
override?" prompt appears.
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4. Type"Y" on theMotorolaVME/IO. "Breadboardis nowin
ManualMode. Press
Return."promptappears.
5. Press<Return>ontheMotorolaVME/10. ManualOverrideMenu
appears.
6. Type "7" on the Motorola VME/10. "Enter desired LLP
using..."
7. Type "A" on the Motorola VME/10. "...press Return to
continue"
8. Type "7" on the Motorola VME/10. "Enter desired LLP
using..."
9. Type "C" on the Motorola VME/10. "...press Return to
continue"
10. Type "7" on the Motorola VME/10.
11. Type "D" on the Motorola VME/10.
"Enter desired LLP
using..."
"...press Return to
continue"
12. Press <Return> on the Motorola VME/10. Manual Override Menu
appears.
13. Type "10" on the Motorola VME/10. "Press the Break key to
exit" prompt appears.
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14. Press<BREAK>on theMotorolaVME/10.
16.
Type "200.MSFC"on theMotorola
VME/10.
Type"ALGO" on theMotorolaVME/10.
17. Type"Y" on theMotorolaVME/10.
18. Type"Y" to eachof theLLPsthat
areapplicable(10, 12and13)and
type"N" to theLLPs thatwill not
use(11, 14, 15,20 and21).
19. Type"N" ontheMotorolaVME/10.
"Enteruserno.=" prompt
appears.
,, IV
= prompt appears.
"Do you wish to use real
Xerox communications?"
prompt appears on the
VME/10.
"Is CN10 present? prompt
appears on the VME/10.
"Do you wish to go back
and try again?" prompt
appears on the VME/10.
"Do you wish to download
to CN10?" prompt appears
on the VME/10.
20. Type "N" on the Motorola VME/10.
21. Type "N" on the Motorola VME/10.
"Do you wish to go back
and try again?" prompt
appears on the VME/10.
"Do you wish to use the
debug statements?" prompt
appears on the VME/10.
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22. Type"Y" on theMotorolaVME/10.
23. Press<Return>ontheMotorolaVME/10.
24. Select"Reset"on theSymbolics3620D.
25. Select"8 Hour" on theSymbolics3620D.
26. Selecthefollowing activities:
Task3 A
Task3B
Task4 A
Task4B
Task5 A
Task5 B
Task6
Task7
Task8
Task9
"Ensurethereis a
terminal..."promptappears
on theVME/10.
TheWyseterminalscrolls
with information.
Menufor startof mission
timeappearson the
Symbolics.
SelectLength of Scheduling
Period menu appears on
the Symbolics.
Select Activities for
Scheduling menu appears
on the Symbolics.
The Schedule is ready.
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27. Click Left Mouse Button on
"Highlighted" on the Symbolics 3620 D.
28. Select "Schedule" on the Symbolics 3620 D.
29. Press <META> S on the Symbolics.
30. Select a "one minute" delay to start
the schedule on the Symbolics 3620 D.
31. Inject a fault at Point C (open
circuit) at mission time 3
(Figure 5.12.5.10.1-1).
Activities are displayed on
the Symbolics.
The activities are scheduled.
Starts and updates control
box (No visible action).
C01, C05, D01, and D05
lights will turn on when
the schedule starts.
DO 1 and D05 turn off
(under voltage).
D sends data to FRAMES.
FRAMES waits for data
from A, B & C.
FRAMES diagnoses
situation and sends
information to FELES.
MAESTRO processes
contingency and sends
contingency list down.
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A05 is turned off when
contingency list takes
effect. This will be
observable on FRAMES
interface.
32.
33.
34.
At mission time 20, click Left
Mouse Button on "Screens"
on the Symbolics 3620 D.
Select "Resource Manager" on the
Symbolics 3620 D.
Select "Immediate Power Change" on
the Symbolics 3620 D.
35. Type "800" on the Symbolics 3620 D.
36. Type "0:0:10" on the Symbolics 3620 D.
Select a Screen Menu
appears.
Resource Manager Window
appears.
"Power available to the
module (watts)" prompt
appears.
"How long effective"
prompt appears.
Starts processing.
Control will be in
contingency state.
On the Xerox, either CO 1
or C05 will go out.
"Contingency Power
System Fault" appears.
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37. Wait for contingencyeventlist to
takeeffect.
38. Let schedule finish.
Qm
A consistent state of the
world is present.
All lights are turned off.
5.12.5.12
Shutdown
Motorola VME/10
, Turn off power to Motorola VME/10
monitor.
2. Turn off power to Motorola VME/10.
Monitor is turned off.
VME/10 is turned off.
3. Turn off power to terminal connected
to Motorola VME/IO port 2.
4. Turn off power to the LLPs.
Terminal is turned off.
LLPs are turned off.
. Turn off power to 20kHz, 208V,
nominal and housekeeping power.
Power is turned off.
Q--
5.12.5.13
.
Xerox 1186
Select "Exit" with the Right Mouse
Button.
Screens disappear.
. Type "(il:logout)" Screen will blank out and
Xerox can be turned off.
TASK HI
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3. Turn off Xerox 1186. Xerox is turned off.
Qm
5.12.5.14
o
Symbolics 3620 D
Selected "Screens" Select a Screen Menu
appears.
2. Select "Console" Console Menu appears.
3. Select" Menu" Select an Operation Menu
appears.
4. Select "Kill" Everything is reset.
5. Press <SELECT> L. Lisp Listener appears.
6. Type "logout" User is logged out and
Symbolics can be turned
off.
7. Type ":Halt Machine"
8. Type "Yes"
"Do you really want to halt
the machine?" prompt
appears on the Symbolics.
The machine is halted.
° Turn off the Symbolics 3620 D. The Symbolics is turned
off.
Q_
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I
I On December 14, 1988 a NASA Change Request specifying 120 V dc source power was
put into effect.
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6.0 TASK IV
Task IV for the SSM/PMAD was completed in October of 1985. The
fundamental activity of Task IV was to study various host computer candidates and to make
recommendations based on conclusions reached within the study.
Requirements were established as a result of the Task IV study. Also, trades in
cost and performance were done. Recommendations were made based upon the specified
and derived requirements and the results of the trades. The Motorola VME/10 was
recommended as the host computer of choice and has since been purchased and
successfully integrated into the SSM/PMAD as such.
Detailed results of Task IV are provided in the Task IV Study Report, included
as Appendix III within this document.
TASK IV
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7.0 SUMMARY
Martin Marietta's team for the SSM/PMAD, under contract to NASA/MSFC,
has produced a working multi-agent knowledge based system. Its purpose is two-fold.
First, it provides automation for scheduling and managing power enabling activities.
Second, it functions to perform fault analysis and management for the test bed in near real-
time conditions. These activities are brought about by the cooperative efforts of many
independent software entities. These are:
1) Fault Recovery and Management Expert System (FRAMES)
2) Front End Load Enable Scheduler (FELES; peripherally including
MAESTRO)
3) Load Priority List Management System (LPLMS)
4) Communications and Algorithmic Software (CAS)
5) Lowest Level Functions (LLFs).
Each high level software grouping, for example, LPLMS, exists within one or
more hardware processing environments. These being:
1) FRAMES - Xerox 1186 and Lowest Level Processors (LLPs)
2) FELES & MAESTRO - Symbolics 3620 D
3) LPLMS - Symbolics 3620 D
4) CAS - Motorola VME/10 Communications and Algorithmic
Controller (CAC)
5) LLFs - Motorola 107 Card Lowest Level Processors (LLPs).
The development effort has been on-going since 1985. The development
process was organized around four major tasks. Task IV was completed first in 1985 and
focused on selecting a host processing environment; the Motorola VME/10 was chosen.
Task I was completed next in 1986 and provided an overall partitioning of the system by
functions. Task II, which defined the roles of the various components in both the AI realm
SUMMARY
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andthedeterministicfunctionality, wascompletedin 1987. And, asafinish to the initial
systemactivity,theTaskm systemwasdeliveredto NASA/MSFCin 1988.
2
The completed development of the initial system does not mark the termination
of analysis, development, and refinement within the SSM/PMAD system environment.
Work is now in progress to improve thesystem from both the hardware and software
perspectives. The present ssM/PMAD power automation system is a firm foundation
upon which to base these continuing efforts. Important advantages in power automation
have been gained.
The advantages which have been gained in the implemented design for the
SSM/PMAD power automation system exist in the areas of modularity and integration.
The activities of Task I enabled the understanding of the needed relations
between power hardware and the automated control of that hardware. Definitions of the
controlling entities were made in Task I and functions were partitioned, providing a basis
upon which to achieve system-wide modularization in a top-down decomposing flow.
The modularization of the breadboard provided the capability to partition
functions into software entities which could be allocated to appropriate hardware
processing environments. This allowed for the approach which was taken in Task II,
defining what activities belonged to knowledge base functions and how those functions
would in turn be allocated.
The implementation which was achieved in Task III provided a working set of
AI and deterministic functions. These functions are supple representations of the actual
hardware in the power automation breadboard, and of an expert's view of how the system
should behave under the given breadboard conditions. The suppleness of the system is
allowing for flexible growth of the knowledge and the associated knowledge processing
functions. As well, the deterministic modularization makes it possible for integrated
SUMMARY
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systemgrowthwithin thatprocessenvironment.In all, theSSM/PMADpowerautomation
systemis readyto achievenewevolutionarygoals.
7.1 What's Next?
The SSM/PMAD possesses a rich and flexible architecture providing
considerable opportunity for growth and enhancement. Both NASA and Martin Marietta
have identified a set of tasks for enhancing the system. The enhancements under
consideration should make the system more robust, increase the usability of it by crew
members and/or other people, and provide for extendability and integration with other
components and systems, etc. The following subsections outline a number of areas for
improvement.
7.1.1 Knowledge Base Rule Groupine
The need for understanding interactions among multiple expert systems in a
near real-time environment such as the SSM/PMAD is imperative. In order to attain the
goal of this understanding, two tasks must be accomplished. First, the rules which are
used within the total expert system environment must be organized as sets of complete and
complementary entities. Otherwise, rules and their execution within one expert system may
negate or deadlock rules or their effects as viewed from the knowledge bases of other
expert systems (e.g., FRAMES may be depending upon decision information from a
planning expert system which is in turn dependent upon FRAMES for an accurate system
configuration status. Which rules belong where, and what is the individual rule content ?).
The rules controlling the activities of the SSM/PMAD should be grouped into families
which would be represented by their intentions and acfioias. The second task Which must
be accomplished is a completely uniform management of the multiple knowledge bases.
This is discussed in the next paragraph.
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7.1.2 Knowledge Base Management System
The current implementation of FRAMES is coded in LISP on a Xerox 1186
computer. The expert system rules are implemented in-line in the LISP language. This
was done in order to achieve an initial measure of the comparative performance of
FRAMES in its simplest form within_e overall system. _e know!_ge pr_essing within
the system does not raise performance issues. However,_ the management of the
knowledge within the overall system proves difficult under these circumstances.
Interactions among FRAMES, FELES, and LPLMS, as well as their impact on
the user-interface, can onlY be understood by ProPerly managing the knowledge and its
varying inferences which occur as muhi-variate functions. Uniform knowledge
management combined with the proper rule grouping representations will provide a
cohesive picture of these multiple interacting agents.
Currently, work defining and implementing a Knowledge Base Management
System that will allow for easy modification of rules and diagnoses, is being performed.
This will allow for the viewing of knowledge which currently exists in FRAMES and will
extend it to incorporate more of the data gathering task in a meaningful manner as well.
Finally, organizing the rules and their patterns of execution will provide the basis for
further development in verifying and validating the various interacting agent knowledge
bases for consistency and completeness.
7.1.3 Model Based Causal Reasonin_
FRAMES currently only uses a model to keep track of the representation of the
power system network. FRAMES should be enhanc_ to allow for the use of a model to
reason over the possible faults and symptoms that can occur in the power system network.
Motivation for this currently exists when diagnosing soft faults. Depending upon the
configuration of RBIs in the power system network, the node equations used to test for
soft faults are different. This is model based reasoning.
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Oneof thedrawbacksof modelbasedreasoningis thatcomputationis pushed
to thereal timesituationswhereit is notwanted. Thisdoesnot necessarilyhaveto bethe
casethough. Modelscanbesetupat initialization sothatcompilationscanthenbedone
beforeactualoperationof thesystem.Also, thedepthof neededmodelingis variableand
can becombinedinto a hybrid approachusing model basedreasoningonly where it is
relevant.Thiswouldallow alternativetopologiesto beexaminedwithout majorrewritesof
software. This would alsoallow thesystemto beappliedto otherareasof powersystem
automation.
7.1.4 Levels of Automation and User Interaction
Another area of enhancement is the addition of intermediate levels of
automation. This allows the user to dynamically adjust schedules and have the adjustments
be reflected at the scheduler. It also allows manipulation of switches via the FRAMES
interface so that FRAMES knows what positions switches should be in in case of fault
situations. The user-engaged automation level works in harmony with user-interface
enhancements. The result is that when a user increases the amount of manual control on the
SSM/PMAD, knowledge is added at the user-interface, avoiding the need for the user
knowing how the automation expert systems accomplish their tasks. Therefore, the
knowledge based activities take on an additional but related role. They must understand
who is guiding the system execution, and the flow of knowledge must be regulated
between the automation activities and the user-interface. And, at the user's demand, the
expert systems must completely withdraw from execution within the system, leaving only a
total manual mode.
7.1.5 Multiple_Fault Diagnosis
Although multiple faults are not seen as very likely in the Space Station
Freedom module power management and distribution system environment, this does not
mean that they should not be taken into account. There was the recent example of a space
shuttle launch in which a possible bug in the software was known to exist. The bug was
supposed to be very unlikely to occur (e.g..001 probability) in a launch situation, yet it
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did. This entaileda fix of thebugfor properoperation.Therefore,experienceestablishes
thatalthoughmultiple faultsarenotvery likely, it is still quiteimportantto allow for them
andto handlethemproperly.
7.1.6 Data Acquisition and Analysis
Enhancing the system in terms of better acquisition and analysis of data in a
longer term fashion is also needed. There is some need to do this for incipient fault
analysis. It would be nice to analyze data on a long term bases to characterize load
performances, and the power system network performance in general. The current
hardware implementation is not robust enough to handle increased levels of data analysis
and acquisition.
7.1.7 User Interface
Currently, three Separate user interfaces must be operated to run the system.
These should be integrated into one common type of user interface. The computer upon
which _[s resides will then control the initialization and operation of the other computers.
This enhances usability, as well as understandability of the system.
7.1.8 Computer Hardware
To make progress on these enhancements requires more robust and extendable
computer platforms. The system is currently using a Symbolics 3620 D, Xerox 1186,
Motorola VME/10, and VME bus 68000 microprocessors for the LLPs. The computer
hardware has added a lot of constraints on current operations that prohibit a number of the
enhancements which should be made. Moving to a general purpose workstation, such as a
SUN based platform, perhaps in conjunction with 80386 type processors for the LLPs to
provide robustness, flexibility, and performance.
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7.1.9 ADA
Additionally, it would be desirable for an SSM/PMAD system to fly on the
Space Station Freedom. To do this, ADA is seen as a probable target software
environment. Initial investigations into available ADA platforms and the the feasibility of
moving to an ADA implementation for the SSM/PMAD are currently in progress.
7.1.10 Faul_ Injection
Extensive experience with the SSM/PMAD breadboard provides a strong basis
for understanding the problems encountered in both managing it and in planning activities
to be used in its analysis. From this experience it is seen that there is a strong need to
develop a software fault injection capability. Fault injection, from a simulation approach,
would provide an immediate means to exercise many of the breadboard components and
capabilities, which otherwise may not be abIe to be accomplished without a full mock-up
capability for the Space Station Freedom. Software fault injection requires a strong
modeling capability within the overall breadboard architecture. Therefore, the model based
causal reasoning capability will work hand in hand with fault injection, and this provides a
needed first step towards knowledge base validation and verification.
7.1.11 Knowledge Base Validation and Verification
Knowledge base validation and verification is an important and critical activity
which must be accomplished in order to get expert systems into space. NASA's strong
concern and commitment to the validation of software in general and expert systems in
particular is recognized. Much needs to be done in this area to further the investigation
leading to specific implementations for verifying expert systems. The expert systems
within SSM/PMAD should be verified as to consistency and completeness at a minimum.
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7.1.12 Power System Simulatiqn
In conjunction with a number Of the above ideas, a simulation tool is needed for
simulating the power system which is being modeled and automated. This would allow for
exercising the automation and fault diagnosis software without having to rely on physical
hardware being present and available. A simulation capability would provide a strong
environment for a fault injection capability, and it would appear as a natural outgrowth of
any model based causal reasoning capability which existed.
7.1.13 120 Volt DC Source Power
On December 14, 1988 a Change Request specifying 120 Volt dc source power
went into effect. The SSM/PMAD system software needs to be modified to handle this
new type power source.
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9.0
Activity
Anomaly
Artificial
Intelligence
Autonomy
Breadboard
Bus
Causal
Reasoning
Common
LISP
Object
System
Component
Contingency
GLOSSARY
An activity defines a task consisting of a set of subtasks to be executed
sequentially. Activities are scheduled by MAESTRO.
An anomaly indicates an unexpected event. A switch tripping due to
excess current is an anomaly.
Assuming "intelligence" is defined: The faculty of thinking, reasoning,
and acquiring and applying knowledge - as exhibited by people. Artificial
Intelligence, then, is the mimicking of natural intelligence; furthermore,
the artificial intelligence is exhibited by an artifact. For example,
analyzing and implementing the knowledge of an expert to create an expert
system describes the process of ascribing some artificial intelligence in the
domain of the said expert to the expert system as implemented in some
artifact (i.e. a computer).
The condition or quality of self-operating.
The hardware required to monitor, distribute, and control power flow to
the loads. This hardware consists of SICs, GCs, A/Ds, RBIs, RCCBs,
RPCs, and sensors.
A nodal point of a power distribution network.
Reasoning from causes to effects. Causal reasoning attempts to describe
how components of the domain are causally related to one another. Then,
as these components are analyzed, causal reasoning can make use of the
causal relationships to understand what has happened and predict what
will happen.
The object oriented programming paradigm currently under consideration
of the standards committee (made up of individuals from the Common
LISP community) as the standard for object oriented programming in
LISP.
In general, a component is some entity in the domain that is being
modelled and reasoned about. For example, a switch may be a
component.
A possibility that must be prepared against; future emergency.
GLOSSARY
9-1
GLOSSARY
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February1988
Controller
Current
Database
Equipment
Event List
Exception
Condition
Expert
System
Fault
Fault
Isolation
Fault :
Management
and
Recovery
First
Principles
Hard Fault
Incipient
Fault
The functional module of the automation software residing controlling the
scheduling and related processes. On the Symbolics, the Controller
maintains a state transition network to determine what it should do in any
of the def'med events.
Voltage + resistance.
A collection of data arranged for ease and speed of retrieval.
Various items of hardware that need power to operate. An individual item
includes information about it indicating various modes of operation.
A transaction consisting of a list of events_ An event in the list indicates a
switch that should be turned on or off, how much power is allotted to it,
etc.
A condition that does not conform to normal expectations.
A program that mimics the knowledge of an expert such that the program
is as expert as the expert is in the domain of the expert_
A defect in a circuit or wiring caused by imperfect connections, poor
insulation, grounding, or shorting.
The act or process of isolating a fault given information of the symptoms
of the fault.
The act or process of managing and recovering from new faults so that
autonomy is maintained.
The basic axioms of a system or model. First principles are used in some
reasoning programs for analyzing existing situations and predicting future
situations.
A fault causing a switch to physically trip.
A fault that is beginning to exist or appear; leading to a hard or short fault.
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Knowledge
Base
Knowledge
Base
System
LLP/SIC
ICD
Load
Load Center
Load
Priority
List
Load Shed
Lowest
Level
Processor
Masked
Fault
Model
Model Based
Reasoning
The part of a knowledge base system that contains codified knowledge
and heuristics used to solve problems.
A problem solving system that uses a knowledge base to reason about
data in a database and the external world.
The interface control document defining the data formats and commands
between the LLP and the SIC.
A device or the resistance of a device to which power is delivered.
The physical box at which a number of loads may be connected. A load
center contains up to twenty-eight one kilowatt RPCs to which loads may
be connected.
An ordered list of switches. This list is used for shedding loads (opening
switches) in the event that available power is reduced.
The act of opening a switch such that the load can no longer use power
through the switch.
The computer that is responsible for commanding switches and collecting
data from switches. Each LLP is a self contained processing unit
responsible for either a load center, power distribution control unit, or
subsystem distributor.
A fault that cannot be observed except by the presence of another fault.
For example, a switch having a broken current sensor won't trip on
overcurrent, while the switch above will.
A description of a system or theory that accounts for all of its known
properties (or the properties that are important to the model builder).
A method by which reasoning uses a model for drawing conclusions
about the domain being studied.
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Motorola
VME/10
Multiple
Fault
Parent
Switch
Portable
Common
Loops
Power
Power
Factor
Power -:
Distribution
Control
Unit
Power
Hardware
Power
System
Network
Resource
Resource
Scheduling
Schedule
The computer on which the CAC resides. Controls and processes
communications between the LLPs and FRAMES.
A situation where more than one dependent or independent faults occur
within delta time of one another. Delta time used here is the time it takes
to recover from a single fault.
The switch hierarchically connected immediately above another switch.
The most common implementation of CLOS. This implementation was
originally created by Xerox PARC and is implemented for a large number
of computers. Portable Common Loops has no relationship to Xerox
LOOPS.
Electrical energy dissipated within circuits or components.
Ratio of average power to apparent power.
The physical box which controls the distribution of power to load centers.
All the components within the breadboard which monitor or control the
flow of electrical current.
The topology of switches and cables making up a network from source to
loads.
An object used by a piece of equipment. For example, crew time is a
resource, a switch is a resource.
The process of scheduling a set of activities to make the most efficient use
of available resources.
The object that indicates when what activities are to be executed. The
schedule includes descriptions of what resources the activities need as
well.
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Sensor A device which responds to a voltage, current, or temperature and
provides an analog measurement used in monitoring the breadboard.
Sibling
Switches Those switches that immediately below the parent switch of the switch
except for the switch itself. Exactly analogous to the siblings of a person
in a family.
Single Fault A hard, soft, or incipient fault which occurs as a singleton.
Soft Fault An illegal use of current. Hard faults may also have an illegal use of
current; soft faults may be distinguished in that they don't necessarily
cause a hard fault.
Source
Power
Reduction The act of specifying a reduced amount of power available from the
source.
Subsystem
Distributor A load center containing three-kilowatt RPCs instead of one-kilowatt
RPCs, capable of distributing power to lower level distributors.
Switch A device which permits current to flow when closed. RBIs, RCCBs, and
RPCs are all switches.
Switch
Manipulation The act or process of opening and closing switches by the diagnostic
routines of FRAMES for the purpose of isolating a fault.
Switchgear A general term referring to all breadboard power hardware involved with
switching activities.
Switchgear
Interface
Controller The element of power hardware which communicates with LLPs,
switches, and sensors.
Symbolics
3620D A LISP machine on which MAESTRO, FELES, and LPLMS resides.
Symbolics
3640 A LISP machine on which MAESTRO, FELES, and LPLMS resides.
Symptom A tripped switch or current reading, etc. providing an element of
information about a fault.
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Symptom
Set
Transaction
Voltage
VME/10
Xerox 1186
A set of symptoms indicating a fault. A fault directly maps to a set of
symptoms. The object is to take a set of symptoms (possibly indicating
many different faults) and determine which fault may have produced the
symptom set.
A message that is transmitted anywhere between the automation software.
Electric potential or potential difference expressed in volts.
A computer workstation on which the CAC resides. Also known as the
CAC.
A LISP machine on which FRAMES resides.
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INTRODUCTION
This document is in response to the Summary Report requirements of Task I of
the Statement of Work for Automation o£ the Co_,non Module Power Management and
Distribution (CM/PMAD). Task I, CM/FMAD System Automation Plan Definition,
includes the review, with respect to automation, of Government provided
candidate network topologies. In addition, Task I includes CM/PMAD functions
definition, function partitioning and evaluation of any expert systems role in
those functions. Task I also includes study of the issues involved in CM/PMAD
automation as well as investigations of hardware and software approaches.
Additionally, efforts include requirements definition for CM/PMAD data
exchange with other elements of Space Station. Overall, Task I efforts,
summarized in this report, provide a data base of information for the
selection o£ an automation approach as well as definition o£ an automation
approach for the Space Station CM/PMAD.
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1.1 GOVERM4ENT-FURNISHED CM/PMAD DESIGN REVIEW
Government-£urnished conceptual network designs £or the common module
electrical power management and distribution system were to be
reviewed and evaluated with respect to the subtasks o£ Task I. Five
designs (Fig. 1.1-I through 1.1-5) were furnished that identified
candidate distribution networks; each defining power types,
converters, switches, and circuit breakers. The five designs (Table
I.I-I) provided a matrix o£ candidates involving two input power types
and various distribution schemes. All £urnished designs use remote
power controllers (RPC), remote-controlled circuit breakers (RCCB),
and remote bus isolators (RBI). Additionally, designs two through
five incorporate intramodule bulk power conversion for distribution as
shown in Table 1.1-I.
Table i.I-I Five Government-Furnished Designs Summary
Design4
2
3
4
5
Input Power Type
115/200 Vac,
400 Hz, 3 Phase
115/200 Vac,
400 Hz, 5 Phase
115/200 Vac,
400 Ez, 3 Phase
115/200 Vac,
400 Hz, 3 Phase
150 Vdc
Distributed Power Type
, f
Nodes
Loads
Input
Input
Input &
150 Vdc
Input
Input
Ports
Input
Input
Input &
150 Vdc
Input
Input
Out£itters
Input
150 Vdc
150 Vdc
Input &
150 Vdc
Input &
[15/200 Vac,
400 Hz,
3 Phase
Users
Input
150 Vdc
150 Vdc
Input &
150 Vdc
Input &
115/200 Vac,
400 Hz,
3 Phase
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I.I.i General Review and Evaluation of GFP Designs
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None of the candidate designs use direct current (dc) only for both
input and distributionpower type. An all dc system greatly reduces
the number of sensors, effectors and software complexity; and
therefore, reduces risk and cost with respect to automation software
development, test, and integration. However, it must _iso be noted
that there are hardware considerations to be studied, such as the
electrical isolation issue, which becomes more difficult to resolve in
an all dc system. In addition, load requirements and total power-type
use must also be a mjor consideration when selecting distribution
power types. The hardware trade studies involved with respect to an
all dc system are not repeated or evaluated in this task and may
offset the automation software advantages of adc system supposed and
investigated here.
The total number o£ se_ors, ef£ectors, and implemented function
complexity are not t_e0nlyc0ns_derat_ons _n s_zing an automation
task; but they are c0nsldered signi£ic_t keys{n any automatic
control and data acquisition system. In this sense, the automation
task of these designs is typical. Using this as a comparison tool in
this case is valid because as the total number of sensors and
effectors increase, the complexity of functions implemented also
increases.
The number of sensors, and therefore, data requiring handling, are
piOtted versus gurnished design for var{ous _o_al numbers of loads in
Figure 1.1.1-1. The parameters include an all dc system approach for
its comparison. Groundrules in the baseline number of loads include
assuming loads and power availability points as follows:
1) Node Loads--12 per node load center;
2) Node Ports--Five per node distribution assembly;
3) Outfitters--37 per secondary distribution assembly;
4) User Loads--30 per load center.
Additionally, where two power typesareavailable to a class of
electrical loads, it is assumed that half of each load class is
allocated one o£ the power types. Two electrical power types
available to a single load point are assumed not to exist. Finally,
all other measurements, such as temperature, are considered the same
for each design, and therefore, are ignored.
07051/3013B 1-8
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The expected results show the significant difgerences in total
measurements in approaches, where there are 192 total measurements for
an all dc approach and 668 for an all three phase distribution
approach. Converting the total number o£ measurements into absolute
automation software effect estimates is only debatably possible at the
present stage of software definition. However, insight-lending
comparisons are made by estimating the automation software for an all
dc system from 20,000 to 40,000 lines of high-level code. This
estimate comes from comparison of a similar automatic control and data
acquisition system* and from a review of the functions to be
implemented, developed, and discussed in Appendix A.
Using the baseline estimate of software code and factors of both 25_
and 50% increase per 100Z increase in total number of measurements
allows conversion from measurements to software sizing. The results
in the relative software sizing are presented in Table 1.1.1-1.
Table I.I.I-i Automation Software Relative Sizing
Design
dc
I
2
3
4
5
Relative Software Sizing Range
(Lines of Code: Minimum - Maximum)
25% Factor
20,000 - 40,000
37,000 - 75,000
28,000 - 56,000
28,000 - 57,000
33,000 - 67,000
30,000 - 61,000
50% Factor
i
20,000 - .40,000
55,000 - 110,000
36,000 - 73,000
37,000 - 73,000
47,000 - 94,000
41,000 - 81,000
*Martin Marietta's Battery Development and Test Facility, developed
in 1982-1984, comprises a network of three HP I000 computer systems
coupled with data acquisition and control hardware. The entire system
contains approximately 2000 points of measurement and 1600 effectors.
It is a real-time battery test facility, containing approximately
75,000 lines of code (excepting the operating system), implementing
many functions similar to a CM/PMAD.
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Using $400 per line of code as a_comparison {n dollars and using the
midpqints_O£ Table 1.1.1-I entries yields the estimates shown in
Figure 1.1.1-2. Clearly, the software advantage_-c_ be seen as the
use _ dc distribution is increased. The estimates given are not
intended to be used in an absolute sense, but for comparisons. They
are_ l_owever, also _inten_-_ a-bas_ £6r decidingw-ha_t ,_i_ any, _
significant effect automation-_are has on-power-type Selections.
An estimated savi_s-of $2.5 mill.ion is _sS{ble{n a_utO_t_6n "_
software development by selecting an all dc distribution network
scheme. The second best approach, with respect to aut_at_on software
development cost and risk, is to us=e two wire distribution when
possible while still meeting _st_; r_Uirements.
The total number of measurements and parameters is not the only effect
on power management and distribution software. An alternating current
(ac) system requires more complex software data conditioning with
respect to peak voltages, root-mean-squa_r e voltages, frequency
account ing, and power factors. In addi tion, any Power c6nvers_on also
requires control, redundancy assessment, an_[ _a-ui£ management.
Additionally, in the case of three-phase systems, phase angles and
load balancing also are factors in an increase of overall automated
management hardware and software complexity.
Subtask Review and Evaluation of GFP Designs
In addition to the above review of the general approaches, review and
evaluation_of-the automation o_ the candidate networks are presented
in each of theappiicable subtasks of Task I. The differences in
candidate designs, when reviewed in Subtask 1.2 Function Partitioning,
result in including Power conversion management and table maintenance
in the top-level functional decomposition for designs two through
five. Subtasks 1.4 Automation Architecture Issues, and 1.8 Automation
Approach/Architecture Definition, are also affected directly by the
differences in these distribution approaches. These effects are
presented in the respective sections.
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1.2 CM/PMAD FUNCTION PARTITIONING
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1.2.1
Electrical power is an indispensable resource in a space vehicle with
a human crew. I£ it failed, few devices on the vehicle would operate,
and the safety of the crew would soon be at risk. Thus, management
and distribution of connon module electrical power is a vital task;
yet, ironically, it is an inherently tedious one. Because the task is
tedious, it would seem logical to automate as much of it as possible.
However, because the task is vital, _t would seem-t/n-w_se to delegate
all of it to machinery. _ Obviously, h_ and-nmchinery must man--age
and distribute electrical power in the common module. The questions
are (i) which functions of the task should hum_perform; (2) which
functionsshouldmachinerypereorm; andS) what kindsof machine 7
are to be used, In answering those questions, we partition the task
of conmon module power management and distribution (CM/FMAD); i.e., we
assign to each function of the task a specific type of controlling
entity. The partitioning done in this section applies to the CMIPMAD
task as it will exist in the i0C.
Partitioning Approach
I.2.2
The approach used to partition the CM/PMAD task is divided into four
major steps:
I) List-ar,_ define potentially useful types of controlling entities
for functions in the CM/PMAD task;
2) Develop rules and guidelines to partition functions;
3) _pefine the task of CMIPMAD to a sufficient level o£ functional
detail to allow partitioning of a single controlling entity to
each function;
_) Partition the controlling entities and definitions of step one to
each of the functions in the functional decomposition of step
three, using the rules and guidelines of step two.
Definitions of Controlling Entities
1)
2)
Hardware Partition--In this report, any function partitioned to
hardware is to be controlled entirely by hardware. The hardware may
be settable (for example, the remote power controllers may have
settable trip levels), but not programmable in the usual sense.
Algorithmic Software Partition--Algorithmic software is also called
conventional software. Any function of the CMIPMAD task that is
partitioned to algorithmic software is to be controlled by algorithmic
software plus sufficient hardware to allow the software to be
effective (e.g., software needs memory to reside in, a microprocessor
to be executed in, etc).
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Expert System Partition--Any function of the CM/PMAD task that is
partitioned to an expert system is to be controlled by expert software
(sometimes called artificial intelligence), plus sufficient hardware
to allow the software to be effective. Expertsoftware incorporates
analogs of the knowledge_nd experience of one or more human experts
and is designed to mimic their intelligent approach to solving complex
problems.
Crew Partition--Any function of the CM/PMAD task that is partitioned
to the crew is to be controlled by one or more persons on the space
station or on the ground plus sufficient hardware and software to
allow their actions to be effective. These persons are assumed to be
technically trained, but not necessarily expert in the function to be
controlled.
Expert-Aided Crew Partition--This partition has the same definition as
crew partition, above, except that the crew person(s) will be aided in
their controlling function, by an expert. The expert may be an expert
system (above), or a person who is not part of the day-to-day crew.
1.2.5 Partitioning Rules
The second step in partitioning CM/PMAD is to list rules for function
partitioning. The rules of this step are in Table 1.2.3-1. As each
function of the CM/PMAD task isidentified, these rules are consulted
to determinewhich o£ the controlling entities is the most practical
one to perform that function. Function types, as referenced in the
rules, are coarsely categorized as follows:
l)
2)
3)
-- Functions/processes which are well understood (i.e., "common
knowledge"), usually involving simple mathematics/logic, with
predictable inputs and outputs.
ComDlex -- Functions which are technically understood using knowledge
available from accepted text books or procedures, but which involve
advanced scientific skills or special training to implement.
Expert -- Functions which are usually understood only by recognized
experts, and require the knowledge and judgement o£ an expert to
fulfill defined requirements.
0705113013B
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Functional Decomposition of the CM/PMAD Task
sufficient level oT detail to allow partitioning of the functions
involved. A useful way o£ doing this is to map a functional breakdown
of the task. Figure 1.2.A-I shows the upper levels o£ the current
functional breakdown of(_M/-|_MAD. The major functlon labeled "power
network control"is broke_n_d0_wn to a finerleMel Of _unctional detail
in FiEure 1.2.A-2. The two £iEures constitute the functional
breakdown of CM/PMAD to the level o£ detail necessary to complete
partltion_.
The detailed description of the functional breakdown of the CM/PMAD
task is in Appendix A. The description refers to FiEure 1.2.4-I and
follows it from left to right until it gets to the ma_or function
labeled "power network control"; then the description refers to Figure
1.2.4-2 and follows {t-from ieTt to right. The descr_pti6n defines,
for convenience, the term "CM computer*' to mean any part o£ or all of
the distributed information processing in the common module (CM),
whether S/W (including expert systems) or logic H/W. Similarly, the
term "space station main computer" is taken to mean any part of or all
of the distributed information processing in the space station outside
of the modules.
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At this point in the CMIPMAD partitioning, it is obvious that most of
Functions 1.0 (Power Conditioning) and 2.0 (Power Distribution) will
probabty be controlled by hardware, while most of Function 3.0 (Power
Network Control) will probably be controlled by some mix of software
types.
1.2.5 Estimates Relevant to Software Development of Function 3.0
The next step in the functional partitioning of CH/PHAD is to consider
the (provisionally assumed) software development of Function 3.0,
Power Network Control. Begin by determining which subfunctions of
Function 3.0 could be controt!ed entirely by a single type of
controlling entity. Next, estimate a rough necessary capability (or
complexity) of each subfunction. Then make rough estimates of the
difficulty of developing the necessary software to control the
subfunctions. The results are summarized in Table 1.2.5-1. Table
1.2.5-1 is arranged to follow the functional breakdown of Figure
1.2.4-2 from left to right.
1.2.6 Results of Partitioning
The final step is to perform the actual partitioning of the entire
CM/PMAD task, Functions 1.0, 2.0, and 3.0. Table 1.2.6-1 shows the
final partitioning of Functions 1.0 (Power Conditioning) and 2.0
(Power Distribution). Table 1.2.6-1 is arranged to follow the
functional breakdown of Figure 1.2.4-i from left to right. Table
1.2.6-2 shows the final partitioning of Function 3.0 (Power Network
Control). Table 1.2.6-2 is arranged to follow the functional
breakdown of Figure 1.2.4-2 from left to right. The Applicable
Partitioning Rules referred to in Tables 1.2.6-I and 1.2.6-2 are the
rules presented in Table 1.2.3-1.
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Table 1.2.3-1 Rules for Function Partitioning of CMIPMAD
,
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
10.
11.
12.
13.
15.
16 ¸
Functions should be implemented by the most life-cycle cost-effective
approach.
The implemention of a function must be capable of meeting all
requirements specified for the function.
It is usually life-cycle cost-effective to implement simple functions
in algorithmic software, where required response times are greater
than a few milliseconds.
A function that requires a response in the microsecond range should be
implemented in hardware.
A function that is responsible for last-line-of-defense crew safety
should be initiated by hardware or by crew action.
Hardware should not be used to implement a complex function that
allows a response time in the minutes or longe r range.
Complex functions cannot require a response time equal to or less than
a few milliseconds.
Complex functions that require responses in a few seconds should be
implemented in software.
Complex functions that require responses in equal to or greater than
tens of seconds may be implemented in algorithmic software, expert
systems or crew.
Functions that require an expert's knowledge and judgment should be
implemented by expert systems or expert aided crew.
Expert functions that are required to respond in seconds or less are
sufficiently small to allow implementation in algorithmic software.
Complex functions should be implemented in algorithmic software,
expert systems or crew.
A function that is responsible for last-line-of-defense equipment
safety must be implemented by hardware, crew, or algorithmic software.
A function that is responsible for last-line-of-defense of
experimental equipment safety or experiment data safety may be
implemented by hardware, algorithmic software, expert systems, or crew.
Functions that occur predictably and periodically on a less than or
equal to weekly basis are usually most life-cycle cost-effective when
implemented in algorithmic software or expert systems.
Expert functions that occur predictably and periodically on a less
than or equal to weekly basis are usually most life-cycle
cost-effective when implemented in expert systems.
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17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
2_.
25.
26.
Simple and complex functions that occur predictably and periodically
on a greater than or equal to monthly basis are usually most
life-cycle cost-effective when implemented by algorithmic software,
expert system, or crew action.
Expert functions that occur predictably and periodically on a greater
than or equal to monthly basis are usually most life-cycle
cost-effective when implemented by expert-aided crew.
A complex function that has totally predictable and absolute ranges of
inputs is usually most life-cycle cost-effective when implemented in
algorithmic software.
A function that has no predictability of inputs should not be
considered for automation.
Expert functions that occur unpredictably but periodically less than
or equal to a monthly basis are usually most life-cycle cost-effective
when implemented in expert systems.
Expert functions that may occur unpredictably and require a response
in less than fractional hours are usually most life-cycle
cost-effective when implemented in expert systems.
Any function routinely and historically implemented in software is
probably most life-cycle cost-effective when implemented in software.
A function that is on-line and in the real-time control loop for the
initial operating configuration should not be implemented in an expert
system.
Any function routinely and efficiently implemented in hardware is
probably most life-cycle cost-effective when implemented in hardware.
Expert functions that may occur unpredictably and require a response
in hours may be life-cycle cost-effective when implemented in expert
systems.
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1.3 EXPERT SYSTEMS ROLE EVALUATION
AS a part of the work to automate CM/PMAD on space station, the role
that expert systems/knowledge-based systems (ES/KBS) might play has
been evaluated. This role evaluation consisted o£ gathering
information about various functions that an autonomous power system
must perform, then evaluating each of these with respect to a set of
expert systems applicability criteria. The evaluation covered not
only explicit CM/PMAD functions, but also possible functional
implementations beyond IOC.
It must be noted that the terms "expert system," "knowledge-based
system," and "rule-based system" are not synonymous. Within the
context o£ this report, the term expert system will mean any software
system that performs a complex, well-defined task using the same input
information and problem-solving strategies as a human expert and that
has the capability to make accessible to a user the reasoning it uses
to perform the task. Expertise within such a system has its origins
in the experience one or more persons have accumulated while
performing the task. The term "knowledge-based system" refers to a
software system that implements probl_solving knowledge that may
have come from a human expert, textbooks, or other knowledge sources.
This distinction is important because there are no human experts who
have experience managing a power system like tha6 which will be on the
common modules, as none has ever been built. Certain aspects o£ this
problem Will be similar enough to existing tasks that the experience
of humans can serve as the basis for a software system, but in other
cases this will not be true.
The third term, "rule-based systems", refers to a specific method of
implementing a knowledge-based system or an expert system, and there
are other methods that may be used. Rule-based prograrm_i_ has proven
to be an effective vehicle for capturing a human expert's knowledge of
a problem.
A primary source of information about the functions evaluated was the
CM/PMAD function partition matrix, section 1.2, that identifies those
functions that should be automated intelligently and those that should
be handled by conventional means. Other sources include Weeks (ref
l), Weeks and Bechtel (ref 2), the A_AC report on automation (ref 3),
and an article by Prerau (ref 4), that details criteria used to select
an appropriate domain for an expert system.
A number of functions meet the criteria well enough to warrant the
application of ES/KBS techniques to their implementation. Of these,
some are specific to the CM/PMAD system as it is defined, while others
are less limited in scope or are intended as explorations into new
technology applications, proof-of-concept exercises, etc.
Applications for ES/KBS specific to the CM/PMAD system include load
priority list maintenance, and status estimation and prediction for
system health maintenance. More general applications include dynamic
load scheduling, fault management, and maintenance procedures advising.
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Certain nonessential functions can be implemented as isolated expert
systems considered experimental and having the status of other
payloads. One of these is a fault analysis system specific to a
hardware device with which a crew member would interact to diagnose a
program with that device but which would have no controlling hardware
connection to it. Another is an expert system that would monitor the
operation of a payload and attempt to operate it in a power-efficient
maoner.
This paper discusses these functions and their evaluation with respect
to ES/KBS applicability criteria. Section 1 explains some of these
criteria. Section 2 describes specific CM/PMAD applications, and
Sections 3 and 4 examine more general applications and experimental
applications, respectively. Section 5 provides some general comments
and recommendations concerning the development of these systems.
1.3.1 ES/KBS Applicabilit 7 Criteria
i.3.1.1 General Criteria--The applicability of ES/KBS techniques to a
task depends on problem complexity and scope, availability of
alternative approaches, decomposability of the task, and the nature of
reasoning processes used to perform it. A good task will be difficult
but not inordinately so; it will require a few minutes to a few hours
for a person to perform. Conventional approaches to the task will not
be satisfactory. The task will be well defined, with clearly
specified ranges o£ inputs and outputs. It will not attempt to be
expert in an entire field, but only in a limited subdomain within that
area.
The task will require the use of heuristics that efficiently partition
a large problem space or that allow decisions to be based on uncertain
or incomplete information. The knowledge in the system will be
domain-specific; weak problem-solving methods (i.e., deduction from
first principles) are not required, nor is deep reasoning based on
causal analysis.
Decomposability is essential. A large problem must be broken into a
set of subtasks that can be attacked independently. Within each
subtask a basic approach must be feasible that can be refined later so
that special cases need not be treated immediately. The program can
in this way be prototyped easily, and changes made to the approach
before the methods initially chosen are set in stone. A decomposable
task will more easily be gradually phased into operation, with those
subtasks in which there is confidence allowed control earlier than
others. The task must allow the program to be tested in the
environment for which it is designed without being given control until
it iS trusted.
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i.3'1.2 _Criter{-a speci£icto _ert systems_expe_ system i
implements a problem solution based on the experience a person has.
Therefore, a human expert must be available to the project, and must
be willing and abie to _ve _s lu_wl_ge t0 the progr_de-slgher, who
W_I1 tr_late this into=a representation {nterpretable _byso_tware.
The expert must be recognized as such by others in the £1eld, or the
program w{ll not be trusted. The expert must be'patient enough to put
up with the knowledge engineer's initial lack of domain expertise. He
will be asked quest{0ns about issues that seem trivial or irrelevant.
The knowledge-engineering process and subsequent software development
will require a substantial amount of the expert's time, so there must
be a commitment;_= t0__the_.......pro_ect On the part og management. _
An expert system can be thought of as an archive of expert
problem-solving knowledge specific to some domain. If this knowledge
is scarce, the system development wi!l be l_ked on much more
favorably than i£ there are many experts, who may look at the program
as a competitor. It is i_rtant t_t these _;o!her domain area
personnel support, or at least do not hinder, program development.
A task that _s fr_uen_ly performed " _i i_ _=_
_ but reqd res real expertise is an
especially good candidate for aut_on/as_e_ts tend'to become
bored by repetition, preferring to go on to new and more challenging
problems.
Appl_cations within Power Network Control
1.3.2.1 Load Priority List Maintenance
1.3.2.1.1 Descr_ption_e of the CM/PMAD tasks detailed in the
function partition is generating a load priority list. This list will
control the selection o£ loads to be disconnected in the event of a
reduction in available power, and the choice of loads to be connected
if an unexpected increase _n power availability occurs. Algorithmic
software can be used to generate a list using a static set of
specifications, but there are occasions where a special mission
requirement may affect the load priorities, or a complex set of
circumstances may require the application of seldom-used criteria.
The task of load priority list maintenance _s to assess the priority
list and determine if there are circumstances indicating that a change
is needed in the list. Priority list assessments will be made
whenever the list is updated, every 15-20 minutes.
This function does not include generating the criteria used in
decision-making. Some of these criteria will depend on the space
station configuration; others will change more frequently, and these
changes must be communicated to the list maintenance function
regularly.
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1.3.2.1.2. ES/KBS Applicability--This function should be implemented
as a knowledge-based system, incorporating the list assessment
criteria as rules that an interpreter can apply when appropriate. The
complexity of the task, as well as its data-driven nature and
frequency of performance, _ indicates that it is a prime candidate for
intelligent automation of this type. The criteria will vary over
time, and this implementation approach will accommodate changes in
criteria without necessitating restructurir_ o£ the software that
performs the task. Rapid prototyping will be made easier because only
a small subset of the rules need be generated for the system to be
executable and testable.
1.3.2.2 Health Status Prediction
1.5.2.2.1 Description--In a system as complex as CM/PMAD, it will not
be enough to handle component failures as they occur. The health of
the system must be continually monitored and an attempt made to
predict its future status to enable replacement of elements before
they fail. Engineering data will be accumulated on the ground and
analyses and predictions made on a weekly basis, with more thorough
analyses done monthly. In this way, the number of system failures can
be reduced and the necessary replacement units made available before
they are needed.
1.3.2.2.2 ES/KBS Role--This function should be implemented as an
expert system. The difficult aspect of the task is that it requires
the analysisnot only of single variable values or value trends but o£
interactions between these that dan indicate that failure is imminent
even though no single value or trend would. Recognizing these
circumstances requires a high degree of power systems expertise. Also,
many CM/PMAD system components will degrade in a more-or-less
continuous manner, as opposed to tailing all at once, and judgments
must be made as to when a system or interaction is such that a
component must be replaced. The task will involve large amounts of
data, and only some of them will be relevant to any particul&r
prediction. These factors, combined with the frequency and regularity
of task performance, indicate that an expert system would be the most
cost-effective method of function implementation.
07051/3013B
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Systems Involving Power Control or Maintenance
1.3.3.1 Rationale--It is essential to consider applications that are
not speci£ically limited to CM/PMAD functions, especially with FOC
space station in mind. Intelligent programs that control a subsystem
on the common modules need information about other systems that
interact with and are integrated with that subsystem, just as a human
expert would. A typical example might be a situation where a
temperature sensor goes out of range. This may be caused by a power
system failure or a mechanical failure such as loss of lubrication in
a bearing, or a blockage in aduct that causes a pump to work harder
and overheat, etc. An optimally autonomous co_mon module will require
expert systems that span subsystem boundaries, interacting with other
expert systems and managing the interactions between subsystems or the
resources used by or involved with more than one subsystem. The
£ollowing applications are involved with power management but are not
specific to CHI_D.--: : :_ - _ :
1.3.3.2 Dynamic Load Schedulinf_
1.3.3.2.1 Description--The task o_ dynamic load scheduling involves
creating and modi_li_ load activation schedules subject to
constraints on resource availability, load characteristics, mission
priorities, etc, that vary continuously. An optimal schedule will
achieve mission goals in the shortest time possible without violating
power availability and other constraints. On the common modules, it
is expected that power requests will total many times that which is
available, so this is an important and ongoing problem. Included in
this task is the problem o£ e££iciently handling situations where a
schedule must be abandoned unexpectedly and a contingencyschedule
developed on short notice.
1.3.3.2.2 ES/KBS Applicability--Load scheduling is a costly,
human-intensive task that requires a great deal o£ experience. It
belongs to a class o£ problems whose complexity rises exponentially
with the number of operations, and it requires heuristics developed
through years o£ scheduling experience to deal with this complexity.
The task is well defined and to an acceptable extent decomposable,
though not optimally so. An expert system could be developed that
deals with some subset o£ the constraints human schedulers handle,
with more information added incrementally. As con£idence in the
schedules the system creates increases, its use can be gradually
phased into operation.
The payo£f associated with development of a program such as this will
be large, because there are many similar applications that this system
could handle well, with only modifications to the domain-speci£ic
parts o£ the knowledge base. The program could include other
£unctions such as the analysis o£ power consumption trends to
determine actual power availability, and provision o£ interrogation
options to allow crew members to determine power system status and the
reasons £or scheduling choices or conditions that led to contingency
scheduling, £or instance.
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1.3.3.3 Fault Management
1.3.3.5.1 Description--Fault management in the co,mon modules
consists of detecting an abnormal state in a system, isolating the
fault(s) that caused the abnormal state, and suggesting (or
initiating) an action that brir_s the system back to an operationally
sound state. A typical example would be a short circuit that causes
an increase in current through a breaker. The breaker is tripped,
shutting off current through the circuit. A fault management system
would monitor that circuit, recognize the current shutoff, isolate the
cause of it, and suggest that an alternate circuit configuration be
selected. The program must have information about all of the common
module subsystems because a problem in one system may cause a
recognizable fault in another. The types of faults dealt with must
not be such that a real-time response is required.
1.3.3.3.2 ESIKBS Applicability--Fault management systems have been
built for a variety of applicati6ns, and though the common modules are
potentially more complex than in previous projects, a knowledge-based
approach appears to be a cost-effective alternative. The program w_ll
need to interface with various hardware systems and possibly with
other software, such as the contingency payload scheduler as well. It
can provide a focus for automation in several subsystems. Monitoring
these and their interactions will be time intensive and will require
more intelligence and flexibility than algorithmic software can
provide. Also, it is assumed that the hardware aboard the common
modules will change over time, and a knowledge-based approach will
make it easier to keep the fault management system up to date.
1.3.3.4 Maintenance Procedures Advising
1.3.3.4.1 Description--The various subsystems aboard the common
modules will be continuously monitored, and when a fault occurs, it
will be necessary to come up with a short-term workaround and to
replace the unit responsible for the fault. Maintenance procedures
advising involves giving the crew (or perhaps an autonomous robot at
FOC) the information needed to carry out service procedures, both
unscheduled, as above, and routine maintenance such as filter
replacement, parts lubrication, etc. Information the crew member
needs includes the location o£ the unit, the states that various
systems must be in for the operation to be carried out, and
step-by-step instructions for the procedure, including contingency
information to handle foreseeable abnormalities.
1.3.3.4.2. ES/KBS Applicability--This task is a good candidate for a
knowledge-based approach. The number o£ interacting subsystems on the
common modules will be large, and crew members will be rotated too
frequently to allow sufficient time for them to become expert at
maintaining these changing systems. The task is amenable to the kind
of incremental development and phase-in appropriate to ES/KBS
techniques. Until the systems to be maintained take on more
definition, there will be no expert at this task, so the knowledge
base will be developed by analyzing subsystem construction and
operation.
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Applications as Onboard Experiments
1.3._.1 Fault Analysis--There may be hardware devices on the common
module that will be su££iciently complex that they will require expert
troub !eshoo ting_but which are= no t ame_ble to rout inetr anspor t back
to Earth. An example o£ such a system on Earth is £he PROFS
workstations used by the Natlonal Weather Service. These workstations
are distributed throughout the country and require an expert
technician tO travel t0 remote _]:-es-t:o repair them--at great
expense. A diagnostic expert sys_ a la MYCIN could be used to
assist a crew member in deciding how to £ind a faulty component in a
device o£ this sort, how to replace.......the de_ective part, and how to
carry out routine testing and maintenance. Such a system would £ree
an expert on the ground and the communication channel he would use to
help the crew member repair the device. The program could have a
minimal hardware inter£ace with the device but would more likely carry
on a dialogue with the crewman, requesting in£ormation and presenting
In-dec_d_ng-whether tO:;implement such=:an expert system-; -a-nt_ober Oi=
£actors must be considered. For example, how critical is rapid repair
o£ the hardware; what is the C0St 0£ developing tlle _ert _ system;
what is i_e--cost 0_ keep__ a _i_ expert on hand; what" IS _he cost
o£ the computer used £or the expert system (including expenses in
weight, power, and maintenance o£ the computer itsel£; and how likely
is it that :a:human _ert would have to: remain on call anyway? Other
£actors include how common the expertise is and the ability of the
crew to make repairs once they know the problem.
i'3.4.2 Payload Power Monitoring--Many o£ the payloads aboard the
common modules will be capable of a variety o£ modes o£ operation,
di£_eri_ in the amount of power they consume. An expert system
specific to a particular experiment could monitor its operation,
analyzing its power use trends to communicate to the payload scheduler
or health status monitor, and operating the payload (or suggesting an
operational regime) that would be most power e££icient and would
accomplish the mission goals t=or that payload. Included in this
system could be £ault detection software that would make certain the
payload could not draw more power than it would under normal operating
cond i t ions.
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Among applications within power network control, the load priority
maintenance system is the best candidate for current implementation.
Because this system will actually control hardware (by deciding with
no human intervention which loads will be shed), it will be necessary
to test and refine the system incrementally over time. This will
assure that the system is modifiable and can be trusted.
Work on health status prediction could start now, using expertise
developed £rom experience with other power systems. Current power
systems test bed projects such as the Autonomously Managed Power
System (AMPS) could become a proving ground for this type of expert
system. Testing (and raising confidence in) the system will be a
major issue. Prediction problems typically are such that only good
statistical analysis can prove a program useful, and thls requires a
large number of system tests with real data.
All of the applications described earlier that are not limited to
CM/PMAD can be approached now. Dynamic load scheduling will require a
great deal of work, because within certain contexts the general
scheduling problem is still a difficult research issue, but this work
will result in enormous benefit in terms o£ the number of man-hours
saved and the range of applicability of the solutions devised.
Temporal modeling is a hard problem, as is the size of the task in
this domain. The work done here on the Energy Management Expert
System (EMES) has provided Some insights into the problem.
The £ault management and maintenance procedures advising tasks are
more dependent on speci£ic common module systems definitions: but
these systems are sufficiently defined to allow work to begin in
knowledge acquisition and representation. Both systems will be large
and complex, and work on them must begin early i£ they are to play a
role in initial operational configuration (IOC) space station.
The ES/KBS applications as onboard experiments are comparatively
small, self-contained systems and can be considered for development
whenever the associated devices or payload S become available.
!
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Under this subtask we addressed and analyzed the issues of distributed
versus centraliz_edautomation, fault i_lation, load management,
interfaces to space station power and data buses and their returns,
separation of data and power grounds, local energy storage, crew
interfaces, sensing - reguirments, and sens!_ngtechniques as they
pertain to the automation o£ the CM/PMAD system.
i._.i Distributed versus Centralized Automation Analysis
Automation is defined as "the use of machines to control and/or carry
out processes in a pr_efin_or .K_de!e_i set of circumstances without
human intervention." Centralized automat_0n is defined as a central
computing element for pr_:essing Of data reS-ulting in c0ntroi
decisions and coEmand issuance. Distributed automation is defined as
several or more computing elements either arranged single level, or
hierarchically with several levels. The s_gn_f{cance in the
difference between centralized and distributed is that distributed
automation allows both preprocessing of data (hierarchical
arrangement) and processing of data in smaller amounts, in parallel
fashion on each level. For this report, all automation approaches are
within the power subsystem, i_e.:
I) Centralized refers to a single process lng element in the Space
station power subsystem;
2) Distributed refers to multiple processir_ elements on a single
level, i.e., one power subsystem processor for each module or
element ;
3) Hierarchically arranged distributed system (HADS) refers to a
hybrid approach, using both central processor(s) and distributed
processors arranged in hierarchical fashion.
Processing, although not totally interchangeable with automation, is
an important part of automation with respect to comparisons in the
distributed versus centralized question. Distributed processing has
recently been a favorite candidate for functions and tasks that were
related through processing resources available and not related through
dependence on a large amount of shared task-dependent data.
Complexity of those distributed systems greatly increases when the
amount o_ shared dependent data increases. However, improvements in
communication links, e.g., local area networks (LAN), between
processors have significantly reduced the complexity factor and,
therefore, risk. ConverselY, a processing system must be increased in
required size, power, and processing speed as more functions are
allocated to a central computer.
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The analyses and comparisons performed here pertain to the CM/PMAD
subsystem. However, the overall station power system, including
source, conversion, storage, and distribution, is briefly considered
for completeness. Experience gained from the automated power systems
management (APSM) (Ref 5) sun,narized in Table 1.4.1-1, indicates the
HADS approach is preferred for the overall station power system.
Additionally, Autonomous Spacecraft Design and Validation Methodology
Handbook, Issue 2, (Ref 6) indicates a hybrid between centralized and
distributed approaches is preferred for spacecraft that require a high
level of processing complexity. Major keys in our recommendation of
the HADS approach are risk, growth capability, subsystem performance,
modularity, and adaptability to change. The overall ,x>dular approach
selected in the reference station configuration lends itself
particularly well to the distributed approach in overall power system
automation. In the HADS approach, the shared data between the
station-level managers o£ power and the CM/PMAD manager of power are
simplified to power and energy requirements and resource allocations.
Using the HADS approach, each station module has maximum flexibility
in local power subsystem use. This approach most closely resembles
the power network of a typical commercial power company, a desirable
goal in that the power subsystem of space station is more of a
"utility" than ever before in a space project. The HADS automation
approach down to the module level in turn requires processor
capability at the top CM/PMAD level as a minimum.
The major advantage of HADS is that the approach uses the Strong
points o£ both the centralized and distributed approaches. The
specific advantages of HADS from an overall general view in the
comparison of distributed versus central power management and
distribution control are:
i) Increased testability (distributed strong point);
2) Higher growth capability and flexibility (distributed strong
point);
3) Increased speed of information transfer (distributed strong
point);
4)" Lower development risk (centralized strong point)
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A centralized approach for the entice power system at the space
station level would be impractical if not impossible to ground test
before flight without building the entire station power system and
related loads or without a very large amount o£ simulation. Either
testing approach for the Centralized power system control would be
very expensive and poss_ly render the testing resui_s questionable in
the case o£ widely used simulation. Alternatively, the distributed
approach with its modularity lends itself particularly well to
verification testing, both in development and preflight. This
especially pertains t6 dlstrlbuti_ %_0h_6 at iieast _h_ mO_u!e
level. The control and operation of each power system element (i.e.
_r generation and ener_gy storage, distrlbution _ints, and module
power management and distribution) could be checked OUt separately
before flight, accommodating buildup of the station. Within the
module, testing is also simplified in the distributed approach, but
the factor is not as significant.
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Table 1.4.1-I
APSM Factors in Selecting Distributed vs Central Computer Architecture
APSM Requirement
I. Computational Rates
2. Hardware Cost
3. Packaging
4. Software Complexity
Central Approach
Time Sequenced, Timing
Criticality
Initially Lower
Complex, Heavy Wire
DistributedApproach
Concurrent Processing of
Critical Processes
Initially Higher
Simple System Interconnect
5. Software Develop-
ment Cost
Harness
Complex Executive
Software, Software
Module Interaction
Simple Executive Software,
Independent Partitioned
Software Modules
6. Reliability
7. Development Risk
8. Adaptive to Change
9. Growth Capability
10. Spacecraft
Interface
11. Subassembly and
System Testing
12. Future Data System
Trend
Equivalent (Complex
Interaction)
Complete Loss Due T¢
Processor Failure.
More Expensive To
Add Redundancy
Greater
More Expensive
Hard to Expand
Equivalent
Complex, Expensive
Decreasing
Equivalent (More Software
To Be Developed)
Graceful Degradation
Cheaper To Add Redundancy
Less
Less Expensive
Easy to Expand
Equivalent
Simpler, Lower Cost
Increasing
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Growth capability and overall flexibility are majgr advantages of a
distributed system, either single or multiple level. As long as the
interfaces are carefully maintained, the particular functions in the
distributed processors are easily modified without major testing of
the overall systeafbeing necessary. Conversely, in a centralized
system, the addition, deletion, or modification o£ a function would
cause validation testing of the entire system to assure changes haye
not violated timing constraints or degraded overall system performance
to an unacceptable level.
The speed o£ information transfer is also an important consideration
for comparing distributed to centralized power system control.
Ideally, the exact requirements for CM/PMAD automation would be
specified and always remain unchanged. The functions car_ be well
defined, partitioned, and allocated, but the automation requirements
with respect to speed of reaction, for example, depend heavily on
electrical loads and their requirements.. The nature o£ space station
and its projected long-time operational life precludes defining these
detailed load requirements with a guarantee of no change (or even no
major change). The speed of reaction to an event is very important to
the trade between centralized and distributed control of the power
management and distribution system. How long can a load be
disconnected (or connected) or a failure or fault goundetected before
the controlling section of the power system must actually be apprised
and react? An answer given to this question can be as fast as is
technically feasible, but within reasonable hardware and software
constraints.
The worst case data rates and required processing time for
centralized, distributed and HADS approaches, as determined in Section
1.6 o£ this report, show clearly and not surprisingly that the FADS
approach reacts fastest of all approaches where it is assumed that all
relevant data must be transmitted to the decisionmaker for
processing. Under the assumptions of Section 1.6, the centralized
approach (using a total of six modules with the common module as a
baseline) is limited to hundreds of milliseconds reaction time, while
the distributed is less than a hundred milliseconds. The HADS
approach can react in less than ten milliseconds. Where the required
reaction time and required subsystem performance has not yet been
totally specified, HADS represents the least risk approach for meeting
those eventual requirements that may change during the design phase of
space station.
Finally, the HADS approach lends itself to overall commonality in the
power subsystem and perhaps across other subsystems as well.
Additionally, the HADS approach has a high degree of modularity, thus
reducing development risk. Software programs can be smaller and more
manageable; however, it should be noted that for the HADS approach,
software interfaces increase and must be well thought out early in the
design phase, keeping the interfaces as simple as possible to maximize
the advantages of the HADS approach.
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It must be noted that the availability of reliable, cost-effective,
fault tolerant processors, and supporting integrated circuits having
low weight and power characteristics, i.e., VLSI and CMOS processors
was assumed.
In the HADS approach, as many functions and subfunctions as possible
are allocated to the lowest level physical elements as defined by the
ability to perform the decision process with a minimum of external
data required. The approach is to make the lowest level controllers
as small as is reasonably possible while maintaining the required
capability for the allocated functions. Primarily, lowest level
functions include the following:
I) Data acquisition;
2) Data conditioning;
3) Data synchronization (time stamping for analysis in system
solution);
4) Data compression;
5) Limit checking;
6) Local fault handling;
7) Short term data storage;
8) Requested data transfer;
9) E£fectors control.
The major functional responsibilities of overall distribution, load
ranking and scheduling, and subsystem health management are allocated
to the top-level CM/PMAD controller in the HADS approach.
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Fault Isolation Analysis
...... "i_- L
In 1985, Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace successfully demonstrated
FIES-II, an expert system computer program that diagnoses hardware
faults in a breadboard dc power system. This program, developed under
contract to NASA's Marshall Space Flight Center, demonstrates that
artificial intelligence software can effectively locate faults in a
power system by examining telemetry data.
FIES-II demonstrates the handling of faults of moderate complexity,
but it is limited to finding a single£ai!ure. However, this failure
may be any o4 several types, including a remote power controller stuck
open or closed, a bus shorted to ground, an overload, or a resistive
path where none should exist. Because the power system breadboard
used in the demonstration had multiple buses, these faults could
change the interconnections between sources and loads, resulting in
numerous subtle problems.
An actual space station power system might exhibit faults beyond what
FIES-II could analyze. For one thing, the space station's power
system is not a simple dc system but a three-phase ac system. This
means that faults can develop on any of the three phases. Further, an
ac system has more parameters than voltage and current to examine for
faults--a problem may appear as an incorrect frequency or phase,
low-power factor, or high distortion. In addition, multiple faults,
failed sensors, and fault propagation must be considered as
possibilities. Some faults may require causal reasoning for diagnosis.
Other faults in the power system may be easier to examine. For
example, at the low end o£the spoctrumo£ fault complexity, circuit
breakers have been used for many years to clear simple electrical
overloads.
Between these extremes are numerous possibilities that must be
considered.
Under this task, the range of possible faults that might occur in the
space station power system were investigated, and findings and
recommendations for approaches to detecting and isola.ti_ each kind
are presented.
1.4.2.1 Fault Type Analysis--The term "fault" as used here embraces
the full spectrum of malfunctions mentioned previously, and ranges
from minor deviations from expectations to catastrophic failures.
Faults in components that are part of CM/PMAD or are connected to it
are considered here. In this context, the term "computer" will mean
all o£, or any part of, the distributed intelligence in the common
module and will include conventional software as well as any expert
systems or other artificial intelligence software.
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1.4.2.1.1 Problem External to Common Module--First, any automated
power management and distribution system must be aware o£ the quality
of power delivered from outside the co_on module. Problems in this
area may not be caused by anything inside the co_m_on module, and there
may be little that a system in the common module can do to isolate or
correct such a fault. Nevertheless, failure to recognize such
problems could lead to incorrect problem analysis and inappropriate
action.
Faults in this category include low voltage, incorrect frequency,
improper phase relationship between the three phases, and high
harmonic distortion. For any of these problems, CM/PMAD has little
choice of action: (i) switching to the alternate bus if that bus has
better quality power; (2) recording the problem in a log; (3)
notifying a higher authority; and (4) remembering the problem to guide
future actions. None o£ these actions would require complex decisions
beyond the capability of conventional software. On the other hand,
attempting to diagnose the cause of such problems is not a suitable
task for CM/PMAD, because this would require a great deal o£
information from outside the ¢o,_uon module.
1.4.2.1.2 Open or Short Circuit--A second fault type is a short or
open circuit in the network. In general, shorts will result in
excessive current and will therefore be cleared by circuit protectors
before any kind of computer could begin an analysis. This means that
the computer analyzing the fault will need to recognize an open remote
power controller that should be closed and deduce that there is a
fault downstream from it; the fault itself may or may not appear in
the telemetry the computer examines.
Our experience with FIES-II has convinced us that either conventional
software or rule-based or expert system software could diagnose shorts
and opens and take corrective action. However, either implicitly or
explicitly, both types of software would need to include heuristics to
guide the search for the fault, recognize the implications of an open
remote power controller, or find an appropriate corrective action. We
recommend rule-based software that may use frame-based representations
because heuristics are most easily expressed in this form and because
heuristics are considerably more difficult to recognize, modify, and
debug in conventional software. In addition, rule-based or
£rame-basedsoftware will simplify the modifications that must be made
as the space station grows and experiments are changed, because it
minimizes the amount of code that must be changed and encapsulates
information that is likely to change, isolating it from code that will
not need modification.
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I._.2.1.3 Faulty Sens0rL-i third type of failure is a £aulty sensor.
This type o£ fault may be easy to diagnose or extremely difficult.
The key factor that determines the level o£ difficulty is the an_unt
o£ redundancy in the sensor configuration. For exa_le_, _£ there is
no redundancy, a failed sensor will be very difficult to identify,
because one problem can produce the same measurements as another.
The co,_lexity of this problem is compounded by the number of ways a
sensor can fail; sensors may be noisy, intermittent, stuck at one
output value, or have an incorrect scale factor. In addition, if
sensor data are multiplexed on a bus, one sensor's data may be
mistaken for another's. Furtheru_ore, all data passing through one
multiplexer or bus interface may be garbled by a single failure in the
multiplexer or interface.
We do not believe that the possibility of faulty sensors will greatly
complicate the SOftwa;e for fault detection and isolation. However,
making such software practical will require some constraints on design
and will have some effect on operations,
Specifically, redundancy should be provided in critical measurements,
particularly in bus voltage measurements. Without this redundancy,
the software may be unable--as indeed a human might be--to distinguish
among possible failure ,K)des without conducting such e_eriments as
switching a load from one bus to another, turning loads off or on, or
having crew members change out an 0RU, or report _0bservatlon.
Although redundancy will minimize the chances for the software to
ignore a failure or m{sdiagnose a problem, we beiieve that full
redundancy is unnecessary. In fact, we expect the law o£ diminishing
returns to limit sensor redundancy to a _i_ fraction of the total
number of Se_ors' ...._iswiii, however, req_re aiiowir_ the so{tware
to conduct experimentsto_locate-and isolate a_£ault.
1.4.2.1.4 Failed RPC--A fourth fault type is a failed RPC. These
devices might fail in any of a number o£ ways. For example, an RPC
may change state when no command is given or fail to change state when
commanded to do so. This could result from a failure in circuitry
that decodes the RPC's address or command from the control bus, or it
could be a failure in a switching element. In either case, the
problem is a subset of the short-or-open=ifa_lure _e discussed
previously as long as the software does not conduct experiments.
However, addi tiona--1-co_lexity- resuits _r_l an _C--that- responds to
the .wrong address--performs a function another RPC was commanded to
perform--or one that misunderstands a command. I£ the software is
attempting to conduct experiments to isolate a fault, the
malfunctioning RPC could take actions and send status data that would
be very misleading. We believe that the software can cope with this
malfunction, but it will have to be explicitly considered as a failure
mode during software design.
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Twoother RPCfailure modes would be difficult to detect unless an
overload caused the RPC to trip. In the first of these modes, the RPC
trips at a different current level than the one for which it was set.
Because of the rarity of overloads and the length of the measurement
inter_ral, the software might have no way of determining that this type
o£ failure has occurred. We believe that this type of failure is best
examined by fault-tolerant design, a built-in self-test function, or
periodic testing of the equipment rather than by the fault-isolation
software.
The second difficult-to-detect failure mode is a changed trip delay.
Specifically, circuit protectors typically are rated to carry a
specified overload for a specified amount of time before tripping. If
the delay characteristics change, there will generally be no way for
the software to determine that they have. We believe that this type
of failure is also best handled outside of the fault-isolation
software.
A final RPC failure mode is a resistive closure, i.e., excessive
voltage drop across the RPC when it is closed. The effects of this
failure are distinctive and should be easily detected.
I._.2.1.5 Fault 7 Power Conditioner--At this time, the role of power
conditioners in the coeenon module, if any, has not been determined.
However, the failure modes typical of power conditioners--no output,
incorrect frequency, low efficiency, high distortion, i_roper
phasing, etc--produce symptoms that are readily traced to the
conditioner. We therefore believe that fault isolation software will
be able to properly diagnose this type of fault.
07051/3013B 1-51
MCR-86-583
1.4.2.1.6 Power Control Unit (PCU) Failure--The PCU is assumed to be
the highest-authority computer with algorithmic software in the
CM/FMAD. Computer failures present the most complex set of
possibilities, because, at least in principle, a computer malfunction
can result in any o£ thousands of inappropriate actions. In practice,
however, most computer malfunctions result in very obvious s_toms,
e.g., the computer stops doing anything at all that is detectable from
outside the machine, sprays random characters onto the termina! screen
continuously, or prints an error message and halts. None of these
failure modes would interfere with space station operability or place
the common module closer to a life-threatening situati_ Other ....
failure modes might, if the computer is given too much control
authority. For example, if it is possible for the PCU to turn off
life-support systems, a malfunction could cause it to do so.
An error in PCU software could produce the same range of problems as
hardware faults can produce, including sendi_ misleading information
to the fault-diagnosis COmputer if dlagnos_s _S done _n a separate
computer. Such software and hardware techniques as self-test
programs, watchdog timers, and similar handshakes with external
equipment, error-_orrecting memory, and built-in consistency checks
can reduce the likelihood of serious failures, but preventing such
failures will require reducing the PCU's authority. This can be done
by adding hardware that prevents the PCU from issuing certain
dangerous conmmnds without an enabling signal from an independent
authority. This authority could be the crew, a second computer, or
special hardware. In this case, the fault diagnosis and isolation
would be provided by the independent authority.
Another factor to consider is that the PCU is assumed to control the
RPCs, so if the PCU fault is to be isolated, it must be disconnected
from the control bus and its functions taken over manually or by
another computer. An architecture that allows such a switchover would
introduce other equipment that would also have failure modes.
i._.2.1.7 Fault-Diagnosis Computer--If fault diagnosis and isolation
are done by a computer separate from the PCU, this computer will be
subject to the same kinds of problems as the PCU is. To some extent
these computers can check each other, but full checking would require
embedding the programs of each in the other. Even then it would be
unknown which computer had malfunctioned. A third computer could be
added with a majority vote arrangement; but we do not believe this
level of complexity is warranted in IOC.
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1.4.2.1.8 Microprocessors Subsidiary to the PCU--It is assumed that
microprocessors will be embedded in various subassemblies of the
CM/PMAD to minimize the amount of logic circuitry required to
inter_ace sensors to the data/command bus, decode commands, perform
self testing, provide status information to the PCU, etc. These
microprocessors and their associated memories and support circuitry
can fail in a variety of ways, the most probable of which is to stop
performing any detectable function at all. This failure will be
readily identified, because the fault isolation computer will be
unable to commnicate with it.
Certain other failures will be more difficult to isolate. For
example, a microprocessor may babble on the data bus, making it
impossible to communicate with any of the microprocessors. Or it may
appear to function normally but report erroneous data or status
information, change the state of an RPC or ignore a command to do so,
or respond to commands directed to a different microprocessor.
Some of these problems may be misdiagnosed as a faulty RPC, but this
would probably be acceptable, because the microprocessor likely would
be housed in the same ORU.
Other failures of microprocessors may have to be isolated through
experimentation. Failures that disable the data bus can be minimized
by providing a redundant bus.
1.4.2.1.9 Load Faults--Fault isolation software for power management
and distribution would generally view loads as "black boxes," i_e., it
would have very little information about them. It would be beyond the
scope of such software to attempt to troubleshoot problems internal to
a load. However, where the load produces externally observable
symptoms of malfunction, the software might be able to signal that
there is a fault or log the fault. Specific examples include:
l) Current to the load is out of normal operating range but not high
enough to trip the RPC;
2) The load's power factor is out of normal operating range;
3) The distribution of power consumption among the three phases is
abnormal.
In addition, the software might be able to identify some cases where
conducted emissions (electrical interference with the power system)
from the load exceed allowable levels.
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1.4.2.2 Recommendations--We recommend that experimental
fault-isolation software be _lown on IOC. This software would monitor
the data coming from sensors and status indications coming from RPCs.
It would also monitor the commands sent from the PCU to R/nCs and
maintain an internal software model o_ the state of the power system
in the common module_ it would then contlnuously look for {%dications
of faults and notify the crew when_6he is detected. Finally, :_t would
attest diagnosis of the problem and report its findings to the crew.
In diagnosing the problem, it may request such crew actions as
toggling an RPC or reporting visual clues, e.g. whether an indicator
light is on. We do not recommend giving this program control
authority on IOC; it will be used to test the fault isolation concept
and to gather performance data so that an enhanced version can safely
be given some control authority by FOC. However, even at FOC we
foresee a need for some human override capability.
The IOC versi_on o£this software:should be able to diagn_Q_s@shorts and
opens, RPCs that are stuck open or closed, nx)St sensor failures (with
some redundancy in sensors and allow_r_ for some experimentation),
faulty power conditioners, and most types o£ failures of the PCU and
microprocessors subsidiary to it. It would also be able to notify the
crew of loads consuming too much or too little power. Such a program
should be able to determine why an RPC tripped, although it may have
to conduct some experiments to isolate the malfunction to the ORU
level.
Switching to reduo_ant hardware can sometimes be done without the
level o£ intelligence required to diagnose a fault. For example, when
bus voltage drops to zero because o£ a tripped RPC, conventional
software Could take corrective action to restore power to the bus
before (or while) software using artificial intelligence techniques
analyzes the details o£ the problem. In general, we recommend using
conventional software for all tasks that are co,_only and effectively
handled by conventional software, particularly where it is important
to rapidly get to a safe condition, even though this condition may not
be optimum.
1-54
07051/3013B
1.4.3 Load Management Analysis
MCR-86-583
Historically, load management has been a human-intensive activity
based on the ground. It consists of scheduling the operation of the
various electrical loads on a spacecraft power system to most
effectively use the power available. To date the most practical
approach to automating this activity has been automatic load shedding,
i.e., having an onboard computer turn off the lowest priority loads in
sequence until the power consumption has been reduced to an acceptable
level.
This approach has not been fully satisfactory for several reasons:
I)
_)
Priorities change during a mission. For example, a low-cost
experiment may initially have very low priority, but its priority
may increase greatly if it has gathered 99 hours of data out of
an intended I00 hours and must be completely restarted if it is
turned off. Similarly, a load may require a considerable
investment in power, crew time, or other resources to prepare for
operation. After it is prepared, its priority may be very high
although initially it could not be operated at all. Another
example is a science experiment for which data-gathering
opportunities are very rare. Such an experiment would usually
have very low priority, but when conditions are right, it would
have a very high priority;
One set of loads may be moreuseful than another set although it
contains more lower-priority loads than the other set contains.
This may happen, for example, when one high-priority load
duplicates some of the functions of another high-priority load or
When two loads working together produce much more benefit than
the sum of their individual benefits;
3) The lowest-priority load that is on may consume a large amount of
power. If this load must be turned off because of a power
shortage, it may be possible to turn on several still
lower-priority loads without exceeding the power budget. A
simple numerical priority scheme would not detect this
opportunity.
Because of such factors, it is highly desirable for any load
management software for the common module to reason about more factors
than a single numerical priority rating. On the other hand, reaction
time constraints may make it necessary to minimize the reasoning done
in shedding loads.
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Under contract to Marshall Space Flight Center, Martin Marietta Denver
Aerospace wrote a load-management computer program known as the EMES.
This program considers a large number of factors for each load,
including power consumption, r_uirements for operation in daylight or
during eclipse, pointing requirements, whether the load can be
restarted after interruption, or whether it should not be
interrupted. The program can plan operation of the loads for a
specified number of hours, replan for changed conditions while
attempting to minimize schedule changes, or do emergency replanning
when equipment failure suddenly reduces available power.
Although EMES served its purpose as a test bed for demonstrating that
software can reason about some of the subtleties of load management,
it would require a number of changes to make it suitable for managing
loads on a real space station.
First, EYES was too slow. This problem has been examined in EMES-II,
developed under independent research and development (IR&D) funding at
Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace. Making such software fast with a
rule-based design approach requires a well thought out mixture of
production rules and algorithmic code. For example, the original
version of EMES typically used "fired" rules 70 times to update a
table of power availability versus time. Algorithmic code could have
updated the table thousands of times faster. Many such inefficiencies
are obvious only after considerable time has been expended on software
design.
Second, EMES "knows" about loads by maintaining a set of parameters
for each load. These parameters specify power consumption and a
number o£ constraints on operation of the load, but they do not
specify all the factors that human schedulers might consider.
Furthermore, it is likely that the set of relevant factors will change
considerably during the life of the space station, as will the values
assigned to these factors. For example, the addition of an experiment
may place a new and unanticipated constraint on the operation of other
loads. Designers of load management software will have to be very
careful to allow for the addition of new types of information about
loads, new constraints, and new rules for using this new information
without introducing errors or inconsistencies into the program.
A related problem is that any software with limited, parameterized
knowledge of loads will probably miss constraints imposed by
unanticipated events during a mission--equipment failures,
emergencies, political factors, etc--to which human planners could
readily adapt.
On the other hand, allowing for the fact that EYES was written in
1983-1984 when the design of the space station had not progressed very
far, EMES produces schedules competently. Furthermore, EMES-II is
faster than human planners and, unlike humans, does not suffer from
fatigue, get careless when under pressure, get sick, or forget
details. Such software would permit more frequent replanning as
situations change, which might be more beneficial than having a better
plan to start with and being unable to change it.
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Webelieve that load management software similar in capability to EMES
should be used for IOC, but it should be regarded as an experiment,
not a controller. Such a program could be used to give a new priority
list to conventional load-shedding software periodically, perhaps once
every few minutes. Although, for reasons mentioned previously, this
would not result in optimum load sheddin4_, it would be a great
improve_eent over any fixed-priority scheme, and would generally be
superior to what human schedulers could do, because the priority list
would always be fresh, reflecting the current situation. This
approach is preferred over giving direct control to the software
because it gives human observers a chance to modify its priority lists
or replace them altogether. In addition, the conventional software
that i,_lements the load shedding based on this list can perform
consistency checks by cc_aring it to a partially ordered list of
prearranged priorities. For exa_le, Load A may always have higher
priority than Load B despite changes in either's numerical rating.
Using intelligent load-management software as an experiment will
provide several benefits:
I) Better power use can be expected because of frequent revision of
the priority list;
2) Observing the behavior of the software will provide the data
needed to refine the scheduling rules, load-definition parameter
set, and parameter values;
3) Using the software as an experiment will develop confidence in
the program's coa_)etence without risk to mission success.
The recommended eventual approach to load management is describedas a
scenario in these following paragraphs. The description assumes that
the schedule being composed is to cover all of the next crew shift
period. Usually, the load scheduling function will be used for that
specific purpose. It should be noted, however, that under
extraordinary circumstances (loss of a solar panel, for example), the
function amy be invoked to reschedule the remainder of the present
crew shift.
"Space station manager" refers to the software entity that manages
that portion of the space station not contained within the modules.
Shortly before the beginning of each crew shift, the space station
manager will inspect that portion of the ground-generated timeline
that covers the coming shift. Using that information and using what
it "knows" about the present status of stationwide resources, the
space station manager will compute preliminary estimates o£ how much
of each stationwide resource to allow each module to use during the
coming shift. At the end of this process, the manager will have
composed for each module a preliminary resource allowances list.
These lists cover only available stationwide resources; the space
station manager will not have direct information about resources
available within a given CM.
1-57
07051/3013B
MCR-86-583
At this point, the space station managerwill alert the major
scheduling functions of each module and will present to each module
its individual list of preliminary resource allowances for the coming
shift ....
Aboard the CM, the major scheduling function will now compose a ......
preliminary schedule of CM activities that would cover the coming crew
shift. It is estimated that it will take about a half hour for the
major scheduler to compose the schedule. Input data to this function
will include_ but not be limited to, the preliminary resource
allowances list from space stat_on, the _rtion of the
ground-generated timeline, the CM/PMAD Redundancy Assessment Record of
Function 3.1.1.2 (Appendix A), and various sensor measurements.
One of the most important products of this preliminary schedule of CM
activities will be the preliminary load enable schedule. The
preliminary load enable schedule will be a compact, chronological
sequence of CM/PMAD events that would occur during the coming crew
shift. Each event entry will contain the following information:
i) A load designator (identifying number or other label);
2) Whether that load is to be enabled (connected to electrical
power) or disabled (disconnected from electrical power);
3) The time when this event is to occur.
As it composes the preliminary load enable schedule, the major
scheduler will assign to each CM load a load class number. Load class
is not the same as load priority. A load priority number exactly
defines a load's CM-wide priority over a moderate time interval (about
15 minutes or less). No two loads in a given CM will have the same
load priority number. A load class number coarsely defines a load's
space station-wide priority over a wider time interval (a fraction of
a crew shift period or more). Many loads may have the same load class
number.
Each module on the space station will use the same algorithm _o assign
load class numbers to its own loads. By this means, the CM will be
able to assign rough, stationwide priorities to each of its loads,
even though it knows nothing about individual loads in other modules
or about individual loads on the station structure.
The preliminary load enable schedule is composed, and load class
numbers are assigned, and CM/PMAD now has enough information to make
load requirements projections to cover the coming crew shift. A
description o£ these projections is given in Function 3.2.2.2
(Appendix A). The projections are forwarded to the space station
manager as "electrical resource requests" broken down by load class.
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Ideally, the load requirement projection "requests" of the CMIPMAD
would closely match the preliminary resource allowances originally let
by the space station manager. But perhaps a load originally scheduled
in the ground-generated timeline failed an hour before, so the major
scheduler decided not to put it in the preliminary load enable
schedule at all. In this case, the CM/PMAD "request" would be less
than the preliminary allowance, and the space station manager could
decide to give the excess resource to another module. Alternatively,
one crf the scheduled loads may have started drawing more power than
us"ual during a previous shift, and the major scheduler "knows" this.
In that case, the "request" would be larger than the preliminary
allowance, and the space station manager would need to decide whether
to draw some resource from other modules to make up the difference.
The space station manager will review all of the load requirements
projections from all of the modules and will use an empirical
algorithm to decide how to allocate electrical resources among the
modules. The algorithm must be empirical, because the space station
manager will not have detailed information about individual loads
within modules. The manager will not have detailed information
because its interfaces to the modules must be kept relatively simple
and generic. The interfaces must be kept relatively simple and
generic so that, if one module is taken off the station and replaced
with an improved version, it won't be necessary to make significant
S/W and H/W changes to the other modules or to the station.
After reviewing all the load requirements projections, the space
station manager will issue toeachmddule a list of final resource
allowances.
In the CM, the minor scheduler will inspect the final resource
allowances and will make whatever small adjustments are necessary to
the schedule of CM events covering the coming crew shift period. The
function will do its work within a few minutes.
The schedule o£ CM activities is now _eady for final crew or ground
personnel modifications, if any.
If the crew or ground personnel decide to remove loads from the
schedule, this can be accomplished immediately. After the crew has
approved the change(s), the minor scheduler would take a few more
minutes to schedule enough additional loading that the excess energy
of the removed load(s) would be used efficiently. In doing this, the
minor scheduler would be limited to adding loads that do not require
crew monitoring or assistance. To do otherwise would require the
minor scheduler to schedule a stationwide resource, i.e. crew shift
time. Such a decision could not be made at the CM level.
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The crew and ground personnel should be discouraged £rom making final
load additions to the. schedule; electrical energy that can be ga£hered
and stored by the space station is limited, and close to 100_ of it
will have been accounted for by the original ground-generated
timeline, the major scheduler, and the minor scheduler. If a
last-minute load mustbe added, the crew orground personnel would
specify which_oad, w_nit is to be added, and how long it must be
uupplied with power. The_rscheduler would quickly determine
which other loads wo_Tm_ve to be shed to accommodate the new Load
and would so noti£y the crew and ground personnel. It would shed as
few loads as possible£rom _he iowest loadc_asse_6.- The Crew and
ground pe£s6nnel could_d%_e to accept the rec_o_,endations of the
minor scheduler, to control all loads manually during the-time the
added load would be in operation, or to cancel the original request.
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Space Station Power and Data Bus Interface Analysis
The objective of this task is to analyze and define the CM/PMAD power
and'data bus interfaces to space station for each of the candidate
government-furnished networks, shown in Section 1.1 as Figures 1.1-1
through 1.1-5.
1.4.4.1 CM/PMAD Interfaces to Space Station Power--The CM/PMAD is
unique in the sense that it must distribute power to its own
controllers. In the recommended approach, PCU, the main controller
for CM/PMAD, receives its power directly from the main power bus.
Connection is made on the CM main transformer output side in the case
of designs one through four. PCU power for design five is from the dc
primary input bus directly. The interface, in either case, will be to
the local conditioning in the PCU. The PCU conditioning is required
to provide transformer isolation. The local or midlevel processors
receive power from the power input of the device within its command
which is electrically nearest the CM power input. Similarly, lowest
level device controllers interface to power at the power input of the
device being controlled. Isolation is again accomplished at the local
power conditioning required in the device controllers. In all cases,
the local power conditioning provides isolation that allows a local
grounding scheme to chassis.
Alternatively, bulk power conditioning could provid e power for a
CM/PMAD controller power bus. However, we recommend against this
approach. The main factors in recommending against this approach are:
I) Single-point failure causes inoperability of all controllers and
processors on the power bus. Providing redundant buses to match
the dual redundancy approach in the candidate design would still
be susceptible to a single-point failure problem in the user load
center where cross strapping is used;
2) Line regulation to the required levels would be difficult;
3) .Local power conditioning would still be required for isolation;
4) Flexibility after IOC is reduced.
I-S1
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1.4.4.2 Space Station Data Bus Interfaces--The data bus interfaces
considered include the CM data management network, space station
management network, and the CM/PMAD power control unit. The selection
o£ central versus distributed power control has signific_ e_fect on
power subsystem data interfacing to the Space Station data bus(es).
Therefore, the approach to data bus interfac_s de£{ned for both
central and distr_bdt_approaches. A centralized system!s defined
as a single control processor for the entire space station power
system, even though it may be termed a distributed subsystem with
respect to the overall space station. A distributed approach is
defined as a MS. A mS [s_urther defined, f0r the purposes of
investiEating inter_aces, to be a master-slave arrangement. While
networking is possible in a HADS, that case is treated under the
centralized system.
Interface hardware grounding constraints are discussed in Section
1.4.5, Data and Power Ground SeparationAnalysis.
I'4'4'2.i _ Da6_us_nter£a_s in DistriSuted Approach--The =
master-slave arrangement in the HADS requires a data link from each
slave to the master. The arrangement either must comprise a minimum
o£ a shielded twisted wire pair (or coaxial wire, depending on the
selected bus) or a fiber-optic link. In the case of electrical wire,
the traflsmit/receive electronics must provide isolation through
optical coupling, transformer isolation, or provide differential
drivers or receivers with high common mode rejection to minimize
possible ground loop currents. The shield, in the case of electrical
wire, should be tied to chassis ground at the receiver or source, but
not both. In the case of a HADS where there are multiple drops, the
best approach is opticai isolation or transformer isolation with the
shield tied to a single chassis ground.
The candidate designs are all well suited to the HADS approach.
Hierarchically above the power control unit, there is no difference in
data bus interfaces for the candidate designs. The differences in the
internal bus interfaces per candidate design are simply in number and
location.
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1.4.4.2.2 Data Bus Interfaces In Central Approach--In the centralized
approach, the interfaces between the overall power system controller
and the space station data management network is through a bus
interface unit (BIU) to the CM network and then through a packet
switch or bridge to the space station management network. The bridge
and BIU are each a set of electronics with an electrical wire or fiber
optic interface to the CM LAN. As in the case of the HADS
interfacing, these sets of interfacing electronics must also be
isolated as above.
For the central approach, the devices within the CM/PMAD are
interfaced through _ultiplexer/demultiplexers (mux/demux) that provide
the data interface to the central control processor. The mux/demux
also must provide electrical isolation as above. In addition, the
central approach requires additional cabling design or packaging so
that the interface from a mux/demux group to the central control
processor must becomepart of a cable assembly.
1.4.4.2.3 Software Interfaces--Software interfacing to the CM/PMAD in
the central approach is an integral part of the overall software
package. The software interface in the central approach, while it is
easily definable and straightforward in design, it is address and data
intensive at the highest level, requiring an address for each device
in the CM/PMAD. Alternatively, the HADS approach, using the
master-slave approach, gains the advantage o£ the centralized system
in software interfacing while gaining the modularity and flexibility
of a distributedsystem.
1.4.5 Data and Power Ground Separation Analysis
The local power conditioning, either ac-dc or dc-dc, of each processor
and controller, as discussed in the previous section, provides
transformer isolation from the main power bus. This prevents dc and
low-frequency current returns through the structure. The design must
provide at least 10 megohms dc isolation from the power supply inputs
to the signal ground of each box. Also, signal ground must be
isolated from chassis ground by at least 10 .megohms. It is noted,
however, that the internal grounding scheme for each processor or
controller must also be designed to the electro-magnetic interference
constraints given in an eventual space station electromagnetic
compatibility (EMC) document.
Prevention of ground loops between the various CMIPMAD elements can be
accomplished by using optical coupling data or by the transformer
isolation provided in the Manchester coding approach as used in the
MIL-STD 1553B data bus. A base-band standard wire bus using
differential line drivers and receivers would also provide good
insulation. The small ground loop current that would result would not
affect signals on the bus because of the high common mode rejection
ratio of the differential receiver. A base-band wire data bus would
require the use of a twisted shielded pair for each signal wire of the
bus. The shield would be tied to chassis ground at the receiver or
the source, but not both.
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The local energy storage, if used, can be either primary or
secondary. Applications can range from low=rate, long-duration use
(such as would be used for maintenange of a safe haven condition) to
providing high-rate, short-duration power (such as would be used for
an uninterruptible power supply). A typical and most probable use of
local energy storage is in the adaption of a common module to provide
a logistics support module that must have internal electrical power
during transition periods.
Seven _ electrochemical couples for loeal_energy stocage are
considered for functional effects on the CM/PMAD control network:
Primary
i) Silver-zinc (AgZn);
2) Lithium-thionyl chloride (Li/SOC12);
Secondar 7
3) Nickel-Cadmium (NiCd);
4) Nickel-Hydrogen (NiH2);
Secondary - molten salts
5) sodium-suleur;
6) Lithium-metal sulfide;
Regenerative fuel cell
7) Hydrogen-Oxygen.
Each Couple and type was analyzed for effect to the functional
decomposition with results given in Tab!e 1.4,6,1_ Each of the
£unctlonschecked {s a deltat0_a_w{thout any iocai energy
storage. If local energy storage is added to the CM, using the
hydrogen-oxygen fuel cell or the silver-zinc battery provides the
least effect to CM/PMAD automation.
_There are certainly more electrochemical couples possible that may
have been considered for a local energy storage effect analysis, but
these were considered representative of the functional effects of all
types.
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TABLE 1.4.6-1 LOCAL ENERGY STORAGE FUNCTIONAL IMPACT ANALYSIS
ENERGY SOURCE TYPE
LE
FUEL
PRIMARY SECON DARY CELL
AgZn LiSOCL2 NiCd NiH2 NaS LiMS H-O
CHARGEMAINTENANCE _ _ _ _
RECHARGECONTROL _ _ _
DISCHARGECONTROL(CURRENTlIMIT)
DISCHARGECONTROL(OVERDISCHARGE)
STORAGEENERGYMANAGEMENT
RECON_=NG M,',N,_EM_
.......................... °00o.i. .......... .o.°. ........... • ............. o.o.oo--. ............. o.i ....... •
0 0 0 Q Q 0 0
0 0 Q 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 Q
0 0 0 0
• ,,.,,,o ........... a-.,... ....... o..,.4 ......... ,,..,.-,.-.I ......... ,,,,,,,,I ..........................................
FAULTO_ Q O O Q
S_-,U_ PO_ ST^'rus e
Q O O
O
STATEOFCHARGECOMPLEX
HAZARDOUSMATERIALDETEC'nON
0 0 Q 0TRENDN_IN.YSIS
O
REGENERATIONMANAGEMENT
0 O O
O
O 0
Q O
O O O
O
0 0 0 0 0 0
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1.4.7.1 Introduction
1o4.7.1.1 Purpose--It is intended that the CM/PMAD task be as
automated as is practical. _it iS also recogniz_tha_ some human T
(crew or ground) monitoring of and intervention in the task will be
necessary. This section examines possible types o£ interfaces between
CM/PMAD and the crew and rec0mmends those types considered practical.
Possible interfaces between _/_ and groundpers0nnei are not _
considered here.
Z
1.4o7.1.2 Scope--At this writing, much r_ to be resolved in the
larger details of the designs of the _powe_inetwork and of the C24
data network. Much also needs to be resolved in defining the elements
of the mission of the spate Station. G_venthese facts,_ observing
the rapid development in micr0co_uter technoi0Ey, it is impossible to
predict with confidence what inter_ace types, existing or projected,
would be appropriate for the entire 0peratlonai i_£_ _hesta_ion,
which is estimated to be between IO and 30 years. And soi _less
otherwise noted, types of interfaces recommended in this report will
be assumed _0 apply only to common modules W_thln the I0C o_ the_space
station.
1.4.7.1.3 Definitions--This paragraph defines several short-hand
terms that are used for convenience in this section.
The term "CM computer" means any part o£ or all of the distributed
inf0rmat_on processing in the CM, Whether S/W (inclUd_ expert
systems) or logic H/W, Simiiarly, the term "space station main
computer" is defined as any part of or all of the distributed
information processing in the space station outside of the common
module.
The "CM/PMAD subsystem" consists of the CM electrical power network
and that portion of the ,'CM computer" that is devoted to the CM/PMAD
task.
1.4.7.2 Crew Interfaces Relevant to CM/PHAD Functions--In Appendix B,
Crew Interfaces Relevant to Functions of the CM/PMAD Task, each
function of the CM/PMAD task is examined to determine which functions
require interfaces between CM/PMAD and the Crew. For easy
cross-referencing, Appendix B has the same paragraph arrangement as
Appendix A, Functional Breakdown of the CM/PMAD Task. (Appendix A
presents a detailed description of the CM/PMAD task and its functions.)
In Appendix B, the two major CM/PMAD displays are mentioned, but not
described in detail: the load enable schedule display, and the
CM/PMAD block diagram display. These displays are described below in
paragraphs 1.4.7.3.1.2.1 and 1.4.7.3.1.2.2, respectively.
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1.4.7.3 Conclusions
1.4.7.3.1 Reco._ended Interfaces between CM/PMAD and the Crew--The
following recommended interfaces between CMIPMAD and the crew are
concluded to be practical and cost-efficient for the CM/PMAD task
only. They are not intended to preclude the development of other
technologies thought useful to support other CM subsystems. It is
stressed that these recommendations apply'only to the IOC.
1.4.7.3.1.1 Hardware
1.4.7.3.1.1.1 CM Computer Console--Some sort of CM computer console
should be available to allow the crew to monitor and control elements
not only of CM/PMAD but of other CM subsystems as well.
1.4.7.3.1.1.1.1 Video Screens--It is recommended that the CM computer
console have at least two identical video screens o£ 14-in. diagonal
measurement or larger to support crew intervention in the CM/PMAD task.
A touch-screen capability is recommended for each video screen.
would allow a crew member easy selection of interactive control
options on low- or medium-density displays.
This
Color graphics capability is recommended. Because two-dimensional
graphics should be fully capable of supporting the CM/PMAD task
(paragraph 1.4.7.3.2.2.2), color capability need not be
sophisticated. Eight colors including red, yellow, green, blue,
black, and white should be sufficient.
A screen resolution of 640-by-400 pixels or better is recommended to
allow display of complex block diagrams.
1.4.7.3.1.1.1.2 Keyboard--The CM computer console should include a
keyboard. A keyboard would allow the crew to transmit precise
commands o£ considerable complexity to the CM/PMAD task. The keyboard
keys should include all letters, numbers, and punctuation marks found
in a standard QWERTY arrangement. All American astronauts having a
technical education sufficient to control CM/PMAD will be familiar
with this arrangement. Other key arrangements said to be more
efficient than the QWERTY system are not nearly as well known and
would, therefore, require special training of many of the crew members.
An accessory numerical keypad should be included on the keyboard.
This keypad would feature the numbers 0 through 9 and + and - sign
keys in an adding machine cluster arrangement. Most of these keys
should have alternate cursor control functions. In some operating
modes (such as changing a control quantity on a block diagram), these
keys would have numerical entry functions only. In other modes (such
as modifying a tabular display for control purposes, or in editing),
these keys would have cursor control functions only.
It is likely that special function keys will have some use for
controlling the CM/PMAD task. Without a detailed crew interface S/W
design, it is difficult to predict how many special function keys will
be useful, but it is recommended that at least five be included on the
keyboard.
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1.4.7.3.1.1.1.3 Trackball Assembly--In a high-density graphic display
(such as the CM/PMAD block diagram display described in paragraph
1.4.7.3.1.2.2), touch-screen control may not be practical simply
because a crew member's finger is too big to place the control cursor
accurately. For accurate control of high-density displays, a
trackball assembly (the ball plus a push-button switch) is
recommended. An appropriately designed trackball assembly need not
weigh more than a mouse interface. A mouse requires an open, flat
surface against which it can be pushed, while a trackball does not.
Also, in weightlessness, a mouse would require a bracket in which it
could be stored when not in Use; a trackball assembly, being
permanently mounted, would have no such problem. Furthermore, a mouse
would trail a cable that could become entangled in the close working
environment of the CM; a trackball assembly could be mounted at the CM
computer console without using an exposed cable.
Where should the trackball assembly be mounted? If it were mounted on
one side of the CM computer keyboard, it would be inconvenient for
crew members of opposite-handedness to operate. Mounting the ball on
the axis of symmetry of the console would not be as space-efficient as
a side mount, but that arrangement would not require special training
for some crew members. It is recommended that the assembly be mounted
on the axis of symmetry of the CM computer console, and between the
keyboard and main video screen. In this position, the assembly would
not be in the way of a crew member using both hands to work the
keyboard. It is further recommended that the trackball assembly be
built onto a pivoted platform that can be rotated left or right in
small angular steps (much like a rotary switch) to any angle
convenient to the user.
1.4.7.3.1.1.2 Dead-Face Switch--A double-throw dead-face switch
should be provided that would enable a crew member to cut all
electrical power in the CM, except emergency lighting and other
emergency subsystems. The switch should be absolutely fail-safe.
The purpose o£ the dead-face switch would be three-fold: (i) it would
be the crew's last line of defense in case of an electrical fire; (2)
it would be a rapid and sure means o£ disconnecting runaway equipment
in the CMwhich threatened in_nediate crew injury or equipment damage;
and (3) it would be a convenient means of safeguarding CM circuitry
while power cables were being connected to or disconnected from the CM.
The dead-face switch and its surroundings should be distinctly colored
and adequately lit by regular or emergency lighting circuits.
When used to open the dead-face circuit, the operation o£ the
dead-face switch should be intuitive and easily accomplished from any
angle in weightlessness. When used to open or to close the dead-face
circuit, the operation of the switch should not require foot
restraints.
It would be permissible for the CMIPMAD subsystem also to control the
dead-face circuit by digital command. However, the design should be
such that manual opening o£ the dead-face switch must inhibit all
computer commands to the dead-face circuit.
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1.4.7.3.1.2 Software
1.4.7.3.1.2.1 Load Enable Schedule Display--This should be the
display/control most often used by the crew to intervene in the
CM/_PMAD task. A crew member need not be specially trained in the
CM/PMAD subsystem to use this display and its controls effectivelY.
The load enable schedule display would allow the crew visibility into
and limited control over the on-board scheduling function o£ CM/PMAD.
Before proceeding _urther in this section, we recommend that the
reader review Appendix A, Function 3.2.2, On-Board Scheduling. There,
the reader will find definitions and explanations o£ terms used in the
discussion that follows.
In the absence of human intervention, the _ormal script _or CM/PMAD
activities will be the baseline load enable schedule (BLES). The BLES
will be a compact, coded _ile o@ Load enable/disable instructions
suitable _or direct use by CH/PHAD S/W. AS such, it will not be
readily understandable by people. The crew, to understand and control
the BLES, will need a user-friendly interface tool: the load enable
schedule display (LESD).
The LESD would show the BLES in chart Corm and with English labels.
Information shown for each Load would include the following:
(I) Load name (such as X-ray telescope);
(2) SIW code number o_ the RPC that directly feeds that Load;
(3) Load class number;
(4) Load priority number (if one is presently assigned);
(5) Indications showing what time(s) the Load is scheduled "enabled"
and what time(s) it is scheduled "disabled,"
Loads would be sorted on the chart by load class with the higher
classes toward the top and the lower classes toward the bottom.
Because there would generally be more loads scheduled then could
conveniently be shown on a single video screen, a means would be
provided to allow the user to scroll the chart up and down.
At user option, the LESD would show any one o@ the _ollowing: (i) the
present BLES, (2) a BLES evolved by S/W _or the next scheduled period,
or (3) a BLES that was used in the past.
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If showing the present BLES, the LESD would include a prominent,
moving line that would divide the chart into tWO parts: (i) scheduled
events that have already happened, and (2) scheduled events that have
yet to happen. If any Loads originally scheduled in the present BLES
have been disabled by load shedding (Appendix A, Function 3.2.3),
those Loads would be £1agged with a distinctive color. Als0, if any
Loads originally scheduled in the present BLES are recommended to be
descheduled by minor scheduling (Appendix A, Function 3.2.2.5) in
response to a Load addition by the crew, those Loads would be flagged
with a distinctive color. _ •
As mentioned earlier, the LESD not only would show the form of the
baseline load enable schedule, but also would provide controls for a
crew member to modify that schedule. At one end or corner of the
LESD, there should be a special window through which a crew member and
the CM/PMAD could ccmmmicate interactively via the keyboard. CM/PMAD
would use this window to advise the crew member of display options and
to prompt the crew member for the information necessary to change the
BLE$. The crew member would reply with keyboard entries and
touch-screen _entries, as appropriate, _--_1 _
Keyboard communication between a crew member and the LESD should be,
as much as possible, in natural language. With this aid, a crew
member not specially trained in the CM/PMAD Subsystem could still
control it effectively through the LESD. For example, the S/W should
be able to recognize that "enable the Upper Atmosphere GCMS", "turn on
the chromatograph", and "energize the gas chromatography experiment"
probably all mean: "connect electrical power to the input of the
upper atmosphere gas chromatograph and mass spectrometer". If there
is more than one type of GCMS, the S/W should be able to ask: "Do you
mean the upper atmosphere GCMS, or the heavy ion GCMS?".
1.4.7.5.1.2.2 CM/PMAD Block Diagram DisDlay--The CM/PMAD block
diagram Display would show the general state of the subsystem H/W. At
crew option, the display could also be used as a control tool. This
option would invoke a module o£ emergency S/W that would bypass much
of the automatic CMIPMAD S/W, allowing the crew direct control of
subsystem H/W at the individual RPC level.
The CMIPMAD block diagram display would be a video display that could
be called up by a crew member at the CM computer console. The display
would show all of or any selected part of the CMIPMAD subsystem
hardware in block diagram form. The diagram Would be a line drawing
representing elements o£ the subsystem. Elements that were presently
connected to electrical power would be drawn in a distinctive Color
(perhaps white); those elements not connected to power would be drawn
in black.
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The flnest available resolution o£ the CM/PMAD block diagram display
would be to a level of detail sufficient: (I) to allow the crew to
intelligently control all interfaced H/W elements of CM/PMAD, and (2)
to effectively support the crew (should the automatic S/W be unable to
do so) in preventive maintenance and repair operations. At all levels
of resolution any element for which a fault had been detected and
isolated by CM/PMAD S/W would be flagged in red. Density of the
display permitting, notes would be shown nearby briefly describing the
nature o£ the fault. If the faulty element were still connected to
electrical power, the red flag would flash; if the element had been
disconnected, the flag would dim and would not flash. CM/PMAD
elements that had been predicted to fail would be displayed using a
strategy similar to that just described, except that elements
predicted to fail would be flagged in yellow.
When first called up, the displaywould show the entire CM/PMAD
subsystem. At this point, the general detail o£ the display would
necessarily be simplified to show the whole subsystem. In this
simplified form, three-phase elements would be shown with one line or
node representing all three phases plus the neutral path and the
grounding path. The display would show the sensed switching states of
RBIs or RCCBs connecting the major buses to one another and connecting
major buses to the inputs of the load centers For three-phase
devices, the switching states would be assumed to apply equally to all
three phases, i.e., either all three phases would be connected, or all
three phases would be disconnected. The display would also show major
bus voltages and major feeder currents. For three-phase elements, the
voltage and current values displayed would be the averages for all
three phases.
If more detail about a particular region of the display were needed, a
crew member could position a window over the area in question and
zoom-in for a closer look. As the crew member zoomed-in, more details
and measurements would be displayed for elements in the window;
details would be added in order of importance. The display would show
the part number of and the schematic boundary of each H/W module in
CM/PMAD. It would also show the part number o£ each interconnecting
cable between modules. The module and cable part numbers would be
used by the crew to locate actual CM/PMAD devices during preventive
maintenance and repair operations (actual modules and cables should be
clearly marked or labeled). When the crew member had zoomed-in toward
a particular CM]PMAD element (an RPC, for example) to the maximum
limit of resolution, the display would show for that element every
phase-independent quantity that was presently measured by sensors at
that element or that was computed for that element based on the sensor
measurements. At maximum resolution, three-phase devices would be
represented by one line or node representing all three phases, plus
one line or node representing the neutral path, and one line or node
representing the grounding path. Where it is deemed appropriate and
practical, some three-phase devices would be shown at maximum
resolution with a separate line or node for each phase. At that level
of detail, sensor measured quantities would be shown for each phase
separately instead of averaging for all three phases.
1-71
07051/3013B
MCR-86-583
Usually, numerical and logical quantities sho_on the CM/PHAD block
diagram display would be the values most recently measured by sensors
or computed £rom sensqrmeasurements. The crew would have the option,
however, to view CM/PMAD qu_tities as they had been measured just
prior to the most recent trip of an _ or RCCB. The crew couid use
this information to check whether the trip was appropriat e.
At crew option, the CM/PHAD block diagram display could__be_ used_ as a
control tool. This optiPn_ul d invoke a module o_emergency S/W that
would byp@ss much of the automatic CH/PMAD S/W, allowing _ £he crew
direct control of subsystem H/W at the individual RPCI_vel _ The
option would allow the crew direct control of all H/W elements in the
CM/PMAD power network, and would allow coarse control of many H/W
elements in the _PMAD data network.
There should be two general types o£ control: (I) control o£ bilevel
states (on/o£f, connect/disconnect, enable/disable, etc.), and (2)
control oe states_h which _num_r6_ar-ea-ss_iate<! (trip level oe
RPC, regulator voltage adjustment, modenumber, etc). For three-phase
devices, it is recommended that any applied control should apply to
all phases simultaneously and equally (e.g.,a connect co,_,and should
connect all three phases at the same time),
It is specifically recommended that any control that the crew applies
to a give n three-phase device should apply S_mult_eousiy and equally
to all phases o£ the device, If crew control were not limited in this
way, loading imbalances could occur which could open RPC's or similar
devices in the power network. Such loading imbalances Could
conceivably damage elements 0f the CM/_ Subsystem.
Bilevel states would be controlled by the crew in the £ollowing
manner. First, a crew member would zoom-in (i£ necessary) to the part
o£ the CM/PMAD block diagram display showir_ the state to be
controlled. Second, the crew member would position the cursor at this
indication using the trackball assembly, Third, the crew member would
press the push-button switch on the trackball assembly to signal the
computer o£ his or her desire to change to the other state. At this
point, the display would show the other state, but £1agged in a
distinctive color to indicate that this was a "co,_anded" and not yet
an "actual" state. When the color flag disappeared, this would
indicate that the "commanded" state had become an "actual" state o£
the device. At any time during this sequence, the crew member should
be able to cancel the state change by entering a single convenient
input.
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Control states with which numbersare associated would be controlled
by the crew in the following manner. First, a crew memberwould
zoom-in (if necessary) to the part o_ the CM/PMADblock diagram
display showing the value to be controlled. Second, the crew member
would position the cursor at this indication using the trackball
assembly. Third, the crew member would press the push-button switch
on the trackball assembly to signal the computer that this number is
now to be changed. At this point, the display would flag the number
in a distinctive color to indicate readiness to accept a new value.
The crew member would then enter the sew value for the number via the
keyboard. This number, too, would be flagged in a distinctive color
to indicate that this is a "commanded" value and not yet an "actual"
value. When the color flag disappeared, this would indicate that the
"commanded" value had become an "actual" state of the device. At any
time during this sequence, the crew member should be able to cancel
the number change by entering a single, convenient input.
1.4.7.3.1.2.3 Other Video Displays/Controls--Each o£ the following
displays would also double as a control tool for the crew to use.
Descriptions o£ the displays may be found in Appendix B under the
function number cited.
* Load Priority List Display (Function 3.2._.4).
Interactive Self-Test Displays (Function 3.3.2.1).
Interactive S/W Comparison Displays (Function 3.3.2.1).
Each o£ the following would be for display purposes only.
Descriptions of the displays may be found in Appendix B under the
function number cited.
History Records Displays (Function 3.3.1.5).
Fault Report Displays (Function 3.3.2.4).
Audio alarm indicating significant CM/PMAD fault (Function 3.3.2.4).
1.4.7.3.2 Other Technol0gies that Were Considered--Described here are
other potential crew interface technologies that were considered while
preparing this section, but which are not specifically recommended.
The reasons why they are not recommended are listed.
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1.4.7.3.2.1 Hardware: Control via Mouse--A mouse can be used to
perform the same valuable services as a trackba11 assembly (paragraph
1.4.7.3.1.1.1.3). Also, a mouse can be used with equal facility by
left- or right-handed crew members, Unfortunately, a mouse requires
an open, flat surface against which it can be pushed. Wii_hJimited
space available, and considering weightlessness, open, flat surfaces
will have little other use in the CM. A mouse also trails a cable
that can become entangled in a close workin_ environment.
Furthermore, in weightlessness, a m0use would require a bracket where
it could be stored when not in us_e. It seems that a trackball
assembly would be a better choice than a mouse to help the crew to
monitor or control high-density displays in CM/PMAD.
1. _. 7.3.2.2 Software
1._.7.3.2.2.1 CH/PHAD Schematic Display--This would have been a
display similar to the CM/PHAD block diagram display described above
in paragraph 1.4.7.3.1.2.2, except that it would have shown far more
detail. It would have b_en. Fimila_ to a detailed electric a! schematic
in form, showing all three phases o£ three-phase devices _even showing
connector and pin numbers). In addition, it would have shown every
sensor measurement of all elements in the power network. Finally, it
would have shown details of faults that had been detected and isolated
in S/W, and would have shown them on a phase-by-phase basis. A
CM/PMAD schematic display is specifically not recommended, because it
would be inappropriate for it to do any of these. A discussion
follows.
Detailed electrical schematics are commonly used as aids for trouble
shooting of the system depicted. Trouble shooting is done so that
preventive maintenance or repair may be performed. It is practical
for the crew to do preventive maintenance or repair, but only to a
limited extent.
Coarse maintenance and repair (specifically, device replacement) could
be done at the modular level, down to an individual RPC or to a
particular electrical cable. The level of detail necessary for this
type of operation would be provided by the recommended CH/PHAD block
diagram display.
Finer maintenance or repair could be done by replacing an individual
card within a multicard module. This could be done inweightlessness
with simple tools, but how would the crew know which card to replace?
The level of sensor measurement now contemplated does not go lower
than module level, so Fault Management (Function 3.3.2, Appendix A)
would not be able to locate a particular faulty card in a module. It
is conceivable that the crew could use detachable test equipment to
find a faulty card, but this would mean either removing and
disassembling the module and then performing manual tests, or
connecting test equipment to special connectors on the module case.
Neither o£ these operations is reco_ended; the first, because of the
crew time involved; the second, because of the weight o£ the special
connectors and their associated wiring.
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Because maintenance or repair at a level finer than that of individual
modules doesn't seem practical, and because detail sufficient to
support module-level maintenance would already be available in the
CM/PMAD block diagram display, a CM/PMAD schematic display cannot be
justified for maintenance or repair.
If the CM/PMAD schematic display were made sufficiently detailed to
show all phases of the three-phase devices, it could be made
sufficiently detailed to display every sensor measurement taken in the
power network. This would be a huge amount of data. Meaningful
correlation o£ this data would be a difficult task even for a person
specially trained in the CM/PMAD subsystem. Because most crews are
expected to contain no such experts, it does not seem useful to design
a CM/PMAD schematic display to display all sensor data.
If the CM/PMAD schematic display were made sufficiently detailed to
show all phases of the three-phase devices, it could be made
sufficiently detailed to display comprehensive fault data, flagged in
color, on a phase-by-phase basis. This would be useful if a crew
member were allowed control over individual phases; he or she could
simply recalibrate or disconnect the faulty phase. However, it is
specifically recommended that any control the crew could apply to a
three-phase device should apply to all phases simultaneously and
equally. If control were not limited in this way, loading imbalances
would be possible that could open RPCs or similar devices in the power
network. Such loading imbalances could conceivably damage elements of
the CM/PMAD Subsystem. Because, under this limitation, a fault on any
single phase could only be compensated by disconnecting the entire
device, and because sufficient display detail to decide to do this
would be available on the reco-,,ended CM/PMAD block diagram display,
it'is not necessary to have a CM/PMAD schematic display to show
detailed fault data.
In conclusion, there seems to be no practical use for a CM/PMAD
schematic display to support crew interface with the CM/PMAD task.
1.4.7.3.2.2.2 Perspective Graphics and Three-Dimensional
Graphics--The displays recommended for crew interface with the CM/PMAD
task are Of four general types: (I) chart form, (2) block diagram
form, (3) text form, and (_) measurement-versus-time graphic form.
Perspective graphics and three-dimensional graphics have been used to
augment displays o£ mechanical layouts or of mechanical interaction.
In none of the four general types of displays mentioned will there be
any mechanical layout information or mechanical interaction
information to be augmented.
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It is possible that perspective graphics or three-dimensional graphics
could show the locations of _/PMAD elements needi_ replacements.
However, any complete servicing instructions would also have to give
step-by-step directions on how to remove access covers, how to safely
disconnect modules from the subsystem, etc. It would seem more
practical to simply put numbered labels on all access covers, modules,
cables, etc, and refer to these in any servicing instructions. The
servicing instructions would be generated under Preventive Maintenance
Scheduling (Appendix A, Function 3.5.i.2) or under Fault Logging
(Appendix A, Function 3.3_2.4).
In conclusion, there seem to be no useful roles for perspective
graphics or three-dimensional graphics in a crew interface with
CM/_.
1.4.7.3.2.2.3 Voice Recognition/Speech Synthesis--The idea was
examined that the CM computer console should have provisions for voice
recognition and speech _thes_s. Thls equipment would have allowed a
crew member located in any part of the CM to conduct a command
conversation with CM/I_AD. One serious difficulty exists with this
approach.
The difficulty is that most of the replies given by S/W in answer to
crew commands would have to be fairly detailed, making it difficult
for the crew member to remember all his options while judging which
was best. For example, suppose the crew member wanted to change the
baseline load enable schedule on the load enable schedule display
(paragraph 1.4.7.3.1.2.1). This would be the simplest common crew
input to the CM/PMAD task. The crew member could keep his or her
modification request fairly straightforward:
"Enable the UV Telescope at 06:00:00, U.T. for 25 minutes."
The S/W might reply:
"I can do that. However, to support your Load, I would have to disable
the following Loads:
(i) The upper atmosphere GCMS at 06:02:10, which would be 14 minutes
early after a 3-hour and 46-minute run;
(2) The_ti£_gus spraying sequence-_ d6:03:40, which would be 2
hours and 6 minutes early after a 54-minute run; and finally;
(3) The Quenton Medical electrophoresis experiment at 06:15:50, which
would be 1 hour and 20 minutes early after a l_-hour run.
"After your Load was disabled, I could reconnect only the antifungus
spraying sequence at 06:25:00. Is all of this acceptable?"
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This would be a £airly typical reply; replies involving many more than
three recommended disabled Loads are possible. The complexity o£
these replies could be done away with i£ CM/PMAD reserved an
"electrical resources pad" big enough that, i£ an unscheduled Load was
added, other Loads would not have to be shed. ZSuch a pad was used on
Skylab. On space station, however, we recon_end using modern so£tware
to keep our pad as close to zero as possible; to waste as little o£
the available energy as possible.
The only way most people could e£ficiently evaluate a S/W reply such
as the one above would be to view it in graphic Corm, perhaps as a
timeline chart with b_rizontal bars plotted on a time grid showing
when the various Loads o£ the command and reply would be enabled and
disabled. Without such a display, the crew member would have to ask
the S/W to repeat its reply one or more times while considering
whether the S/W recommendation was appropriate. An appropriate
graphic display showing the kind o£ S/W reply described above would be
available in the recommended load enable schedule display. To view
this display while making his o£ her decision, the crew member would
have to come to the CM computer console. I£ he or she has to do this,
the prime advantage of voice command (control of CM/PMAD £rom anywhere
in the CM) has been neutralized.
A second illustration o£the complex reply problem may be shown by
supposing that voice were to be used to control the other major crew
interface, the CM/PMAD block diagram display (paragraph
I._.7.3.1.2.2)_ The information on that display would be densely
packed and highly symbolic. Anyone who has tried to describe details
of a complex block diagram to another person while relying on language
alone soon recognizes the di£ficulty in doing so. Usually, the person
doing the describing must resort to a blackboard or similar aid (such
as a video screen).
The other recommended displays were examined £or possible voice
control, but the problem was the same: unwieldy amounts of data would
have to be remembered by a commanding crew member while judging
whether a given S/W reply was appropriate.
In conclusion, voice command o@ the CM/PMAD task seems to be too
cumbersome to be practical.
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To automate common module power management and distribution, the
control computer or computers will needWto sense the quantity of power
used in different parts o£ the network and the quality of that power.
In addition, it will need to sense the status of each remote power
controller, and temperature measurements will prove useful in
diagnosing malfunctions.
Although an7 power system can be expected to require sensing these
factors, the type o£ power (ac or de, single-PhaSe or polyphase, etc)
will determine the physical quantities to be measured and the
appropriate techniques. The discussion that follows examines three
different types of power--de, 400 Hz three-phase ac, and 20 kHz
single-phase at--because at the time of the study no firm decision had
been made about the type of power that will be used in the com;on
module.
1.4.8.1 quantity o£ Power--For adc system, the quantity of power can
be measured by sensing voltage and current and multiplying these
quantities in the control computer. Voltage isreadily sensed with a
voltage divider, which reduces the voltage to a level appropriate for
an analog-to-digital converter and provides current limiting in the
event of a failure in the instrumentation electronics.
Direct current is more difficult to sense. Although a current-sensing
resistor (meter/shunt) in series with the line could be used, this
approach has two significant drawbacks. First, _f dc is used, it will
likely be 270 volts. The circuitry required to sense a few hundredths
o£ a volt o£ drop across the resistor at 270 volts above ground is
more complex than alternative approaches. Second, the power
dissipation in the current-sensing resistor may be as high as three
watts ina feeder and, therefore, _ may contribute urmecessarily to
packaging problems.
Unfortunately, the alternatives have undesirable features also.
First, Hall-effect devices can be used to measure current by measuring
the magnetic flux density in the core of a one-turn inductor placed in
series with the line. A similar approach can be used if the
Hall-effect device is replaced with a resistor made of
magnetoresistive material.
For accuracy with this approach, the flux-density measurement is not
used directly; nonlinearities, hysteresis, and sensor sensitivity
drift severely degrade accuracy. Instead, the signal is amplified and
used to drive a second (feedback) winding to drive £1ux density to
zero. The current in this feedback winding is forced to be
proportional to the sensed current, and a voltage proportional to it
is readily obtained as the sensor output signal. The feedback
approach is not effective with magnetoresistive sensors because they
are not sensitive to polarity.
A dc transformer is another alternative. This type of sensor requires
an oscillator and can be expected to be more complex than the
Hall-effect approach.
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Despite the complexity of the feedback from the Hall-sensor approach,
it still appears better for the application than the alternatives. It
has the additional advantages of proven technology and isolation. The
technique is commonly used for oscilloscope current probes.
In summary, we recommend a voltage divider for dc voltage sensing and
a feedback Hall-sensor approach for dc current sensing.
For ac systems, measuring power quantity becomes more complex, because
the power £actor must be considered. It is possible to build a sensor
with an output proportional to power. For example, an analog
multiplier could be driven £roma voltage divider on one input and
from a current transformer on the other input. The output o£ the
multiplier could then be low-pass filtered to provide the desired
si&q_al. A similar effect could be achieved with a Hall-effect
device. The bias current would be provided by simply connecting it to
the line voltage through a series resistance. The magnetic field
would be provided by placing the device in a gapped inductor core as
with the current-sensing scheme described previously. Because a Hall
device's output is proportional to the product o£ bias current and
magnetic £1ux density, this arrangement would make the output
proportional to power.
We do not recommend these techniques for two reasons. First, we doubt
that the desired accuracy would be achieved, and second, we believe
the automation computer will need power factor information for other
purposes.
We recommend measuring voltage, current, and the phase angle between
them instead. The computer can calculate power from these quantities.
Voltage is easily measured with a voltage divider as with dc.
Integrated circuits are readily available to convert the
reduced-amplitude ac signal to adc signal proportional to its RMS
value.
Current measurements can be handled similarly, except that a current
transformer is used in place o£ a voltage divider.
Power _actor is most readily measured indirectly by measuring the
phase angle between voltage and current. This approach has the added
benefit of determining whether current is leading or lagging voltage.
One simple technique is to convert sinusoidal voltages and current
signals--from the same voltage divider and current transformer
described previously if convenient--to logic-level square waves. This
requires two comparators, one for each signal. The low-to-high
transition o£ the signal representing voltage can start a counter that
counts pulses from an oscillator. The low-to-high transition of the
current signal latches the count in a register. The second appearance
of the voltage signal's low-to-high transition freezes the count in
the counter. The count in the counter is now proportional to the
period o£ the voltage waveform, and frequency can be calculated by
simply computing its reciprocal. The ratio of the register count to
counter count is proportional to the phase difference, and power
£actor is readily computed from this.
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Major benefits of the technique are that frequency measurement is a
byproduct, that the component count is small, and that the measurement
is produced in digital form directly, so no analog-to-digital
conversion is required.
.... !_::_ - .- ..... _
Although all these techniques are proven for low frequencies, we have
not seen them applied to 20-kHz power. This frequency approaches the
pergo_ance limits of some common!_i_yaiiab!e trge-RMS-t0_c
converters, and careful design would be required to achieve accuracy
in phase angle measurements. Nevertheless, we see no fundamental
problem in using thesame techniques at 400 H_z or 20 kHz.
1.4.8.2 Quality o_ Power--To detect problems and diagnose their
solution, the automation computer(s) must know something about the
quality-o_--the power. F6ra dc--_stem, the minimum in£ormatlon needed
is the voltage. In contrast, an ac system would also require
measurements o£ power factor and perhaps, at the point where power
enters the Common module_also frequency and phase angles between the
phases o£ a three-phase system. Techniques suitable for all these
measurements have been discussed.
Another measurement that could be of benefit is noise. However, we do
not see noise measurements being useful enough to warrant the cost of
the instrumentation.
I._.8.3 Status of Remote Power Controllers--To evaluate problems, the
control computer(s) must know the commanded state of each remote power
controller and its actual state, because a controller may fall to
respond to a command or may self-diagnose a fault. We believe that a
minimum o£ six status messages should be provided for:
I) "Normal and closed,"
2) '9_ormal and open,"
3) '_alfunctioning and shorted,"
4) "Malfunctioning and open,"
5) "Other malfunction,"
6) "Tripped."
It may also be useful to distinguish between a slow trip from a small
overload and a fast trip from a gross ove_load that required current
limiting.
1.4.8.4 Temperature--Temperature measurements will prove useful in
detecting failure, because overheating is an easily measured symptom
of a number of potential failure modes. Temperature can be measured
many ways--fhermistor, thermocouple, semiconductor junction, platinum
wire, etc--but thermistors are inexpensive and easily provide
sufficient accuracy for this purpose.
07051/3013B 1-80
1.5 FIBER OPTICS EVALUATION
MCR-86-583
We do not recommend using fiber optics internal to CM/PMAD unless it
becomes required for high data rate performance or electrical
isolation. The internal data bus requirements in the CM/PMAD current
architectural control approach do not overcome the operational issues
involved in using tiber optics. While the performance characteristics
of a fiber optic bus are very attractive, operational issues such as
onboard maintenance, environmental effects, total dose radiation
effects, outgassing, and connector mating lessen the attractiveness.
In performance characteristics, optical cables have significantly
smaller mass and bulk than the coaxial cable or twisted wire pairs
required by electrical networks, and being nonconductive, they provide
complete electrical isolation between all bus units. They are
insensitive to, and do not produce, electromagnetic interference.
Electrical networks with throughput sufficient for power control
applications include Ethernet and MIL-STD-1553. Each of these
networks is a bus having a single tapped cable (coaxial for Ethernet
and twisted wire pair for MIL-STD-1553). Integrated bus interface
units are available for each.
A bus topology is possible with fiber optics networks, but insertion
losses in taps limit the total number of nodes to a handful (10-15
typical). Fiber optics usually use a star configuration where
transmitter power is divided equally among all of the receivers, or a
ring where information rotates around and is regenerated at each
node. A star network uses a passive optical coupler, and thus, may
have simple transceiver electronics. A failure in one node will not
disable the entire network. Its disadvantages are that the coupler
represents a single point o£ failure, and that the amount o£ optical
tiber cable required to reach each node from the coupler location can
be prohibitive. I£ there is a large number of nodes, it may be
necessary to use laser sources to assure an adequate optical power
margin. The ring is essentially a loop o£ point-to-point links.
Because each transmitter sends to only one receiver, large power
margins may be maintained with inexpensive LED sources. The ring
requires less cabling than the star, as fibers are placed only between
nodes. Disadvantages o£ the ring configuration are that messages must
be regenerated at each node and then removed from the network after
reception; and that a node failure will open the loop. Techniques for
eliminating the latter problem include optical bypass devices and
dual-rir_ architectures that provide redundant signal paths.
Commercial networks using both star and ring configurations exist, and
some, such as the Siecor LAN (star network) emulate Ethernet and other
popular electrical protocols. One promising candidate where extremely
high data rates are required, is the tiber distributed data interface
(FDDI), a lO0-megabit per second ring-based LAN with ANSI
standardization, and which is soon expected to have integrated
electronics available. _
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1.6.1
The objective of this task is to determine the maximum data rates, the
most appropriate microprocessor(s) for the CM/PMAD..... system, and the
data bus to be used. In particular, w9 ev%!uated the use of the MC
68000 microprocessor. Critical issues that influenced the selection
included the amour of distributed automation, funqtions to be
automated, power system sensing techniques, total system data,
computer language selection, and the overall approach or architecture
for CM/PMAD automation.
Maximum Data Rates
Functions of Section 1.2 were reviewed to identify those functions
Within _ network control that would be factors in calculating
maximum data rates within CM/PMAD. Specifically, functions of
interest are those functions that require significant data transfer.
Distribution management was not considered a key With respect to
required data rates. Distribution management, in both the centralized
(one power system controller for all space station) and distributed
(distributed processing to the CM/PMAD level) is table driven; and
therefore, requires transmission of only that data affecting a portion
of the relevant table. However, for a centralized power system, load
management and health management can require all PMAD system data to
be transmitted to the decisionmaker. It is noted that a distributed
approach does not necessarily require all CM/PMAD data to be
transmitted for the load management function.
Having found that there is reason to transmit all CM/PMAI) data, it is
key to define the minimum time required for reaction to an event. The
question to answer in the definition is: "How much time can CM/PMAD
take before it must correct an anomaly?" Inspecting the types of
loads reveals three categories exist with respect to required speed o£
reaction to loss of power or power quality outside of specifications
but within the remote power controller's set points.
Category one loads cannot have any power interruptions, e.g,
computers, etc. Category one loads must have additional hardware,
capacitor bank or battery driven, to provide uninterruptible power
during the reconfiguration period.
Category two loads can have interrupted power, but only for the tens
of milliseconds range. Category two loads include category one loads
where a capacitive approach is used for the uninterruptible power
supply (UPS). These loads must be hardware handled using an
analog-sensing circuit on the input and a lock-out switching scheme to
the redundant bus. As shown in subsequent paragraphs, it is possible
to handle category two loads with software interaction only by using a
hierarchically arranged distributed system down to a manageable number
of loads.
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Catesory three loads include those loads that may have input power
interrupted and require service within several seconds. Many loads
£a11 into this category, even though they may be critical loads, such
as the environmental control and life support subsystem and the
thermal subsystem. Category three loads are the only software
serviceable loads £or both space station power subsystem centralized
and CM/PMAD centralized approaches.
The worst-case approach with respect to category three loads is taken
to determine the required bus rates. The £ollowing assumptions are
made in the analysis:
1) All sensor data are required at the decisionmaker.
2) There are six modules on space station (growth).
3) There is a possibility of 28 load centers, each with 20 possible
loads in a tully loaded module.
4) On the fully loaded module and the CM, there are _I subsystem
loads, totaling two load centers.
5) There are seven load centers, each with 20 possible loads, in a
CM.
6) There is one current measurement per phase per load.
7) There is one voltage measurement per phase per load center.
8) Temperature, power factor, etc, do not require rapid measurement.
9) A measurement word comprises 16 bits.
10) A three-phase system requires a 30% data increase for commands
and occasional data.
11) Adc system requires a 100% data increase for commands and
occasional data.
12) Required processing time is 50 microseconds per word including
memory stuffing overhead. (Derived from 100 lines assembly £or
approximately 500 machine cycles at a microprocessor clock rate
of I0 mHz.)
13) Intelligent £ault detection and isolation is a background task.
14) No DMA controller for communication.
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Using these assumptions, the required data rate is plotted versus
required reaction time. Using parameters, we calculated the data rate
for both a fully loaded module baseline, plotted in Figure 1.6.1-1,
and a CM baseline, plotted in Figure 1.6.1-2, each with the following:
I) Three-phase, six-uxxiule, space station power subsystem
centralized;
2) Dr, six-module, space station power subsystem centralized;
3) Three-phase, single-module (distributed to at least the module);
4) Dr, single-module (distributed to at least the module).
The equation for the curves is as follows:
Dt
Dr = , where:
Tr - Tppb * Dt
Data rate (bits/second)
Total data (bits)
Tr = Reaction Time (seconds)
Tppb = Processing time per bit (seconds/bit)
Interpret{ngthe curves, the "steep" port'on reelects processing time
limited, while the "dotted" lines represent transmission time
limitations. Decreasing the processing time "moves" the "steep"
portions to the left, while increaslng the processing time
significantly increases the reaction time (at the "knee" o£ the
curves). The effect of changing the total data handled is shown by
comparing the four curves. The curves show that for both CM and fully
loaded module approaches, and each using a distributed system (at
least to the module level), a 1-megahertz data bus is adequate (with
the listed assumptions) for about 100 milliseconds o£ reaction time.
This would be satisfactory for all category three loads..
Using a KADS significantly decreases required data bus rates and
reaction times. Local decisionmaking at the load center level results
in the data for 20 loads required to be transmitted. A level up to
the CM/PMAD controller is roughly the same with each load center
considered as a load. The data rates in the HADS approach are plotted
(Fig. 1.6.1-3) for comparison. As expected, the HADS approach is far
superior to other approaches with respect to reaction time. The plot
also shows, with a HADS approach, category two loads can be
software-serviced. Additionally, using a 1-megahertz data bus,
available processing time is increased. For instance, with HADS and
with a l-megahertz bus and at 100-milliseconds required reaction time,
approximately 98.7 milliseconds is available as processing time, even
in the three-phase system.
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There are two buses or data interfaces in CM/PMAD in the HADS
approach. There is a data interface between the CM/PMAD controller
and the load centers. There is also a data interface between the load
centers and digital logic controlling a group of six to twelve remote
power controllers. We recommend that the same approach be used for
each data interface, simply for commonality, to reduce risk and
complexity.
Selecting I megahertz as a bus data rate allows design flexibility as
a 1-megahertz rate satisfies the 100-millisecond distributed (to CM)
and the 10-millisecond HADS approaches. The MIL-STD 1553 serial data
bus has overwhelming advantages when compared to other standards for
this application. The advantages are as follows:
I) Military standard--military qualified;
2) Protocol well defined, well understood--very little development
risk;
3) Serial--two wire interface (shielded twisted pair);
4) Transformer isolation--Manchester coding;
5) Over 40 db common ._le rejection (with transformer isolation);
6) Handles up to 31 remotes (load centers)--32 without broadcast;
7) Supported by off-the-shelf hardware;
8) Block transfer--up to 32 data words per transfer;
9) Twenty bit word includes three synchronization bits and one
parity bit.
Other approaches considered were:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
e)
7)
8)
RS232C--20 kilobits/second, serial interface;
RS423--100 kilobits/second, serial interface;
RS422A--10 megabits/second, serial interface;
RS449--2 megabits/second, serial interface;
IEEE 488--4 megabits/second, parallel data bus;
IEEE 802.3, Ethernet--10 Megabits/second, LAN;
IEEE 802.4--token passing bus, LAN;
IEEE 802.5--token passing ring, LAN.
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Critical issues that influence the selection include the amount of
distributed automation, functions to be automated, role of expert
systems, power system sensing techniques, data rates, computer
language selection, commonality with other subsystems, and the overall
approach to CM/PMAD automation. It is noted that if this selection
were done ten years ago, the selection would have been limited to four
or five eight-bit processors, all; fairly limited by today's
standards. Screening resulted in five processor families. General
guidelines for the coarse screening were:
1) Flight qualifiable;
2) Minimum of 16 bit data bus size;
3) Minimum of 5 Megahertz clock rate;
4) Minimum address range of 1 megabyte.
The processors passing coarse screening are as follows:
I) Zilog Z8001,
2) Intel M8086,
3) Harris 80C86,
4) Motorola 68000 family,
5) Fairchild F9450.
Any o£ the above processors can be made adequate through development
programs, however, the Fairchild F9450 is an easy choice for the
following reasons:
I) MIL-STD-1750A processor--standardized and well understood,
reducing any development risk;
2) Screening to BCQPL;
3) Ada cross assembler available;
4) 20-megahertz clock rate.
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The Fairchild F9450 is a 16-bit processor fabricated with I3L
technology. It can perform bit, byte, word, double word, single
precision (32 bit), and double precision (48 bit) floating-point
numbers. Arithmetic operations include multiply and divide. The
processor can directly address two megawords of memory, expandable to
16 megawords and has ten addressing modes. The F9450 is intended £or
real-time processing using two on-chip programmable timers and 16
levels of vectored interrupts. The architecture of the F9450 is
organized into five sections: data processor, address pTOcessoE,
interrupt and fault processor, microprogramm_ control, and a tlming
unit. The data processor is !§-bits wide and is responsible for all
data processing in the CPU. The address processor includes an
instruction counter and a memory address reg_st%r tha_ide_e_ine_ the
addresses for all instructions and operands. A l! faults and
interrupts, whether generated internally or externally, are handled by
the interrupt and fault processor. The microprogrammed control
section governs all operations o£ the CPU with two levels of
pipelining. The timing unit generates the internal and external
strobes required for internal CPU operation and the different bus
tr_a_tiOns. It has 24 user-accessible registers. Multiprocessing
is supported by a flexiblebus arb_6rition scheme and process
synchronization (test and set) instructions.
The F9450 instruction set is optimized for complex real-time
applications. It implements the complete MIL-STD-1750A instruction
set architecture on a single chip. It has 141 commands. Co, mmnds
include signed and unsigned multiply and divide operations, program
and timer control instructions, extensive interrupt and fault ContrOl
operations, and multiple function instructions. Compnehensive
software support for the F9450, including assemblers, loaders,
simulators, and compilers, is provided by Fairchild and other
sources. Software development can be performed using the Fairchild
System-1 development system or the VAX I1/7XX computers using the VMS
operating system.
In addition, we specifically examined the MC680XX family. The
MC68000, which is representative o£ the family, performs operations on
bit, BCD, byte, ASCII, 16-bit word, and double-word data. This 16-bit
processor is actually a 32 bit machine internally, and has full 32-bit
wide registers. The processor can directly address 214 bytes o£
memory, and is organized so that it has a separate data and address
bus (16-1ine data bus and 23-1ine address bus).
The architecture resembles that of a mainframe computer. All internal
registers are 32-bits wide and the ALU is aiso 32 bits. The program
counter is 24 bits, o£ which 23 go directly to the address bus and the
24th bit generates special strobe signals that can be externally
recombined to form the 24th address bit. 0nly external clock, memory,
and I/O circuits are needed for operation.
The instruction set of the MC68000 contains 61 basic commands, but
almost all can take advantage of the 14 addressing modes. Co,1_ands
include signed and unsigned multiply and divide operations, special
trap instructions, powerfu ! subroutine call and return functions, and
multiple-function instructions.
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So£tware £eatures o£ the instructions set include a structure that
supports high level languages such as Pascal, Basic, Cobol, and
Fortran, and more recently, Ada. Each instruction operates on bytes,
words, and double words, and can use any of the 14 addressing modes.
The large addressing range and the powerful subroutine link and unlink
instructions permit reentrant codes to be easily generated. Special
trap instructions make the code easier to test with the 16-trap
vectors available to the progran,ner.
Disadvantages of the MC68000, when compared to the F9450, are that it
is not currently scheduled for flight qualification development, and
it is not a MIL-STD-1750A processor. The disadvantages mani£est
themselves mostly in commonality and standardization.
07051/3013B
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The objective of this task was to determine the most appropriate
computer language for CM/PMAD consistent with NASA guidelines on
computer languages for use on space station. At the time the study
began, the guidelines s_mply favored hlgh-level languages, and there
were many posslb{llt{es. However, NASA has now standardized on Ada
for all operating software_ except possibly for artificial
intelligence software. -
Because of the new guidelines, we focused on two questions:
1) Is there any compelling reason not to use Ada for CM/PMAD
conventional software? -
2) What language or expert system shell is most appropriate for the
artificial intelligence software?
1.7.1 Conventional Software
We found no convincing argument eor avoiding using Ada in the
conventional CM/PMAD software. Ada has all the capabilities neede d
for real-time control, and few other languages do. For instance, Ada
includes muitltasking and interrupt servlc{ng as a standard £eature.
And while Jovial, Forth, and Modula-2 also provide multitasking, they
do not do it any better than Ada. Other languages, if they support
tasking at all, do so through nonstandard operating system calls or
language extensions.
Similarly, we examined:
I) Costs associated with software growth and maintenance;
2) Readability of code;
3) Support of structured and modula= coding concepts;
4) Standardization and commonality with other space station software;
5) Error checking;
6) How well it fits the problem, which affects the volume of code,
its clarity, and the time required in development;
7) Compiler cost and availability;
8) Code size limitations;
9) Speed of compiled code;
i0) Overall software development and life-cycle costs, including the
development environment cost.
07051/3013B 1-92
MCR-86-583
In this examination, we compared Ada to Modula-2, Forth, Fortran,
Pascal, Assembly Languages, "C", Algol, Jovial, Basic, and PL/M. Some
of these languages offered a few advantages. For example, some
compilers for various languages generate code that runs faster than
Ada code does. Part o£ this difference is built into Ada because of
its error-checking capability, but part is because of the in_naturity
of current Ada compilers. The next generation o£ compilers can be
expected to narrow this gap.
Likewise, according to a TRW presentation at SIGAda, Ada software
tends to require a longer development schedule than some of the other
languages. However, TRW concluded that Ada's error checking can
result in a net reduction in cost. In short, none of the other
languages offered advantages strong enough to warrant requesting a
waiver from the use of Ada for conventional software in CM/PMAD.
1.7.2 Artificial Intelligence (AI) Software
Because the field of AI is changing so rapidly, to select a language
for AI in the automation of CM/PMAD, it was necessary to make some
assumptions about languages for AI. These assumptions are in some
cases currently untrue, but which may be true in the future. It is
assumed that a language for these applications will meet the following
CM/PMAD AI software requirements which we deem it essential that any
language intended to support CM/I_fAD conform to. The language must:
I) Support powerful and flexible means of modeling rich and complex
problem domains dealing with many levels of abstraction, allowing
arbitrary data structures to be created and modified as desired.
These data structures may include numbers, symbols, tables,
relations, rules, functions, networks, etc.
2) Provide structures and functions that facilitate sophisticated
search methods over large problem spaces.
3) Be supported by a strong interactive development environment that
facilitates incremental program development and testing.
Provide a mechanism for executing a program to create or load
another program and integrat e it with the presently executing
program to begin executing the loaded program in a meaningful way
(Ref 7).
Not absolutely essential for ACMPMAD, but included here for
completeness, as many AI applications require this mechanism.
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The only language that meets these requirements is LISP. Based on the
assumption that future work would allow other languages to do so, we
have evaluated several languages for use in the AI portions of ACMPMAD
software, including Forth, Ada, Common Lisp, LOOPS_SPwjthflavors,
KEg, ART, Knowledge Craft, 0PS-83, 0PS-_, PROLOG, and Common LISP with
KEE or ART. There was no significant difference found between Ada and
two versions of LISP in our analysis, summarized in the following
paragraphs. However, because Ada does not meet the above AI software
requirements,and in aCt would 6niz  modie d do so at costs
well exceeding $50 million (Ref 7), we recommend LISP as the language
for Ai-w_t_n t_e A__I _i_ _ - __
The comparison of languages for AC_ AI tasks was accomplished by
an assembly of eightMartin Marietta employees _elevanti_ -
backgrounds. The results presented are from group discussions as
opposed to a statistical compilation of eight individual analyses. We
started the investigation by defining evaluatlon criteria and assigned
numerical ratings to indicate the importance of each. A rating of 0
indicates negligible importance; a rati_ of ten indicates a serious
concern, hard to overcome. The criteria and their ratings are:
I) Does the use o£ this language Or shell represent a business risk?
2)
Specifically, some shells, e.g., KEg and ART, are proprietary
products of small companies. Should those companies fail, there
would be no support for the shells. Because of the fiercely
competitive nature of the AI software business at this time, it
is not unlikely that'some small companies will get pushed out of
the market. A related problem is that shells are rapidly
evolving. Even if a company survives, some of its products may
become unsupported "orphans." Similarly, where standards are
loose, as in Forth or LISP with Flavors, the code may reflect one
vendor's dialect of the language so much that it is difficult to
convert to another vendor's compiler. We assign this criterion a
rating of four for pre-implementation experimentation and five
for flight software.
Does the language or shell support large software projects?
This question involves two issues, First, some languages,
including the best-known implementations of Forth, limit program
size. They wiil not allow large programs without such "tricks"
as swapping program segments and data between disk and memory.
The other issue is support of modern techniques for managing the
complexity of large software projects with many progran_ners.
These techniques include structured code, modular design,
information hiding, maximizing module strength, and minimizing
£ntermodule coupling. A rating of ten is assigned for both
experimental software and flight software.
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Are interfaces to the external world and to other types of
software available?
The concern here is with providing direct control of hardware and
automatic acquisition o£ the data needed for making decisions.
In addition, some of the software may involve intensive numerical
computation that may be difficult to express in the formal
language or shell. Access to subroutines written in other
languages may be useful if not absolutely essential. We give
this criterion weights of four and six.
Does the language or system support validation and verification?
The main issue here is testing, but a number of subordinate
issues are involved. For instance, if a proprietary shell
accounts for the greater part of the code, should this shell code
be verified, and will that be practical? Can the rules, frames,
inheritance mechanisms, etc, in an expert system's knowledge base
be verified? A language or shell that makes validation difficult
may have an effect on reliability and cost. We assign this
criterion weights of six and eight.
Does the language or system have general use for a large variety
of AI software?
Practical considerations argue for minimizing the number of
languages used in space station flight software, so it is
desirable ,that one language be selected for all AI software.
Some of the shells are not very flexible for use in a general AI
context; they are specialized for expert systems or even a class
of expert systems. Such shells would be difficult to use for a
robotic path planner o_anatural language data base interface.
Weights of eight and ten are assigned to this criterion.
Is there sufficient hardware support?
In other words, can the language or shell be used with hardware
that can be £1own on space station? I£ not, can it be modified
readily to do so, or can hardware be built to run it in space?
The ratings are three and five.
Are support tools adequate?
For instance, shells for developing expert systems typically
provide tools for tracing rule firings and other functions that
minimize the labor of developing and testing a new expert
system. Special editors, error checking compilers, and similar
aids were also considered. Ratings are five and four.
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s) Is the system or language suitable for space?
=
_iS consideration is closely related t0 Verifiability. A
language like Ada, for which compilers have pass_ _tensive
validation suites, wouid rate highiy. A proprietary language
that has never been examined in detail by anyone other than the
vendor Would get a low score. We assign weights of four and
eight tothiscri , ion = ....
9)
10)
Are robust implementations available?
Although a language may be good, it may be implemented poorly.
For example, existing compilers for the language may fail to
detect certain syntax errors, may generate incorrect code for
certain constructions, or may produce few run-time error checks.
These problems could result in bugs that escape detection during
testing or an excessively long testing period. This criterion is
assigned weights of five and ten. _-_, _=:_ _:_._Z _ _:
Is there flexibility and user control of the end product?
Some shell developers make it easy to develop an expert system by
providing major portions of the end product, e.g:, windowing
facilities, monitoring o_ variables, etc. _ile this reduces
development time, it also forces the expert system into the shell
vendor's mold, limiting options for such things as display
appearance, hardware interfaces with external equipment, and
conflict resolution strategies. This could cause problems in
developing an embedded system for use in space. Ratings of four
and eight are given .to this c_terion, .....
II) Does the language or shell support clean representation for the
problem domain(s)?
Frames, flavors, and rules are very useful ways to represent
knowledge, but they are not universally the best ways. Does the
language restrict the software developer to perhaps inappropriate
paradigms? This criterion is given weights of ten and eight.
After cataloging these criteria, we grouped them into categories to
prevent overemphasis in certain areas. For example, several of the
considerations are of concern primarily because of their effect on
cost. Without grouping, cost might be overemphasized at the expense
of reliability or performance. Table 1.7.2-1 s_rizes how the
considerations were grouped and the effect this grouping has on their
weights. Essentially, what is done adjusts the weights proportionally
so that the total o£ the weights for the criteria in each group
equaled the group weight.
07051/3013B
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Under life-cycle cost we grouped business risk (criterion one),
support for large software projects (criterion two), adequacy of
support tools (criterion seven), and support for clean representation
for the problem domains (criterion 11). Although some of these
criteria also have reliability and performance ramifications, their
primary effect was cost, either during the initial software
development or later during maintenance.
Under reliability we grouped support for validation and verification
(criterion four), suitability for space (criterion eight), and
implementation robustness (criteria nine). Again, it can be argued
that these criteria affect the other categories as well, but they
seemed to be primarily reliability issues.
We grouped the remainder of the c;iteria under functionality and
perfor_mnce. These criteria included interfaces (criterion three),
general utility (criterion five), hardware support (criterion six),
and flexibility (criterion_en>.
The various languages and shells were evaluated against each
criterion, and weighted scores were computed (Tables 1.7.2-2 and
1.7.2-3) It was expected that the shells for expert system
development would fare much better than they did. However, the unique
constraints of flight software (and of minimizing the cost of using
experimental results in flight software) tipped the balance in favor
of general purpose languages. The shells were particularly weak in
provision for interfaces to instrumentation and actuators, in being
nonstandard and proprietary, and inmaking formal verification of the
complete system difficult. They also were narrowly focused toward
expert systems, making them difficult to use for other AI applications
as planners and natural language database interface.
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1.8 AUTOMATION APPROACH/ARCHITECTURE DEFINITION
MCR-86-583
Reviewing all previous sections results in redo_,ending a HADS
approach for CM/PMAD as shown in Figure 1.8-I. The selected approach
has maximum flexibility and growth capability while maintaining a high
degree of automation. Additionally, the approach meets all the
derived possible requirements described in the previous sections. It
is noted that the approach assumes there is a common module data
management network and a space station-level data management network.
The CM/PMAD PCU interfaces to the common module data management
network via a bus interface unit. The PCU interfaces to the lower
level processors via a MIL-STD 1553 bus that is transformer isolated
at each drop point. The lower level processors interface to the
remote switches and sensing devices through a controller buffer.
There are approximately ten remote devices, e.g., remote power
controllers, etc, storing data and accepting commands from a
controller buffer. The interface between the controller buffer and
the remote devices is synchronous, located on the same card as the
remote devices.
The major functional responsibilities of the PCU are CM/PMAD top-leve7
internal coemmnd and data handling, overall distribution management,
load prioritization and scheduling, and subsystem health management.
The functions allocated to the lower-levei processors areas follows
l)
2)
3)
_)
5)
6)
7)
8)
Data acquisition,
Data conditioning,
Data synchronization (time stamping for analysis in system
solution),
Data compression,
Local limit checking,
Short-term data storage,
Requested data transfer,
Effectors control.
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TIME SHARED USE OF SPACE STATION BUS VS CM/PMAD DEDICA .TED BUS
Time sharing an overall space station network data bus versus using a
dedicated CM/PMAD bus is highly dependent on the power subsystem
control architecture approach as well as the maximum required data
rates. Reviewing the centralized approach versus a distributed
approach (Section I._.1) and the maximum data rates (Section 1.6)
possible in worst-_ase situations, we recommend a dedicated CM/PMAD
data bus. The advantages o£ the FADS in reduced protocol overhead,
development risk, Erowth, and testability would be significantly
reduced by sharing an overall space station data bus network.
Additionally, another major drawback in time sharing the space station
network data bus is the possibility of effecting the space station bus
during a fault condition. During a major fault condltion, there will
be a flood o£ data from all subsystems while each subsystem is
attempting rectification tbxough local redundancy. Additional
complexities result i£ the fault condition is power related. With the
recoalnended architecture, a minimum o£ data is required between
CM/PMAD and other space station subsystems; therefore, there would be
little to gain by time sharing the space station network.
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1.10.1
WORK PACKAGE-O_ DATA EXCHANGE IDENTIFICATION
Mc -a6-s83
This section describes the data that must flow between the CH/PHAD
task and Work Package--O_.
Data from W'P-0_ to CM/PMAD
I. I0.1. i Total Power Allowance Versus Time--Whe% necessary, Work
Package -0_ must be able to send a total poyer allowance versus time
projection to CM/PMAD. Total power is defined as the magnitude (in
kVA) o£ instantaneous complex power that could be dellvered to the CM
at a given moment without causing a circuit breaker or similar device
to open in WP-04. The time resolution o£ the projection will be
limited; if the projection were blotted as a graph, it would look like
a stair-step function, with each stair-step representing a discrete
time interval. The value of total power assigned to each stair-step
should be the maximum allowable value predicted for that interval.
The prgjection period shouldprobably be no shorter than one orbital
day (or, when the station is in continuous sunlight, noshorter than
one orbit) and should probably be no longer than one crew shift
period. The time resolution of the projection should be no narrower
than one CM/PMAD control cycle (about I0 seconds) and should be no
wider than 5% of the projection interval.
In determining allowed values of total power, WP-04 must assume
worst-case power factors for the CM based on information contained in
the Ground-generated timeline or on experience. It cannot compute
worst-case power factors, because it will have no detailed knowledge
of the CM/PMAD power network or its Loads.
Work Package--04 must be able to send such projections to CM/PMAD
during thestation-wide resource bargaining portions of formal onboard
scheduling operations (Appendix A, Function 3.2.2, Onboard
Scheduling). When called to do so, it should be able to transmit the
entire projection within 1 minute.
1.10.1.2 Energy Consumption Allowance Versus Time--When necessary,
Work Package--0_ must be able to send an energy consumption allowance
versus time projection to CM/PMAD. The time resolution of the
projection will be limited; if the pTojection were plotted as a graph,
it would look like a stair-step function, with each stair-step
representing a discrete time interval. The value of energy
consumption assigned to each stair-step should be the total allowable
value predicted for that interval only.
The period and time resolution for this projection should be the same
as those for the total power allowance versus time projection
described above.
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Work Package--04 must be able to send such projections to CM/PMAD
during the station-wide resource bargaining portions of formal onboard
scheduling operations (Appendix A, Function 3.2.2, Onboard
Scheduling). If _-0_ detects a new, significant fault in the energy
conversion or energy storage subsystems, it should quickly be able to
send a revised projection covering the remainder o£ the present
projection period. When called on to send an energy consumption
allowance projection, it should be able to transmit the entire
projection within i minute.
1.10.2 Data from CM/PMAD to Work Package--04
1.10.2.1 Total Power Request vs. Time--When necessary, CM/PMAD must
be able to send total power request versus time projections to Work
Package--04. Total power is defined as the magnitude (in kVA) o£
instantaneous complex power that CM would require to support a
preliminary load enable schedule evolved during formal scheduling
operations (Appendix A, Function 3.2.2, Onboard Schedulin_). A
projection must be sent for each load class (see discussion of load
class in Appendix A, Function 3.2.2.1, Major Scheduling). The time
resolution of the projections will be limited; if the projections were
plotted as graphs, they would look like stair-step functions, with
each stair-step representing a discrete time interval. The value o£
total power assigned to each stair-step should be the maximum required
_alue predicted for that interval for that load class.
The projection periods should probably, be no shorter than one orbital
day (or, when the station is in continuous sunlight, no shorter than
one orbit) and should probably be no longer than one crew shift
period. Meanwhile, the time resolution of each projection should be
no narrower than one CM/PMAD control cycle (about I0 seconds) and
should be no wider than 5% of the projection interval.
In determining requested values of total power, CM/PMAD must assume
nominal major input bus voltages, and worst-case power factors for
delivered power based on information contained in the ground-generated
timeline or on experience. It cannot compute worst-case power
factors, because it will have no detailed knowledge of the other
module power networks or their loads or of the space station power
network and its loads.
CM/PMAD must be able to send such projections to WP-04 as soon as it
is able to evaluate its preliminary load enable schedule during the
station-wide resource bargainin E portions of formal onboard scheduling
operations (Appendix A, Function 3.2.2, 0nboard Scheduling). When
ready to send its projections, it should be able to transmit them all
within "n" minutes, where "n" is the number o£ load classes.
1-105
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1.10.2.2 Energy Consumption Request vs. Time--When necessary, CMIPMAD
must be able to send energy c0nsumption reque,st versus time
projections to WP-04. The time resolutions o£ the projections will be
limited; i£ the projections were plotted as graphs, they would look
llke stair-s_p £unctions, with each Stair-step representing a
discrete time interval. The value of energy consumption assigned to
each stair-step should be the tc)tai requested value predicted for that
interval only ......
The period and time resolution £or this projection should be the same
as those for the total power request versus time projection described
above.
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Five Government-furnished power distribution candidate topologies were
reviewed and compared. The candidates included distributing an input power
type o£ 115/200 Vac, 400 Hz three-phase with and without internal bulk power
conditioning. Also included was an input power type of 150 Vdc with bulk
conversion to 115/200 Vac, 400 Hz three-phase power. An all DC system was
also considered for completeness in comparison. A comparison and review of
the candidate power distribution topologies indicated significant automation
software impact where three phase power was utilized. The impact was due to
three phase requiring an increase in total number of sensors required for
automation and the increased complexity of a network solution used in fault
diagnosis and isolation. The increased number of sensors results in an
increase in the automation software e._Eort because o£ the additional internal
data requiring handling. In addition, an AC system requires more complex
software data conditioning with respect to peak voltages, root-mean-square
voltages, frequency accounting, and power factors. Additionally, in the case
of three-phase systems, load balancing is also a factor in an increase of
overall automated management hardware and software complexity. A range o£
possible savings in millions of dollars was estimated by including the all DC
distribution system. The automation software was estimated utilizing the
functions defined in this study.
The CM/PMADmajor power network control functions were defined as: 1)
Distribution Management; 2) Load Management; 3) Health Management; and A)
Command/Data Interface. These functions were further decomposed into levels
sufficient to perform function partitioning. Function partitionsweredefined
as: I) Hardware; 2) Algorithmlc Software; 3) Expert System; 4) Crew; and 5)
Expert-aided Crew. In addition, rules for partitioning were developed and
used in the function partitioning. The major control functions o£
distribution management and command/data interface were partitioned to
algorithmic software, while portions of load management andhealth management
were partitioned to expert systems.
In addition to function definition and partitioning, automation issues were
addressed. Issues included distributed versus centralized automation, fault
isolation, load management, Space Station power and data bus interfaces, data
and power ground separation, local energy storage impacts, crew interfaces,
and sensing techniques.
Required data bus rates were found to be highly dependent on the overall
automation approach, central versus distributed. The central approach
required very high data rates while the recommended hierarchically arranged
distributed approach can be supported by data rates less than megabits per
second.
Automation hardware was evaluated having addressed issues and data rates.
CM/PMAD internal hardware recommended included the military standard 1750A
chip set, with a Military Standard 1553 data bus. The use of fiber optics for
a data bus internal to CM/PMAD was found with attractive advantages in
performance characteristics in electrical isolation and electromagnetic
interference considerations. However, with the use of fiber optics not being
absolutely required, and with operational issues such as onboard maintenance,
environmental effects, total dose radiation effects, outgassing, and connector
mating, it was not recommended.
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Computer languages internal tO I_/P_ were also evaluaked. Software studies
resulted _n _e_denti£1cation of no compelling reason to avoid the use of Ada
as the recommended computer ia_uage for algorithmic soft-ware_th_n _/_.
However, argument was found for the use of LISP computer language in expert
systems developmentfo r Space Station IOC.
The overail approach reconlnended Utilizes an hierarchically arranged
distributed system for CM/PMAD ¢6ntroi. A power subsystem procesS0r
interfaces to the Common Module data _ag_en£_ne_work _hrodgh a bus
interface unit. The power subsystem processor g_icates with and direct_
the lower l_el power Sub_st_ processors through an internai dedicated power
subsystem data bus. The lower level processors, in turn, manage the lowest
level data with i_ediate control of switchgear through digital logic
interfaces. The lower level processors are responsible for data acquisition,
conditioning, compression and synchronization as well as locaZ limit checking_
short term data storage _ e£fectors Contr611_i _ i_
The recommended approach requ{res certain data between the Space Station powe_
production element and the CM/PMAD. The CM/PMAD power subsystem processor
must receive the total power allowance versus t_me _ the energy consumption
allowance versus time. In adder{on, the CM/PMAD power subsystem processor
must provide to the power production element the total power request versus
time and the energy consumption request versus t_me,
07051/3013B
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This document is in response to the Swmnary Report requirements of Task
II ofthe Statement of Work for Automation of the Core Module Power
Management and Distribution (CM/PMAD). Task II, Definition of Hardware
and Software Elements of Automation, includes definir_ those elements
o£ hardware and software necessa_ for implementation o£ the automation
approach defined in Task I o£ this contract. Elements of software
include knowledge base, knowledge base management systems, inference
procedures, as well as deterministic algorithms. Efforts, with respect
to software, also include an overall approach to development o£
non-standard software for use in CM/PMAD automation. Task II also
includes the development o£ an overall approach to fault management for
(_I/l_£_D. Hardware definition includes hardware requiring development
for implementing the automation approach.
During Phase I, we performed characterization studies in defining the
plan for an overall approach to automation of a CM/I_4AD. The CM/PMAD
functions were defined as shown in Figure I-1 withpower network
control defined as: I) Distribution Management, 2) Load Management, 3)
Health Management and 4) Command/Data Inter_ace. Further decomposition
of the power network control function resulted in the functional
breakdown shown in Figure I-2. Study of those functions as well as
partitioning efforts resulted in identification of several areas where
the use of artificial intelligence techniques (specifically knowledge
based systems) is warranted. The major control functions of
distribution management and con,,and/data interface were partitioned to
algorithmic software, while portions of load management and health
management were partitioned to expert systems.
In addition to function definition and partitioning, automation i_ues
were addressed. Issues included distributed versus centralized
automation, fault isolation, load management, Space Station power and
data bus interfaces, data and power ground separation, local energy
storage impacts, crew interfaces and sensing techniques. In Task I,
required data bus rates were found to be highly dependent on the
overall automation approach, central versus distributed. The central
approach required very high data rates while the recon_nended
hierarchically arranged distributed approach can be supported by data
rates less than megabits per second.
In Task I, computer languages internal to CM/PMAD were also evaluated.
Software studies resulted in the identification of no compelling reason
to avoid the use of Ada as the recommended computer language for
algorithmic software within CM/PMAD. However, argument was found for
the use of LISFcompu_er language in expert systems development for
Space Station IOC.
The overall approach recommended in Task I utilized an hierarchically
arranged distributed system for CM/PMAD control. A power subsystem
processor interfaces to the Core Module data management network through
a bus interface unit. The power subsystem processor communicates with
and directs the lower level power subsystem processors through an
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internal dedicated pOWersubsystemdata bus. The lower level
processors, in turn, managethe lowest lev_el data with in=nediate
conhrol O_ switchgear through dig{tal logic inter£aces. The lower
level processors are responsibie_Or da£a acquisition, conditioning,
compression and synchronization as weil as local limit checkir_, short
term data s_orage and elC{ectors cont_-ol.
=
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2.0 TASK II S_"ITDYSUMMARIES
DEFINITION OF KNOWLEDGE BASE AND DETERMINISTIC ALGORITHMS
Knowledge Base Definition
A knowledge base typically contains the procedural, often heuristic
information necessary for solving a complex problem. This general
information, similar to the understanding an expert in the field might
have, is used in conjunction with specific factual data to handle a
particular problem. Defining knowledge bases for the CM/PMAD first
requires identifTing functional areas they will address. Drawing on
the partitioning in Task I, these functional areas are load scheduling,
contingency planning and aspects of both fault prediction during normal
operations and fault management during anomalous conditions. While
these categories are not strictly sequential or temporal in nature,
they do describe the phases or states of the subsys:em. By augmenting
the algorithmic execution of the conventional software, the knowledge
based systems provide CM/PMAD with an ability to react "intelligently"
and with a higher level of autonomy to changes in mission requirements,
power subsystem status, related subsystems' status, and available
resources.
Automated on board final load scheduling, which reduces human
interaction, must result in an executable time-line or load schedule.
The knowledge base for this function deals with temporal and spatial
constraints, as well as power subsystem hardware availability
constraints. Concisely developing this knowledge base also requires
understanding how loads are described, including load
interrelationships, constraints, and requirements. These load
descriptions are the data that a scheduler uses heuristically to create
a schedule based on its understanding of hdw to balance constraints.
Consistent with Task I results, a large part of the information for
this function will be transmitted in the coarse or multi-day mission
uplinked time-line, in which electrical loads will be time "windowed"
with any required constraints. Example load constraints in the
knowledge base include:
i) earliest and/or latest task start time,
2) latest completion tfme,
3) minimum/maximum duration,
A) physical location,
5) set-up time or initialization period,
6) load interdependencies (other loads/scheduled resources),
7) required resources each profiled, e.g., power, crew
interaction, thermal, experiment specific resources,
8) maintenance periods,
9) load class assignment for relative importance (includes
mission requirements),
I0) overall qualitative "level loading" requirements of any
specified resources,
II-5
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Ii) resources availability (versus maximum load duration which
maybe longer than period being "scheduled"), and
12) load continuity requirements.
General load descriptions on which the knowledge base is used include:
I) unique identifier,
2) load owner,
3) location (rack, power switch number, etc.),
4) dependence on othe K subsystems and other loads,
5) resource requirements prof_!e_(with maximum and minimum)
resolved to minutes,
6) tolerance to interruption,
7) power usage description, e.g.:
a) level constant load_ _ ; _
b) pe:i_ic-_{_ consist peak and valley usage values,
c) aperiodic with constant peak and valley usage values,
d) periodic w_th variant peak and valley usage values,
e) aperlodi6 W{£h variant peak and valley usage values,
f) power factor profile, and
g) in-rush current surge magnitude and duration,
8) redundancy methodology,
9) crew serviceable components,-and
10) load priority statement (load class designator and general
time based profile of load importance relative to importance at
load start.
Contind_ency plannir_, a second area for knowledge based systems, is
required for the graceful shedding of loads when there is a required
change in loading due to a significant decrease in resources available,
either identified by the system or directed by the Space Station
manager. This planning is embodied in the load priority list
management function described in Task I. The knowledge base, best
implemented in production rules, consists largely of heuristics
patterned after those used by experts in determining the dynamic
relative importance of loads. Example rules would be:
I) Life critical loads are of the highest importance.
2) Equipment safety is of high importance.
3) Overall mission requirements are probably more important than
individual experiment requirements.
_) If a load is dependent on another load, both loads should have
close relative priorities.
5) Non-repeatable experiments should have higher priority than
easily repeatable experiments.
6) A load requiring redundant power inputs probably has a higher
priority than a load not requiring redundancy.
7) A load with less tolerance to interruption generally has more
priority than a load with greater tolerance to interruption.
II-6
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8) A load near completion generally has a higher priority than a
newly started load in the same class.
9) Loads of a higher class should have relatively higher priority
than loads of a lower class.
I0) A load Pri0rity may increase as a result of the £ail_re of a
similar load, e.g., the last working light in an area.
ll) A failed br unavailable load has no priority.
i2) Loads requiring perishable resources generally have higher
priority than loads in the same class that do not.
13) Loads requiring many resources generally have higher priority
than loads in .the same class that do not.
I.) Note: Apparent relative priority (defined by its shedding or
lack of shedding during a resource reduction or anomaly) for a
load can be increased if its shedding will not aid crisis
resolution.
Fault management, also requiring a knowledge base, is discussed here in
a general sense with respect to Space Station power management and
distribution. Section 2.3, Fault Management, presents approaches for
its implementation. Types of credible faults, re_erence Task I Summary
Report, that must be considered are as follows:
I) faults external to CM/PMAD (external to the subsystem or
external to the element),
2) open or short circuit faults,
3) faulty sensor,
_) £a_led switch (at any hierarchical level),
5) faulty local power conditioner,
6) subsystem control unit failure,
7) microprocessors subsidiary to the subsystem control unit, and
8) load faults.
The knowledge base required to detect, diagnose, isolate and provide
correction or reconmended action consists of knowledge of the
confiEuration of the power system, principles in its operation under
normal conditions and heuristics for locating and handling failures.
Configuration knowledge includes subsystem architecture, redundancy
methodology, sensor type/location and component operation. Example
required component operation knowledge is stur,narized for the lowest
level switch, a remote power controller (RPC):
l) Current limiting capability,
2) Data acquisition constraints,
a) measurement type,
b) accuracy, resolution and repeatability,
c) speed,
d) dependence on environment,
e) format including status,
3) Current switching capability level,
_) Circuit protection parameters,
5) Power stage dependence on environment, and
6) Typical failure mode.
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The operation of the subsystem with its components is best modeled
using an object oriented approach to describe the components'
interconnections and causal interactions. This can be used to generate
expected values to be compared to measured values for fault
identification and location. Additionally, principles governing the
subsystem operation together with the above mentioned heuristics
provide the basis for resolving fault location. Example heuristics
would be:
I) More than 3% continuous voltage drop across a switch indicates
a serious problem in the switcl_.
2) Widely varying current readings in a switch or sensor while all
other readings appear normal indicate a fa_7 sensor.
3) I£ a switch has recently changed state, dependent asynchronous
measurements may not be valid for comparison.
The detection of incipient faults, or fault prediction, also a part of
health management, also requires a knowledge base. The function
utilizes historical data combined with configuration and component
knowledge as well as trend analysis techniques to detect the incipient
faults. Working as a background task on the data base, including fault
and event historical records, the predlctlon process shares a knowledge
base with the fault management process, In addition to what the latter
requires, the fault prediction knowledge base must include an expert's
knowledge on the importance of subtle changes in CM/PMAD overall
operation as well as individual component operation. The knowledge
would not just be a set of "soft limits" of operation, but would more
importantly include the knowledge of component interaction under stress
and the resultant effect on future operation.
Knowledge Base Management System Definition
The development of knowledge based systems (KBS) in the prototype
phases of space station could be profitably based on a number of
existing "expert system building tools" (typically with a "production
system" at its core) or, as they are also called, knowledge base
management systems (KBMS). An extant I_MS provides a variety of
advantages. AS a very high level language, it Can be easy to learn and
can spare the developer entanglement with low level coding. Many K3MSs
available offer considerable flexibility in representational techniques
for information, allowing a good fit between data and representation,
different representations for different types of data and, equally
important, the opportunity'for Changing or experimenting with the
representation to find the most appropriate fit. In addition, many
KBMSs provide both good applications interfaces, useful for clear
concept presentation during demonstrations, and good development
interfaces, aiding the system developer in orchestrating the knowledge
in different parts of the system.
For the implementation of on-board knowledge base systems, however, the
current generation of tools by their very generality and their
interface capabilities have far too much overhead in both storage and
computation time. They do not currently provide a practical and
II-8
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efficient implementation choice for deployed knowledge based systems.
A more appropriate approach would would be to use such tools where they
are suitable for prototyping and initial development. Deployment
development could then proceed in at least two ways, depending on
several factors including need for flexibility. If little flexibility
is required, then the knowledge based system could be "hard-coded" in a
suitable language such as Lisp or Ada. A more likely route, depending
on the need for flexibility or other special capabilities, would be to
implement application specific, highly tailored tools in a language
like LiSP or Ada and then use those tools to implement the KBS. Done
properly, this latter approach could combine the efficiency of
"hard-coding" with the power of the more general tools.
Inference Procedures Definition
Inference procedures for fault management and status prediction are
expected to be forward chaining intermixed with causal reasoning.
Scheduling and load priority list management will primarily be based on
constraint balancing techniques coupled with temporal reasoning.
Deterministic Algorithms
Functions that are usually understood only by recognized experts, and
require the knowledge and judgemenf of an expert to fulfill defined
requirements are best performed by experts or knowledge based systems.
However, functions ranging from simple to complex can be accomplished
with deterministic algorithms. We define complex as functions that are
technically understood using knowledge available from accepted text
books or procedures, but that involve advanced scientific skills or
special training to implement. In addition to performing many
functions in their entirety, deterministic algorithms can be integrated
with some knowledge based systems for an increase in overall function
performance efficiency. _ault management is an example of this
approach. The fault detection function in the space station growth
configuration is shared by hardware, deterministic algorithms, and a
knowledge based system, each with its own responsibilities. Primarily,
however, deterministic algorithms are recommended for use according to
the guidelines developed in Task I.
From our function partitioning studies of Task 1, the deterministic
algorithm approach should be used for the following CM/PMAD functions,
reference Figure I-2:
I) distribution management,
2) load monitoring and load shedding, within load management,
3) signal conditioning within maintenance support,
_) fault detection (limit verification and condition exception
handling) within fault management, and
5) the entire co_and and data interfacing function
(communications as well as data compression, data reporting, and
execution of commanded Switch control.)
In addition, deterministic algorithms should be used for initialization
of the subsystem for initial use and after any periods of non-use.
II-9
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PROGRAM PLAN
Develipi_ the software systems described in paragraph2.1 above,
particular attention to the AI techniques is warranted. There are
three basic themes that typify much of AI, including that above, which
necessitate a development approach somewhat different than in
conventional software development. These considerations are as follows:
I) The use of knowledge representation techniques,
2) the use of heuristic search methods which render large problem
spaces manageable, and
5) the use of informative, interactive user friendly interfaces.
In addition, there are issues that must be dealt with when describing
an approach to expert systems development and testing:
I) Does the development effort address the correct problem
statement?
2) Is there an expert who solves the problem sufficiently
accessible
to the project?
3) Does the knowledge in the program emulate that of the expert
in the chosen domain, including capability to interact with
a non-expert?
4) Is the program sufficiently robust and free of coding errors?
5) Can the program be modified to incorporate more expertise,
or to handle a related or analogous probiem area?
In order to obtain satisfactory results with respect to the concerns
mentioned above, expert systems designers have developed a methodology
for program development based primarily on empirical analysis. Using a
technique known variously as iterative refinement or rapid prototyping,
designers develop an initial prototype system intended to elucidate
essential problem aspects, then develop successive versions of the
program (which may or may not incorporate any of the previous versions)
as more is learned about the problem and the most promising approaches
to its solution.
As each prototype version is developed, it must be evaluated in several
ways. The authors of the prototype must ensure that it performs as
expected, i.e., the code as written expresses their intent. The
experts must evaluate the prototype, verifying that it contains their
approaches to solving the problem and that it applies their knowledge
appropriately. The customer must make certain that program will
perform a useful task, solving the problem they have in mind, and that
the interface(s) to the program ensure its usefulness within their
operating regime. This frequent evaluation is reflected in the
progression of steps in the expert system development approach, as
listed below.
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PHASE I: Initial Problem Analysis and Prototyping
I) Initial problem definition
2) Identification, location and selection of experts
3) Initial knowledge acquisition, knowledge representation
study, and initial interface design
4) Development tools selection and prototype hardware selection
5) End user technical review
6) Knowledge acquisition, representation and coding, interface
design, initial coding and function level testing
7) Prototype expansion and expert evaluation
8) End user demonstration and evaluation
P.A_E 2: Second Generation Prototypir_ and Knowledge Refinement
I) Analysis of prototype with respect to end user system
evaluation
2) Second generation prototype preliminary design
3) Second generation tools and hardware selection and/or
development
4) Second generation prototype design refinement
5) End user/system technical review
6) Knowledge refinement with experts
7) Second generation prototype coding and documentation
8) Prototype domain coverage expansion, prototype expert
evaluation, and internal function level testing
?) End user/system demonstration, review and perfor_nance
evaluation
PHASE 3: Deliverable System Development
I) Problem restatement
2) Preliminary system design
3) Experts and end user design review
_) Detailed design, including interface(s)
5) Experts and end user detailed design review
6) System coding and documentation
7) Function level testing
8) Element level _ntegration and verification testing
9) System level integration and verification testing
10) End user use and evaluation
These three phases - initial problem analysis and prototyping, second
generation prototyping and knowledge refinement, and deliverable system
development - are characterized by level of attention to considerations
such as efficiency and verifiability. These considerations have
relatively low importance initially as the system concept is
established and explored. Over the course of development these
gradually become overriding factors. The final phase is very similar
to the development cycle for a conventional program, the prototyping
having resulted in a sufficiently thorough understanding of the best
methods to solve the problem that attention to program efficiency and
integrity dominates.
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2.3 FAULT MANAGEMENT APPROACH
The discussion on fault management in this section draws on the MSFC
power management and distribution breadboard that has been the focus o_
our Task III efforts. Fault management on the MSFC breadboard
facilitates illustration of fault management techniques applicable in
the Space Station power management and distribution system. The
efforts on the breadboard with its set of dat_a acquisition capabilities
have shown that for the fault management system to be non-trivial, it
should handle multiple simultaneous failures as well as failure in
different types of components (e.g., sensors, switches and cables). If
only single point failures or only failures in one type of component
are considered then any given set of symptoms can be caused by only one
failure.
It appears that the best approach to managing the more complex fault
scenarios during Space Station development - and very likely operation
as well - would incorporate causal reasoning in an object oriented
paradigm. The power system configuration is expected to change and
evolve throughout Space Station developmentas different configurations
are examined and new requirements imposed. As discussed below, if
diagnostic knowledge is hard-coded, a configuration change can result
in substantial re-coding with the concommitant re-testing.
A causal reasoning approach obviates the bulk of this problem. It
would require only that the changes in the configuration be reflected
in the software ("causal") model of the configuration that is used to
reason with. Additionally, changing components (e.g., using a switch
with different trip characteristics) would only require changing the
description of that component in the model. In the course of
subsequent analyses, the system would deduce the effect o£ that change
on system behavior.
A similar situation arises when analyzing or diagnosing a previously
degraded system. A traditional, hard-coded diagnostic system would
simply fail when considering the degraded parts of the network. (It
should be noted that there are some more or less elaborate workarounds
for this).
A causal based diagnostic system would take the situation in stride.
If it had identified the degradations while troubleshooting, it would
have updated its model of the network appropriately. When it next
needed to examine system operation, it would base its considerations on
the up-to-date model, using it in the same way it had previously used
the original model of the 'healthy' network. The causal system would
of course know that the network was degraded: what is important is
that it would reason on the basis of what is (as reflected in its
model) rather than from pre-compiled assumptions about what should be.
The essential point of this section is that the most £1exible and
adaptable diagnostic system for Space Station power network control is
one that uses a significant amount of causal reasoning during the
actual diagnosis (during "runtime" Space Station operation rather than
in advance), to adequately characterize the problem, determine its
possible causes and evaluate those possible causes.
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2.3.1 Aspects o£ Diagnosis
This section discusses the three general steps in the automated
diagnosis. The next section, 2.3.2, presents five options for
performance of these steps, while section 2.3.3 delineates the
advantages and disadvantages for each of the options. Finally, section
2.3.4 examines the fifth option in detail - the option indicated in the
preceding paragraph that uses causal reasoning to perform the analyses
at runtime for diagnosis. This is the chosen approach for the Fault
Recovery and Management Expert System (FRAMES) of the MSFC breadboard.
When a human diagnoses a power system problem manually, he or she uses
a great deal of sensory data that will not (at least initially) be
available to an automated diagnostic mechanism on board Space Station.
Not having such direct information (such as a burned wire, etc.)
available, an automated troubleshooter must structure its analysis
differently. It must use available sensor data to determine if a
problem exists, what the problem is, identify possible causes and then
evaluate those possible causes to determine if any actually did cjuse
the problem.
The existence of any symptom indicates that there is a problem to ba
diagnosed. Defining that problem is, in effect, identifying all the
symptoms that have occurred. A symptom is any anomalous state in the
network (or equivalently, any anomalous response by a component to an
input or change in the network status). Most anomalous states will be
reported by the lowest level processing units - a tripped switch is
£1aEEed as anomalous data and sent for analysis to FRAMES which is at a
higher hierarchical level. Some anomalous states will not be
identified at "the lowest level = for example, when a switch s_ould trip
but does not, or in a soft fau!_ scenaTio, when a sensor with its
circuitry has been consistently reporting slightly erroneous data, The
higher level must have capability to ascertain such cases and add them
to the re?orted anomalous data to form the 'symptom set' Defining the
problem is establishing this symptom set.
It is important for understanding the assessment of the pre-compiled
approaches in the succeeding sections to look at how symptom sets can
be grouped together into classes. Different symptom sets could result
from the same fault depending on the pre-fault status of the network.
For example, in Figure 2-1, if the PPDA RCCB trips (due to, e.g.,
overcurrent from a hard cable short), all previously closed switches
below it <the PPDA R/_Cs and the LC RPCs) should trip on under-voltage.
(One of the characteristics of RPCs and RCCBs is that they will trip
open on under-voltage as well as over-_urrent.) The switches reported
as having symptoms are those that were closed, so the number of
symptoms, and hence the symptom sets, vary in accordance with which
switches were open or closed.
It is thus possible to group together into a 'class' all symptom sets
that could result from a given fault (or set of _aults) in accord with
the different possible pre-fault states of the network. Note that some
classes could be caused by more than one fault. In addition, a given
symptom set could result from several different types of faults and
thus in general be a member of several different classes. At run time
in the pre-compiled approaches, the diagnostic process would have to
consider all the causes of all the classes that the identified symptom
set was a member of.
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Once the symptoms have been identified, an automated troubleshooter
must determine what kinds of failures could have caused those
symptoms. The complexity of this analysis depends on the complexity o9
diagnosis being done. Power system failures could be in the power
control, coEmnications or processing area. Considering only power
control, failures could arise in sensors, switches or cabli_. If the
troubleshooter is only considering one of these types, e.g., switch
failures, rather than all three, then any given set of symptoms that
could arise in the MSFC breadboard could have been caused by one and
only one type of fault. Similarly, if only single point failures are
addressed, then any set of symptoms could have resulted from one and
only one type of fault. These two situations would make for a rather
si_lified system.
In contrast, if multiple failures are addressed and all three types o£
control faults considered, then a symptom set in the MSFC breadboard
could have been caused by up to eleven (11) distinct types of faults
(and combinations o£ faults). Thus, FRAMES is intended to handle
multiple faults and combinations of sensor, switch and cable faults.
FRAMES will address both hard and soft faults and at some later point
will examine trending conditions and incipient failures (which can
either be or or not be the preludes to soft faults). Causes can also
be considered to be grouped into classes. A class might be, for
example, that there was a hard short below an LC RgC and the LC RPC
failed to trip on overcurrent (this obviously involves two independent
failures). The class does not refer to which LC RPC is involved, only
that one is. The individual causes that are members of this class
would each refer to a different LC RPC. One member might be: "there
was a hard short under LC RPC-I and LC RPC-I failed to trip". Other
members would specify the other LC RPCs on the involved bus.
Once the set of possible causes (or, more accurately, the set of
classes of causes) has been identified, evaluation of them should be
relatively straightforward. FRAMES' primary means of evaluation is by
manipulating switches. _ The following simplified example illustrates
an evaluation:
Assume a shorted condition in the load and a failed LC RPC such
that overcurrent does not "trip" the LC RPC, but that
under-voltage does "trip" it as a result of the PPDA RPC tripping
on an overcurrent condition. The symptoms would be the same as
i£ there was a hard short in the cabling between the PPDA RPC and
the LC RPC. Evaluating the possible causes(s), in this example
c%se, FRAMES would turn on the PPDA RPC (with the lower level
affected RPCs in the off condition). If the PPDA RPC does not
trip (it would not in our example case because the shorted
condition is "below" an RPC in the "off" condition) then a
shorted cable between the PPDA and LC can be discounted.
It is not clear that switch manipulation by a fault manager will always
be appropriate or even always allowed during operation of the Space
Station. There are many considerations, including personnel and
* In a number of soft fault scenarios, FRAMES will also draw on first
principles. While the bulk o£ the discussion and examples presented here
focus on hard faults, the critical elements of the approach transfer readily
to soft faults.
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equipment safety, required load operational scenarios (an electrical
load may not be restartable), etc., in the aliowance of switch
manipulation. However, a mature fault management system can
incorporate governing rules and guidelines as well as accept
"permission" from a "higher authority" to manipulate particular
switches necessary for evaluation.
I£ no switch manipulation is allowed, however, the diagnostic process
could, as a minimum, report the classes of possible causes it has
identified which could account for the symptom set. It could
prioritize them with respect to likelihood but it could not provide
further discrimination. For purposes of this discussion, it is assumed
that some switch manipulation is permissible and the process of
evaluating possible causes described below •uses it. This discussion
draws a distinct{on between calculating how to evaluate a particular
possible cause (and thus testing them one at a time) and determining
what each step of a standardized (tree-) search procedure would reveal
about the possible causes. If intermediate steps need not be presented
to the user, the latter approach appears to be more appropriate unless
it is decided that the power network might become (in the graph
theoretic sense) cyclic or non-hierarchical in significant ways. This
is addressed in section 2.3._.3.
2.3.2 Options For Performing DiaEnostic Processe_
There are five (5) main options for performing the key diagnostic
analyses. Advantages and disadvantages are discussed in section 2.3.3.
(I) Perform all the analyses ahead of time by hand.
o
o
o
Enumerate all symptoms and all causes, not just their
classes. Enumerate all possible symptom sets.
For each symptom set, numerate all possible causes.
For each cause identify how to evaluate that cause
<which switches to manipulate to get evidence for or
against).
(2)
At runtime then, it would only be necessary to identify all
the symptoms. From that, all possible causes would
imediately be known, e.g., via table look-up, as would all
the means of discriminating between possible causes.
Perform all a1%alyses ahead of time by machine.
o Same as (I) but the analyses are automated.
Runtime behavior would be the same except under degraded
conditions where the automated version might be able to
handle the situation and the manual very likely could not.
See coment in next section.
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(3)
(_)
Perform the analyses by class ahead of time by hand.
Enumerate all possible classes of symptom sets.
For each class, enumerate all possible classes of
causes. For each class of causes, identify how to
evaluate the class and when necessary how to find the
appropriate member within it.
Runtime processing would be somewhat different than (I),
since the pre-compiled analysis deals with classes, not
individual symptom sets or causes. The notion of classes
is introduced largely as a way of reducing the exhaustive
enumeration of (i) and (2) above, shifting some of the work
to runtime. During actual diagnosis, it would be necessary
to identify all the symptoms and then determine what class
that symptom set belongs to. Once the class of symptom
sets has been determined, the classes of possible causes
would be available via look-up from pre-compiled analyses.
Depending on how the evaluation analysis was done, it may
be possible to search through the class of causes or it may
be necessary to search through the individual members of
the classes.
Perform the analyses by class ahead of time by machine.
o Same as (3) but analysis is automated.
Runtime behavior would be the same as (3) except that it
would likely be much easier for the automated version to
handle degraded conditions than the manual. It is not
clear that the manual version could - see comment in
following section.
(5) Perform all the analysis during actual diagnosis.
o
o
o
At runtime (obviously), establish the symptom set.
From the symptom set (rather than its class),
determine the possible causes. No=e _hat this does
not require finding the class of the symptom set or
the class(es) of causes. This process works by a
causal analysis of the specifics rather than using
the general classes
Determine how to evaluate the causes and do so. in
many cases this will mean simply executing a standard
evaluation procedure and when anomalies appear,
determine what cause is being implicated.
2.3.3 Advantages and DisadvantaKes of Options
The _ive options described in the previous section each have
various advantages and disadvantages. These focus on such issues
as complexity of pre-runtime analyses, speed at runtime, data
management at runtime and flexibility both in moving to new
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network configurations and in adaptin_ to failures or runtime
changes in configuration.
(i) Perform all analyses ahead of time by hand.
o
o
ADVANTAGES:
Fast runtime execution (depending on how diagnostic
information generated by analysis is handled at runtime).
DISADVANTAGES:
Possibility of overlooki_ possible symptoms or causes due
to the enormity of the analysis. --
Poss_5ie siEn_£icant problem managing all diagnostic
information generated in analyses. The amount of this
information can be prohibitively large. If the network had
15 LC RPCs per bus, some of the 35 classes of symptom sets
Can have on the order of 1013 members. Effectively
managing this amount o£ information on a time critical
fashion is basically unfeasible.
Analysis must be re-done (or re-verified) completely if
move tO a different network (or configuration).
Analysis must be re-_done (or re-verified) after a fault has
occurred. To do this by hand while Space Station is
operating is not feasible except under trivial failures.
(2) Perform all analyses in advance by machine.
o
o
ADVANTAGES
Fast execution time (dependir_ on how diagnostic
information is handled)_
Pre-runtime analysis is much faster and more likely to be
complete and reliable than (1).
DISADVANTAGES
Possible significant problem managing all the diagnostic
information generated in analyses. See comments under (I).
Computation to perform analysis is substantial and must be
repeated if move to different network (or configuration).
Computation to perform analysis is substantial and may need
to be repeated (off-line while Space Station continues to
operate) after every failure.
Again, there may be programmatic solutions to the
re-computation, e.g., it would be possible to restrict the
re-computation to address only areas effected by the
failure. These may or may not be sufficient.
(3) Perform analyse_ by class ahead of time by hand.
o
o
o
ADVANTAGES
Fast execution time.
Depending on how the fault diagnosis information is handled
in (i) and (2), execution time for (3) and (4) could be
close to or much slower than execution time in (i) and (2).
Execution time for (3) and (4) may or may not be slightly
faster than for (5).
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DISADVANTAGES
Possibility o£ overlooking classes of possible symptoms or
causes.
Still requires rt_ntime classification of symptoms and
searching within cause classes for individual causes.
These two steps are no___tpart of (5), which "adds" to the
relative speed of (5).
0verlapping class problem - symptom sets may belong to more
than one class, multiplying the search space and slowing
execution time unless handled with finesse.
Analyses must be re-done (or re-verified) completely if
move to a different network (or configuration).
Analyses must be re-done (or re-verified) after a fault has
occurred. See comments under (i):
Perform analyses by class ahead of time by machine.
ADVANTAGES
Fast execution time. See notes under (3).
Pre-runtime analyses much faster and more likely to be
complete and reliable than (3).
DISADVANTAGES
Still requires runtime classification of symptoms and
searching within cause classes for individual causes. See
note under (3).
Overlapping class problem. See coments under(3).
Must repeat computation if move to different network (or
confi&q/ration).
MaY need to repeat computation after every failure. See
comments under (21.
Perform all analTses necessary during actual diagnosis.
ADVANTAGES
Greatest flexibility of all options, both in adapting
(automatically) to identified mmtime failures and in
moving to new networks (or configurations).
More likely to identify all possibilities and therefore
find 'obscure' faults - than (I) or (3).
Minimizes problem of managing diagnostic information - can
be concisely formulated in an object oriented paradigm.
Substantive explanation is easier than under the other
approaches.
DISADVANTAGES
May be slower than pre-compiled approaches at runtime.
The relative speeds of the five options are a function of:
(a) How the enormous volume of diagnostic information is
handled at runtime in (1) and (2).
(b) How fast the classification and declassification processes
are in (3) and (_).
(c) How much the heuristics will reduce computation time in (5).
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:iven the substantially greater flexibility along with these
trade-offs in execution time, it seems prudent to pursue option
(5).
2.3.A The Use o£ Option Five in FRAMES
As dlscussed earlier, the runt_me process consists of three main parts:
1) establishing the _tom set,
2) identifying possible causes for the symptom set, and
3) evaluating the possible causes.
The following subsections examine how option 5 is used in FRAMES.
2.3.4.1 Establishing the Symptom Set
A proposed procedure for establishing the symptom set is:
(I) Gather data
(2) Identify the highest level in the network with a reported
anomaly"
(3) Predict what other symptoms should be present given 2,
reasoning from the pre-fault network configuration
(_) Compare the predictions in 3 with the reported anomalies in
1
(5) The symptom set is the reported anomalies in I plus the
differences from
Gathering data is an algorithmic task allocated to the lowest level
processes. It is asst_med that the lowest level processes which control
the switches identify any tripped switch. All these are £1agged and
reported to the higher level control, FRAMES. Using the structural
information about the network represented in its object oriented causal
model, FRAMES does a standard search to find the flagged component tha:
is closest to the power source ("highest" in the network). Typically
this might be a switch reporting tripped on overcurrent. Using the
same structural information along with information about current flow,
voltage dynamics and the behavior of network components, FRAMES might
reason as shown in the following simplified example:
A tripped switch means that there should be zero voltage on the
load side of the switch. This zero voltage condition should hold
along the cable beneath the switch down to the next level of
subordinate components, in this case switches. Each of these
switches should have zero voltage at their inputs which should
cause all of them to trip on under-voltage.
It would then add these switch "tripped" conditions to its predicted
symptoms and continue in the same fashion moving downward through the
network through each of these switches. The comparison in & and set
union in 5 are straightforward.
Note that the FRAMES only needs to know about how a component, be it a
cable, switch or sensor, responds to an input - that is, how it changes
state and what its output will be. A significant advantage to this is
that changes in the network are noted in the model by changes in the
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behavior of components and their connections - all of which are merely
data for the process that is propagating effects through the network
and lookin_ at global activity/behavior. If an old or faulty switch is
replaced by a switch with different trip characteristics, for example,
FRAMES will at the appropriateltime consider whether that new switch
will trip under a particular set of circumstances, independent of
whether any other switch will or not.
2.3.&.2 Identifyir_ Possible Causes
Once the symptom set is identified, possible causes can be established
using a form of causal reasoning known as constraint suspension. In
this method, the healthy functioning of each aspect of a component is
considered a constraint on the system behavior. A sensor, for example,
imposes at least two such constraints: It measures (and reports)
properly, and it does not significantly alter system function (e.g., it
does not significantly reduce current flow or cause a voltage drop). A
switch imposes seve_al: It permits no (or negligible) current £1ow
when open, it trips on current flow above a certain level, it trips on
volt_e below a certain level, etc.
The various constraints "imposed" on the system by its components can
be suspended, singly or in sets, to see if that malfunction could cause
the identified symptoms. This can be done to different degrees. For
example, the constraint that a cable flows current from its input to
its output without any intermediary shunt could be suspended
completely, creating a hard short condition, or only partially,
creating a Soft fault situation.
Beginning with the highest component in the network to evidence an
anomaly (e.g., a tripped switch or a _onsistently high sensor reading),
FRAMES would look at the constraints imposed by that component. It
would select one, suspend it, and then propagate the effects through
the network model, "tripping" switches and "reporting" sensor data ;n
an internal simulation. (Note: both the action and depth of
propagation could be controlled to minimize computation.) If the
effects generated in this simulation match the actual symptom set
identified in the previous step (i.e., the symptoms that resulted when
the actual fault occurred), that suspended constraint is added to the
set of possible causes. If the effects do not match, that constraint
is not added. In either case, the analysis goes on to the other
constraints of that component, then to the constraints imposed by
subordinate components in a breadth first, partially Constrained
search. Further, if the effects are only a subset of the symptom set,
that constraint is given consideration as one of a set of multiple
faults and (at the appropriate time) FRAMES searches for other
constraints that would non-trivially complement this one and together,
in a multiple fault scenario, account for the symptom set.
An analysis by constraint suspension could be done poorly using a brute
force method and result in gross inefficiencies. It might, for
example, suspend constraints at locations in the network model
unrelated to the symptom-reporting area - in an extreme case, it might
look at bus "B" when all symptoms are on bus "A". As another example
Of such inefficiency, it might suspend a constraint that could in no
way produce any of the symptoms in question.
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The analysis needs to be guided. Some heuristics for this include:
o start at the highest level with identified anomalies and
work away from the source,
o search in the location of symptoms (first),
o examine faults in groups of equal liklyhood, e.g., evaluate
single point causes before identifying multiple causes, and
o depth of search (in terms of levels of subordinate
switches) is equal to the number of faults being considered.
2.3.a.3 Evaluating Possible Causes
 sumi forthis discussionthatmanipulationofswitches is allowed
in order to evaluate possible causes, the underlying analysis for
evaluation is closely related to the causal analysis used in
identifying possible causes. The relationship is sufficiently close
that under certain circumstances, the identification and evaluation
might happen at the same time. Switches would thus be manipulated and,
based on the results, the nature of the faul£ 6r cause would be
deduced, tither than vice versa. Such Casesshould be exploited since
execution time as discussed in 2.3.3 would be considerably reduced and
would make option 5 much closer in speed to the other options. As
noted in 2.3.3, however, this would remove the possibility of cleanly
presenting information concerning possible causes.
Assuming, however, that evaluation is done after possible causes have
been identified, the problem is: given a possible cause, how can
evidence be obtained concerning it? If all raw data analysis has
already been incorporated, evidence can be obtained only by bringing
power to the locale of suspected failure. Thus: what switches need to
be closed to connect this locale to the power source and, at the same
time, what other switches need to be opened to isolate that connection
and minimize unintended interactions?
This question can.be addressed by a fairly straightforward bounded
_earch using the structural connections reflected in FRAMES' causal
model of the network. Because this is straightforward and since the
maximum depth of search will not be more than a handful of levels (3 or
4 in most network topologies), the process will take lit[le computation
time. Actual switch manipulation time is considered constant across
the five options.
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2.4 HARDWARE DEVELOPMENT DEFINITION
Hardware requiring development for the automation of CMIP_%D may
include sensors for 20 kHz range voltage, current, frequency, power,
and power factor (phase an_le). Specific sensor development efforts
may be required in the areas of accuracy, resolution, and repeatability
for the specified types and range. We feel this development may be
required to mitigate risks associated with sensi.ng parameters at 20
kHz. We purposely excluded tem_rature sensors in identification of
hardware requiring development in that we believe the technology is
well developed for the ranges and uses projected by Task 1 studies.
Sensor requirements are highly related to the techniques used to carry
out the CM/PMAD identified functions. The development or definition of
those requirements may cl_e as the MSFC breadboard development and
evaluation efforts of Task III provide data. Our studies currently
show that barring 20kHz integration risks, data accuracy in the one
percent range will be sufficient for CM/PMAD operation. Furthermore,
excepting te_erature sensors, the approach considered utilizes voltage
and current sensors as the only physical sensing hookup to the power
circuitry. Output from these sensor types will also be used in
derivation of frequency, power, and power factor values. Hardware
development with respect to these additional measurements will be
required in the sensing and data conditioning circuitry. We view this
situation as typical of any £1iEht hardware requiring development from
the initial requirements definition phase. Also included in this
category are the following hardware areas:
I) digital support circuitry for switchgear, including interface
logic, data acquisition, and coanand/control logic,
2) microprocessor based load center controllers, and
3) microprocessor based power distribution control unit
controllers.
Required development of hardware within the power network control
function that supports Space Station growth configurations and that
also require advances in technology consists of developing:
I) flight suitable multi-megabyte random access memory capable
of the extended mission duration in the space environment
with respect to total dose radiation,
2) flight suitable multi-lO0 megabyte data storage devices also
capable of operation in space environments, and
3) a flight suitable computer capable of taking full advantage
of the AI techniques used in overall CM/PMAD operation as well
as qualified for an extended mission in space environments.
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3.0 SUM/_ARY
Knowledge bases, knowledge base management systems, inference
procedures, as well as deterministic algorithms to implement the
approach as defYned--in-_sk -i were de_- Appiication areas
requiring a knowledge base approach included scheduling, load priority
management, fault prediction, fault management. Currently available
knowledge base management systems prove useful in the early stages of
the development of an expert system, but have far too much overhead in
both storage and computation time to be used in the final flight
version systems. The recommended approach for development Of these
final versions would be to implement application specific tools in Lisp
or Ada and then use these tools to implement the knowledge based
system. Roles for deterministic algorithms were also defined. The
deterministic algorithm approach was recommended for distribution
management, load monitoring and shedding, signal conditioning, lowest
level _ault detection, and communication functions.
A methodology for producing the above software requiring unique
development was presented. The approach consisted of three phases -
initial problem analysis and prototyping, second generation prototyping
and knowledge refinement, and deliverable system development.
Fault management studies identified five options for approaching the
diagnosis problem. The most flexible and adaptive of these, and the
one with the greatest potential for sophisticated explanation, has been
chosen for use in FRAMES. This approaches uses a heuristically guided
causal reasoning system embedded in an object oriented paradigm;
Fault management studies resulted in recommending a knowledge based
system in an advisory role for IOC with deterministic algorithms at the
lowest level for condition exception handling and limits verification.
The approach provides the capability for growth in the fault management
function _or Space Station growth configurations. The approach also
_acilitates incorporation of new technologies, e.g. AI hardware and
software, as they become available.
Required hardware development necessary _or implementation of the
automation approach of Task I was defined. Results divided the
hardware development into two general areas. The first was development
typical of programs with flight hardware. Sensors, data acquisition
and control circuitry, and digital interEacing logic to effectors were
grouped into this category. Also in this category we identified
microprocessor based controllers for both the load center and the power
distribution control unit. The second area was defined as hardware
development that requires advances in a technology. Flight suitable
multi-megabyte random access memory, _light suitable multi-megabyte
data storage devices, and a flight suitable computer capable of taking
_ull advantage of AI techniques were identified as requiring
development in the second category.
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4. O REFERENCE
This Task II effort was preceded by the referenced Task I, CM/PMAD
System Automation Plan Definition, under the same MSFC contract
NAS8-36433. Those Task I efforts in characterizations and plan
definitions served as an embarkation point for Task If. Full
documentation for a more detailed understanding of those Task I efforts
and results can be found in the following report:
W.D.Miller, et. al., "Space Station Automation of Common Module Power
Management and Distribution: Task I Study Report,"
Martin Marietta Report MCR-86-583, July 1986.
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APPENDIX III- TASK IV DATA
FOREWORD
Martin Marietta Denver Aerospace is submitting this report to NASA's
George C. Marshall Spaceflight Center in fulfillment of the
requirements of contract NASS-36433j Task IV, item 2. The report
details the results of our evaluation Of the government-proposed
requirements, hardware, software support packages, and operating system
for the two computer systems that will interface with the common module
power management and distribution (CM/PMAD) controllers.
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I. TASK-IV STUDY CONCLUSIONS
We do not reconxnend the computer system defined by General Digital
Industries, Inc., for the coi_onmodule power management and
distribution (CM/PMAD) breadboard. Instead, we recommend an alternate
configuration based on the Motorola VME/10 development system.
We reached this conclusion in completing task IV, item one, of the
contract statement of _ork. Under this task we evaluated the
government-proposed requirements, hardware, software support packages,
and operating system for the two computer systems chat are to interface
with the CM/PMAD controllers. The system we evaluated was defined in a
study conducted by General Digital Industries (GDI) and was documented
in their report Space Station Power System Control Study Final Report.
The primary reason we recommend a different configuration is cost: the
GDI version costs _i20,747 with the modifications we found necessary
(Table I-l). The VME/IO system (Table I-2) costs only $65,585. This
is an important consideration, because the contract has only _53,000
allocated for the system, and purchase of the GDI system would require
additional funding or rescoping of other tasks.
However, there are additional reasons for recommending a different
configuration. Specifically, although the GDI system appears to meet
the major requirements for the breadboard, it is incomplete. For
example, for the 18 Opto-22 circuit cards, no provision is made for a
cable to connect the cards to the computer or for a card cage or other
housing for the cards or a power supply to power the cards. Similarly,
although Ethernet hardware was specified, the required To_eruet
software was not.
A related problem is that NCR has changed its product line since GDI
wrote its report. The model 1632 is no longer manufactured (although
used equipment iS available), and the features NCR now includes with
the basic Tower XP differ from what the report describes.
Further, some of the parts do not appear to work well together. For
example, the Unix-V operating system of the GDIconfiguration is
designed for an office environment -- accounting, spread sheets, data
base management, etc. -- not for real-time control. GDI therefore
specifies the polyFORTH language. However, according to Ms. Sheree
Krawetz at FORTH, Inc., the polyFORTH software provides its own
operating system with its own file structure, utility software, I/O
drivers and device handlers. These are not compatible with Unix. In
fact, once polyFORTH has written on the Winchester disk, it cannot be
used for Unix without being erased first. The result is that the
entire Unix environment will be rendered useless for developing the
automation software. And because the Etheruet software runs under
Unix, it will be very difficult to use Etheruet in the control software.
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Table I-l GDI System Components
PRIMARY COMPUTER
Quantity Manufacturer Model
1 NCR Tower XP
1 NCR CWDSO9-
2001-00FD
1 NCR CWDS09-
2008-OOFD
1 NCR CWD509-
2009-OOFD
l FORTH, Inc. pF32/NCR
1 FORTH, Inc.
1 NCR
1 Excel-- EXOS 201,
Model 3
1 Exce laD
l Excelan
1 Data Trans- DT712-
fat ion 64DI-PGH
1 Data Trans- DT724
lation
1 Data Trans- EP067
lation
I Data Trans- DT705
lation
i Intel
2 Opto-22
6 Opto-22
6 Opto2
1 Tektronix
l Tektronix
I Tektronix
i Hayes Micro- Smartmodem
computer 2¢.00
Products
I TBD TBD
Description Price
Computer, Difi Memory, $16545
I Flexible-Disk Drive,
I Streaming Tape Drive,
1 Winchester Diskj
I High-Per fo.finance
ES-232C Interface,
and I Printer Interface
Unix operating System 755
FORTRAN Compiler 650
Pascal Compiler
FORTH Software
License to Download
to Controllers
Towernet Software
Ethernet controller
700
3200
800
995
2095
Cable for Ethernet
Ethernet Transceiver
64 Diff. A/D Channels
155
495
1780
Total
$16545
755
650
700
32O0
8OO
995
2095
155
495
1780
4-Channel D/A 730 730
4 Cables 260 260
330Termination Panel
iSBC519 72 Chan TTL I/O 660
PB24Q Relay Driver Socket Bd 108
ODC5Q Quad Relay Driver 35
IDCSBQ Quad Relay Sensor 45
4125P+Opt 19 Computer Display 20850
4691 Color Graphics Copier 12950
4510+Opt 30 Graphics Rasterizer 4495
2400-baud Modem
TOTAL
Cables
899
200_
330
660
216
210
270
20850
12950
4495
899
200
70240
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Table I-I GDI System Components (Cont.)
STIMULUS COMPUTER
Quantity Manufacturer Model Description Price
I NCR Tower XP
1 NCR
i NCR
I NCR
I FORTH, Inc.
i Data Trans-
lation
I Intel
1 Opto-22
16 Opto-22
25b Opto-22
I Tektronix
I TBD
I TBD
I TBD
I TBD
CWD509-
2001-OOFD
C_DS09-
2008-OOFD
CWD509-
2009-OOFD
pF32/NCR
DT724
Computer, iMBMemory, $16545
I Flexible-Disk Drive,
i Streaming Tape Drive,
I Winchester Disk,
I HiEh-Performance
RS-232C Interface,
and I Printer Interface
Unix Operating System 755
FORTRAN Compiler
Total
$16545
Pascal Compiler
755
650 650
700 700
FORTH Software 2400 * 2400
4 Channel D/A 730 730
iSBC519 72 Chart TTL I/0 660 660
AC7 RS-232C to RS-¢22 Cony. 85 85
PBI6MS Multiplexer 260 4i60
ODC5 Relay 7.90 2022
4125P+Opt 19 Computer Display 20850 20850
TBD Power Supply, 5vdc 75 75
'rBD Pwr Supply, +/- 12 vdc 75 75
TBD Cables 200 est 200
TBD CardCage, Housing, 600 est 600
Connectors for Relays
and Mul tip lexer s
TOTAL 50507
TOTAL, BOTH COMPUTERS: $120,747
* Second-system price break shown.
NOTE: Prices are based on distributor price lists, data from the GDI study,
vendor advertisements and catalogs, and informal quotations received by
telephone. They do not include Martin Marietta G&A, shipping/freight charges,
or receiving inspection. Actual cost may therefore differ from the amount
shown.
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Table I-2 VME/IO System Components
PRIMARY COMPUTER
Quantity Manufacturer Model
1 Motorola M68KI02DI
1 Motorola MVME330-VX
1 Excelan
I Exce fan
1 Motorola MV_222-I
1 Motorola MVME400
I Motorola** MVME350
1 Archive ** FT60
I Archive ** SC199-2
1 Diablo C150
i Motorola M68KVMPRTCE
1 Motorola MVME605
1 Motorola HVHE600
2 Motorola MVME601
1 Motorola MVME410
1 Mo Coro la MVME340
3 Motorola MVME62.5
3 Hotorola MVME620
1 Motorola
1 Motorola
1 US Robotics Password
Descript ion Price Total
Computer, 0/S $16530 $16530
E thernet 3300 3300
Cable for Ethernet 155 155
Ethernet Transceiver 495 495
1 MB Memory 1750 1750
Dual KS-232C 395 395
Streaming Tape I/face 1450 1450
Streaming Tape Drive 1295 1295
Streamer Controller 375 375
Color Inkier Printer 998 998
Printer Cable 125 125
4-Channe I D/A 675 675
8-than A/D Master 750 750
8-than A/D Expander 350 700
,Printer Port 350 350
TTL I/O, Timer 1125 1125
Relay Driver 340 1020
Digital Input 325 975
M68VVXBPASCAL Pascal Compiler 995 995
MVME922 Expansion Backp lane 290 290
Modem 450 450
TOTAL 34198
**MVME350 is not available until Nov/Dec. An alternate configuration using
MVME319 and Cipher "Floppy Tape" is now available at a similar price but
requires changing tapes to archive a full 40 MB disk.
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Table I-2 V_/IO System Components (Cont.)
STIMULUS COMPUTER
Quantity Manufacturer Model Description Price Total
1 Motorola
1 Motorola
1 Archive
1 Archive
1 TBD
1 Motorola
1 Motorola
1 Motorola
1 Motorola
1 Motorola
1 Opto-22
16 Opto-22
256 Opto-22
i TBD
1 TBD
M68KI02D I
MVME350
FT60
SC199-2
TBD
MVME410
MVME605
NVME340
MV_202
Computer, O/S
Streaming Tape I/face
Streaming Tape Drive
Streamer Controller
Cab les
Printer Port
4-Channe I D/A
TTL I/O, Timer
512 KB Memory
M68VVXBPASCAL Pascal Compiler
AC7A I/face w/ Pwr Supply
PBI6MD Relay Multiplexer
ODC5 * Relay, 60vdc, 3A
TBD Power Supply, 5vdc
TBD Card Cage, Housing,
Connectors for Relays
and Multiplexers
16530 16530
1450 1450
1295 1295
375 375
200 est 200
350 350
675 675
1125 1125
1395 1395
995 995
190 190
260 4160
7.90 2022 *
75 75
550 550
TOTAL, BOTH COMPUTERS: $65,585
TOTAL 31387
* Relay part number will depend on power type. Part number shown allows
comparison with GDI system.
NOTE: Prices are based on distributor price lists, da_a from the GDI study,
vendor advertisements and catalogs, and informal quotations received by
telephone. They do not include Martin Marietta G&A, shipping/freight charges,
or receiving inspection. Actual cost may therefore differ from the amount
shown.
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Moreover, a few of the items in the GDI system seem to be inconsistent
or inappropriate. In particular, GDI specifies two flexible disk
drives on each computer to allow copying disks. The second drive is
not necessary for copying disks, however, because info_ti6n can be
copied to the Winchester disk and then back _0 as many flexible disks
as required from the Winchester. In addition, GDI specifies two DMA
channels with a minimum of I0 MB/s transfer rate but specifies no use
for them. We assume they are intended for Ethernet and Winchester
interfaces. If this is the intent, it is sufficient to state that the
system will provide Ethernet communications and Winchester disk
storage. Similarly, GDI has specified streaming tape backup capability
for only one of the two computers. Both have large-capacity Winchester
drives. If it is reasonable to have backup capability on one, it
should be reasonable for the other as well.
Finally, the GDI configuration does not appear to meet all the
"mandatory" requirements set forth in the report. For example, the
report calls for 150 ms flexible-disk access time; the NCR computer
provides no better than 181 ms. The report calls for at least 40 MB of
Winchester disk space; the NCR computer provides 39 MB. The report
requires D/A output impedance under i000 ohms; the selected devices
provide 4000 ohms. The report calls for a library of graphics
routines, but no such package is provided in the software specified.
And, although such a package is available from a third party (Precision
Visual Graphics), it is designed to work only with FORTRAN programs.
The POlyFORTH system is incompatible with this software and would
require a separate graphics package. Mr. Ed Boykin, the Denver,
Colorado, NCR representative, was not aware of any support for graphics
under FORTH. Similarly, the report states as a requirement that the
RS-232C ports be configured by means of '_DIP" switches. The NCR
computers do not have switches; they are configured through software.
In most cases, these differences are inconsequential For example, the
access time for the flexible disk need not be specified at all, because
the flexible disks will not be used during breadboard operation. They
are provided only as a means for getting software onto and off of the
Winchester disk.
We assume from these discrepancies that the term "mandatory" is not to
be taken literally, and in view of the current uncertainty about
exactly how these computers will be used, this appears to be a
reasonable assumption. In addition, we assume that phrases that appear
to be extracted from a particular vendor's sales literature are soft
requirements, e.g. that the screen editor must have "powerful search,
replace, and formatting commands."
Based on these assumptions, we have identified the previously mentioned
VME/10 system. This system appears to meet all essential requirements
for CM/PMAD at a considerably lower cost. An analysis of how this
system meets requirements {S presented in chapter II.
The primary differences between the two systems are physical
appearance, operating system software, graphics resolution, and
expansion bus structure. Specifically:
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i) Physical Appearance. The GDI system is based on the NCK Tower
computers, which stand on the floor. The VME/10 system is a
desk-top unit. The shapes and dimensions of the components of the
systems differ, and although total volume is similar, the GDI
system is somewhat larger. The VME/10 system has a smaller screen
(14 inches vs. 19 inches for the GDI system);
2) Operating System Software. The GDI system uses Unix and polyFORTH;
the VME/IO system uses VersaDOS. VersaDOS has a hierarchical file
system that resembles that of Unix, but it is less flexible and
does not allow for directories within directories with nesting to
any depth as Unix does. Unlike Unix, VersaDOS is designed for
real-time applications and provides high-level language (Pascal)
support for such multi-tasking functions as intertask
communication, interrupt-service routines, setting of task
priorities, suspending tasks, spawning new tasks, etc;
3) Graphics Resolution. The GDI system has approximately 50% better
resolution, but both systems appear adequate for the CM/PMAD
application. The VME/10 system has a resolution of 600 x 800
pixels;.
4) Expansion Bus Structure. The expansion bus of the NCR computers is
Multibus-I; the VME/10 system uses a VME bus. There is no clear
superiority of either over the other. Multibus-I is an older
standard and therefore has a wider variety of products available
for it.
The VME/10 system has the advantage of being usable for compiling
programs for read-only memories in the controllers of a
distributed-intelligence architecture. Such software development on
the GDI system would require each controller to have at least partial
polyFORTH support, because FORTH code is not compiled entirely to
machine code and requires run-time interpreters from the polyFORTH
system.
Both systems are based on the Motorola 68010 microprocessor; both
provide high-resolution color graphics terminals and color inkjet
printers. Neither system is better than the other in all respects.
However, we believe the VME/IO system provides all necessary features
at a much lower cost than the GDI system.
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IIo RE(_UIREMENTS ANALYSIS
A.
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.
.
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Listed below are what we believe to be the real requirements for the
two computers. In most cases, these agree with those given in the GDI
report. We have deviated from GDI's requirements only where GDI's own
system did not meet the requirement, where a significant cost saving
would result from a small requirement change, or where we saw no basis
for a requirement.
BOTH SYSTEMS
Graphics Terminal. Both systems should have high-resolution color
graphics suitable for displaying schematic diagrams for viewing not
only by the operator but also others standing nearby. The display
should have at least eight colors, and the terminal should be equipped
with a detachable keyboard and an interface to the computer.
The VME/10 system has a built-in color graphics terminal with a
fourteen-inch screen and 600x800 resolution with eight colors. The
detachable keyboard and interface are included in the basic V_/10
system.
Color Printer. The two systems should share a high-resolution (at
leas= 80 dots/inch) color inkier printer. This printer should be
capable of printing the terminal screen with a one-keystroke command
from the terminal. A page should be printed in less than five minutes.
The Diablo C150 color inkjet printer has a resolution of 120 dots/inch
and prints a page in 4.5 minutes. Although the maximum page size is
smaller than the llxlT-inch area provided by the Tektronix printer GDI
selected, it will draw on a full 8.5xll-inch page, and the cost is
$16465 less than the Tektronix printer. Further, the C150 is not
restricted to printing what is on the terminal screen as the Tektronix
unit is and does not require an expensive terminal as the Tektronix
unit does.
Printing the screen with a one-keystroke command is not automatic with
the Diablo printer, but according to Clint Bauer, a Motorola technical
assistance representative, the VME/10 system can be programmed to read
the screen memory, format the information, and send it to a printer in
response to a control character or function key.
Software Commonality. Both systems should be of the same type and use
the same operating system and development software.
This requirement is satisfied by using two VME/IO systems.
Mode.____mm.The systems should share a modem for transmitting and receiving
data over a telephone line. An RS-232C port should be provided to
support the modem.
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A US Robdtics Password modem is specified, and ports are provided in
each VME/10 configuration for the modem. Although the modem specified
does not have the 2400-baud speed of the Hayes modem GDI specified, it
costs approximately half as much. Furthermore, its 1200-baud speed is
as high as is commonly supported in systems the breadboard is likely to
be connected to.
The MVME400 card provides two RS-232C ports. In the stimulus computer,
one of these is used for the Opt.-22 relay control equipment. In the
primary computer there is one spare RS-232C port.
Support Software. Development software provided should include a
screen-oriented editor, a high-level language, a file manager, a linker
(if needed for the language), and support for real-time multi-tasking
software.
These items are provided in the VersaDOS software that comes with the
VME/10 system and the Pascal compiler specified. The GDI system does
not provide a screen-oriented editor; the polyFORTH editor is line
oriented.
Real-time Clock. A real-time clock should be provided that has the
ability to interrupt the computer at specified intervals and provide
the time of day.
A time-of-day clock is built into the VME/10, and three timers with
interrupt capability are provided on the MVME340 cards, one of which is
in each computer.
S)-nchronization Link. A synchronization link should beprovided
between the computers.
The purpose of this link and its exact function are not yet
identified. However, a spare TTL I/O line from the MVHE340 card in
each computer should suffice for this link,
Disks. A hard disk unit should be provided with each computer. The
capacity of each should be at least 40 megabytes. A flexible-disk
drive should also be provided in each computer.
These items are built into the VME/10 system specified.
Backup Storage. Each computer should be equipped with bulk tape
storage for backup storage and archiving.
The MVME350, FT60, and SC199-2 provide a streaming tape backup
capability. The entire 40 megabyte capacity of each Winchester disk
can be backed up on a single tape with this system.
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B. PRIMARY COMPUTER
I.
.
.
.
.
.
Co
1.
.
The following requirements are unique to the primary computer.
TTL Output. Twenty-four TTL outputs should be provided for the solar
array s_nmlat0r.
These are provided by the MVHE340 card, which actually provides 64
parallel I/O lines, along with interrupt capability.
Analo_ Output. One analog output is required for the solar array
s i_iato r.
This output is provided by the MVME605 card, which provides three spare
channels.
Relay Interface. Twenty-one relay control outputs and 21 relay sense
inputs are required for the load-center interface.
The three MVME620 cards provide 4 channels for 10-60 vdc signal
monitoring with 2500 v input isolation and protection for input
overvoltage and transients. The three MVME625 cards provide 24 outputs
of 10-60 vdc with 2500 v isolation and suppression of inductive load
transients. Overcurrent protection is provided for 2 A, maximum.
Analo_ Inpu t. Twenty differential anal.g inputs are required.
The MVME600 and MVMESO1 boards provide 24 channels of analog input.
Ethernet. An Ethernet interface is required.
This interface consists of the MVME330-VX card and the Excelan cable
and transceiver. Support software is provided and is included in the
cost of the MVME330-VX card.
Memory. A minimum of one megabyte of memory should be provided.
The MVME222-1 card provides one megabyte. Additional memory is
provided in the basic VME/10 system, but approximately half of it is
used for graphics support.
STIMULUS COMPUTER
Relay Outputs. Discrete digital outputs should be provided for 256
relays.
These outputs are provided by the Opt.-22 equipment specified. All 256
relays are dontrolled through a single RS-232C port.
Memory. A minimum 512 kbytes of memory should be provided.
We have specified a 512-kbyte board (MVME202). Additional memory is
provided in the basic VME/10 system, but approximately half of it is
used for graphics support.
III-I0
3.
5
Analo_ Output. One channel of analog output is required.
This output is provided by the MVME605 card. The card provides three
spare outputs.
TTL Outputs. A minimum of 24 TTL outputs should be provided.
These outputs are provided by the MVME340 card, which includes 40 spare
outputs.
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Ill. RECOMMENDATIONS
Werecommend purchase of the VME/10 system described in this report.
However, we believe it would be wise to defer ordering the Ethernet
interface and the relays until the controllers and other portions of
the system are better defined. The reason is that either of these
items could be found to be inappropriate, and both are expensive.
Specifically, the Ethernet interface with the required support software
costs over _3000 for either _he _/i0 system or the CDI system.
Ethernet was designed for an office environment, not for a real-time
control environment, and has characteristics that may not be desirable
for CM/PMAD. These include the fact that messages sent over Ethernet
may be delayed an unknown amount of time, the weight and size of the
coaxial cable required, the high cost and complexity of the interfaces,
and the vulnerability of the network to being disabled by a babbling
transmitter or a shorted controller interface.
Similarly, the relays may be found to be inappropriate. The relays
recommended in the GDI report are rated at 60 vdc and 3 A. Such relays
will not be suitable for directly inserting faults in either an AC or
DC breadboard because of the low voltage and current ratings. They may
or may not be suitable for operating contactors. Postponing the
purchase of these parts will allow tailoring the relay drive circuitry
to the requirements of the breadboard.
Both systems provide analog and TTL outputs to the solar array
simulator. The functions these outputs perform are not yet specified.
These interfaces should be defined as soon as possible, Certainly
before software development begins.
Finally, we recommend addition of a small dot-matrix printer to either
system for such functions as printing program listings during sof_are
development and rapid printout of data. We believe this will be
beneficial because color inkjet printers prin t very slowly -- over four
minutes per page for either model mentioned in this report. The cost
of a typical small dot-matrix printer is less than _400.
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13.0
13.1
CM/PMAD distributed logic circuitry (microprocessors, RAM modules, etc).
some power conditioning must be performed as part of the CM/PMAD task.
13.1.1
FUNCTION DEFINITIONS
Power Conditioning
Of the types of CM input power considered, none is directly suitable for
Clearly,
conversion.
13.1.2
13.2
Logic Power Conversion
Logic power conversion includes voltage transformations and ac/dc
Logic Power Conditioning
Logic power conditioning includes dc voltage regulation and filtering.
Power Distribution
In performing this function, CM/PMAD provides the actual electrical paths
for power to flow from place to place within the CM, or physically prevents power from
flowing.
13.2.1 Circuit Protection
Circuit protection is the actual, physical defense of the mechanical and
electrical integrity of CM/PMAD circuit elements.
13.2.2 Load Switching
Load switching includes the connection of loads to or disconnection of
loads from nearby electrical buses.
13.2.3 BUS Switching
This is the connection of electrical buses to or disconnection of electrical
buses from one another.
APPENDIX IV: FUNCTION DEFINITIONS
IV-1
APPENDIXIV:
FUNCTION DEFINITIONS
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February1989
13.3 Power Network Control
The equipment that will perform Function 13.1, Power Conditioning, will
probably be self-regulating. The equipment that will perform Function 13.2, Power
Distribution, will need to be told what to do and when to do it; Function 13.3, Power
Network Control, will provide that guidance.
13.3.1 Distribution Management
It is assumed that before this function is performed, Function 13.3.2.2, On-
board Scheduling has first determined which loads are to be supplied with electrical power.
The function of distribution management is to determine specifically how to get electrical
power from the CM power input to the loads in question. When this function is complete,
all information necessary to format suitable H/W commands will have been generated.
However, the actual formatting and routing of commands will not be done by this function;
it will be done under Function 13.3.4.1.2, Network Intemal Commands.
Network State Assessment
Switching State T_bl¢ Update
Each line of the switching state table will represent the actual state
(connected/disconnected) of a particular switching device in CM/PMAD. The table will be
updated once every control cycle so that both commanded state transitions and, if they
occur, uncommanded state transitions will be registered.
13.3.1. I. 2 Re,xlundancy Assessment
This function will keep and update as necessary a record of the present state
of availability (available, failed, predicted soon to fail, etc.) of all CM/PMAD elements.
The relative efficiency of redundant elements of CM/PMAD will also be included.
Hereafter, this record will be referred to as the redundancy assessment record.
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Power Path Selection
Command Sequence Generation
Using the data in the baseline load enable schedule (Function 13.3.2.2, On-
board Scheduling), plus the output of Function 13.3.1.1, Network State Assessment, this
function will compose an appropriate time sequence of switching state transitions. The
sequence will be designed to minimize constructive interference between switching
transients. It will also use the most efficient of the redundant elements available.
13.3.1.2.2 Command State Table Update
The command state table will contain in compact form all information
necessary to format suitable commands to execute the switching time sequence composed
by the previous function. The table will be updated at those times that one or more
switching states are changed. Formatting of the commands will be done in Function
13.3.4.1.2, Network Internal Commands.
13.3.2
13.3.2.1
!3.3.2.1.1
Load Management
Load Monitoring
Power Monitoring
Using sensor measurement or computation, the power monitoring function
will fred the total electrical power flow (in kVA) to the CM and will update it every control
cycle. This function will support trend analysis, On-board Scheduling (Function
13.3.2.2), and Load Shedding (Function 13.3.2.3), as appropriate.
13.3.2.1.2 Energy Calculation
The total amount of electrical energy consumed by CM since some
appropriate starting point will be computed in each control cycle by this function. This
function will support trend analysis, On-board Scheduling (Function 13.3.2.2), and Load
Shedding (Function 13.3.2.3), as appropriate.
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13.3.2.2. On-board Scheduling
It is likely that a ground-generated timeiine of some complexity will be
transmitted to the space station. It is assumed that the Timeline will contain information on
all space station activities, including projected activities in the CM. It is further assumed
that the timeline will be uplinked no more often than about once per week, though a limited
number of short uplink modifications may be transmitted at irregular intervals. This
timeline will be one of the data inputs to the onboard scheduling function.
In addition, it is assumed that there will be a S/W entity that manages that
portion of the space station not contained in the modules. In this report, the term space
station manager will be used to refer to that entity. The onboard scheduling function will
bargain with the space statiorrnanager for station-wide resources. Station-wide resources
are those which must be shared between modules; they include electrical energy, thermal
radiation capacity, crew member shift time, etc.
The main purpose of the onboard scheduling function is to produce and
modify as necessary as baseline load enable schedule (BLES) for CM/PMAD. The BLES
will cover a specific period in the near future and Function 13.3.1.2.1, Command
Sequence Generation. Each entry in the BLES will contain the following information:
(1)
(2)
(3)
A load designator (identifying number or other label);
Whether that load is to be enabled (connected to electrical power) or
disabled (disconnected form electrical power);
The time when this event is to occur.
13.3.2.2.1 Major Scheduling
This function will be the most advanced tool in onboard scheduling. Input
datatothe major scheduling function wili include _the CM portion of the ground-generated
timeline, preliminary station-wide resource allowances from the space station manager, the
redundancy assessment record of Function 13.3.1.1.2, and various sensor measurements.
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Themajorschedulingfunctionwill produceapreliminaryloadenableschedule(PLES)that
is aprecursorto thedesiredbaselineloadenableschedule.
In producing the PLES, the major scheduling function will try to use
efficiently 100%of thepreliminaryelectricalresourceallowancesfrom the spacestation
manager.Thedifficulty of this taskdependsonwhetheranysignificantequipmentfaults,
either within the CM or outside of it, have occurred since the original timeline was
generatedon theground. If newfaultshavenot occurred,thetaskof themajor scheduling
function is relatively simple,andit will produceaPLESthatwill very muchresemblethe
CM portionof thetimeline. But if significantnewfaultshaveoccurred,theywould affect
the balanceof electrical resourcesall over the station. In this latter case, the major
schedulingfunctionwouldeitherhaveto makedo with lower-than-expectedallowances,or
would haveto find waysto useasmuchaspossibleof anunexpectedsurplusof electrical
resources.If significantnew faults haveoccurred,thenthe taskof the major scheduling
function hasbecomemorecomplex. Under suchcircumstances,it is estimatedthat this
function couldtakeup to, roughly,ahalf hourto composethePLES.
In additionto composingthe PLES,this function will also assignto each
CM/PMAD loadaloadclassnumber.A loadclassnumberis arough,station-widepriority
designation.ManyCM loadsmayhavethesameloadclassnumber.Becausetherewill be
alimited numberof loadclasses tation-wide(it is recommendedthattherebe10or fewer),
thebargainingof station-wideresourcesbetweentheonboardschedulingfunctionandthe
spacestationmanagercanbeconductedovera simple,genericinterface,thuspreserving
the modularity of the CM design.
13.3.2.2.2 Load Requirements Projections
Using the data in preliminary load enable schedule generated in the previous
function and other data available in the CM, and using portions of the software that
supports Function 13.3.3.1.3, Network Solution, this function will compose projections
(predictions) of various CM/PMAD load requirements versus time.
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Therewill betwo typesof projections: totalpowerprojectionsandenergy
consumptionprojections.A projectionof eachtype will becomposedfor eachload class
(loadclassnumbersaregeneratedin thepreviousfunction). Thus, if thereare "n" load
classes,this functionwill provide"2n" loadrequirementsprojections.
It is assumedthattherewill beoneor moreintermediatelevelsof software-
controlledmanagementtasksbetweentheCM/PMAD taskandthespacestationmanager
task. This function will forward its projectionsthrough thoseintermediatetasksto the
spacestation manager task as electrical resourcerequestsnecessaryto support the
preliminaryloadenableschedule.
13.3.2.2.2.1 Total Power Projections
This function will compose a total power request versus time projection for
each load class in CM/PMAD. Total power is defined as the magnitude (in kVA) of
complex power.
Each projection will cover the period of the preliminary load enable
schedule. The time resolution of each projection will be limited; if the projections were
plotted as graphs, they would look like stair-step functions with each stair-step representing
a discrete time interval. The value of total power assigned to any given stair-step will be
the requested maximum value expected during that interval.
13.3.2.2.2.2 Energy Consumption Projections
This function will compose an energy consumption request versus time
projection for each load class in CM/PMAD.
Each projection will cover the period of the preliminary load enable
schedule. The time resolution of each projection will be limited; if the projections were
plotted as graphs, they would look like stair-step functions with each stair-step representing
a discrete time interval. The value of energy consumption assigned to any given stair-step
will be the estimated energy to be consumed during that interval only.
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13.3.2.2.3 Minor Scheduling
The space station manager will examine the load requirements projections of
Function 13.3.2.2.2 and will produce final station-wide resource allowances for each of
the modules. Those final allowances that are intended for CM will be forwarded to this
function. The minor scheduling function will consider these allowances, any final
modifications requested by the crew or ground personnel, and other data available in the
CM, and will modify the PLES generated in Function 13.3.2.2.1 to produce a BLES. The
BLES is a compromise schedule that the timeline, the space station manager, the onboard
scheduling function, the crew, and the ground all agree with at the end of formal
scheduling activities. If there w_r_inaccuracies in the various scheduling processes on
the ground and aboard the station, if no new equipment faults appeared (either in the CM or
outside it) which effected the CM/PMAD task, and if neither the crew or the ground
requested further loading changes, the BLES would be the final schedule for the
CM/PMAD activities.
In producing the BLES, the minor scheduling function will try to use
efficiently 100% of the f'mal electrical resource allowances from the space station manager.
Because the minor scheduling function has the PLES to begin with, and because the final
allowances from the space station maftager will not be greatly different from the preliminary
allowances, the task of minor scheduling is much less difficult than that of major
scheduling (Function 13.3.2.2.1). The minor scheduling function should be able to
perform its task within a few minutes.
To this point, all of the description of the onboard scheduling function and
its attendant subfunctions has been concerned with formal scheduling activities. It is
estimated that formal scheduling as described above (excluding final crew or ground
modifications) will take up to 30 or 40 minutes to accomplish. Because formal scheduling
will include bargaining with the space station manager for station-wide resources, and
because station-wide resources must be shared between modules, it seems reasonable that
formal scheduling will occur on all modules simultaneously. Also, because crew shift time
is a station-wide resource, all of the crew should be given the opportunity to approve or
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modify the formal schedulesfor the variousmodules. This final approval,evenby an
experiencedcrew,couldtakeasmuchas 15or 20minutes.Whenthis timeis addedto the
timealreadytakenby S/W,thetotal for formal schedulingactivity comesto aboutanhour.
Becauseof the time taken by S/W, becauseall of the modules must be involved
simultaneously,andbecauseof thetimetakenawayfrom thecrew,it is obviousthatformal
onboardschedulingwill not beinvoked frequently. In fact, it will probably not bedone
anymorethanoncein eachcrewshift.
Therewill betimeswhenthecrewor groundwill wish to modify theBLES
of aparticularCM without havingto go throughaformal schedulingprocess.
Supposethat a crew member becamesuddenlyill three hours into the
scheduleand could not monitor several loads assignedto him. Becauseother crew
members'shift timehadalreadybeenscheduled,theycouldnotmonitorhis loadseither. If
the crew decided not to invoke a formal rescheduling, they would simply tell the
CM/PMAD taskwhich loadsto remove. Minor scheduling(this function) would remove
theill crewmember'sloadsfrom theBLES andwould replacethemwith other loadsthat
wouldnotrequirehumanassistance.This load-filling processwouldassurethatasfew as
possibleof theCM's final resourceallowanceswerewasted. Any informal changeto the
BLESthat involvedthe netremovalof loadingwould becompensatedby this load-filling
process.
What aboutinformal changesto the BLES that involve adding a load or
loads?Thecrewor groundshouldbediscouragedfrom makinginformal changesthatadd
loads;electricalenergythatcanbegatheredandstoredby thespacestationis limited, and
closeto 100%of it will havebeenaccountedfor by theoriginal ground-generatedtimeline
andby themajor andminor schedulingfunctions,all of which contributedto theBLES.
For example,supposethat anastronomyteamin Arizonahasjust concludedthat thesolar
flare theyareobservingwill becomethebiggestonerecordedsince1947. Supposefurther
thatthespacestationis nowon thenight sideof Earthbutwill beableto observethesunin
20 minutes,not enoughtime for a formal scheduling. In a caselike this, the crew or
groundwould tell the CM/PMAD taskwhich load is to be added(the solarinstrument
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platform), whenit is to beadded,andhow long it is to besuppliedwith electric power.
Minor scheduling(this function) would thenquickly determinewhich other loadswould
haveto bedescheduledfrom theBLESto accommodatethenewloadandwouldsonotify
the crew/ground. The function would recommendthe deschedulingof asfew loadsas
possible from the lowest load classes. If the crew or ground approved these
recommendations,this functionwouldmodify theBLES accordingly.
13.3.2.3 Load Sheddin_
Ordinarily, the BLES produced in onboard scheduling (Function 13.3.2.2)
would require no further modification. However, further modification by rapid load
shedding may be required if one or more of the following things happen:
(1) If there has been a significant error in one of the scheduling
functions, on the ground or in orbit, which underestimates the
electrical resources required by scheduled loads;
(2) If a scheduled load suddenly begins drawing significantly more
power than usual;
(3) If CM/PMAD is notified by the space station manager that there
must be a sudden reduction in the electrical resource allowances
scheduled for the present period;
(4) If CM/PMAD is notified by the CM thermal subsystem that more
heat is being generated in CM than can be safely dumped.
Should load shedding become necessary, this function will use the load
priority list (Function 13.3.2.4) as a guide for the rapid disabling of low-priority loads.
After it has shed a load, this function will not re-enable it. It will communicate with minor
scheduling (Function 13.3.2.2.3). This latter function may reschedule the shed load to be
enabled at some later time or may replace it with a less demanding load.
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13.3.2.4 Load Priority List Maintenance
As a background task, this function will continuously maintain a load
priority list. If the CM/PMAD subsystem is being started upfor the first time or after a
general power failure, this function will have the capability of generating a completely new
load priority list in about 15 minutes and continuously maintaining it. In the list, each
CM/PMAD load scheduled in the baseline load enable schedule (Function 13.3.2.2.3) as
enabled or soon-to-be-enabled will have a unique CM-wide load priority number.
If load shedding (Function 13.3.2.3) decides that one or more loads must
be quickly disabled, it will use the load priority list as a guide to determine which loads
should be shed first and which should be kept powered to the end. The load priority list
may also be used as a guide for some strategies of fault isolation (Function 13.3.3.2.2).
Ordinarily, the BLES will be comprehensive enough that the load priority
list will seldom need to be invoked. The primary use of the list will be to help maintain
effective load control in the event of the sudden onset of a significant equipment fault,
either within CM or outside it, that reduces CM load capacity.
13.3.2.4.1 Load Schedule Assessment
This function will assess the importance to load priority of elements of the
BLES of Function 13.3.2.2.3.
13.3.2.4.2 Loads Availability Assessment
This function will inspect the redundancy assessment record of Function
13.3.1.1.2, and will determine whether a given load can be connected to CM electrical
power. If a load is not available, this function will direct that it be stricken from the load
priority list, or if the load is not already on the list, that it not be placed there.
APPENDIX IV: FUNCTION DEFINITIONS
IV-10
APPENDIXIV:
FUNCTION DEFINITIONS
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February1989
13.3.2.4.3 Operational Requirements Interpretation
There will probably be a body of operational requirements, mission rules,
and other similar documentation that could affect the assignment of load priority. This
function will interpret that body of documentation (or a database equivalent).
13.3.2.4.4 Load Priority. A_ignm¢nt_
As the functions described above are being performed, they will direct the
Load Priority Assignments function. This latter function will perform the actual updating
of the load priority list.
When the BLES (Function 13.3.2.2.3) directs that load "X" be disabled,
this function will take its priority number away and remove load "X" from the list entirely.
As long as a load remains scheduled as disabled, it will not be on the list and will have no
priority number. This function will then fill in the resulting gap in the list by upgrading the
priority numbers of those loads which had had a lower priority than load "X".
When the BLES shows that load "Y" is scheduled soon-to-be-enabled, this
function will assign to load "Y" a provisional priority number and will place load "Y" on
the list in the appropriate place. Loads having a priority number equal to or less than load
"Y'"s number will have their priorities reduced by one so that no two loads will have the
same number. Soon after when load "Y" is enabled, this function, in accordance with the
directions of Functions 13.3.2.4.1 through 13.3.2.4.3, will move load "Y"'s priority
number up within the list until load "Y" arrives at its enabled priority level. Thereafter, as
long as load "Y" is scheduled as enabled, its priority will be reviewed about every 15
minutes and changed as appropriate.
13.3.3 Health Management
This function manages the "health" of elements within CM/PMAD only.
13.3.3.1 Maintenance Support
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13.3.3.1.1 Status Prediction
In this function, accumulated engineering data from the CM/PMAD
subsystem will be analyz_and predictions made regfirding the future reliability of various
CM/PMAD elements.
13.3.3.1.2 Preventive Maintenance Scheduling
Based on the results of the previous function, this function will develop
preventive maintenance schedules for CM/PMAD. These schedules will eventually be
incorporated into the mission timeline generated on the ground.
13.3.3.1.3 Network Solution.
±
This function will compute periodically a general solution of the CM/PMAD
power network state. Inputs to this network solution will include electrical measurements
at the CM power input, information from the switching state table (Function 13.3.1. i. 1),
and a database of operational characteristics of various loads and CM/PMAD elements.
The network solution will provide computed values to check against actual sensor
measurements around the CM power network.
The network solution will be used by fault management (Function 13.3.3.2)
to detect and log subtle changes in the operating characteristics of various CM/PMAD
elements. Detecting these subtle changes will be useful in managing soft faults in the CM
power network. Logging of the changes will provide some of the input data for status
prediction (Function 13.3.3.1.1).
Fault management will also use the network solution to spot malfunctioning
network sensors.
Portions of the networksolution software will be used to support Function
13.3.2.2.2, Load Requirements Projections.
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13.3.3.1.4 Monitoring
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Collect CM/PMAD engineering data with various transducers;
Convert the data (if necessary) to electrical signals;
Condition the electrical signals in hardware;
Convert the resulting analog signals to digital values;
After each digital value is transported to one of the CM/PMAD
microprocessors (Function 13.3.4.2.2, Network Internal Data), the
monitoring function will condition the value in S/W, converting it
into a mathematical or logical analogue of the original engineering
datum.
13.3.3.1.5 History_ R¢cor_ls Generation
Various records of the operating history (or predicted operating future) of
CM/PMAD will be kept by this function. The function will initiate the recording of most of
these records into peripheral storage (disk or similar) at the CM computer. The function
will also initiate the transmission of some of the records to the space station telemetry
subsystem for ultimate transmission to the ground.
Fault Management
Fault Detection
This function will detect faults, either in H/W or in S/W, within the
CM/PMAD Subsystem.
13.3.3.2.2 Fault Isolation
After a fault has been detected, this function will determine its location
within the CM/PMAD subsystem.
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13.3.3.2.3 Fault Compensation
When the fault has been precisely located, this function will restore the
CM/PMAD subsystem to as normal an operating state as is possible.
13.3.3.2.4 Fault Log_ng
The fault logging function will do two or more of the following:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Compose a fault report consisting of: (a) a description of the fault,
(b) a time-seqUence log of its detection, isolation, and
compensation, and, if appropriate, (c) instructions for the manual
replacement of the failed component;
Cause to be written to peripheral storage (disk or similar) a
permanent record of the fault report;
If necessary, update the redundancy assessment record (Function
13.3.1.1.2) to show whether the affected CM/PMAD element is
failed or predicted to fail;
Initiate the display of the fault report on a video screen at the CM
computer console;
Initiate transmission of the fault report to the space station telemetry
subsystem;
Initiate an audible/visible alarm within the CM.
How many of these steps that are performed by the function will depend on
the severity of the fault.
13.3.4 Comm_d/Data Interfacing
This function is performed in every hardware system that is primarily
computer controlled but also monitored by persons. The techniques required to perform
this function are well understood and have been well developed by systems programmers;
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therefore,theywill not bedescribedin detail here. However,broadclassesof command
handling and data handling functions are listed below.
13.3.4.1
13.3.4.1.1
13.3.4.1.2
13.3.4.2
13.3.4.2.1
13.3.4.2.2
Command Handling
Network External Commands
Network Internal Commands
D_a Handling
N_twork External D_tt_
Network Internal Data
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14.0 APPENDIX V: CREW INTERFACES
14.1 Power Conditioning
14.1.1 Logic Power Conversion
This function includes voltage transformation and ac/dc conversion of
power for the distributed logic circuitry in the CM.
Display to Crew:
Data specific to the module that performs this function would appear on the
CM/PMAD block diagram display. This display would show data sufficient to allow the
crew to decide whether it was necessary to connect an alternate module.
Control by Crew:
Not appropriate. Applications similar
precisely, efficiently, and reliably controlled by hardware.
14.1.2
to this are routinely, rapidly,
Logic Power Conditioning
This function includes dc voltage regulation and filtering of power for the
distributed logic circuitry in the CM.
Display to Crew:
Data specific to the module that performs this function would appear on the
CM/PMAD block diagram display. This display would show data sufficient to allow the
crew to decide whether it was necessary to connect an alternate module.
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Controlby Crew:
Not appropriate. Applications similar to this
precisely,efficiently, andreliablyControlledbyhardware.
are routinely, rapidly,
POWERDISTRIBUTION
Circuit Prot,¢tion
Display to Crew:
Data specific to any given RPC or RCCB that performs this function would
appear on the CM/PMAD block diagram display. Included would be data showing whether
the device tripped and when it tripped. For a device which had tripped, the crew would be
able to select whether to view data which applied to the device just prior to the moment it
tripped, or to view data describing the present state of the device. The display would also
show data relevant to the state of the CM dead-face switch (described below).
Control by Crew:
Trip levels may be set remotely on RPCs or RCCBs. If so, they would be
adjustable via the CM/PMAD block diagram display. For devices controlling three-phase
circuits, trip levels should only be adjustable for all three phases simultaneously and
equally.
It is specifically recommended that any control that the crew applies to a
given three-phase device should apply simultaneously and equally to all phases of the
device. If crew control were not limited in this way, loading imbalances could occur that
could open RPCs or similar devices in the power network. Such loading imbalances could
conceivably damage elements of the CM/PMAD subsystem.
A double-throw dead-face switch would be provided that would enable a
crew member to cut all electrical power in the CM, except emergency lighting and other
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emergencysubsystems.Thepurposeof thedead-faceswitchwould be three-fold: (1) it
would be thecrew'slast line of defensein caseof anelectricalfire, (2) it wouldbearapid
andsuremeansof disconnectingrunawayequipmentwhich threatenedimmediatecrew
injury or equipmentdamage,and(3) it wouldbeaconvenientmeansof safeguardingCM
circuitry whilepowercableswerebeingconnectedto or disconnectedfrom theCM.
14.2.2 Load Switching
Display to Crew:
Data specific to any given RPC that performs this function would appear on
the CM/PMAD block diagram display. Included would be data from the command state
table (Function 14.3.1.2.2) showing the commanded switching state of the RPC, and data
taken from the switching state table (Function 14.3.1.1.1) showing the actual switching
state of the RPC.
Control by Crew:
RPCs that perform this function would be controllable via the CM/PMAD
block diagram display. They could be commanded by the crew to connect or to disconnect.
For RPCs controlling three-phase circuits, connect/disconnect commands should apply to
all three phases simultaneously and equally (i.e., either all phases would be connected, or
all phases would be disconnected).
14.2.3 BO_ SwitChing
Display to Crew:
Data specific to any given remote controlled circuit breaker (RCCB) or
remote bus isolator (RBI) that performs this function would appear on the CM/PMAD
block diagram display. Included would be data from the command state table (Function
14.3.1.2.2) showing the commanded switching state of the device in question, and data
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takenfrom the switching state(able (Function 14.3.1.1.1) Showing the actual switching
state of that device.
Control by Crew:
RCCBs or RBIs that perform this function would be controllable via the
CM/PMAD block diagram display. They could be commanded by the crew to connect or to
disconnect. For devices controlling three-phase circuits, connect/disconnect commands
should apply to all three phases simultaneously and equally (i.e., either all phases would be
connected, or all phases would be disconnected).
14.3 POWER NETWORK CONTROL
14.3.1 Distribution Management
14.3.1.1 Network State Assessment
14.3.1.1.1 Switching State Table Update
Display to Crew:
Data from the updated switching state table would be featured on the
CM/PMAD block diagram display.
Control by Crew:
Not appropriate. Sufficient redundancy should be built into the CM/PMAD
S/W and its supporting H/W that manual control of this function would not be necessary.
The crew must rely on software to display the switching states, because traditional
hardware displays (e.g., pilot lamps or mechanical flags) will not be used on the CM.
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14.3.1.1.2 Redundancy Assessment
This function will keep and update as necessary a record of the present state
of availability of and relative efficiency of all CM/PMAD elements. Hereafter, this record
will be referred to as the redundancy assessment record.
Display to and Control by Crew:
The present state of availability of CM/PMAD elements, as kept in the
redundancy assessment record, would be shown on the CM/PMAD block diagram display.
Elements that were recorded as failed would be flagged in red. Elements that were
recorded as having been predicted soon to fail would be flagged in yellow. Ordinarily, the
redundancy assessment record would be updated automatically by CM/PMAD S/W; this
would in turn drive the placement of the colored flags on the CM/PMAD block diagram
display. However, the crew would have the option to reverse this sequence by manually
entering flags in to the CM/PMAD block diagram display. The status implied by such
manually-entered flags would then be automatically incorporated into the redundancy
assessment record.
A crew member could elect to place a red flag on an element in the
CM/PMAD block diagram display. This would prompt the S/W to change the entry for that
element in the redundancy assessment record, listing the element as failed. In effect, the
element in question would have been permanently disabled so that the S/W would not
connect it into the subsystem again.
Alternatively, if a crew member had reason to believe that a particular
element of the CM/PMAD subsystem would fail in the near future, he or she could place a
yellow flag on the element in the CM/PMAD block diagram display. This would prompt
the S/W to change the entry for that element in the redundancy assessment record, listing
the element as predicted to fail. Thereafter, whenever the CM/PMAD S/W established a
power path that could involve the flagged element, it would select the unflagged alternate
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instead. The softwarewould not use the yellow-flagged elementunlessthe alternate
elementsubsequentlyfailed.
14.3.1.2 Power Path S¢lectioh
14.3.1.2.1 Command Sequence Generation
This function will compose appropriate time sequences of commands for the
purpose of establishing or breaking electrical power paths in the CM/PMAD power
network. Each sequence would be designed to minimize constructive interference between
Switching transients, and would use the most efficient redundafit'elements available. This
function does not encompass the formatting of or actual execution of the commands.
Display to Crew:
If this function were being performed by CM/PMAD S/W, it would proceed
too rapidly for the crew to follow. If the crew elected to perform this function, a display of
the composing of a sequence would be unnecessary (see "Control by Crew", below). Of
course, the crew would be able to see the results of any command sequence as it was being
executed by viewing the CM/PMAD block diagram display.
Control by Crew:
A crew member electing to intervene in the CM/PMAD task should move
cautiously. He or she should only give one manual switching command to the subsystem
at a time and should wait to see the results. Therefore, a crew member would perform the
command sequence generation function in his or her mind and only one step beyond the
most recent manual command. Because of the relative slowness of human reflexes and the
need for caution, the crew member would be initiating successive manual commands too
slowly to cause significant constructive interference between switching transients.
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14.3.1.2.2 Command State Table Update
Display to Crew:
Updated data from the command state table would be available to the crew
via the CM/PMAD block diagram display.
Control by Crew:
Not appropriate. The command state table will be a compact coded record
suitable for use only by other CM software. While it is conceivable that the crew could
control CM/PMAD elements by manually updating the command state table, such a task
would be time consuming and not at all intuitive.
14.3.2
14.3.2.1
14.3.2.1.1
Load Management
..Load Monitoring
Power Monitoring
Display to Crew:
display.
Data specific to this function would appear on the CM/PMAD block diagram
Control by Crew:
Not appropriate. Though this is a very simple function, it will have to be
performed in every control cycle. This would, therefore, not be a practical task for a crew
member.
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14.3.2.1.2 Energy Calculation _::
Display to Crew:
display.
Data specific to this function would appear on the CM/PMAD block diagram
Control by Crew:
Not appropriatel Rough this is a very simpie function, it will have to be
performed in every control cycle. This would, therefore, not be a practical task for a crew
member.
On-board Scheduling
Major Scheduling
Display to Crew:
Data generated by this function would be available to the crew in the load
enable schedule display.
Control by Crew:
Not appropriate. The manual performance of this function would require
the review of large amounts of data and the expenditure of a great deal of time. If this
function were to fail, the entire on-board scheduling function would become unreliable. In
such an event, the crew would probably elect to control CM/PMAD manually through the
CM/PMAD block diagram display. Such control would be on an adhoc basis, and would
not really be scheduling in the spirit of this function.
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14.3.2.2.2 Load Requirements Projections
Display to Crew:
Data generated by this function would not be directly available to the crew in
real time, though it would be implied in the load enable schedule display. Records of this
data would be available through Function 14.3.3.1.5, History Records Generation.
Control by Crew:
Not appropriate. The manual performance of this function would require
the review of large amounts of data and the expenditure of a great deal of time. If this
function were to fail, the entire onboard scheduling function would become unreliable. In
such an event, the crew would probably elect to control CM/PMAD manually through the
CM/PMAD block diagram display.
14.3.2.2.3 Minor Scheduling
Display to Crew:
Data generated by this function would be available to the crew in the load
enable schedule display.
Control by Crew:
Not appropriate. The manual performance of this function would require
the expenditure of too much time to be practical. If this function were to fail, the entire on-
board scheduling function would become unreliable. In such an event, the crew would
probably elect to control CM/PMAD manually through the CM/PMAD block diagram
display. Such control would be on an adhoc basis, and would not really be scheduling in
the spirit of this function.
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14.3.2.3 Lead Shedding
Displays to Crew:
The performance of this function would be directly evident to the crew in
the load enable schedule display and would be implied in changes in the CM/PMAD block
diagram display.
Control by Crew:
Not appropriate, in order to be effective, this function would need to be
performed far more rapidly than human reflexes would permit.
14.3.2.4 Load Priority List Maintenance
14.3.2.4.1 Load Schedule Assessment
Displays to Crew:
The crew would consult the load enable schedule display and the load
priority list display (Function 14.3.2.4.4) to assess the effect of the schedule on the list.
Control by Crew:
Strictly speaking, a crew member would control this function in his or her
mind. Of course, the results of this function would be applied by the crew to the load
priority list display (Function 14.3.2.4.4).
14.3.2.4.2 Loads Availability A_¢ssment
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Displays to Crew:
The crew would consult the CM/PMAD block diagram display (looking for
red- or yellow-flagged elements) to assess whether a given load were available and,
therefore, whether a priority assignment were appropriate.
Control by Crew:
Strictly speaking, a crew member would control this function in his or her
mind. Of course, the results of this function would be applied by the crew to the load
priority list display (Function 14.3.2.4.4).
14.3.2.4.3 Operational Requirements Interpretation
Displays to Crew:
Operational requirements, mission rules, and other similar documentation
are likely to be extensive. It is unlikely that complete hard copies of all of it would be
stored aboard the space station. It is equally unlikely that it would be convenient for a crew
member to skim through this large body of documentation via video display. The most
useful display would seem to be an audio conversation with the ground personnel who are
familiar with the documentation and can refer to it directly.
Control by Crew:
The crew should certainly be allowed to participate with the ground in
controlling this function if human intervention becomes necessary. Strictly speaking, a
crew member would control this function in his or her mind. Of course, the results of this
function could be applied by the crew to the load priority list display (Function
14.3.2.4.4).
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14.3.2.4.4 Load Priority. Assignments
Using data generated by Functions 14.3.2.4.1 through 14.3.2.4.3, this
function performs the actual updating and maintenance of the load priority list.
Display to Crew:
The crew would be able to view the load priority list at any time by
consulting the load priority list display. The display is described below.
" :: _7
Control by Crew:
The load priority list would ordinarily be maintained automatically by
CM/PMAD S/W. It is recommended that the crew not be allowed to modify the list while
the automatic function is running. However, the crew would be allowed to disable the
automatic function. The crew would then be able to modify the list via the load priority list
display. This tabular display would show (in English) the form of the compactly coded
list. Each entry in the display would cite a specific Load and would show its priority
number (1 would be the highest priority, 2 the second highest, etc.) The crew would be
able to modify the list by modifying the display using simple keyboard or touch-screen
entries as appropriate. After modifying the list, the crew could elect to restart the automatic
function if appropriate.
14.3.3
14.3.3.1
14.3.3.1.1
Health Management
Maintenanc_ Support
Statu_ Prediction
In this function, accumulated engineering data from the CM/PMAD
subsystem will be analyzed, and predictions will be made regarding the future reliability of
various CM/PMAD elements. Because this is a rather complex function, it will probably be
performed by experts and expert systems on the ground. The results of this function will
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be uplinked to the CM/PMAD task in a timely manner. Theseresultswill also drive
preventivemaintenancescheduling(Function14.3.3.1.2).
Displayto Crew:
Elementsof CM/PMAD that havebeenpredictedsoon-to-fail would be
flaggedin yellow on theCM/PMAD block diagramdisplay. Also includedwouldbe time
estimates to failures. This information would be uplinked from the ground to the
redundancyassessmentrecordof Function14.3.1.1.2.CM/PMAD S/Wwould usedatain
theredundancyassessmentrecordto determinewhich(if any)elementsto flag in yellow on
theCM/PMAD blockdiagramdisplay.
Controlby Crew:
Not appropriate.This is arathercomplexfunctionwhich will probablybe
performedby expertsandexpertsystemson theground. It is doubtful thatthecrewcould
sparethetimenecessaryto performthis function.
14.3.3.1.2 Preventive Maintenance Scheduling
Based on the results of status prediction (Function 14.3.3.1.1), a preventive
maintenance schedule for CM/PMAD will be developed and eventually incorporated in the
ground-generated timeline. Also contained within the timeline may be codes referring to
canned maintenance procedures which may be kept in high-density storage devices (laser
disk or similar) aboard the CM. This function will probably be performed on the ground.
Display to Crew:
Preventive maintenance schedules will be a part of the timeline. As such,
they will be considered by onboard scheduling (Function 14.3.2.2) in producing the
BLES. The BLES will contain instructions to disable appropriate CM/PMAD devices and
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loads in support of preventive maintenanceor repair operations. Thus, preventive
maintenanceschedulingwill bevisibleto thecrewvia theloadenablescheduledisplay.
It is assumedthatCM S/Wnotconnectedwith theCM/PMAD taskwill note
thecodesreferring to the cannedmaintenanceproceduresmentionedabove. Subsequent
productionof hardcopiesof thoseproceduresfor useby thecrew is not now assumedto
bepartof theCM/PMAD task.
ControlbyCrew:
Not appropriate.To do this functionproperly,it would first benecessaryto
performthepreviousfunction (Function14.3.3.1.1.,StatusPrediction),andthecrewwill
notbedoing that.
14.3.3.1.3 Network Solution
Displays to and Control by Crew:
It is conceivable that expected data from the automatically generated network
solution could be available for display at crew option on the CM/PMAD block diagram
display. Of course, actual data measured by sensors or computed from sensor
measurements would already be available on that display. However, meaningful
comparison of the expected and actual data would be a difficult task even for a person
thoroughly trained in the CM/PMAD subsystem; useful control of the function would be
even more difficult. Because most crews are expected to contain no such experts, it does
not seem useful to design a crew interface to support this function. It should be noted that
a tool on the ground similar to that conjectured here might be useful to an expert examining
the automatic performance of this function.
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14.3.3.1.4 Monitoring
Display to Crew:
Sensor data collected and processed by the monitoring function would be
available on the CM/PMAD block diagram display.
CM/PMAD:
Control by Crew:
The monitoring function, as defined, will perform the following services for
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Collect CM/PMAD engineering data with various transducers;
Convert the data (if necessary) to electrical signals;
Condition the electrical signals in H/W;
Convert the resulting analog signals to digital values;
After each digital value is transported to one of the CM/PMAD
microprocessors (Function 14.3.4.2.2, Network Internal Data), the
Monitoring function will condition the value in S/W, converting it
into a mathematical or logical analogue of the original engineering
datum.
It is plain from the above definition that direct control of the Monitoring
function by the crew would not be appropriate.
14.3.3.1.5 History R¢c0rds Generation
Displays to Crew:
Various records of the operating history of CM/PMAD (various sensor
measurements or computed quantities versus time) will be kept by this function. The
function will initiate the recording of most of these records into peripheral storage (disk or
similar) at the CM Computer. All such on-board records would be available to the crew in
APPENDIX V: CREW INTERFACES
V-15
APPENDIXV:
CREWINTERFACES
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February1989
user-friendlydo-it-yourselfvideodisplays,theformsof which thecrewcouldcomposeas
needed. The forms most likely to be of useby the crew would be columnar tablesof
relatedvariables sampledat the sametime intervals, and measurement(s)versus time
graphs.ThesedisplayswouldbeavailablethroughtheCM computerconsole.
Conu:olby Crew:
Not appropriate.Doing this function manuallywould takea greatdealof
time. It is doubtfulthatthecrewcouldsparethetimenecessaryto performthis function.
Fault Man.agement
Faul_ Detection
Displays to and Control by the Crew:
Ordinarily, fault detection (this function) and fault isolation (Function
14.3.3.2.2) would be performed automatically by CM/PMAD S/W. If this part of the S/W
should fail and if a significant fault should also appear in H/W, the crew should notice that
something is wrong. For example: a load is unpowered when the load enable schedule
display clearly shows it should be enabled. Another example: a powered load is acting
strangely (panel light dims, device continually cycles on and off, module lighting flickers,
etc.), suggesting that the quality of power delivered to its input has eroded. In situations
such as these, where it appears that the fault management S/W is not doing its job, the crew
should have some means Of detecting and isolating the H/W fault. To manually search for
H/W faults in the CM/PMAD power network, the crew would examine the subsystem data
available in the CM/PMAD block diagram display. In principle, any H/W fault in the
power network could be detected and isolated by this means, though the more subtle ones
might escape notice of the crew. To manually detect and isolate a fault in the CM/PMAD
data network, the crew would, via interactive displays (keyboard plus video), initiate self-
test programs. The crew would also use interactive displays to run S/W comparisons
between programs in CM/PMAD microprocessors and their recorded equivalents in
peripheral storage (disk, tape, or similar) of the CM computer.
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14.3.3.2.2 Fault Isolation
Displays to and Control by the Crew:
See comments under Fault Detection (Function 14.3.3.2.1).
14.3.3.2.3 Fault Compensation
Displays to Crew:
Any fault compensation that had been applied automatically by CM/PMAD
S/W would be a part of the fault report (see Fault Logging, Function 14.3.3.2.4). The
results of fault compensation, whether applied by the S/W, through crew intervention, or
by ground command, would be shown on the CM/PMAD block diagram display.
Control by Crew:
No special control tool dedicated solely to this function is necessary. The
crew would be able to apply whatever fault compensations were deemed appropriate by
manipulating one or more of the following: the load enable schedule display, the
CM/PMAD block diagram display, or any of the control tools described elsewhere in this
appendix.
14.3.3.2.4 Fault Logong
Displays to Crew:
As part of its usual operation, this function will automatically generate fault
reports. Each fault report will consist of (1) a description of the fault, (2) a time-sequence
log of its detection isolation, and compensation, and, if appropriate, (3) instructions for the
manual replacement of the failed element. Fault reports will be written to peripheral storage
(disk or similar) at the CM computer. The crew would be able to read these records by
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calling themup on thevideo screenof theCM computerconsole. If a givenfault were
mild, this wouldbe theonly way thecrewwouldseetheassociatedfault report. If thefault
werealittle moresevere,theFaultLogging functionwould automaticallycausethefault
reportto bewritten to avideoscreen,aswell asto peripheralstorage,if the faultwerestill
moresevere,the fault logging function would alsocauseanalarm to be soundedin the
CM. Regardlessof the severityof the fault, its detection,isolation, andcompensation
would be implied in thedataavailablein the CM/PMAD block diagramdisplay. In that
display,faulty componentswouldbeflaggedin red,componentsthatwerepredictedsoon-
to-fail wouldbe flaggedin yellow, anddisconnectedcircuits in generalwould beevident.
Furthermore,asdisplaydensitypermitted,noteswouldbedisplayednearflaggedelements
briefly describingthefault or predictedfault,
Controlby Crew:
The crew would be ableto generatemanualfault reports,if desired,via
keyboard entries at the CM computer console. The crew should be inhibited from
modifying alreadyexisting fault reports,particularly thosewhich were automatically
generatedby thefault loggingfunction.
14.3.4 Command/Data Interfacing
This function will need to handle large amounts of digital data rapidly and
precisely. Consequently, this would not be an appropriate function for human
intervention.
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15.0 APPENDIX VI: SYMBOLICS ENVIRONMENT
15.1 The Symbolics Intcrfo¢e Processing Architectur_
The Symbolics Interface (SI) to the Space Station Module Power Management
and Distribution (SSM/PMAD) system provides software for the User Interface (UI), Front
End Load Enable Scheduler (FELES), Load Priority List Management System (LPLMS),
Scheduling (MAESTRO), and TCP/IP communications.
The architecture provides for independent processes operating in an
asynchronous real time environment shown in Figure 15.1-1:
Figure 15.1-1 Symbolics Interface Processing Architecture
APPENDIX VI: SYMBOLICS ENVIRONMENT
VI-1
APPENDIXVI:
SYMBOLICSENVIRONMENT
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February1989
The Power System Streamis the streamconnection to the network. All
communications that flow to/from the Symbolics Interface and the SSMPMAD breadboard
are processed through this data object. This stream insulates the transaction processing
software from the specific communications medium.
The Receiver listens for input on the Power System Stream then reads a
transaction. If the historical log is active, the transaction is recorded there, as well as being
deblocked and placed on the queue of input transactions, the ReceiVe Queue.
The Receive Queue is a first in first out queue of transactions obtained by the
Receiver. It serves as an interface between the Receiver and the transaction Input Handler.
The Deblock Spec library is a set of deblock specifications for each of the
blocked transactions that the system may process.
The Input Handler is responsible for obtaining messages from the Receive
Queue, deblocking if necessary, formatting into an application transaction, then dispatching
the transaction to the Input Transaction Queue or any other processing entity.
The Input Transaction Queue is a 3 level priority queue (high, normal, low) that
obtains application specific transactions from the Input Handler. It provides the input to the
real time Controller.
The Controller is responsible for the real time operations of the SSM/PMAD
system. It is the main driver that provides for the initialization, time synchronization, event
list distribution, priority list distribution, and contingency operations of the SSM/PMAD
breadboard.
The mission Clock is the time driver for the operations of the the Symbolics
Interface. Time granularity in the system is 1 minute. All time derived processes utilize
this for time synchronization.
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MAESTRO is the schedulingcomponentof the systemwhich provides the
capabilitiesfor schedulingspacecraftactivities.Theschedulefrom whichthebreadboardis
drivenisdevelopedbyMAESTRO. MAESTROalsoprovidesthereschedulingcapabilities
necessaryin theeventof arealtimefault in thepowersystembreadboard.
The Activity Library is a library of spacecraftactivity models that may be
chosenfor scheduling.
TheEquipmentLibrary is a library of poweredequipmentmodels,specifying
whereeachpieceof equipmentmaybeconnectedin the powersystemand the various
modesof operationof thosepiecesof equipment.
TheScheduleLibrary providesarepositoryfor previouslygeneratedschedules.
The Front End Load EnableScheduleris the interface betweenMAESTRO
basedschedulesandcommandsthateffecttheoperationof thebreadboardcomponents.It
is responsiblefor periodicallysendingcomponenteventlists to thebreadboardfor switch
operations.
The Load Priority List ManagementSystemis responsiblefor periodically
notifyingthebreadboardsoftwareof therelativeprioritiesof eachof theloads.
The Output TransactionQueueis a first in first out queuethat provides an
interfacebetweencommandsgeneratedby theController and the Output Handler that is to
process those transactions.
The Output Handier is responsible for obtaining forms from the Output
Transaction Queue, performing any required reformatting, performing required blocking,
and adding an entry to the Transmit Queue for transmission of the transaction.
The Transmit Queue is a fh'st in fin:st out queue of transactions to be transmitted
to other processing components in the power system network.
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The Transmitteris responsiblefor the transmissionof transactionsalong the
network. It operatesas its own process,sleepingUntil something is on the Transmit
Queue. The transactionis removedrr0rn the queue,foi-mattedfor transmissionon the
PowerSystemStream,thenif thehistoricallog is active,thetransactionis addedto it.
15.2 Transaction
15.2.1 Transaction Format
15.2.1.1
The following table describes the basic transaction format:
Message Start
Destination
Source
Message Type
Message Block
Message End
x Start of message indicator
Control-A (ascii 1)
x Address of unit where message is being sent
x Address of unit sending the message
p Type of message
? Contains message data bytes
The format of this varies with each
message type
x End of message indicator
CR (ascii 13)
Notes on Formatting
All messages will consist of a sequence of ASCII data bytes. Except for
Message Start and Message End all bytes will be printable ASCII characters.
PACKED numerical values are represented as a single ASCII character offset
from 48 (zero) through 126 (tilde) which provides a range 0-78.
PACKED79 numerical values are represented as two ASCII packed numerical
values describing a base 79 number. The first byte is in increments of 79, the
second are units. This provides a numeric range of 0-6240.
NUMERIC values that are not PACKED or PACKED79 will be passed as a
group of ASCII bytes (i.e. 300 would be 3 0 0).
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Unit addressesfor sourceanddestination:
V CAC(VME/10)
X FRAMES(Xerox)
S SI (Symbolics)
P bothFRAMES& CAC
lip aparticularLLP (A-H)
15.2.2 Transactions
15.2.2.1 01 Syn¢ Time
SYNC TIME provides the timing parameters for time synchronization of the
breadboard software components. SI will distribute this to the CAC and FRAMES. Now
represents the current time. Start of Mission provides an actual calendar/clock time from
which to base all scheduling offsets. It corresponds to mission time 00:00:00 (dd:hh:mm).
All time based schedule data will be represented as minutes offset from Start of Mission.
15.2.2.2 02 Ev¢n_ Li_t
SI will distribute the events for the load enable schedule to the CAC and
FRAMES for operation of the breadboard.
15.2.2.3 03 Load Prioriw List
Whenever a new load priority list is created, SI will distribute the list to
FRAMES and the CAC.
15.2.2.4 06 Component SwitCh _0 Redundant
Whenever FRAMES is notified that a switch has been switched to its redundant
supply, FRAMES notifies the SI of the information using this transaction.
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15.2.2.5 07 Load Shed
FRAMES will notify the
scheduling decisions may be made.
SI anytime loads are shed, so that appropriate
15.2.2.6 08 Contingency Events
When SI has completed its reaction to a contingency situation CAC and
FRAMES will be notified of the new enable schedule, as well as what state the power
system components should be in to successfully execute the new set of events. All state
entries will be listed before all event entries. Both state and event entries have the same
format, the difference being that all "time of state"s are filled with zeros.
15.2.2.7 09 Out of Service
Whenever a component is known to be out of service FRAMES will notify SI
so that appropriate scheduling decisions may be made.
15.2.2.8 10 Utilization
In order to report/graph actual power utilization of components vs. available
and/or scheduled power, FRAMES must notify SI of those measurements.
15.2.2.9 11 Ready?
READY? is sent by SI to tell FRAMES and the CAC to initialize and be
prepared for the initial EVENTS and PRIORITIES. When the initialization has occurred,
CAC and FRAMES will notify SI with the declarative I'm READY! message.
15.2.2.10 12 Ready!
The declarative message READY! is sent by FRAMES and the CAC to the SI as
a notification that they are ready to receive the initial EVENTS and PR/ORITIES.
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15.2.2.11 13 Initialized
After receiving the initial EVENTS and PRIORITIES, FRAMES and the CAC
send this message to the SI, this notifies SI that the other breadboard computer system
components are ready for operation.
15.2.2.12 !4 Source Power Change
The SOURCE POWER CHANGE is a simulated Space Station message, i.e.
someone/thing of authority has notified the module that there will be change in the
availability of power to the module.
15.2.2.13 15 Contingency Start
An anomalous condition has been recognized in the power system. FRAMES
is working the situation and tells SI so via this transaction. Any transactions received by SI
between the CONTINGENCY-START and CONTINGENCY-END messages are
considered pertinent information to the contingency situation.
15.2.2.14 16 Contingency End
The contingency situation has been handled by FRAMES and all pertinent
information has been sent to SI. SI should now handle implications to the schedule.
15.3 Controller State Transitions
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QUIET
READY-WAIT
FRAMES-READY-WAIT
CAC-READY-WAIT
READY
INITIALIZE-WAIT
FRAMES-INITIAL-WAIT
CAC-INITIAL-WAIT
INITIALIZED
NORMAL
CONTINGENCY
send<READY? 11>
--> READY-WAIT
if<READY! 12>from CAC
--> FRAMES-READY-WAIT
else
--> CAC-READY-WAIT
if <READY! 12>from FRAMES
--> READY
if <READY! 12> from CAC
--> READY
start FELES
start LPLMS
send <EVENT-LIST 02>
send <PRIORITY-LIST 03>
--> INITIALIZE-WAIT
if <INITIALIZED 13> from CAC
--> FRAMES-INITIAL-WAlT
else
--> CAC-INITIAL-WAIT
if <INITIALIZED 13> from FRAMES
--> INITIALIZED
if <INITIALIZED 13> from CAC
--> INITIALIZED
send <START-OF-MISSION 01 >
--> NORMAL
when <CONTINGENCY-START 15>
halt FELES
halt LPLMS
--> CONTINGENCY
when <CONTINGENCY-END 16>
handle contingency MAESTRO
send <CONTINGENCY-EVENTS 08>
send <PRIORITY-LISt 03>
--> NORMAL
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15.4 User Interface
The User Interface (UI) for the Symbolics Interface of the SSM/PMAD
software provides capabilities for developing, inspecting, and initiating operational
scenarios for the power system breadboard. Through the use of multiple windows and
configurations, the UI assists the user in the operation and monitoring of the mission
definitions to stimulate the use of the breadboard.
The UI is command driven; each of the commands may be initiated through the
use of the mouse, keyboard, or in some cases single key accelerators. The interface is
designed to minimize keyboard input and promote use of the mouse.
The following 8 screen configurations are available:
Console
Front End Load Enable Scheduler
Load Priority List Management System
Scheduler
Resource Manager
Communications
Activity Editor
Equipment Editor
Each Screen is organized in a similar fashion. Figure 15.4-1 outlines how a
typical screen is partitioned. Please note that it is nearly always the case that mouse
sensitive objects appear in light windows while reverse video windows are information
displays.
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CON'TIN_UO_I _W [L[CT ItO PH01_$'15 ...........................................
_Title
,-Status
e--Interactive Displays
_Commands
e-Command Typeira
_-Messages
Figure 15.4-1 Example Symbolics Screen
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15.4.1 Console
The Console provides overall system status information. It consolidates many
of the status monitors that appear on other screens. The Console is the first screen
displayed when the user initiates the system. See Figures 15.4.1-1 and 15.4.1-2 for the
Console and its Help Screen.
The Mission Time window monitors the simulation mission time. The time is
represented in a DD:HH:MM format. If the time is surrounded with square brackets [] the
breadboard is stopped or halted. When starting the breadboard an alternate representation
will appear, a countdown of how long until the start of the mission will be displayed and
continuously updated.
The Control monitor displays the status of the system, that is, whatever status
the real time Controller currently maintains.
The Schedule monitor displays the name of the schedule that is active.
The Next Event List monitor displays how long until the next event list is
created.
The Event List Prepared monitor displays when the last event list was created.
The Next Priority List monitor displays how long until the next priority list is
created.
The Transmitter monitor displays the type of transaction transmitted.
The Receiver monitor displays the type of transaction received.
....... tt-, I, . .
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G ihce Station Module PMAD Console
.bEHI LIUL LSCH_OUI.ER
FELES
LPLMS
COMMUNICATIONS
LVLItl Ll_il t'ItLt_AHIL)
I'HIIJHI'I Y-I Ib I PHI.t_'_H_- t,
IH_I_t_I1 ILH HL(.I IVLH
lilt E IUI t
#R¢f_h ¢Scrccns Hcnu
Figure 15.4.1-1 Console Screen
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Figure 15.4.1-2 Console Help Screen
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15.4.2 Front End LO_t Enobl_ Scheduler
The Front End Load Enable Sched_!er e_ables the user to browse and monitor
the generation 0fq0ad enable comman-ds_- see_Figur_sA5.4-2-1 and i5A_2'2 for the
FELES and Help Screen. Please refer to the Console description in the Symbolics
Environment section for status line monitor definitions.
The Event Monitor is a textual and graphical display indicating what commands
are being recognized by the power system. This monitor is continually updated as events
are initiated as mission time advances. This monitor effectively shows what should be
happening in the power system. _e graphical display shows the RPCs within each load
center. If the RPC is black it is enabled. A circle cross below an RPC_indicates the RPC is
out of service.
The Event Data Base is a textual listing of an event list. When the list was
created and when it becomes effective are indicated. The user may choose any list that has
been created by the FELES. By mousing on an event line the user will see what
experiments are utilizing the specific component at the time indicated.
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00:OO:00 ftS ON ioo
EVENT OATA BASE
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] OO:Oo:08
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Figure 15.4.2-1 FELES Screen
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!
Figure 15.4.2-2 FELES Help Screen
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15.4.3 Load Pri.0rity List Management System
The Load Priority Maintenance screen provides the user the ability to inspect
load priority lists that have been generated by the LPLMS and transmitted to the power
system. See Figures 15.4.3-1 and 15.4.3-2 for the LPLMS and its associated Help
Screen. No updating or modification operations are permitted.
The Priority Data Base displays when a priority list was created, when that list
is effective, the ordered priority list, and for each component in the priority list the subtasks
of the activities that are utilizing that component during the effective time period. The user
may display any priority list that has been created by the LPLMS.
The Weightings is an informational display that shows what weighting criteria
was used in the development of the priority list. These ratings are non-modifiable and
represent lO-highest to O-lowest.
........ _ :i._
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Figure 15.4.3-1 LPLMS Screen
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Figure 15.4.3-2 LPLMS Help Screen
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15.4.4 Scheduler
z
The Scheduler is used for displaying the current schedule as well as for
resetting the scheduler, retrieving a schedule from the schedule library and getting
information about the scheduled activities. The help screen for the scheduler provides more
detail on the available operations on the Scheduler Screen. The following two figures,
15.4.4-1 and 15.4.4-2 reflect the SchedUler and Scheduler Help Screens respectively.
MAESTRO the SS Module Scheduler
_MIS-SiON" TIME-- "-'_ I ........ SCHEDOI_E CONTROL
...... [00:00:00 No N,me ..,_
lPlI'G_IN "e'lt_rl'l r¢ _'_:r :_:::_ _::_:::::: ::: :::::::'::_:::_::::::-:::v_$_:::_'.:_'-';_:::_'g_._:,-_-:,_:_._._:.:_:s_:-.._'_-_._._,_._...,._ .......
:::: ] ============================ ............. :- :_
J: -:..................................................................._.........................................................................................._7_iii_515 ii_i_!_:U_:_i? _:
_Refresh oScreen= Remove Revieve $eve [xtznd Ouery ReVue,L, R¢,¢_ $chedute St.o_
Figure 15.4.4-1 Scheduler Screen
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Figure 15.4.4-2 Scheduler Help Screen
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15.4.5 Activity Editor _ :: ......
The Activity Editor is used to create activities describing tasks to be scheduled.
Each activity has a priority and a number of subtasks to be executed sequentially. The main
window is used to enter information about the activities and the subtasks associated with
that activity. The inverted window is for display purposes only. Figures 15.4.5-1 and
15.4.5-2 show the Activity Editor and Activity Editor Help screens respectively.
De rLne ACTIVITY
Actlvlty Name: Spacelab2
Pttorlty [0-highest Ihtu 3mlowest]: 3
Number of Performance= Requested [ 1-100]: 1
Number of _|asks {1"50]: I
abOrtS, eg> uses these values
Oefk_e t_rst StJBTASK (SA431601A)
of ACTIVITY
Spacelab2
Figure 15.4.5-1 Activity Editor Screen
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15.4.5-2 Activity Editor Help Screen
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15.4.6 Equipment Editor
The Equipment Editor provides the mechanisms for adding modes of operation
and locations tO equipment: There are two main windows to the Equipment Editor.- The
Description Window is used for adding modes and locations to equipment, as well as for
displaying information about equipment. The PoweredEquipment display is a scroilable
window of the available _e_q_u_!prnent. Each lineon th!s _sp!ay is mouseable. The follow_
two figures, 15.4.6-1 and 15.4.6-2, show a sample display of the Equipment Editor and
............ respec y_ = :=the Equipment Editor Help screen tivel : ...... :':: .... .... ::
DESCRIPTION POWERED EQUIPMENT
Modes for Eq.Jlpment
Load Center _ Test Device
MAUIr MA_ mnwl_a MAX ¢_ImRPNT
Off 0 0.000
1000w Test 1000 4,808
N_ANT TF_T
_S NO
_9 _S
Locations for Equipment
Load Center 3 Test Device
DO0 Load Center 3
O01 Load Center 3
D02 Load Center 3
003 Loe, d Center 3
DO4 Load Center 3
DOS Load Center 3
D06 Load Center 3
DO7 Load Center 3
1:)08 LOad Center 3ll
eRef'rcsh eScrcens Mcl Locitlon Add ftodc Show Locsd_n Shc;w Hades
Load Center 3 Test Device
Load Center 4 Test Device
Subllntem 1 Tell Device
SUl_lyetefll 2 Tilt Device
RPC 00 Test Device
01 Test Device
RPC 02 Test Device
0_1 Test Device
04 Test Device
05 Tell Device
PPC 06 Tell Device
P,PC 07 Tell Device
RPC 06 Test Device
RPC 14 Teit Device
FIF'C 15 Tell Device
RPC 16 Test Device
RPC 17 Test Device
RPC 18 Tell Device
RPC lg Test Device
PJ>C 20 Test Device
RPC 21 Test Device
RPC 22 Tell Device
Figure 15.4.6-1 Equipment Editor Screen
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Figure 15.4.6-2 Equipment Editor Help Screen
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15.4.7 Resource Manager
i ±_, .
The Resource Manager screen provides graphical and textual information related
to power resource utilization. The user may display power utilization graphs for the entire
system, by load center, or individual components. Another feature of the interface is the
specification of a change to the source power in order to effect the breadboard during
operations. See Figures 15.4.7-1, 15.4.7-2 and 15.4.7-3 for the Resource Manager,
Utilization Graph and Heip Screen.
The Interactive Display region of the screen provides two functions: 1) display
of power utilization graphs, and 2) input region for Source Power Changes. Graphs
displayed are always mouse sensitive providing the capability to display its parent
component utilization, a textual list of utilization, or a list of activities that are scheduled to
utilize the component.
Source power change specifications utilize this area for input of the change in
power and the duration of that change.
APPENDIX VI: SYMBOLICS ENVIRONMENT
VI-26
APPENDIXVI:
SYMBOLICSENVIRONMENT
Interim
Final
Report
MCR-89-516
February1989
Utilization Oraph_ for Subcystem Distributor 1 [3kw RPC:s] 00:00:00 thtu 00:08:00
q
JlJ _1
CRcfi'eoh Future Power CE_ _ R¢louec4o
*_e¢cns Im_cdlot4 Power Ch_oe! teKI Ccnt-_r Ut,il_zal.ion
Power U_iliz_tion
Figure 15.4.7-1 Resource Manager Screen
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Module Pow_ ACttml (solid) vs Projected (line) Utilization
......................................................._............................' ...........................#...................................................... i............................°...........................
...................... -:............................ a ............................ _............................ ÷ ........................................................ i....................................................... "-'
.......................... i............................ -i ............................ i............................ _".................................................... i...................................................... ;
........................... ;. ........................... - ........................... _............................ ÷........................... a ............................ :............................ .:........................... ,_
........................... _............................ -; ............................ i............................ _....................................................... ;............................ i ...........................
...........................+...........................:...........................4.......................... +................................................... !........................................................;..
.......................... i............................. i ............................ ;............................ i. ........................................................ i...................................................... .i
.........................., '...........................+............................_............................+........................................................i ...........................*..........................q
..........................; ............................_............................i............................÷.........................."_............................i............................_..........................."..'
IlNNN ............... '*....................................................... _ .................... .-t,............................ l ............................ + ........................... •
1o14 ............. +.................... i ............................ .;............................ _...................... +............................ .;............... _ ................ ;:
II4F:I ; :II
Figure 15.4.7-2 Resource Manager Screen
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Figure 15.4.7-3 Resource Manager Help Screen
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15.4.8 Communic_ion$
The Communications Screen displays raw transactions that are received by the
Receiver or transmitted bY t he Transmi_'_tt__er'_When tge monitors are on, as each transaction
is processed it is displayed; if the monitors are off, no display of the transactions Will occur
until the monitor is turned on. See Figures 15.4.8-1 and 15.4.8'2 for the Communications
and its associated Help Screen. __
z
The Transmitter Monitor displays each transactions that is transmitted over the
network by the SI. The actual time and mission time are displayed along with each
transaction's "raw" contents. By mousing_ on a transaction the user may see the deblocked
version of the transaction.
The Receiver Monitor displays each t_ransact!0n _that is received over the
network by the SI. The actual time and mission time are displayed along with each
transaction's "raw" contents. By mousing on a transaction the user may see the deblocked
version of the transaction.
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RECEIVER MONITOR I1
Show Log Turn OFF H<miLor Turn ON Nonitor
TRANSMITTER MONITOR
I_¢mJ _ th41 TP4n_rJt _ at 912IJlOO 10:28:07,
[IIllllllll]l/|I/ll I IhII=lll q I O0:all t 0:_00500|1|010: t 0|
|oo:oo:o§]e/_l/ll lo:zotol P520000000Z000_|?COO100YNY0000000000
m i SC00 t 00V NY00_000CO0e t SN00 t 00NNY004000000000000
08A1 IICOO2(XW NY 000_00000000 A ! SCOG200YNY00000000000000008 A0 S
CO0040YN¥00000_O00 A 03C00040VNYOOOOOOOOOOOOOO000A02C0008
oYNv0000_oe60eNoo040NNV00 t 0_0000000000eO02N00020_NY
000_ O04NOOa 20NN YOOOO0000OOOOOOOOSOOONOOg 00NNV 00900
000000000000_ ! ?CO0940¥NV00_OIO_ ! SC00940YNY0000000000
000000g,k04 COO0 _0 YNYOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOOg A 02C00100VNY00_0000000000
01C04_2_00_009_ t $COG140NNY045000000000CO01 ?HO 5
CO0040YNY0_ I ?H02 C 00060¥ NV 0000000000000001 ? A _?COO 10
0¥NY0000_ t 7A I OCO0000YNY0000_001 ? A t $¢0G 360YNV
00_ t ? AOm0¥NYO00_00 t 7A02C00 t _OYNYO0000
000_ t ?00_ _0NN V0(I¢0000000000001 ?0 t $_00040NNY00 t 0000000
000_ 1 ?D ! / Y_00000017E01NOOOOONNY0_ 3m0000
t ?F02NOO t 00NNV00400_ I IA I IC03000 VN V0000000000_ | I A _$
C03110YNV000_O 10000C03000NN W 440000000000002 _N t ?C0 _O(I
0YNYOOOO_g 1H 1SCO t 0 l0 VNY0000000000000002 t F t SCO l 0DONNV a
$ t c_ooomg A t ?co3000 yNV 000000000000000_A 1 $C06000V NY000000
00000000022f102C0300_ t 44 W00000024 N | ?C00 t OOVI_Vl)00OO000_O0
_O0024H 1$C00 t 00VN'f 000(XJOOOOOGOOOO_4F 1SC00 t 00NNY00400OOOOOO
[I0;00:01|ll/lll|| II:Z011I P6300_O06_I00_OOOO2004Ft$C04
Show Log Tur_ OFF Honlt.or Tur_ ON Honlt_r
Figure 15.4.8-1 Communications Screen
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Figure 15.4.8-2 Communications Help Screen
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16.0 APPENDIX VII: ICD
The following are SIC (Switchgear Interface Card) to LLP (Lowest Level
Processor) commands, formats, and expected responses. The COMMANDS are messages
from the LLP to the SIC. The RESPONSE is the actual data returned from the SIC in
response to a command. The LLP will wait for a RESPONSE from the SIC after each
command is sent. If no RESPONSE is received within 2 seconds, the SIC card will be
considered nonfunctional. All COMMANDS sent to the SIC card will end with a CR
(Carriage Return ) which flags end of transmission to the firmware on the MVME331 card
(intelligent communications controller). All RESPONSES from the SIC will also end with
a CR for the same reason. The MVME331 card removes the CR before transmission from
the SIC to LLP and from the LLP to the SIC.
NOTES:
The dip switch configuration for SIC is as follows:
Switch 1 - switch open (off) - bitO high
Switch 2 - switch open (off) - bitl high
Switch 3 - switch open (off) - bit2 high
Switch 4 - switch open (off) - bit3 high
The SIC port configuration is as follows:
Baud rate - 9600
Data bits - 8
Stop bits - 1
Parity - even
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StatusFormat:
where: bytel -> $30-- statusOK
-> $31-- statusNOT OK
byte2 -> cc -- copyof commandreceived
with MSB bit alwayssetto 1
byte3 -> $80-- statusOK
-> $FF-- unknowncommand
-> $81-- first bytenot acommandbyte
-> $82-- did notreceivefirst databyte
-> $83-- first databytemsbnothigh
-> $84-- did notreceiveseconddatabyte
-> $85-- seconddatabytemsbnothigh
-> $86-- switchalreadyon
-> $87-- switchalreadytrippedwhen
tried to turnit on
-> $88 -- switch already off
-> $89 -- switch already tripped when
tried to turn it off
-> $8A -- GC Data Valid error when
getting switch data
NOTE" If the following statuses are received, do not 'download' switch
settings
-> $8B -- continous buffer overflow
(reset continous buffer)
-> $8C -- once buffer overflow
(redo once buffer)
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NOTE" If the following statuses are received, the SIC card must be reset
or must use the redundant SIC
-> $A 1 -- SIC character buffer overrun
-> $A2 -- character overwritten (OE)
-> $A4 -- parity error from UART (PE)
-> $A6 -- OE and PE
-> $A8 -- framing error (FE)
-> $AA -- FE and OE
-> SAC -- FE and PE
-> $AE -- FE and OE and PE
-> $F7 -- SIC internal memory parity error
byte4-> SOD -- end of status
Command Word Format:
where: byte1
byte2
byte3
byte4
-> cc -- command
-> ddl -- first byte of data word
-> dd2 -- second byte of data word
-> SOD -- end of command
Switchword Format:
bitl4=O (switch not tripped)
bit0 current (1)
bit1 current (1)
bit2 current (1)
bit3 current (1)
bit14=1 (tripped)
trippedsurge current H
tripped fast trip H
spare
spare2
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bit5
bit6
bit7
bit8
bit9
bitlO
bit11
bit12
bit13
bit15
(1)
(2)
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current (1)
current (1)
current MSB (1)
always 1
current overrange H (1)
$2 solid state swtch on H
S 1 mech switch on H
overtemperature H
off control input H (2)
on control input H (2)
always 1
MCR-89-519
February 1989
RMS current
bitl3 bitl2
0 0
0 1
1 0
1 1
tripped overcurrent (i2t) H
tripped undervoltage H
tripped grnd fault H
always 1
tripped overtemp latched H
$2 solid state swtch on H
S 1 mech switch on H
overtemperature H
off control input H (2)
on control input H (2)
always 1
GC Data Valid word format:
RPC ¢omman_l
on (error in hardware)
on
off
no change
bit0
bit1
bit2
bit3
bit4
bit5
bit6
-> GC Data Valid switch 7 H
-> GC Data Valid switch 8 H
-> GC Data Valid switch 9 H
-> GC Data Valid switch 10 H
-> GC Data Valid switch 11 H
-> GC Data Valid switch 12 H
-> GC Data Valid switch 13 H
bit7 -> always 1
bit8 -> GC Data Valid switch 0 H
bit9 -> GC Data Valid switch 1 H
bitl0 -> GC Data Valid switch 2 H
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bitl 1-> GC DataValid switch3 H
bitl2 -> GC DataValid switch4 H
bitl3 -> GC DataValid switch5 H
bitl4 -> GC DataValid switch6 H
bitl5 -> always1
NOTE: L - data valid
H - data not valid
Sensorword Format:
bit0 -> sensor data bit 0
bit1 -> sensor data bit 1
bit2 -> sensor data bit 2
bit3 -> sensor data bit 3
bit4 -> don't care
bit5 -> don't care
bit6 -> don't care
bit7 -> always 1
bit8 -> sensor data bit 4
bit9 -> sensor data bit 5
bitl0 -> sensor data bit 6
bit11 -> sensor data bit 7
bit12 -> don't care
bit13 -> don't care
bitl4 -> don't care
bitl5 -> always 1
A current/voltage sensorword_set consists of 9 sensorwords of the above
format for a given current/voltage sensor. The 9 sensorwords will be of the following
order:
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V FITIS
I rms
V offset
I offset
V instantaneous
I instantaneous
P instantaneous
P real
frequency
In this document the notation sensorword_set_n will mean the 9
sensorwords of the described sensorword format in the described order for a given
voltage/current sensor "n" where n can be sensor/voltage sensor 0 to 15
1) COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
execute SIC firmware reset (does not reset actual set
configuration)
cc --> $24
ddl --> $80
dd2 --> $80
- set up 2 sec timeout
- four bytes of data plus the status as described in
the NOTES where the first two bytes give the
following data:
bit 0 -> 0 if GC7 connected, 1 if not
bit 1 -> 0 if GC8 connected, 1 if not
bit 2 -> 0 if GC9 connected, 1 if not
bit 3 -> 0 ifGC10 connected, 1 if not
bit 4 -> 0 if GC11 connected, 1 if not
bit 5 -> 0 if GC12 connected, 1 if not
bit 6 -> 0 ifGC13 connected, 1 if not
bit 7 -> always 1
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bit 8 ->
bit 9 ->
bit 10->
bit 11->
bit 12->
bit 13->
bit 14->
bit 15->
0 if GC0connected
0 if GC1connected
0 if GC2connected
0 if GC3connected
0 if GC4connected
0 if GC5connected
0 if GC6connected
always1
1if not
1 if not
1 if not
1 if not
1 if not
1 if not
1if not
thethirdbytegivesthefollowingdata:
bit 0
bit 1
bit 2
bit 3
bit 4
bit 5
bit 6
bit 7
-> currentSIC switch0setting
-> currentSIC switchl setting
-> currentSIC switch2setting
-> currentSIC switch3setting
-> 0 if A/D connected,1 if not
-> don'tcare
-> don'tcare
-> always1
thefourthbytegivesthefollowing data:
bit 0 -> don'tcare
bit 1-> don'tcare
bit 2 -> don'tcare
bit 3 -> don'tcare
bit 4 -> don'tcare
bit 5 -> don'tcare
bit 6 -> don'tcare
bit 7-> always1
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2) COMMAND:
FORMAT:
switchesasfollows:
resetswitch
cc --> $22
ddl --> $80+ j
j -- 7 bitscorrespondingto the
switchesas follows:
bit 0 -> switch0
bit 1-> switch1
bit 2 -> switch2
bit 3 -> switch3
bit 4 -> switch4
bit 5 -> switch5
bit 6 -> switch6
dd2 --> $80+ k
k -- 7 bitscorrespondingto the
bit 0 -> switch7
bit 1-> switch8
bit 2 -> switch9
bit 3 -> switch 10
bit 4 -> switch11
bit 5 -> switch12
bit 6 -> switch13
RESPONSE:
- setup2 sectimeout
- statusasdescribedin theNOTES
APPENDIXVII: ICD
VII-8
APPENDIX VII: ICD
Interim MCR-89-519
Final
Report February 1989
3) COMMAND:
FORMAT:
command switch on checking switch on or tripped status
first; if any of the above conditions exist, the switch
command for that particular switch or switches is not
executed
cc --> $2E
ddl --> $80 + j (j is defined in (2))
dd2 --> $80 + k (k is defined in (2))
RESPONSE:
- set up 2 sec timeout
status as described in the NOTES
4) COMMAND:
FORMAT:
command switch off checking switch off
or tripped status first; if any of the above
conditions exist, the switch command for that
particular switch or switches is not executed
cc --> $2F
ddl --> $80 + j (j is defined in (2))
dd2 --> $80 + k (k is defined in (2))
RESPONSE: set up 2 sec timeout
- status as described in the NOTES
5) COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
command switch on immediately even if already
on or tripped
cc --> $2!
ddl --> $80 + j
dd2 --> $80 + k
(j is defined in (2))
(k is defined in (2))
- set up 2 sec timeout
- status as described in the NOTES
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6) COMMAND: command switch off immediately even if
already off or tripped
FORMAT: cc --> $20
ddl --> $80 +j (j is defined in (2))
dd2 --> $80 + k (k is defined in (2))
RESPONSE:- set up 2 sec timeout
- status as described in the NOTES
7) COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
get data for one specified switch a specified
number of times
cc --> $2C
ddl --> $80 +j (j is defined as 1 to $7F depending
on the number of times data
is specified to be taken -- input
buffer must be taken into account)
dd2 --> $80 + k (k is defined as 0 to $D depending
on the switch specified)
-set up 2 sec timeout
- data defined as:
j number of 16-bit switchwords plus the status as
described in the notes
8) COMMAND:
FORMAT:
get data for one specified sensor a specified
number of times
cc --> $2D
ddl --> $80 +j (j is defined as 1 to $EF depending
on the number of times data
is specified to be taked)
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dd2--> $80+ k (k is defined as 0 to $F depending
on the sensor specified)
RESPONSE:
- set up 2 sec timeout
- data defined as:
j number of sensorword_set_n for the
specified sensor plus the status as described in the
NOTES
9) COMMAND: get data for all fourteen switches a specified number of
times.
FORMAT: cc --> $30
ddl --> $80 + j (j is defined as 1 to $7F depending on
the number of times data is specified to
be taken, input buffer size must be
taken into account)
dd2 --> $80
RESPONSE:
- set up 2 sec timeout
- data defined as:
(j times ( fourteen switchwords plus
GC Data Validword set)) plus the
status as described in the NOTES
10) COMMAND:
FORMAT:
get data for al! sixteen sensors one time
ce --> $31
ddl --> $80
dd2 --> $80
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RESPONSE:
- set up 2 sec timeout
- data defined as:
sixteen sensorword set n plus status
as described in the NOTES
11) COMMAND:
FORMAT:
select GC (all GC select codes will be set to zero)
cc --> $23
ddl --> $86
dd2 --> $85
RESPONSE:
12) COMMAND:
FORMAT:
- set up 2 sec timeout
- status as described in the NOTES
reset continuous buffer
cc --> $25
ddl --> $80
dd2 --> $80
RESPONSE: - set up 2 sec timeout
- status as described in the NOTES
13) COMMAND:
FORMAT:
fill continuous buffer (First use reset continous buffer
then use this command to download code that is to be
continuously executed. Code will start executing as
soon as the download is started. Up to 80 of these
commands may be concatenated before the buffer space
is overrun.)
cc --> $26
eel --> $80 + q (q is def'med as higher 4 bits of
8-bit code(see sensorword))
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ee2--> $80+ r (r is definedaslower4 bits of
8-bit code(seesensorword))
At theendof thecommandisappendeda$26
until thelastcommand,thenaSODis appended.
RESPONSE: - setup2 sectimeout
- statusasdescribedin theNOTES
14)
15)
COMMAND: fill once buffer (This commandis usedto download
codethatis to beexecutedonly once. Codeexecutionis
startedby thetriggeroncebuffercommand.Up to 80of
thesecommandsmaybeconcatenatedbeforethe buffer
spaceis overrun.)
FORMAT: cc --> $27
eel --> $80 + q (q is defined as (13))
ee2 --> $80 + r (r is defined in (13))
ee3--> asdefined in (13)
At the end of the of the commandor commandsis
appendeda SOD.
RESPONSE: - setup 2 sectimeout
- statusasdescribedin the NOTES
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
trigger oncebuffer
cc --> $2A
ddl --> $80
dd2 --> $80
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16)
RESPONSE:
COMMAND:
FORMAT:
RESPONSE:
-->
- set up 2 see timeOut
- status as described in the NOTES
get buffered data =_
cc --> $29
ddl --> $80 + v (v is defined as:
bit0 -> buffer0
bit1 -> bufferl
bit2 -> buffer2
bit3 -> buffer3
bit4 -> don't care
bit5 -> don't care
bit6 -> don't care)
dd2 --> $80
- set up 2 sec timeout
- data of the following format and status as described in
NOTES
HEADER - $20
$ssssss - three bytes of status
$8F - dip switch setting for SIC card
(if not $8F, SIC card not
installed)
$nnnn - position in loop counter
$kk - times through loop counter
Smm - breakpoint
$22 - start of data
14 switchwords plus 1 GC Data Valid word
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NOTE: TM is temperature
multiplexed,TC is
temperaturecommon
(TM is notuseful)
temperaturesensorwords0TM,
0TC, 1TM, 1TC,2TM,
2TC, 3TM, 3TC
frequencysensorword0
sensor_word_set__0
frequencysensorword1
sensor_word_set_l
frequencysensorword2
sensor_word_set_2
frequencysensorword3
sensor_word_set__3
$22- endof buffer
repeatan-owedsectionsfor sensors
4 to 7, 8 to 11,and 12to 15
17) COMMAND: get power factor and sign (To calculate the power factor
use pfI=[Pavgl/[Vrmsl*Irmsl]. Use the same
calculation to determine pf2 using Pavg2, Vrms2, and
Irms2; if pf2 < pfl denotes capacitive loading; if
pf2>=pfl denotes inductive loading; ie, voltage leading
current)
FORMAT: cc --> $2B
ddl --> $80 +j
dd2 --> $80
(j is defined as 0 to $F depending
on sensor pair used)
RESPONSE:
- set up 2 sec timeout
- data def'med as six sensor words for the specified in the
following order plus status as described in the
NOTES.
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c0 :
FORMAT:
V rmsl
I rmsl
P real 1
V rms2
I rms2
P real2
get all 16 temperature sensor readings one time
cc --> $32
ddl --> $80
dd2 --> $80
19)
RESPONSE:
- set up 2 sec timeout
- 16 * 2 sensorwords for the temperature sensors
and the status as described in the NOTES
COMMAND: get all 16 power factors and signs
(To calculate the power factors see (17))
FORMAT: cc --> $33
ddl --> $80
dd2 --> $80
RESPONSE:
- set up 2 sec timeout
- data defined as 16 * (six sensor words for each sensor
in the following order) plus the status as described in
the NOTES.
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V rmsl
I rmsl
P reall
V rms2
I rms2
P real2
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FOREWORD
MCR-88-624
This report was prepared by Martin Marietta Space Systems Division
for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, George C.
Marshall Space Flight Center, in response to Contract NAS8-36433,
and is submitted as the Post-Installation Test and Usage Plan as
required in the contract data requirements list.
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INTRODUCTION
Th,is document is in response to the derived Test Plan Development
requirement under Task 3 of the Statement of Work for the Automation
of the Common Module Power Management and Distribution (ACM/PMAD)
contract.
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I. Purpose
The purpose of this document is to make recommendations regarding
the appropriate purpose and use of the SSM/PMAD breadboard power
system at Marshall Space Flight Center. This document is produced
under NASA contract NAS 8-36433, and fulfills a contractual
requirement.
II. Scope
The recommendations contained in this document are limited in
application to the SSM/PMAD breadboard. They should not be construed
as being applicable to any other Space Station system breadboard or
to any other power system breadboard, nor should they be applied to
any other breadboard.
III. Proposed Uses of the SSM/PMAD Breadboard
A. Overview
The SSM/PMAD Breadboard is composed of many components, each of
which must be verified individually. In turn, each subassembly must
undergo testing to be sure it functions properly as a unit. Finally,
the entire breadboard must be tested as a system in order to verify
that it performs in accordance with the intent of its designers and
meets all of its requirements. These levels of testing are not
addressed in this document. What is addressed is the question of
what utility the SSM/PMAD has once it is verified as a system.
The SSM/PMAD is a dual channel 20kHz power system large enough to
operate a substantial number of realistically sized loads
simultaneously and autonomously. Its architecture and functionality
are based upon the requirements of a Space Station Core Module, but
implemented in a ground-based laboratory. Topology is as shown in
Figure I, and is clearly reflective of that directed in JSC 30263
(January 15, 1987 issue), "Architectural Control Document for
Electrical Power System (for Space Station)." Vendor-supplied
components were chosen for their suitability to a research and
development environment and their ability to provide required
performance in the appropriate areas rather than their similarity to
flight hardware or nature as flight hardware. Components and
software items that were produced specifically for this breadboard
were specified to implement functions that are expected to be
requirements on Space Station. The physical implementations of
hardware and the required platforms for the software are not of
flight quality but can be considered functional emulations of flight
hardware.
Therefore, simulation should remain on a functional basis. The
traditional hardware-level system performance tests can be performed
and should be performed, but the data may not be applicable to the
Space Station or any other power
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system. In the case of EMI characterization, the breadboard system
cables and their couplings to nearby metallic bodies are not typical
of the flight system, since the flight cables and installation
.....guidelineshave not been specified. The power source used with the
breadboard and the impedance between it and the SSM/PMAD are not
intended to be representative of the flight system since the flight
equipment is not yet designed. Hence, regulation studies, transient
response measurements, and fault reaction and coordination studies
may be performed, but the results may not be valid if extrapolated
to Space Station. They will contribute to evaluation of the
switchgear concepts. Such studies should be done to characterize
the breadboard.
B. Concept Evaluation Facility
The SSM/PMAD functionality provides a basis of the broad functional
capability needed by Space Station. Power is delivered via a dual
ring bus controlled by remote bus isolators (RBIs). Remoie
controlled circuit breakers (RCCBs) control the inputs to redundant
lOkW buses, which, each supply three 3kW remote power controllers
(RPCs), housed in a power distribution and control unit (PDCU). Load
centers, each representing one rack or double rack, contain two 3kW
buses each, traceable to different PDCUs on different channels.
Each bus supplies nine ikW RPCs. Loads requiring redundant power
supply are connected to two RPCs of different channels, and loads
requiring single supply are connected to one RPC. Two load centers
out of six are designated subsystem distribution assemblies (SDAs), and
are equipped with 3kW RPCs instead of IkW RPCs.
By applying loads of differing type, size, and profile to the load
centers and SDAs and coordinating their schedules the system
engineer may simulate a wide variety of situations and observe
interactions in real time, with real loads, and with real power. The
breadboard includes instrumentation, remote control, and fault
protection hardware that allow both monitoring of system behavior
and observation of the monitoring and control operations themselves.
Application concepts in many areas may be set up and evaluated.
Suitable applications include:
a. distribution system management and control
b. switchgear hardware usage concepts
c. protective device operation
d. protection system coordination
e. automated fault management
f. automated redundancy management
g. autonomous operation
h. person-machine interactions
i. autonomous schedule implementation
j. inter-subsystem behavior
k. power interruption and reconnection
I. load converter evaluation.
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It is anticipated that such studies will generate much useful
information, and that the best ways to accomplish critical on-orbit
tasks will be elucidated.
C. Expert System Test Bed
The availability of crew time is one of the most restrictive factors
in activity planning, both on-orbit and on the ground. This provides
a stronq motivation to reallocate functions from the crew to the
lowest subsystem levels possible, and to create expert systems to
implement as many functions as possible. Many ground-based and
orbital functions are manpower-intensive and amenable to performance
by expert systems. The SSM/PMAD provides a test bed equipped with
sensors and effectors that can be used to host expert systems
designed to perform these types of functions.
D. Function Simulator and Real-Time Software Test Bed
The SSM/PMAD is equipped with sensors, data acquisition equipment
and software, and command execution software to provide traditional
automation and remote control capabilities. These permit operation
and observation from a single computer terminal, which provides both
a manual-mode human interface and an interface to higher level
automation computers or autonomous controllers. The switchgear and
sensors included are fully compatible with the data acquisition and
command execution software, providing a hardware test bed for any
real-time automation software that may be required for future
development. The switchgear control, protection, and status
reporting characteristics conform to current Space Station
requirements (JSC 30263) and enable the breadboard to provide a
functional simulation of a Space Station module power management and
distribution system to which appropriate software may be interfaced.
E. System Autonomy Demonstration Program Test Bed
It is currently planned to utilize the SSM/PMAD breadboard in the
System Autonomy Demonstration Program 1990 demonstration. It will
be utilized in the Power System Autonomy Demonstration to show
interaction between expert controllers at the overall Space Station
power subsystem level and at the module distribution and management
level. It may also be used in the Power-Thermal Autonomy
Demonstration to support interactions between the overall power and
thermal subsystem controllers. These activities will exercise all of
the functions included in the SSM/PMAD.
F. Development Toward Hardware Test Bed Usage
The SSM/PMAD can be upgraded with flight or prototype flight
hardware as it becomes available. It can be developed into a ground
simulation that will be useful in flight system evaluation. Not
only can the hardware be updated, but the software can be refined
and modified due to the use of industry-standard languages,
VIII-5
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interfaces, and systems. Therefore, any changes in functional
requirements can beimplemented within £he Constraints of available
Compatible hardwar_._:_SMjPMAD wili be a useful tool for Space
Station power system development for many years to come due to its
flexibility and standardization.
IV. Exercising the SSM/PMAD
A Producing Fault Conditions in Hardware
The fault conditions and operations discussed beiow are chosen with
reference to the set of faults that FRAMES is designed to diagnose.
A selection of these and the symptom sets by which they will be
detected is displayed in Figure 2.
1.0 Load Operations and Faults in a ikW Load Circuit
i.i Load Simulation and Load Bank Concept
Test loads are based on a resistive component of load that
dissippates a percentage of the circuit capability. Table I details
the resistor values, performance to be expected with actual resistor
values, and maximum inductive components for several levels of load
simulation, including fault injection. Assumptions incorporated
include the following:
a. The distribution system will be monitored by measurement
channels with a 1.5% accuracy capability. Therefore, the
loads must be known to 1 part in I000, with the error budget
divided between resistors and reactive elements. Power
resistors will have to be known to at least 0.1% at operating
temperature. This does not affect the way resistances are
specified, but does affect the way they are measured.
b. The inductive component of the load impedance must be less
than this allowed error. The corner frequency of the series
L-R network must therefore be greater than 200kHz. This
drives the requirement relating to purchase of non-inductive
resistors.
c. The voltage is always assumed to be 208 volts rms.
d. All currents are rms values, and all power values are average
rather than peak.
It is also necessary to vary the load power factor over a range
encompassing faulty leading power factor, the permissible
operational range, and faulty lagging power factor. It is
recommended that the ability to simulate power.factors up to and
including 0.7 leading and lagging be incorporated. Leading power
factors may be simulated by adding series inductance to the
resistors specified above, and lagging power factors may be
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TABLE 2 SERIES INDUCTIVE LOAD CIRCUIT
NOMINAL
LOAD
POWER "_EL
FACTOR "_
1.00
0.95
0.9
0.8
0.7
25%
Ract =
175Q
L= 0
/Z/= 175_
I= 1.19A
P= 247W
5O%
Ract =
90_
L= 0
/Z/= 90_
I= 2.31A
P= 480W
100%
Ract=
45_
L= 0
/Z/ = 45_
I= 4.62A
P= 960W
125%
Ract=
35.8_
L= 0
/Z/= 35.8_
I - 5.81A
P= 1210W
VA= 247VA
L= 458_.H
/Z/= 184_
I= 1.13A
P= 223W
VA= 235VA
L= 673FH
/Z/= 194_
I= 1.07A
P-- 200W
VA= 223VA
L= 1.041_H
/Z/= 219_
I= .950A
P= 158W
VA= 198VA
L= 1.42FH
/Z/= 250_
I= .832A
P-- 121W
VA= 173VA
VA = 480VA
L= 235_H
/Z/= 94.7_
I= 4.39A
P= 867W
VA= 913VA
L= 346FH
/Z/= 100_
I= 2.08A
P= 389W
VA= 433VA
L= 536_.H
/Z/= 113_
I= 1.84A
P= 305W
VA= 383VA
L= 729FH
/ZI= 12g_
I= 1.61A
P= 233W
VA= 335VA
VA- 960VA
L= 118pH
/Z/= 47.4_
I= 4.39A
P= 867W
VA= 913VA
L= 173_H
/Z/= 50.0_
I= 4.16A
P= 779W
VA= 865VA
L= 268l_H
/Z/= 56.3_
I= 3.69A
P= 613W
VA= 769VA
L= 3641_H
/Z/-- 64.3_
I= 3.23A
P- 469W
VA= 672VA
VA=1210VA
L= 94.2FH
/Z/= 37.7_
I= 5.52A
P= 1090W
VA=I 150VA
L= 138_.H
/Z/= 39.8_
I= 5.23A
P= 979W
VA=1090VA
L= 2131_H
/Z/= 44.7_
I= 4.65A
P= 774W
VA= 967VA
L= 291p.H
/Z/= 51.2_
I= 4.06A
P= 590W
VA= 844VA
200%
Ract=
22.5_
L= 0
/Z/= 22.5_
I= 9.24A
P= 1920W
VA=1920VA
L= 58.9_H
/Z/= 23.7_
I= 8.78A
P= 1730W
VA=1830VA
L= 86.5_.H
/Z/= 25.0_
I= 8.32A
P= 1560W
VA=1730VA
L= 134_H
/Z/= 28.1_
I1= 7.40A
IP= 1230W
VA=1540VA
L= 182_.H
/Z/= 32.1_
I= 6.48A
P= 945W
VA=1350VA
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TABLE 3 PARALLEL CAPACITIVE LOAD CIRCUIT
_LEVE NOMINAL
LOAD 2 5 % 5 0 %
L Ract= Ract=POWER 1 7 5 _ 9 0
FACTOR "_
C= 0 C= 0
/Z/= 175_ i/Z/= 90_
1.00 I= 1.19A != 2.31A
P= 247W P= 481W
VA= 247VA VA= 481VA
C= 14.9l_F C= 29.0J_F
/Z/= 166_ /Z/= 85.5_
0.95 I= 1.25A I--. 2.43A
P= 247W P= 481W
VA= 247VA VA= 505VA
C= 22.0_F C= 42.7_F
/Z/= 157_ /Z/= 81.0_
0.9 I= 1.32A II1= 2.57A
P= 247W P= 481W
VA= 275VA VA= 535VA
C= 34.0_F C-- 66.1_F
/Z/= 140_ /Z/= 72.0_
0.8 I= 1.49A I-- 2.89A
P= 247W P- 481W
VA,, 31 OVA VA= 601VA
C= 46.311F C-- 90.0_. F
/Z/= 122_ /Z/= 63.0_
0.7 I= 1.70A I= 3.30A
P= 247W P= 481W
VA= 354VA VA= 686VA
100%
Ract=
45_
C= 0
/Z/= 45_
I= 4.62A
P-- 961W
VA= 961VA
C= 29.0FF
/Z/= 42.7_
I= 4.87A
P= 961W
VA=1010VA
C= 85.4FF
/Z/= 40.5_
I= 5.14A
P= 961W
VA=1070VA
C= 132_F
/Z/-- 36.0_
I= 5.78A
P= 961W
VA=1200VA
C= 1801_F
/Z/= 31.5_
I= 6.60A
P= 961W
VA=1370VA
125%
Ract=
35.8_
C= 0
tZ/= 35.8_
I- 5.81A
P= 1210W
VA=1210VA
C= 72.9FF
IZ/= 34.0_
I= 6.12A
P= 1210W
VA=1270VA
C- 107FF
/Z/= 32.2_
I= 6.46A
P= 1210W
VA=1340VA
C= 166FF
/Z/= 28.7_
I= 7.25A
P= 1210W
VA=1510VA
C= 2261_F
/Z/= 25.1_
I= 8.29A
P= 1210W
VA=1720VA
200%
Ract=
22.5_
C= 0
/Z/= 22.5_
I-- 9.24A
P= 1920W
VA=1920VA
C= 1161_F
/Z/= 21.4_
I= 9.73A
P= 1920W
VA=2020VA
C= 171l_F
/Z/= 20.2_
I= 10.3A
P= 1920W
VA=2140VA
C= 265_F
/Z/= 18.0_
I= 11.6A
P= 1920W
VA=2410VA
C= 360p.F
/Z/= 15.7_
I= 13.2A
P= 1920W
VA=2750VA
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TABLE 4 THEORY AND FORMULAE
TABLE 1,
@ POWER =
2
(VOLTAGE)
RESISTANCE
(X % OF FULL LOAD) -- LLN
FULL LOAD = 1000W
POWER = (IO00W) (
RESISTANCE = RNOM
LLN ) =
100
2
(VOLTAGE)
RESISTANCE
RNOM =
2
(VOLTAGE)
10 x LLN
=_
ACTUAL LOAD RESISTANCES (RACT) ARE MADE UP OF 175
AND 90Q RESISTORS IN COMBINATION.
(_ PACT =
2
(VOLTAGE)
RACT
VOLTAGE
IACT= RACT
® LLA= ACTUAL % OF FULL LOAD
2
(VOLTAGE)LLA = + 1000 WATT X 100%
RACT
® LACT= MAXIMUM PERMITTED PARASITIC INDUCTANCE IN THE LOAD
LACT= RACT
2 11 x 200,000 HERTZ
VIII-II
TABLE 4, ('continued_)
TABLE 2,
® THE POWER FACTOR (PF) OF A LOAD IS DEFINED AS FOLLOWS:
PF= COS [ARCTAN ( VAR$WATTS )] =
FOR A SERIES R-L LOAD.
WATTS _
[(WATTS)2+ (VARS) ]2 1/2
VARS = I X2L
WATTS = I R 2
SUBSTITUTING AND SOLVING FOR L,
ii ill r .... _ - " "
L_ RACT (1 1)1/2
2[[ f P F 2
® /Z/ = [(2[[ fL) 2 + R2 ]1/2
© ! = VOLTAGE
/Z/
(_ PACT=I2 x RACT
® APPARENT POWER = VOLTAGE x I
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TABLE 4. (continued)
® THE POWER FACTOR IS DEFINED AS IN TABLE 2. FOR A
PARALLEL R-C LOAD.
VARS = (VOLTAGE) 2
X
C
POWER = (VOLTAGE)2
RACT
USING THESE RELATIONS AND THE DEFINITION OF POWER
FACTOR,
C "
2]'If (RACT) (1__!_ . 1)1/2PF2
(_ /Z/ =
1 (2nfc) 2 ]1/2[ (RACT)2 +
VOLTAGE((3) I =
/Z/
(_ PACT = (VOLTAGE)2
RACT
(_ APPARENT POWER = VOLTAGE x I
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simulated by adding shunt capacitance to them after removing the
inductors. Table 2 identifies the value of inductance required to
produce these power factors at each load level and the load circuit
performance to be expected. Table 3 provides values of capacitance
required and circuit performance to be expected. Theory and
formulae used in these calculations ar_documented in Table 4.
Operation with capacitive loads should only be attempted if each RPC
has a 5 microhenry inductor installed in series with its "hot" 20kHz
terminal.
Loads of varying time profile in either level or power factor maybe
simulated using an electronic load simulator or the load bank
described above. This requires that the load bank be controlled by
relays that maybe switched hot at the expected stress levels. A
load profile of essentially arbitrary shape maybe programmedwith
either of these devices.
1.2 Load Circuit Faults
Load circuits below the IkW RPClevel are susceptible to several
simple hardware faults that can be modelled using relays and
impedances, as shownin Figures 3 and 4. A similar set of fault
injection relays installed below the lOkWRCCBand 3kWRPCs,as also
shown in Figure 4, will be useful as well. The relays shownmay be
used to inject the following types of faults:
a. open circuit - open the series relay while operating a load.
b. supply line short to return - install a shorting bar in series
with the shunt relay, then close the relay while operating a
load.
c. supply short to structure - close the relay to ground while
operating a load.
d. series resistance in cable - transfer the series DPDT relay to
the resistive position while operating a load.
e. shunt resistance in cable - install a large resistor (large
enough to produce a measurable increase in current, but not so
large as to produce an overload) in series with the shunt
relay, then close the relay while operating a 25% or 50% load.
2.0 i kW Remote Power Controller (RPC)
The Remote Power Controllers (RPC) are required to enable and
disable power to the load circuits, isolate failed loads from the
Load Center (LC) bus, control switchover to redundant supply,
measure load current, and interrupt the load current in the event of
one of several types of fault. When loads do not contain internal on
- off control the RPCs will be called upon to control them. RPCs are
therefore required to start, supply, and stop power to loads over a
range of power levels and power factors. In the course of starting
loads inrush currents may reach damaging levels, and the RPC must
protect the LC bus from voltage sag or possible damage. Topology and
functions are shown in Figures 5a and 5b.
Vlll-14
z=
Z
Z
m
m
_ _,_ _ z_
_,Z [-., _: _ _a
_ _oo _=.
_.eN
_[.- Z_ . _
_ _Z_
_ Z_ Z_ _
_a _J _z_
oo
Vlll-15
I (
+
L_
VIII-16
VIII-17
0L d
E
++
_,O--r---O:
i
_j
o_,,o
_ o_ _
Vlll-18
MCR-88-624
2.1 RPCOperation
Simulating load operations requires use of load impedanceelements.
Load impedancesmay be provided by a load bank as specified in
Tables I, 2, and 3, individual load impedances, or an electronic
load simulator. The load bank and the load simulator will afford
muchmore convenient operation over the full ranges of load level
and load power factor than will individual load impedances.
2.1a Starting loads
The load starting capability maybe exercised by connecting the
desired load to the output of an open RPC,and closing the RPC.Once
a load is started, it maybe run, shutdown, or faulted to further
exercise the system. With a load bank the load maybe varied once it
is started to apply a load profile to the control system.
2.1b Supplying loads
If no excessive inrush current trips the RPC on startup, the load is
being supplied if the procedure of Paragraph 2.1a above has been
completed.
2.1c Stopping loads
If the load connected has been started and can be run, it can be
stopped by opening the RPC. If a load bank or an electronic load
simulator is used, the load level or power factor can be changed and
the start-supply-stop sequence repeated.
2.2 Forcing the RPC to trip
A IkW RPC may be made to trip by injecting an actual fault condition
into the breadboard or by hardwiring certain control signals on the
Generic Controller Card (GC). This discussion only deals with
injected faults. The fault injection relays may be used with a load
bank, a special variable load, or an electronic load simulator to
produce overstresses in a controlled fashion. The goal is to produce
overstress conditions to which an RPC is designed without reaching
destructive levels.
The following connections and operations will inject the specified
hardware faults into the ikW RPC load circuit:
a. trip on overload - increase the load level to greater than
120% at any power factor, or at a 100% level reduce the power
factor to 0.7 or less lagging. The load level changes could
be applied in a load bank or in the shunt fault injection
relay, after a properly low resistance (low enough to
represent an overload but not so low that a fast trip is
created) is installed in series with it.
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b. trip on fast trip - inst_ll a shorting bar _ or a resistor _at
will draw 400% or more of the rated load in series with t_
shunt fault injection relay. With the Shunt relay open and a
load being supplied, close the shunt relay. The RPC will trip
via its fast trip mechanism.
c. trip on ground fault - install a large resistor (large enough
to draw 50 milliamps) in series with the short to ground
relay. With the RPC supplying a load, close the relay.
d. trip on undervoltage while the RPC is supplying a load,
either open the 3kW RPC supplying it or the series fault
injection relay above it (interrupt the current supply) or
short the 3kW circuit above it using a shorting bar and the
shunting fault injection relay.
f. trip on inrush - load an RPC with a 43.3 ohm resistor in
parallel with a2 microfarad capacitor, and turn on the RPC.
g. masked overload failure - referring to the Generic Controller
schematic (849NWTI2001, Rev. A, page 3), short U20A pin 2 to
U20A pin 12, reduce the load resistance to between 35.8 ohms
and 22.5 ohms for a 1 kW RPC (see Table i), and close the RPC.
All manipulations of a Generic Controller card must be done
under strict observance Of Electrostatic Discharge guidelines
and safeguards, and by personnel who are fully trained and
certified in those procedures. Failure to observe this
caution may result in destruction of some or all of the
semiconductor de_ices installed on the GC.
h. isolator failed open - referring to the Generic Controller
schematic (849NWT12001, Rev. A, page 4), ground the drain of
Q2.
Then command the RPC to close. These manipulations of the
GC card must be performed with excellent workmanship by a
qualified engineer or technician to avoid damage to or
destruction of the printed wiring board assembly.
i. main switch failed open - on the AC RPC modification card,
connect the banded end of diode DI02 to the positive end of
capacitor CI02, then command the RPC to close. The precautions
mentioned in paragraphs g and h immediately above are required
in this operation, as well.
j. input short to return - install a shorting bar in series with
the shunt fault injection relay located above the ikW RPC.
After the system is operating normally, close the shunt fault
injection relay.
k. output short to return - install a shorting bar in series with
the shunt fault injection relay located below the IkW RPC.
After the system is operating normally, close this shunt fault
injection relay.
VIII-22
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3.0 Sensors
Sensor groups are placed at every input and output of a PDCU and at
every branching point, or bus, in the system. Each sensor group
consists of a voltage transformer, a current transformer and a
burden resistor. Voltage and current waveforms are transmitted to an
AD card. In addition to sampling and digitizing, the AD card
contains a voltage-to-frequency converter, RMS converters for
voltage and current, integrators and squaring circuits to calculate
dc offsets and average power, and a phase shifter used to determine
the direction of the power factor. Power factor magnitude is
calculated by software in the LLP. All of this data is digitized and
transmitted to the LLP via the SIC. Total failure of either a
current sensor or a voltage sensor may be simulated by disconnecting
the twisted pair wires to the sensor in question. Failures of
calibration may be inserted by use of voltage dividers designed to
produce any desired degree of error.
4.0 Cable
Cables serve to transport energy from one power system element to
the .next. The SSM/PMAD uses conventional twisted pairs as an initial
configuration. If in the course of extended system operation this
type of cable is found to be unsuitable, other configurations should
be considered. Though cables are often thought to be not credible as
sources of system failure modes, thatmay not be the case on Space
Station or any other vehicle with a 30 year lifetime.
Cable failures may be injected into the breadboard as follows:
a. short circuit from power to structure - with the system
operating, close the cable short to structure fault injection
relay.
b. resistive path between cable conductors - connect a resistor
in series with the shunt fault injection relay, operate the
system. Close the shunt fault injection relay when it is
desired to inject the fault.
c. series resistive cable or contact degradation - with the
system operating, transfer the dual series relay from the
non-resistive position to the resistive position.
5.0 3kW Remote Power Controller (RPC) - similar to 2.0
6.0 Cable - similar to 4.0
7.0 i0 kW Remote Controlled Circuit Breaker (RCCB)
RCCBs are required to protect the ring bus from short circuits and
heavy overloads that involve an entire radial distribution tree.
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They are required to stop the largest fault currents of any
protective devices and to isolate the fault from the ring bus until
it can be resolved. Hence, they are only provided with an overload
protection capability.
RCCB faults may be injected as follows:
a. failure of the overload trip capability - temporarily disable
the overcurrent detection circuit on the Generic Controller
card by the method described in paragraph 2.2g above. Observe
all cautions mentioned in that paragraph.
b. contacts resistive - same procedure as in paragraph 4c
above.
B. Breadboard Power Revision
The SSM/PMAD must manage its operation such that it does not consume
more power than it is allowed to. A higher level resource manager or
similar system will allocate a specific amount of power to £he
SSM/PMAD. The Load Enable Scheduler (LES) will then schedule as many
tasks as it can within that constraint, among others. Many
situations in the Space Station, such as damage to solar arrays by
meteorites or reduction of solar dynamic capability due to scheduled
servicing may require revision of the power allocation to a specific
module. If a revised allocation is received by the LES, it will
reschedule if required and implement that new schedule. The new
schedule may require addition or removal of loads.
Power allocation changes are made at the Symbolics Interface (SI).
They may be entered while a schedule is being executed. The
breadboard response should be automatic.
C. Forcing a Redundant Load to Change to an Alternate RPC
Assume that a load requiring redundant power is installed, initially
operating from channel A. The load is connected to channel B, but
the channel B RPC is open, being inhibited by the fact that the
channel A RPC is closed.
The next step is to disable channel A while it is turned on, which
may be done in two ways: the "A" RPC may be forced to open on
undervoltage by causing its input voltage to go to zero, or it may
be shorted and forced to open on fast trip. In the first case the
channel A RPC will open on undervoltage, releasing the inhibition on
the corresponding channel B RPC. The channel B RPC will then turn
on, resuming the operation of the load.
In the second case the load circuit is shorted from supply to
return, and it should open on fast trip, reclose, open again, and
stay open. After the channel A RPC has opened for the second time,
the channel B RPC will enter a turn-on sequence. Since the applied
short circuit is still present, a high inrush current will be
r
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detected through the channel B RPC, and it will trip open and stay
open.
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18.0 APPENDIX IX: VISUAL CONTROL LOGIC REPRESENTATIONS
This appendix contains Visual Control Logic Representations (VCLRs) for
the Lowest Level Processor (LLP) functions.
SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14000 LC MAIN
INITIALIZE COMMUNICATIONS
Wait for VME/10 Comm ni tions Snchr niz tion
Initialize Switch Positions
nmalze oa enter axvnum a mg
Initialize Communications Buffers
Initialize Priority List Buffer
t,Time List & Set Clock
nma_ze aut tatus aria es
art or tart o ssIon
Perform Scheduled Switch
CIperatinn_
Get Switch and Sensor Data
P 1 rih . .
ormance n
Send VME/10 Switch Performanc_ Data/Receive VME/10 Data INull
Y\ Time to Send Performance Data ¢'_
Send VME/10 Fault Data/Receive VME/10 Data
to Look for VM_
Send VME/10 Null Message/Receive VME/10 Data
vN_ New VME/10 Data
vrocess VMt_/m tJata
Repeat until Rec, rcle
Repeat Forever
].Null
W
]Null
Null
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMPI4000P PDCU MAIN
INITIALIZE COMMUNICATIONS
Wait for VME/10 Communications Synchronization
Initializ wi hP i" n
Initialize Communications Buffers
_et Initial Event List
Get Initial Time List and $_[ Clock
Initialize Switch/Sensor Records
Initialize Fault Status Variables
Wait for Start of Mission
Perform Scheduled Switch Ot_erations
Get Switch and Sensor Data
Perform Algorithms
l:Zanh l .i_t
. Send VME/l13 Fauh Event Data/Receive VME/10 Data
,?'x S,_,,_'tches ,_'_-_New Sched:aed State
Rend VME/1 lq Nwitch Position l'_ata/Ree.eive VMF/113 ]'_ata
.qonrt _qwiteh Performance
_Send VME/10 Switch Performance Data/Receive VME/10 Data
Time to Send Performance Data
Send VME/10 Sensor Performance Data/Receive VME/10 Data
A New Fault Condition (Settled)
Send VME/10 Fault Data/Receive VME/10 Data
, JNull
Null
Null
Null
Null
vN, Time to Look for YME/10 DaN
Send VME/10 Null Message/Receive VME/10 Data
New VME/10 Data
Process VME/10 Data
Repeat until Recycle
R F
Null
Null
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE (LC)
849CMP14100 ALGORITHMS
Range Check Sensor Voltage
Range Check Sensor Current
Range Check Sensor Temperature
Do For All Sensors
Check Switch Trip Conditions
Check for Switch Overtemp
Check for Switch Current Overrange
Check for Switch Position Inconsistencies
Check for Current Out of Profile Limits
Do For All Switches
.N Maximum Load Center Power Exceeded?
Shed Appropriate Amount of Load
Calculate Performance Data
]Null
,4
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE (PDCU)
849CMP14100P ALGORITHMS
Range Check Sensor Voltage
Range Check Sensor Current
Range Check Sensor Temperature
Do For All Sensors
Check Switch Trip Conditions
Check for Switch Overtemp
Check for Switch Current Overrange
Check for Switch Position Inconsistencies
Check for Current Out of Profile Limits
Do For All Switches
Calculate Performance Data
Detect Soft Faults With Kirchoffs Current Law
Based Upon RBI Configuration
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14150.1 CURRTIME
Get Present Time (Gettime)
Change Present Time to Julian Da_, & Seconds Expired in this Day
Change Start Time to Julian Day & Seconds Expired in that Day
_ Compute Change in Days Deltad_ Present Time (JDay) - Start Time (JDay) ]
Present Time (Year) < Start Time (Year) /[T _ (If So, New Century)
Present Time (Year)_ Present Time (Year) + 100 1 Null
/
While (Start Time [Year] .NE. Present Time [Year]) Do
Present Time (Year) _ Present Time (Year) - 1
_ (present Time (Year) Mod 4.EQ.0 And(Present Time (Year) Mod 400.HE.O)
Deltad-,_-- Deltad + 366 [ Deltad-.q--- Deltad + 365
1
Compute Change in Seconds: Deltas-._-- Present Time(sec) - Start Time (Sec)
Currtime -,4-- Deltas + Deltad *60*60*24
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14150.2 CVT DAY AND SEC
Month
([Year Mod 4] .EQ.O) and ((Year Mod 400) .NE. 0)) /
(If so, Lea p Year) /F
f-" 2_'_'_ Month
" _ 6 7
:_ 10 11 12
!
!
t__.leq eqlv'_ _ "_" u'_ _ i _ ,--, ,- eq e,'_ _ _ _1"
+ + + + + + + + + + + + + + + + +
I',Ill' " l I t li,I I I
a a a aa a a ,a!_ a a e _a!ea a a_i_ a _ a
SECONDS _ ((Hours* 60+ Min) * 60 + Sec)
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14150.3 CVT TIME
Day _ 10" (Ord (Date [4]) -Ord('0')) + Ord (Date [5]) -Ord('O')
Month _ 10" (Ord (Date[l]) -Ord ('0')) + Ord (Date[2]) -Ord('O')
Year -4- 10" (Ord (Date[7]) -Oral('0')) + Ord (Date[8] -Ord('O')
Hour _ 10" (Ord (Time[l]) -Ord ('0')) + Ord (Time[2] - Ord ('0')
Min --I-- 10" (Ord (Time[4]) -Ord ('0')) + Ord (Time[5]) -Ord('O')
Sec -'4-10" (Old (Time[7]) -Ord ('0')) + Ord (Time[8]) -Ord ('0')
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14150.4 GETTIME
Get Operating System Clock Time (XRTM)
Get Operating System Clock Date (XRDT)
Convert Time Format (Cvttime)
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14150.5 SETCLOCK
Convert Month of Time Now to Integer Form
Convert Day of Time Now to Integer Form
Convert Year of Time Now to Integer Form
Convert Hour of Time Now to Integer Form
Convert Minutes of Time Now to Integer Form
Convert Seconds of Time Now to Integer Form
Set The Operating System Date
Set the Operatin_ System Time
Convert Month of Start of Mission Time
Convert Day of Start of Mission Time
Convert Year of Start of Mission Time
Convert Hour of Start of Mission Time
Convert Minutes of Start of Mission Time
Convert Seconds of Start of Mission Time
Store the Start Time
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTION SOFTWARE (LC/PDCU)
849CMP14400.1 CALCENERGY
y_ New Performance Interval
Reset Interval Start/End Times
Reset I avg
Reset I max ! Max Time
Reset I min / Min Time
Do For All Switches
Reset Vrms Statistics
S
Update Interval End Time/Compute
Relative Delta Time
Update I max / Max Time
Update I min / Min Time
Update Time Related Average I
Do For All Switches
Reset Irms Statistics
Reset Real Power Statistics
Reset Frequency Statistics
Reset Power Factor Statistics
Reset Energy Consumed
Reset Energy Record
Initialize Power Factor Data
Do For All Sensors
Update Vrms Statistics
Update Irms Statistics
Update Real Power Statistics
Update Frequency Statistics
Update Power Factor Statistics
Update Energy Consumed
Update Power Factor Data
Do For All Sensors
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE (LC/PDCU)
849CMP14400.2 DOSCHEDULE
New Priority List and Effective Time
Implement New Priorities
New Schedule and Effective Time
Null
Implement New Schedule Null
Schedule Exists
Compute Event Time and Number of Events
Determine if Event Part of Contingency State List
Execute Event
Determine If State List
DO WHILE VALID EVENT AND VALID TIME
NULL
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14400.3 GET ALL DATA
Get Bus A Switch Information
Get Time Stamp
Move Currents To Frames ,,Data Table & Time Stamp
Get Bus B Switch Information
Get Time Stamp
Move Currents To Frames Data Table & Time Stamp
Get Sensor Data
Get Time Stamp
Move Sensor Info To Frames Data Table & Time Stamp
Get Temperature Data
Get Time Stamp
Move Temperatures To Frames Data Table & Time Stamp
Get Bus Power Data (For Use Later In Power Factor Computations)
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14400.4 MANUAL MODE
Write VME/10 CONFIRMATION MESSAGE OF MANUAL MODE
RECYCLE _ FALSE
WHILE NOT RECYCLE DO
GET VME/10 COMMAND
YNNNCOMMAND < > EXIT
SEND COMMAND TO PROPER SIC CARD
GET SIC RESPONSE
SEND SIC RESPONSE TO VME/10
RECYCLE"_"-" TRUE
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14400.5 UPDATE CONTINGENCY LIST
ContingencyFlag-_---- True
ProcessedFaultFlag _ False
UpdateSchedule(849CMP14400.8)
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14400.6 UPDATE PRIORITIES
NEWPTR _ VME/10 INPUT BUFFER
For I"_-'-0 to 27
IPriority [I] _0
For I _ (3 to Number of New Priorities
I Priority [New Priority. Switch] _ New Priority. Priority
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14400.8 UPDATE SCHEDULE
NEWPTR _ VME/10 INPUT BUFFER
TNN(.NOT. (New Schedule Available)).or. (Maxschedules.EQ.2)
Schedule 1 _ NEWPTR
New Schedule Available-.4--- True
NULL
Current Next Effective Time-'_-- NEWPTR .S.ET * 60
Insert Schedule Into Last Location of Schedule Queue
,4
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14500.1 CHANGE SCHEDULE
Curr_Sched -._----Next Schedule in Queue
Num Schedules _ Num_Schedules- 1
y_ Num_Schedules = 1 A
Last_Schedule _ 0 Null
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14500.2 INIT_BUFQUEUE
CNTR 4-- 1
While (CNTR.LE. MAX BUFFERS) Do
_axBuffers-Cntr +ll 4--- MaxBuffers-Cntr;
_ Cntr+l;
New Buff Cntr Allocate Space for BuffQ]...
Cntr _ Cntr +1"
BackQ [1] 4---- MaxBuffers;
Queue [MaxBuffers] 4---- 1;
Num_Sched 4--- 0;
Curr_Sched'_---- 0;
Last_Sched 4---- _;
Next_Free4---- 1;
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14500.3
URR_SCHED .EQ._
INSERT SCHED
Curr_Sched
Next_ Free;
Next_Free _ Queue
[NextFree];
Num_Schedules
Nurn_Schedules + 1;
T_Um_Schedules .EQ. Max Schedule?/
F
Temp New
Next_Free;
NexLFree 4-- Queue
[Next_Free];
Remove_Buffer
[Last_S ched];
Last_Sched
Temp_New;
Num_Schedules
Num_Schedules + 1;
Last-Sched
Next__Free;
Next_Free ,4-- Queue
[Next-Free];
NULL
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14500.4 REMOVE BUFFER
BACKQ [QUEUE [WHICH]] "_----BACKQ [WHICH];
QUEUE [BACK Q[WHICH]]-,_t----QUEUE [WHICH];
QUEUE [WHICH] _ NEXT FREE;
BACKQ [WHICH] _ BACKQ [NEXT-FREE];
BACKQ [NEXT-FREE] -.,II----- WHICH;
QUEUE [BACK Q [WHICH]] -,4-----WHICH;
NEXT-FREE _WHICH;
w
m
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14700.1 CONFIGURE SIC PORTS
CALL CONFIGURE PORT WITH:
Timeout = 2 seconds
Read Line Terminator = 16# _O_J_Ei_D
Writeline Terminator = 16# O_JOO_3OOD
Parity Even
Don't Flush Receive Queue
Don't Flush Transmit Queue
9600 BAUD
PORT NUMBER 1
Wait for Interrupt From 331 Board
Call Intr and Check The Error Flag
CALL CONFIGURE PORT WITH:
Tirneout = 2 seconds
Read Line Terminator = 16# OCJOOOOOD
Writeline Terminator = 16# _JO_JO_D
Parity Even
Don't Flush Receive Queue
Don't Flush Transmit Queue
9600 BAUD
PORT NUMBER 2
Wait for Interrupt From 331 Board
Call Intr and Check The Error Flag
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14700.2 SEND AND RECEIVE DATA
TOWROM SIC
SELECT GENERIC CARD PRIOR TO SENDING COMMAND
WAIT FOR INTERRUPT FROM 331 BOARD/CALL INTR
READ RESPONSE TO SELECT GENERIC CARD
WAIT FOR INTERRUPT FROM 331 BOARD/CALL INTR
CHECK FOR ERROR
SEND COMMAND TO SIC CARD
WAIT FOR INTERRUPT FROM 331 BOARD/CALL INTR
READ RESPONSE TO COMMAND
WAIT FOR INTERRUPT FROM 331 BOARD/CALL INTR
CHECK FOR ERROR
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE (LC & PDCU)
849CMP14800.1 CMNDSWITCH
SELECT SIC CARD FOR OPERATION
SELECT COMMAND (ON/0FF)
ESTABLISH BIT DEFINED COMMAND WORD
SEND OPERATION TO SIC CARD
SET LOCAL AND FRAMES SWITCHWORDS/BASED ON RESPONSE
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14800.2 LOADSHED
DONE _ FALSE
N BUSA.Eq. A
J=14 (Offset for Switches on BUSA) J=O (Offset for Switches on BUSB)
Count _ O
For N _ _ to 13
S _ N&J (S is a Switch Number)
Priotst [NI _ False
_N. ((Switch On) .And. (Lower Priority))
Priotst [N] _ True
Mark Switch 'S' to be Shed
,, ,,,
Count _ Count + 1
NULL
,4
For M _ 1 to Count
Priomin _ Importance
For N _ 0 to 13
S _ N&J
i H i !
.w tch
N((l_onty .SLT. Priomin).And. (Priotst[N] .EG.True))
P
Locale _ N
Priomin _ Priority of Switch S
Priotst [Locale] _ False
Pr_i.'9tst [M] _ Locale + J
Removable Power-q_-- 0
NULL
M-4--0
While ((Removable Power .LT. Amount) .AND. (.NOT. Done)') DO
M_M+ 1
Removable Power _-Removable Power + Max Power of Switch Priotst[Ml
_ (Removable Power.LT.Amount) .And.(M.EO.Count)
Done _--- True '[ NULL
TN% Done.EO.True _F
Addon _ False Addon _ True
For N-.4- 1 to Count
[Unmark To Be Shed (Priotst[N])
NULL
For N-.4- (M+I) to Count
..Unmark To Be Shed (Priotst[N])
For Count -._--M Down to 1
N Removable.GE.Power-MaXAmountPower /
Removable pwr _- Removable pwr
-Max Power(Priotst[Count]
Mark PrioTst[Count] Not to be ShedJ Null
Shed Loads Still Marked
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTION SOFTWARE
(LC)
849CMP14800.3 REDSW
REDUNDANT SWITCH AND PERMISSION
DETERMINE REDUNDANT SWITCH
SET PRIORITY OF REDUNDANT SWITCH
RESET PRIORITY OF SWITCH
ESTABLISH SINGLE EVENT SCHEDULE TO TURN ON
REDUNDANT
IF POWER AVAILABLE TURN ON REDUNDANT
NULL
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14800.4
Change State of
Switch 'N'
Determine Bus Containing Switch 'N'
If Bus B: Adjust Switch Number
y_ Will action exceed max. power limits of bus
Set Anomalous True
Mark Not Enough Power
Determine Switch Location
Loadshed
Set Switch Limits
/
Enough Power Unloaded /N
Mark Could Not Schedule
For Power and
Current
Unconditional Off Switch
Mark Switch Off
Set Switch Limits
For Power and
Current
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14800.6 SWITCH ON
Determine Bus Containing Switch
y_ Will action exceed max. power limits of bus /N
Mark Anomalous True
Mark Not Enough Power
Determine Switch Location
Loadshed
y_ Enough Power Unloaded /N
Mark Could Not Schedule
Turn on Switch
Mark Switch Off
Turn on Switch
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14800.7 UNCONDITIONAL OFF
Determineif Switchis OnBusA or BusB
If Switchis On BusB AdjustSwitchNumber
DetermineWhich Byte of CommandHasSwitchIndictors
SendCommandto TurnOff Switch
APPENDIXIX: VCLRs
IX-28
APPENDIXIX: VCLRs
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February1989
SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14900.1 DECODE
OUTCNT _ 1
COUNT _ 1
While Count < CNTR
ORD (Buffer [Count])
16#7E 16#44
Count -'4- Count + 1 Count _ Count + 1
y_D (Buffer [Count])=l 6#77 N
Buffer Buffer
[Outcnt] .4. [Outcnt]
16#7E Buffer
[Outcnt] - 32
[Buffer -
I [Outcnt]-,_
IBuffer
y_RD (Buffer [Count])=16#TN [Count]
Buffer IBuffer
[Outcnt] -q-- [ [Outcnt]-_-
16#7F [Buffer
I [Count]
Count _ Count + 1
OUTCNT _ 0UTCNT + 1
CNTR _ OUTCNT
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL SOFTWARE
849CMP14900.3 ENC ODE
J-.q- 1
I _ 1 to Length
ORD (INBUF [I]) = ?
lthru 31
OUTBUF[ 1]-._---
16#7E
16#7E
OUTBUF[1]_
16#7E
16#7F
OUTBUF[ 1]-,t-
16#44
16#44
OUTBUF[1]-_--
16#44
ELSE
OUTBUF[I]
INBUF[I]
J "_J+ 1 J"_J+ 1 J _J+ 1 J _J+ 1
OUTBUF[J] _ OUTBUF[J] _ OUTBUF[J] _ OUTBUF[J] _ NULL
CHR(ORD(INBUF 16#7E 16#41 i6#44
[I]+ 16#20)
J_J+l
OUTBUF [J] -,4- 16#0D
OUTBUF [J+l] _ 16#00
OUTBUF [J+2] _ 16#00
OUTBUF [J+3] _ 16#00
Length -.4-- J + 3
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SSM/PMAD CONVENTIONAL
SOFTWARE 849CMP14900.4
CONVERT VME/10
INPUT TO
APPROPRIATE FORMAT
Assign a Pointer to Next Data Space in Buffer Queue
Assign Length of Pointer Type Pointed At
Call READVME 10 (Read a Buffer of Data)
Assign GETVDAT,_ to Pointer to Buffer
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19.0 APPENDIX X:
19.1 Preface
SSM/PMAD EXPOSITORY AND AC'TIVITY PLAN
This document describes a large portion, if not all, of the tests required to
demonstrate the operational capabilities of SSM/PMAD. It is divided into a number of
parts for testing various aspects of the system. In the first part,the tests for dynamic
rescheduling are described. The second part describes testing for source power changes.
The third part describes tests for redundancy in the power system. And finally, the fourth
part describes the tests for FRAMES diagnoses.
In addition, where there are known bugs or conceptual flaws in the system,
these will be pointed out where appropriate.
19.2 Dynamic Rescheduling Testing
To test this, set up a fairly simple schedule should be set up on the scheduler.
Define a number of short, 15 minute activities that all use the same switch, e.g. c05. All
these activities will then have to be scheduled sequentially.
Each of these activities should require, for example, 800 watts.
Then impose a future source power change for, say, 20 minutes, of a maximum
available power of 500 watts. Some of the activities should be taken off of the schedule.
If the activities are interruptible or reschedulable, they should be rescheduled after the
source power change is no longer in effect.
If an immediate source power change is done, the same type of interaction
should occur. If activities are taken off of the schedule permanently it is probably a small
bug in FRAMES.
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19.3 Redundancy Testing
To test redundancy a number of problems must be overcome. FRAMES
redundancy handling mechanisms do not currently work correctly. If a load is switched to
redundant during a fault scenario, FRAMES will think that some symptoms were reported
when they should not have been or that not all were reported that should have been.
FRAMES will not try to turn on the switch that the load was on after it has been switched
to redundant ,though.
If a switch to redundant occurs as a result of a source power change, FRAMES
will handle it correctly. Unfortunately ,this is highly unlikely.
Therefore, redundant switching can only be tested at the LLP level at this point.
To do this, a schedule should be set up so that a load that can be switched to redundant is
currently operating on c05. Another load that cannot be switched to redundant should be
operating on c22. Assume that only these two loads, at 400 watts each, are operating.
Then after the schedule has begun executing, apply a short to c05. The load should then be
switched to c19 and finish its execution there. Ignore whatever happens at FRAMES. The
scheduler will not be notified of the load being switched to redundant either. Once the
short has been applied, FRAMES could then be taken out of service except that the CAC is
dependent upon FRAMES..
19.4 FRAMES Diagnosis T¢,ting
This section describes the tests for generating FRAMES diagnoses. Each test
consists of the diagnosis, its name in the code and its English output, followed by some
notes about the diagnosis and how to test the diagnosis. Each diagnosis refers to the
following figure:
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RCCB 16
3k 2 3k 3
&& ... ±
lkl lk2 lk9
There are two diagnoses that deal specifically with subsystem distributors in-
stead of load centers as depicted by the following figure, (we will refer to this figure as
Figure 2):
Ic-3k 1 Ic-3k 2 Ic-3k 9
RCCB 16
3k 2 3k 3
Each of the diagnoses are accompanied by a short description of the test that
should produce the diagnosis. As most of the tests are actually quite complex and involve
applying shorts to the right locations at specific times, we do not depict them on the
figures. This would just make the figures that much more confusing. Instead the figures
are provided for the purpose of reference in the diagnoses and the test descriptions to get a
better idea of what the diagnosis is about.
A number of the diagnoses describe the symptoms that occurred and end with a
statement: "This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed." What this indicates is
that FRAMES has encountered a scenario where more than a single fault has occurred.
There are some cases where FRAMES can diagnose multiple dependent faults, but in most
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casesmultiple faultsarenotdiagnosed.ThesediagnosesareincludedsothatFRAMEScan
endaline of reasoningwithout halting thesystem.In general,in thesecasesa numberof
switcheswill be takenoutof serviceandautonomousoperationwill continue. FRAMES
will not havediagnosedthefaultper se,however.
Itemsenclosedin '<' and'>', (e.g.<this item>) arevirtual slots that are filled
in by actual switches and faults, etc., when the diagnosis is actually determinedby
FRAMES. We areusingvirtual slotsbecausethesamediagnosiscanbeusedin multiple
cases. In caseswheremultiple valuesare given, e.g., <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>, any of the
valuescanbeinserted.Wheremultiplevaluesoccurin differentplacesin thediagnosis,a
respectiveorderingis kept.
19.4.1 diagnose-format--new-top-or-symp-with-lower-uv
Diagnosis:
<RCCB 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
During testing the switches below <RCCB 1> the following symptoms
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario RCCB 1 trips on either a fast-trip, i2t, or ground fault. When
testing the 3k switches below RCCB 1 we get an under voltage without the corresponding
RCCB 1 retfip. This means we seem to be getting an entirely different fault than the first
time.
To test this we need to initially insert one of the shorts below RCCB 1 (above
the 3ks). This fault is a temporary fault. Then when the 3k switches are being tested,
retrip RCCB 1 with a different fault.
APPENDIX X: SSM/PMAD EXPOSITORY AND ACTIVITY PLAN
X-4
APPENDIX X:
SSM/PMAD EXPOSITORY AND
ACT/V1TY PLAN
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February 1989
19.4.2 diagno_e-format--found-and-double-masked-fault
Diagnosis:
<RCCB 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
During testing of the load center switches below <RCCB 1>, <RCCB 1>
retripped with <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
A <low-impedance, high-impedance, supply-to-ground> short below
A faulty <fast-trip, i2t, gfi> sensor on both the <lk> and <3k>.
Description:
To test this disable the appropriate sensor on a lk and the 3k above the lk, e.g.,
lk 2 and 3k 1. Then inject the short below the lk and let it be a permanent short. All loads
should have permission to test.
19.4.3 diagnose- form_t--RCCB-errors-during-closing-of-3ks
Diagnosis:
<RCCB 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
During testing of the switches below <RCCB 1>, the following symptoms
occurred:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
Originally, RCCB 1 trips on one of the mentioned trips. First RCCB 1 is tested
and tests ok. Then the 3ks are flipped one by one without a fault. Then the 3ks are
sequentially closed. At this point something trips again. During the testing, all of the lk
switches have been previously opened. The point is that if a 3k will cause a trip again
during closings but not flips, something unusual is occuring.
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To testthis, applyashortbelowRCCB 1to causeit to trip. Removetheshort
fight away. Thenduringclosingof the3k switchesapplyanothershort to oneof the3ks
belowRCCB 1. To do this afterthe3kshavebeenflipped,quickly setashorton3k 1. Of
courseyoumustmakesurethatthe3k youuseis onethatwasbeingusedoriginally.
19.4.4
3ks.
diognose-format--lower-current-trip-durin g-closes
Diagnosis:
<3k 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
<lk 2> tripped on a current trip during closing of the switches below <3k
This should not be possible, if it was possible, <lk 2> should have tripped
during the flipping of the switches below <3k 1>.
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
This is exactly analogous to diagnose-format--RCCB-errors-during-closing-of-
To test this, apply a short below 3k 1 (above the lks). Let this be a temporary
short. Then, during the closing of the lks, put another short below one of them. To do
this, set the short after flipping of the lks.
19.4.5 di.a_ose-format--overload
Diagnosis:
<3k 1 > tripped on <i2t, gfi>.
<lk 5> tripped on under voltage during closing of the switches below <3k
1>.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
An overload situation where the lower switches are drawing too much
current for <3k 1>.
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Description:
To have this scenario, there must be at least four lk switches operating. Each
of these switches should be allocated such that the sum total of their power is 3k watts. To
simulate this, apply an i2t trip below 3k 1 and above the lks. Remove the short and
reapply it when the fourth lk switch is being turned on. This test requires that all the lk
switches have permission to test.
19.4.6 diagnose- format--lower- uv-durin g-closes-upper-fast-trip
Diagnosis:
<3k 1> tripped on <fast-trip>.
<lk 5> tripped on under voltage during closing of the switches below <3k
1>.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
A low impedance short below <lk 5> and
A faulty fast-trip sensor on <lk 5>.
Description:
To test this, disable the fast trip sensor on lk 5 and apply a permanent fast-trip
below it.
I9.4.7 diagnose-format--ncw-top-problem-and-uv
Diagnosis:
<3k 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t,gfi>.
When testing the lower switches, the following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario a 3k trips. During testing of the 1ks, we get under voltages at
the 1ks as expected but a different 3k trips.
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To testthis,applyatemporaryshortbelow3k 1. Then,duringtestingof the lk
switchesapplya shortbelow3k2 andanopencircuit below3k 1.
19.4.8 diagnose-format--found- 3k-race-uv
Diagnosis:
<3k 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t,gfi>.
During testing of the lower switches, <lc-3k 2>, a 3k rpc, tripped with
under voltage.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
A <low-impedance, high-impedance, supply-to-ground> fault below <lc-
3k 2>.
Description:
This diagnosis refers to Figure 2.
To test this we first apply a temporary short below 3k 1. Then during testing
we apply the same short again exactly when the load center 3k is being flipped. This could
actually be done by disabling the appropriate current sensor below one of the load center
3ks and applying a permanent short below that switch.
19.4.9 diagnose-format--u-v-durin g-flips-w-out-upper-lrip
Diagnosis:
<3k 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t,gfi>.
When opening <3k 1> the following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
First, this diagnosis is wrong. It Should suggest the problem asthe following:
First 3k 1 trips. During flips of the lks, we get under voltages back from them. But the
3k does not report tripping again.
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To test this, apply a temporary short below 3k 1. Then after testing 3k 1 and
before testing the lks, open the circuit between 3k 1 and the lks.
19.4.10 diagnos¢-format--found-3k-race
Diagnosis:
<3k 1> nipped on <fast-nip, i2t,gfi>.
During testing of the lower switches, <lc-3k 2>, a 3k rpc, nipped with
<fast-nip, i2t, gfi>.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
A <low-impedance, high-impedance, supply-to-ground> fault below <lc-
3k 2>.
Description:
This diagnosis refers to Figure 2.
This is the same test as in 4.8. The difference here is that first 3k 1 nips, then
lc-3k 2 nips with the same symptom. To do this, apply a temporary short below 3k 1.
Then, after opening all the switches and right before testing of the load center 3ks, apply
the same short below lc-3k 2.
19.4.11 diagnose-format--new-top-not-under-v
Diagnosis:
<RCCB 1> nipped on <fast-nip, i2t,gfi>.
When opening <3k 1>, the following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario, RCCB 1 trips on a current nip. During testing of the 3k
switches, RCCB 1 renips on a different symptom. This indicates a different problem than
originally expected and could be multiple faults.
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To test this, first apply a short below RCCB 1. During testing of the 3ks, apply
a different short below RCCB 1.
19.4.12 dJagnose-format--too-many-incl.ependent-failures-when-opening
Diagnosis:
<switch> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t,gfi>.
When opening <switch>, the following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario, one of the switches trips on a current trip. When first opening
all the relevant switches, new, unexpected symptoms occur.
To test this, apply a short below lk 1. After detecting the fault indication at
FRAMES, also apply a short at lk 2.
19.4.13 diagnose-format--f_ound-and- sin gle-masked-fault
Diagnosis:
<3k 1, RCCB 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t,gfi>.
When we flipped <lower switch>, <3k 1, RCCB 1> retripped on <fast-trip,
i2t, gfi>.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
A failure in the <fast-trip, i2t, gfi> sensor of <lower switch> and
A <low-impedance, high-impedance> fault below <lower switch>.
Description:
To test this, disable the fast trip sensor at lk 1 or 3k 1. Then, apply a fast trip
below lk 1 or 3k 1. Let this be a permanent short.
=
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19.4.14
_liagnose-format--multipl¢-tops-during-lower- flips
Diagnosis:
<3k 1, RCCB 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t,gfi>.
When reclosing <3k 1, RCCB 1> the following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
First, this diagnosis is wrong.
The RCCB or a 3k f'rrst trips on a current trip. Then, when flipping a lower
switch, multiple faults occur. This is an unexpected situation and is not diagnosable.
To test this, apply a temporary short below 3k 1. Then, when flipping of the
lks is to occur, apply a short to both lk 1 and lk 2.
19.4.15 dia_ose-format--failure-to-close-top
Diagnosis:
<3k 1, RCCB 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t,gfi>.
When reclosing <3k 1, RCCB 1> the following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario the switch is first flipped without retripping it. Then, when it is
closed for subsequent testing of the lower switches, it trips again.
To test this, apply a temporary short below 3k 1. Then, after 3k 1 is flipped
reapply the short.
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19.4.16 diagnose-format--no-retrip-on-r_cl0_e-of-l¢- _wi_ch
Diagnosis:
<lk 2> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t,gfi>.
It did not trip again when it was reclosed during testing.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
Most Likely: : _-- ......
Short circuit in cable to lad that was burned clear or was otherwise
removed.
Similar temporary short in load on that circuit.
Less Likely:
Intermittent RPC control failure involving current sensor, current
discriminator, or EPLD.
Description:
To test this, apply a temporary short below lk 2.
19.4.17
once.
diagnose-format--with-back-rush
Diagnosis:
<3k 1, RCCB 1> tripped on <fast-trip>.
These lower switches tripped on fast trip: <switches>
These lower switches tripped on under voltage: <switches>
CAUSES of <3k 1, RCCB 1> trip:
Short circuit in the cable below <3k 1, RCCB 1>.
Short circuit in the switch output of <3k 1, RCCB 1>.
Short circuit in the input of one of the following switches: <switches
below <3k 1, RCCB 1>>.
CAUSE of <fast trip switches below> fast trip:
Energy storing load on each of these switches discharged into the short
circuit.
Description:
To test this, apply a short below 3k 1 and get 3k 1 and lk 1 both to fast trip at
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Note: Thiswill probablynotwork properlyin thecaseof backrushwherethe
short is below RCCB 1. In this case,somelks will fast trip and RCCB 1 will fast trip.
Thisdiagnosisexpectsfasttrip symptomsfrom thelevel immediatelybelow.
19.4.18 diagnose-format--multiple-ret-rip-on-single-reclose
Diagnosis:
<switch> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
When <switch> was reclosed, the following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario, any switch trips on a current trip. When the switch is closed,
multiple symptoms occur.
To test this, apply a short below 3k 1. Then, after FRAMES receives the data,
apply an additional short under 3k 2. Both of these should be permanent shorts.
19.4.19 diagnos¢-f0rmat--ncw-top-sympt0m-wh_n-manipulating-lower-lc-switches
Diagnosis:
<RCCB 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
<RCCB 1> tripped on <i2t, gfi, fast-trip, u-v> when <3k 1> was reclosed.
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario RCCB 1 First trips on a current trip. When the 3ks are being
tested, RCCB 1 retrips only with a different symptom.
To test this, first apply a temporary fast trip below RCCB 1. Then, during
testing of the 3ks, apply an i2t short below RCCB 1.
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19.4.20 diagnose-format--renip-on-reclose-with-new-top
Diagnosis:
<switch> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
When <switch> was reclosed <switch 2> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi, u-
V>.
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario, any switch trips on a current nip. When the switch is reclosed,
an entirely new symptom is found.
To test this, apply a temporary fast nip to lk 1. Then after FRAMES opens the
switch, before further testing, apply a fast trip to lk 2.
19.4.21 diagnose-format--renip-on-r¢elose-with-new- symptom
Diagnosis:
<switch> nipped on <fast-nip, i2t, gfi>.
When <switch> was reclosed it nipped on <i2t, fast-trip, gfi, u-v>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario, any switch nips on a current nip. When the switch is reclosed,
the switch nips on a different symptom.
To test this, apply a temporary fast nip to lk 1. Then, after FRAMES opens
the switch, before further testing, apply an i2t nip to 1k 1.
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19.4.22 dia_os¢-format--Ic-retrip-on-reclose
Diagnosis:
<lk 1>, an lk rpc in a load center, tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
When it was reclosed during testing, it tripped again with the same
symptom.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
Most Likely:
Short Circuit supply to return in the cable below <lk 1>.
Short Circuit in load equipment on this circuit.
Less Likely:
Short circuit in RPC output wiring.
RPC control failure involving current sensor, current discriminator, or
EPLD.
Description:
To test this, simply apply a permanent short below one of the lk switches.
19.4.23 diamaose-format--retrip-0n-rc, close
Diagnosis:
<3k 1, RCCB 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
When it was reclosed during testing, it tripped again on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
Most Likely:
Short circuit in cable below <3k 1, RCCB 1>.
Short circuit in the output of <3k 1, RCCB 1>.
Short circuit in the input of one of the following switches: <switches
below tripped switch>.
Less Likely:
Failure of current sensor, current comparator, or EPLD of <3k 1, RCCB
1>.
(if it was 3k 1 and it was an i2t trip and there were more than 3 lks on,
then:
Overload resulting from improper current increase in a heavily loaded
load center.)
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Description:
To test this, simply apply apermanentshortbelowoneof the 3k switchesor
belowRCCB 1.
19.4.24
19.4.25
diagnose-f0rmat--single-top-with-0ndcr-v-no-multiple-possible-and-n0-¢0rrcnt-
above
Diagnosis:
<switch> tripped on under voltage.
The other <lk, 3k, rccb>s were not in a position to trip when <switch>
tripped.
<switch above> the <3k, rccb, rbi> above, registers no current flow.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
Most Likely:
An open circuit below <switch above>.
Less Likely:
Failure of the voltage sensor of <switch>.
Failure of the voltage comparator of <switch>.
Failure of the EPLD of <switch>.
(if the switch was an RCCB:
It is also possible that the power has not been turned on.)
Description:
To test this, apply an open circuit fault between 3k 1 and the lks below it.
diagnose-formab-sin gle-top-with-under-v-multiple-possible-and-no-currcnt-
above
Diagnosis:
<switch> tripped on under voltage.
<x> of the <lk, 3k, rccb>s were closed when <switch> tripped but did not
trip.
<switch above>, the <3k, rccb, rbi> above, registers no current.
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
w
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Description:
In this scenario, a switch nips on under voltage. Some of the siblings of the
switch were closed when the switch tripped but did not trip themselves. In addition, the
switch above has no current flow.
To test this, disconnect lk 1 from the power bus and cause the current sensor of
3k 1 to always read 0. Also, have some other loads connected in the load center below 3k
1.
19.4.26 diagnose-format--_ingle-top-with-under-v-no-mulfiple-possible-and-current-
above
Diagnosis:
<switch> tripped on under voltage.
<siblings of switch> were not in a position to trip when <switch> tripped.
<switch above> the <3k, rccb, rbi> above, registers a positive current.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
Most Likely:
The current sensor, current comparator, or EPLD of <switch above> may
be faulty AND
one of:
Supply to return fault in the cable above <switch>.
Supply to return fault in the switch output of <switch above>.
Supply to return fault in the switch input of one of the <lk, 3k, rccb>s.
(if the switch was a lk:
Less Likely:
In addition to the above:
The current sensor, current comparator, or EPLD of <switch above>
may be faulty.
Description:
In this scenario, one of the switches trip on under voltage. None of its siblings
are in a position to trip. Also, the switch above has current flowing through it but does not
nip. Since RCCBs cannot trip on under voltage, this diagnosis should always be ok.
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To test this, set up one load on lk 1. Then, disable the current comparator of
3k 1 and apply a short below 3k 1.
19.4.27 dia_ose-format--single-top-with-undcr-v-multiple-possible-_nd-current-above
Diagnosis:
<switch> tripped on under voltage.
<x> of the <lk, 3k, rccb>s were closed when <switch>tripped but did not
trip.
<switch above> the <3k, rccb, rbi> above, registers a positive current.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
Most Likely:
Failure in the voltage sensor of <switch>.
Failure in the voltage comparator of <switch>.
Failure in the EPLD of <switch>.
Description:
In this scenario, we can suppose lk 1 trips on under voltage, lk 2 also has a
load running but does not trip. Also 3k 1 has current flowing through it.
To test this, disconnect lk 1 from the power bus during operation. Also, have
additional loads running in the load center.
19.4.28 diagno_¢-format--_ingle-(1 k.3k)-top-with-¢ndcr-v-no-multiple-possible-and-
currcnt-ovcr-limit-_bov¢
Diagnosis:
<lk, 3k> tripped on under voltage.
<siblings of switch> were not in a position to trip when <lk, 3k> tripped.
<3k, rccb>, the <3k, rccb> above, registers a current over limit condition
but does not report tripping.
........... POSSIBLE cAusEs:
Most Likely:
The current sensor, current comparator, or EPLD of <3k, rccb> may be
faulty AND
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Oneof:
Supplyto returnfault in thecableabove<lk, 3k>.
Supplyto returnfault in theswitchoutputof <3k,rccb>.
Supplyto returnfault in theswitchinput of oneof the<lk, 3k)s.
LessLikely:
In additionto theabove:
Thecurrentsensor,currentcomparator,orEPLDof <3k,rccb> may be
faulty.
Description:
In this scenario, we can suppose lk 1 trips on under voltage. 3k 1 has a current
over limit condition and there were no other siblings of lk 1 that could have tripped. Thus,
there should be a fault and a bad current sensing device on the switch above (3k 1).
To test this, have only one load in the load center active. Then, fake out the
sensor on 3k 1 to think the current is over limit so it trips. Keep the sensor faked out.
19.4.29 diagn0se-format--single-(lk.3k)-top-with-under-v-multiple-possible-and-
current-over-limit-alive
Diagnosis:
<lk 1, 3k 1> tripped on under voltage.
<3k 1, RCCB 1>, the <3k, rccb> above, did not report tripping but does
register a current over limit condition.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
Most Likely:
A fault in the switch input of <lk 1, 3k 1> with a failure of the trip
mechanism of <3k 1, RCCB 1>.
Less Likely:
A short somewhere below <lk 1, 3k 1> with a failure of <lk 1, 3k 1> to
recognize it and a failure of <3k 1, RCCB 1> to trip.
A failure in the voltage sensor of <lk 1, 3k 1>, a failure in the current
sensor of <3k 1, RCCB 1> and <3k 1, RCCB 1> not tripping.
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Description:
This is a complex scenario. Simply put, suppose lk 1 trips on under voltage.
There are siblings of lk 1 that are also operating loads but do not trip. Additionally, 3k 1
reports a current over limit condition but does not trip.
To test this, unhook lk 1 from the power bus during operation. Also, at the
same time, fake the sensor of 3k 1 into thinking that the current is over limit and disable the
trip mechanism so it cannot trip or report lripping.
19.4.30 diagnose-format--mulfiple-0ifferent-rccb-top & diagnose-format--multiple-rccb-
top-not-unOcr-v
Diagnosis:
The following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
This is a fault scenario that is not currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario, both RCCBs in a load center trip either both on under voltage
or else on different symptoms.
To test this, simultaneously apply a fast trip below one RCCB and an i2t trip
below the other.
19.4.31 diagnose-format--multiple-different-rccb-top-under-voltage
Diagnosis:
The following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
It is possible that the power was not turned on.
This is a fault scenario that is not currently addressed.
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19.4.32
19.4.33
Description:
In this scenario, both RCCBs in a load center trip on under voltage.
Unfortunately, this is an impossible scenario.
diagn0se-format--multipl¢-3k-top-not-identieal
Diagnosis:
<3k 1> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
<3k 2> tripped on <i2t, gfi, fast-trip>.
This is a fault scenario that is not currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario, two 3k rpcs trip with different symptoms.
To test this, have 3k 1 and 3k 2 both trip with different symptoms.
diagnose- format--multiple- 3k-top-crossed
Diagnosis:
The following 3k RPCs tripped on fast-trip:
3k 1, 3k 2.
The third 3k RPC was also closed but did not report tripping.
POSSIBLE CAUSE:
A short circuit between the output cables of the two 3k RPCs.
Description:
To test this, try crossing the output cables of two 3k RPCs.
APPENDIX X: SSM/PMAD EXPOSITORY AND ACTIVITY PLAN
X-21
APPENDIXX:
SSM/PMADEXPOSITORY AND
ACTIVITY PLAN
Interim
Final
Report
MCR-89-516
February 1989
19.4.34 diagnose-format--mulfiple-3k-top-under-voltage-n0t-all-that-c0uld
Diagnosis:
The following 3k RPCs tripped on under voltage:
3k 1, 3k 2.
The third 3k RPC Was also closed and could have tripped bud did not.
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
To test this, unhook both 3k 1 and 3k 2 both at the same time from the power
bus during system operation.
19.4.35 diagnose-format--multiple-different-_k-top
Diagnosis:
The following symptoms occurred:
3k 1 tripped on <fault 1>
3k 2 tripped on <fault 2>
3k 3 tripped on <fault 3>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
same.
To test this, apply three faults to the 3k switches where not all the faults are the
19.4.36 diagnose-format--multipl¢-3k-top-not-under-v
Diagnosis:
The following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
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voltage).
Description:
In this scenario,two or three3k switchestrip with identical faults (not under
To test this, apply two or three faults to the 3k switches.
applied,donotdo fast-tripasthiswill look like crossedoutputcables.
If two faults are
19.4.37 diagno_¢-f0rmot--multiple-3k-top-under-v
Diagnosis:
The following 3k RPCs tripped on under voltage:
3k 1, 3k 2, 3k 3
<RCCB 1>, the rccb above, did not report tripping.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
A resistive contact in the <RCCB 1>
An open or disconnected cable below <RCCB 1> and above the 3k RPCs.
A low impedance fault below <RCCB 1> and above the 3k RPCs with
<RCCB 1> failing to trip on i2t.
Description:
In this scenario, all the 3k switches trip on under voltage.
To test this, apply an open circuit below the rccb.
19.4.38 diagnose-format--more-than-two- lk-not-fast-wip-or- under-v
Diagnosis:
The following load center RPCs tripped:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
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Description:
In this scenario,multiple lk switchestrippedwith differentfaultsor not all fast
trip or undervoltage.
19.4.39
To testthis,applymultiplefaultsat thesametimeto morethanonelk switches.
diagnose-forma_--multiple-k-no_-all-that-¢ould-under-voltage
Diagnosis:
The following load center RPCs tripped on under voltage:
<switches>
The following load center RPCs did not trip on under voltage and were in a
position to do so:
<more switches>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed.
Description:
In this scenario, multiple lk switches tripped with under voltage. In addition,
more of the load center switches were also active when the trips occur.
To test this, apply multiple under voltages at the same time to more than one lk
switches.
19.4.40 diagnose-format--multiple- lk-all-that-could-under-voltage
Diagnosis:
The following load center RPCs tripped on under voltage:
<switches>
<3k 1>, the 3k RPC above did not report tripping.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
Most Likely:
A resistive contact in <3k 1>
An open or disconnected cable below <3k 1> and above the load center
RPC.
i
H
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A resistive cable below <3k 1> and above the load center RPC.
Less Likely:
A low impedance fault below <3k 1> and a failed overload current sensor
of <3k 1>.
Description:
To test this, simply apply an open circuit below 3k 1 during operation.
19.4.41 diagn0se-format--m0re-than-two- 1k-fast-trip-no-permission-to-test
Diagnosis:
The following load center RPCs tripped on fast trip:
<switches>
None of these switches have permission to test.
Further isolation of the fault is not possible.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
A short circuit in or below any of these load center RPCs.
Description:
In this scenario, multiple lk switches trip on fast trip. No testing can be done
as none of the loads have permission to test.
To test this, set up the loads so that they do not have permission to test. Then,
apply a fast trip to at least two of the lks at the same time.
19.4.42 diagnose-form_t--too-many-and-unequal-retrips-on-multiple-lc-tops
Diagnosis:
The following load center RPCs tripped on fast trip:
<switches>
During testing the following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed:
APPENDIX X: SSM/PMAD EXPOSITORY AND ACTIVITY PLAN
X-25
APPENDIXX:
SSM/PMADEXPOSITORYAND
ACqTV1TYPLAN
Interim MCR-89-516
Final
Report February1989
Description:
In this scenario,multiple lk switchestrip on fast trip. During testing,more
thantwo trips occuragainandthenumberof retripsis notequalto thenumberof original
trips.
This is not straightforwardto test. First, multiple lks needto trip on fast trip.
Then,during testingmultiple lks (adifferentnumber)needto trip aswell.
19.4.43 dia_ose-format--too-many-retrips-on-multiple-lc,tops
Diagnosis:
The following load center RPCs tripped on fast trip:
<switches>
During testing the following symptoms occurred:
<symptoms>
This is not a fault scenario that is currently addressed:
Description:
In this scenario, multiple lk switches trip on fast trip. During testing, more
than two trips occur again and the number of renips is equal to the number of original trips.
Additionally, the number of nips is greater than two.
This is not straightforward to test. First, multiple lks need to trip on fast trip.
Then, during testing the same lks should be tripped again, all at the same time.
19.4.44 diagnose-format--no-r_p-on-moltiple-lc-top
Diagnosis:
The following load center RPCs tripped on fast nip:
<switches>
During testing, none of these switches re-tripped.
(if some of the switches did not have permission to test:
The following switches did not have permission to test:
<switches>
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POSSIBLECAUSES:
A low impedancefault in theswitchoutput,cable,or loadbelowoneof
theseswitches.
A shortbetweentheoutputcablesof two or moreof these.)
Description:
In this scenario,multiple lk switchestrip on fasttrip. If someof theswitches
havenopermissionto testwegetonecase,otherwisewegettheother.
To testthis,applya temporaryfasttrip to multiple lk switchesat thesametime.
19.4.45 diagno_e-format--outpot-¢ables-short-in-lc
Diagnosis:
The following load center RPCs tripped on fast trip:
<switches>
During testing, both <lk 1> and <lk 2> re-tripped on fast trip.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
Most Likely:
A short between the output of<lk 1> and <lk 2>.
(if some switches did not have permission to test:
However, the following switches did not have permission to test:
<switches>)
Description:
In this scenario, multiple lk switches trip on fast trip. When tested, only two
of them retripped (during closes).
J
To test this, apply a short between the output cables of two load center switches
during operation and keep it there.
APPENDIX X: SSM/PMAD EXPOSITORYAND ACTIVITY PLAN
X-27
APPENDIX X:
SSM/PMAD EXPOSITORY AND
AC'TIV/TY PLAN
Interim
Final
Report
MCR-89-516
February 1989
19.4.46 diagnose-format--back-rush-in-lc
Diagnosis:
The following load center RPCs tripped on fast trip:
<switches>
During testing, <lk 2> re-tripped on fast trip.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
Most Likely:
A low impedance short in the cable below <lk 2>.
A low impedance short in the switch output of <lk 2>.
A low impedance short in the load below <lk 2>.
Cause of other switches tripping:
Backrush due to energy storage in the loads.
(if some switches did not have permission to test:
Less Likely:
A short between the output cables of some of the switches--the following
switches did not have permission to test <switches>.)
Description:
In this scenario, multiple lk switches trip on fast trip. When tested, only one
switch retrips. This indicates a possible back rush situation.
To test this apply a temporary fast trip to at least two load center switches at
once. Only leave one of the fast trips in place.
19.4.48
_tiagn.ose-format--sin gle-top-under-v-with-failur_-to-open-subordingt,
This diagnosis is not reachable in the code.
19.4.49 diagnose-format--single-lc-top-under-v-with-failure-to-open-non-top
This diagnosis is not reachable in the code.
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19.4.50 diagn0_¢-fQrmat--no-pcrmission-to-close-top
Diagnosis:
<lk 2> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
<lk 2> does not have permission to close.
POSSIBLE CAUSE:
A <fast-trip, i2t, gfi> fault in some subcomponent of the power network
headed by <lk 2>.
Description:
In this scenario a lk switch trips on a current trip. Additionally, it does not
have permission to test.
To test this, set up a load without permission to test on lk 2. Then, apply a
short below 1k 2.
This diagnosis has a probable bug in it as well.
19.4.51 diagnose- format-- sin gle-top-with- fa.i.lure-to-open- subordinate
Diagnosis:
The initial critical symptom in this situation was <3k 1, RCCB 1> tripping
on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
During routine precautionary switch opening, <lk, 3k> failed to respond to
an open command.
This indicates an Altera chip (PLD) failure in <lk, 3k>, which could have
caused it not to respond to a <fast-trip, i2t, gfi> condition in the circuit
beneath it.
The fault then propagated up to <3k 1, RCCB 1> above, with the <lk, 3k>
below tripping on under voltage.
It is not possible to test this further since the results of any relevant testing
could be attributed to the failed Ahera chip in <lk, 3k>.
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Description:
To test this situation, fake out the current sensor in lk 2 and apply a short
below lk 2. Also, disable lk 2s opening mechanism.
This diagnosis is probably incorrectly coded and may
condition.
=
result in an error
19.4.52 ia_e- format--sin gle-top-with-failure-to-open-top
Diagnosis:
<switch> tripped on <fast-trip, i2t, gfi>.
When commanded to open <switch> did not respond.
POSSIBLE CAUSES:
A failure in the EPLD of <switch>.
Description:
To test this,
mechanism.
apply a short below lk 2. Then, disable lk 2s opening
19.4.53 _liagnose-format--no-permission-to-test-in-load-center
19.4.54
This diagnosis is not reachable in the code.
_lia gnose-format--no-permission-to-te_t-in-lcvel-below
Diagnosis:
<3k 1> tripped on <fast-trip, gfi>.
Testing is not permitted in the switches below <3k 1>.
The fault is only isolated to a position in or below the switches below <3k
1>.
m..
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